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RUSSIA'S MARCH TOWARDS INDIA
CHAPTER XI

Xaufinnnn's tren,tiiient of the Yomuds-Policy of exlormination-A
legacy of llntred nnll revenge-Construction
of Port PatroAlerandrov~1~-Witlldrawal of Russian forcas from I<lliva--Formation of Trans-Caspian military district-Lomekin's exploring
expeditions.

IMMEDIATELY
after the fall of Khiva, ~ i l c lbefore

..

tlie Treaty of Peace hacl beell concluded, General
Iiaufnalln under took a campaign against the
Yomuil tribe of Turkomalls, who inhabited a portion of the I<liivan Oasis in the vicinity of Iliali.
In justification of this expeclition, it was statecl
tllat the Turlcol~~ai~
sul~jeclsof the IChan of Klliva,
Iluil llevcr proved to 1)e ol~eclient,ancl that ullless
tJlcy ~vercillncle to feel the l~owcrof Russia it was
11r01)al~le151:~t as soon as the ni~ssiailt1.oops were
~vitllilrnwntllcy ~voulilrecornmelice their acts of
lx~vlcssness:~11(1pill:~ge,and woulcl tlius, sooner or
lntcr, necessilato tlic? dcsl~ntchof :L liussiau force l o
ltecp t,l~c~rl
in (:11~(:1;.
l h t tlic SC:LIc::\asc of this :~tl,ac,lr011 llie Yolnucls
J'ijl,, 11.

I3
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is probably to be found in the failure of Kaufn~anu's
columll to gain t l ~ efirst honours in the Kllivan
campaign. When Illat caillpaig~iwas first planned,
it had been arranged that ICaufmann should leacl
the main coln~nv from Turkestan, a secoildary
force being sent oi11y from the Caspian to a,ssist in
the uaclcrLaking, I t was thus fuUy expected thnt
Kauimann tvould gain the entire credit of the conquest of Khiva ; and even when the original plans
were modified, it was still believed that the TurIrestan troops would take the leading part in the
operatioas. The result, however, coixpletely falsified these anticipations, for while Xaufmann ancl
his troops were still struggling across the desert
from Kl~alaAta to Uch-Uchak, Vereflrin, wit11 big
Orenburg troops, was 1.apid1y approadling the
I<hivan capital; and after the junction of the
Or enburg a i d Kinderly detachments the unitecl
colulnns contillued their victorious advance and
reached the capilal while Kaufmann was still
many miles distant. The brunt of the fighting
also had been borne by the Orellburg and Kiilderly
columns, while Kaufinann's troops l ~ a dscarcely
seen the enemy; and, to crown all, Kaufinann's
triumphant entry into Khiva had been marred by
SkobelefT's successful a s s a ~ ~on
l t tlie north gate of
the city and advance through the town to the
Khan's palace. There can be no doubt that Kaufmann felt that his share in the campaign had been
completely eclipsed by the more brilliant operations of Verefkin's force, and he was t,hereforc not
clispleasecl when an oppostnnity presented itself
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CAUSE OF ATTACKON

THE

YOMUDS

3

whereby his Turkestan troops could obtain a share
of the fighting, and thus participate in the rewards
and decoratioiis which would be bestowed at tile
end of tlie war.
When, therefore, JhiIaliornmed Rallim Khan, forgetful of the valuable assistance t~liichthe Turkomans hail always given liiin in supplying the best
Inen for the defence of the Khanate, deuoullced
t,llein to I<anfmanii as robbers and outlaws, advantage was taken of these complaints to obtain
distinction for the Russiali troops by an attack 011
these troublesome subjects of the Khivan ruler.
The Khan, who was anxious to regain possession
of 2lis artillery, stated that he could not keep the
Yomuds in order uilless tlie guns which had bee11
captured were given back to hiin; and wlien the
question of tlie war indemnity was being discussed,
he, apparently in the hope of having it reduced,
declared that he could not be held answerable for
its payment, as he could not compel tlie Turkomans
to pay their sllare of the fine. Kaufmann, therefore,returiled to the Khan some eighteen or nineteen
of the pieces of artillery which had been captured,
and decided to himself enforce payment by the
Yornuds of their portion of the war indemnity.
Tlie fact was ignored that, inmediately after
tlle capture of Khiva, the Yoniuds had sent lheir
elilers to tlie Bussian camp with oirers of submission, and llacl then been informed that they mrould
be uilt,ouclied so long as they lived quietly and
abstitined from pillage and robbery. I t was, moreovelo,forgotten that when Colonel Gluk~ioRskywas
a 0

sent early in July with a force of cavalry to Lake
Sari-Kamisl~to examine the ancient bed of the
Oxus, he ailcl liis officers had been treated wit11
the greatest friendliness and liospitality by tlie
Turkomans, ancl that siillilar satisfactory relations
had been maintained when the Orenburg troops
marched to Kone Urgenj and Khojaili. The Turlcomans had, it is true, been tlie chief opponents to
the Russian advance on Khiva; but when that
city had been captured and it becanie evident that
further resistance would be useless, the Yomuds
had formally surrendered ; their submissioil was
accepted by Kaufinann; and from thal; time they
had, by no act of their own, given ally excuse for
the unwarrantable ancl barbarous attack which
was izlade against them.
However, Kaufiiianii had determined to attack
then1 to gain glory for himself and renown for his
army, and he tl~ereforeordered twenty-five heaclmen of the tribe to attend on hiin a t Khiva. 111
compliance with this order, seventeen of the elders
presented theinselves before the Russian General
on July 17, and they were then inforined that their
tribe would have to pay a fine of 300,000 roubles,
one-third of which was to be paid by July 29,
while the remaining 200,000 roubles had to be
paid before August 3.
To clearly understand thc full meaning of tllis
order, it must be borne in inincl that the Yomud
Tnrkomans then settled in Khiva had only 11,000
kibitkas (felt tents), with a populatiorl of about
55,000 souls, and t l ~ a tthis l i ~ ~therefore
e
meant
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that each family hacl to pay over twcnty-seven
roubles ~vitliin two weelm. The sole wealth of
these noinacls consisted in tlieir horses ancl flocks
of sheep, ancl even had these beell accepted in
payment of this contribution, their position would
have been a snficiently harcl one. But, as if for
the purpose of preventing any possilsility of cornpIiance, it was st,atecI that the fine i n ~ ~be
s t paid in
money aiid not in kind, and, therefore, before the
Russian terins could be conlplied wilh, it would
have been necessary for the Yomucls t o lind purchasers for their live stock, m~hic11,of CoLwse, was
c l ~ ~ iimpossible.
te
If any further proof of the injustice and i n morality of this demand were required it is to be
f o ~ ~ n cinl the Treaty of Peace which Kaufinallll
himself signed a m o n t l ~later, and which, it musl;
b e renq.emberecl, had been drafted and sent to
St. Petersburg for the Czar's approval before these
events took place. I n the last article of that
Treaty it is stated that, 'as owing to the insufficiency
of money, both in the country and in the hands of
the Government, the ICllivan Government is unable
to pay the above slum ' (2,200,000 roubles) 'within
a short time, the ILhivail Goveri-lment shall, in
consideratioil of this dffliculLy, have tlie right of
~ a y i n f ;the said fine b y iiistalments, with tlle
addition of interest thereon at the rate of 5 per
c,ent. per annuni, on coridition that during the
first two years 100,000 roubles shall be anilually
paid i n t , ~the Russian excl~ecluer.' And thus,
altl~oughon account of the poverty of llzc people
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it was not con~idered possilsle for the Kllan to
collect more tl~an100,000 roubles per annum, a
srnall section of tlie population was nevertheless
called upon to pay three times the amount within
a fortnight.
This in itself should be sufficient t,o prove the
~itt,erextravagance of the Russian demands, nucl to
sl.101~that Kaufinann inteilcled to render it impossible for the Yoin~~cls
to comply. He, however,
was not coiltent with levying this preposterously
heavy contribution, but; proceeded a t the same
hime to take steps which clearly s h o t ~ ~ ethat
d he
did not believe in the possibility of compliance on
the 1)art of the Yonzuds, and that he was bent on
attacking tlie~n; for on the very next day (July 18)
he wrote a letter to General Golovatcheff, informing
Iiim of the fine which had been inflicted, and
ordering him to proceed at once with his detachment to Hazavat, and if he saw that the Yomuds
were not collecting money to pay the contribution,
but were assembling for the purpose of attacking
the Russian troops, or even for the purpose of
leaving the country, he (Golovatcheff) was -to immediately march against their settlement and
'give owem* the settlements of tlze Yomuds and their
families to comnplete dest~uction, and their 1~e1-cls
and pmlope~-tyto con.scation.'
The Orenburg detachment was also ordered to move to Kizil-Talryr,
under Coloilel Sarantschoff, who received similar
instructions to attn.ck and slaughter the TurlroThese orders were contained in Letter No. 1167, dated Ehive,
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mans in that neig11Isourllood in the event of their
showiilg signs of opposition, or any desire t;o assist
their Yomud kinsmen.
At the same time five of the Yomnd elders
wese sent back to their tribe to give i ~ ~ i ' o r m a t i ~ n
of the fine wl~icllwas inflicted; but tlie other
twelve elders were detained by K aufinan11 as
l~ostages. This cletelltion of Inen wllo had colne
ill response to a frienclly invitation, and who represented a people wliose subivission llacl been pre.vionsly proffered and accepted, was a flagrant
breach of faith, cluite in lreepil~gwit11 the general
course pursued by Kaufillanll in his clealings with
the Yomuds a t this time.
111 accordzn~cevith the orders vbicll he had
received, General Golovatcl~efl' marclied out of
Khiva on July 1 9 , with a force composed of eight
comp~niesof infantry and eigllt sotnias of Cossacks, with eighf; guns, two mitraillenses, and a
rocket-battery. The Eazavat Canal was reached
the same day, agd the force there remained encamped tliroughout tlie next day. On tlie 21st
the advallce was co~itiiluecl,and the coluinn was
so011 passing through a fertile counl;ry whicli was
devoid of inhabitailts ; for the Yomucis, having
desertecl their honzes, were flying.for safety l;o the
desert. Aizcl then began tlle wanton ancl. iiicliscril-ninateclestruction of the Turkoman homesteads,
which MacGahan graphically describes in the following words :-' I was still musing oil the cluietn.ess a i d desolatioii of tile scene, when all at once
I was star~ledby a s l ~ a r pcrackling soulid behind
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me. Looking round I beheld a long tongue
flame darting upward froin the roof of the house
into n7hicll I had just beell ~ e e r i l y ,a n d allotller
from the staclt of nicely-gathered unthreshed wheat
near it. The dry straw-thatched roof flashed UP
like ponder, and the ripe r n l l e a t - ~ t r aI-'urned
~~
allnost as readily. Huge voluines of dense blaclc
smoke rose out of the trees in every direction, and
rolled overhead in dark, ominous-looking clouds,
coloured by the fiery glare froin the flames below.
I spurred my horse to the top of a little eminence
a i d gazed about me. I t was a strange, wild
spectacle. I n an incredibly short space of time
flames and smoke had spread on either side to the
horizon, and, sldvanciilg steadily lorward in the
direction of our course, slowly enveloped everything. Tlirougli this scene movecl t h e Cossacks
like spectres. Torch in hand, they dashed swiftly
across the country, leapiiig ditches and flying
over walls like veTy demons, and leaving behiild
them a trail of ilanle and smoke. Tliey rarely dismounted, but simply rocle up to the ho~zses,appliecl
their blazing torches to the projecting eaves of
thatch and the stacks of unthreshed grain, ancl
then galloped on. Five iniilutes afterwards slleets
of seething flame and darkling snzoke showed llow
well they had done their work. The entire coulltry
was on fire.
' In half an liour the sun was hidden, tile slr;y
grew dark ; for, as thougll the sudclen ligllt,ing o,
SO inany fires had producecl soiile cha1lge in tile
amtinosphere,
a rain set in-a tiling almost; ull~llowll
,
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in Ichiva, and which added one dismal feature
inore to the already dismal scene. It was a slow?
drizzling rain, not sufllcient to put out the fires,
but only to beat off tlie ashes and make them burn
brighter ; to chive dowil the smoke, ancl make it;
hnng over the, trees in heavy, sullen masses, darkening the air a i d forming a lowering backgrouucl
to tlle blood-coloured flames. This was war such
,zs I hacl never before seen, and such as is rarely
seen in nzoclerll days.
' I t mas a sad, sad sight-a terrible spectacle of
vrar at its clestructive work, strangely in keeping
with this strange, wild land.'
While tlie COSS-aclrswere thus wantoilly a i d
pitilessly devastating the country, the illfantry aid
guns of the columil steadily aclvanced along the
roads, a i d a t about lnidclay it mas reported that
the Tu~rlromsmswere in sight. The mass of the
fugitives-men, women, and cllildren-were hastening tot~.arclstjie clesert, where they hoped to find
safety iiom their enemies ; but, as the Eussialls
approached, a small body of horsemen halted and
deinancled mrlly their country was being thus.
iiivnded, allcl stated that they numbered many
t.housands, and that if the Russians persisted in
hunting tlleln down, they would fight, ancl severe
~vouldbe the punisln~ientwliiclz they ~ o u l dinflict
on tlleir foes: Such parleying was, however, useless, for tlie orile~swllicll Golovatcheff hacl received
mere precise, ancl he wa,s obligecl to prevent the
very flight of tile Yomuds to the desert n~liichWas
at that moiaent; taking place ; and, therefore, after

some hesitation, wl~ichappears to have been due
to his reluctance to cause unnecessary blooclshed,
Ile issued orders for six sotnias of Cossacks to
pursue ancl prevent the escape of the Turlromans.
I t was not long before the cavalry overtoolc
the fugitives, who were llanlperecl in their fligl~t
by their arbus (country carts), cattle, sheep,
nnil families ; and then ensued a scene of the
wildest confusioi~ ailcl pitiless destruction. The
terror-stricken nonlacls abandoned everything in
their efforts to escape from their relentless pursuers, and for a brief space the advance of the
Cossacks was checked by the carts mrllich cont.ained the household goods of the fugitives, ancl
by the cattle and sheep which were careering
wilclly over the plain. BLI~
the rocket-batlery was
tlieu brought up to complete the work of clestruction, nncl while the shrieking missiles tore through
the masses of tlie enemy, who were fast clisappea~ing over a clistailt sandy ridge, the laggards and
stragglers were put to death by the Cossacks. No
cluarte~was given to the men, whether armed or
~marined,and numbers of women also were cut
cloml ill the mdle'e. I11 this encounter many hunclrecls of Turkomans were slaughtered, some 2,000
cattle a i d sheep were captured, and tbe whole of
tlieir worlclly goods were destroyed.
It nlust be remembered that this massacre
was perpetrated before the expiration of the time
allowecl for payment of the first instalment of the
fiue. I t is true that the Yomuds could not possibly
have paid, even if the full time hacl been granted ;
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but I'aulnann, in his desire for military g l ~ r y - ~ r
what he was pleased to co~isideras sucli-did not
even give them a chance of paying ; and, following
up his outrageous demands by still move outrageous
actions, he ordered a savage and barbarous at,tack
on these wretched nomads, for which no justification can be found.
011 the next clay (July 22) Golovatcheff again
moved forward, wlleil the same wllolesale system
of destruction was continued, aid the couiltry was
devastated for miles on both sides of the line of
advance. He reported to Kaufmann that the
Yomuds showed no signs of collectiilg inoney l o
pay the fine, but, on the contrary, were assembling
either for the purpose of leaving the country or
for resisting tlie Russian advance ; ancl that lie
had, therefore, in accordance with his instructioas,
been obliged to attack them and lay waste the
country. Xaufmann, therefore, iss~led another
order, clated July 22, in wllicll he exl~resseclhis
approval of Golovatcheff's actions, and went on to
state that he had liberated the elclers who had
been lrept as hostages, in order that they might
influence their folIowers ; and he then adcled : ' If
the Y ornuds Lecome submissive stop ravaging
them, but keep watch of what is bei~lgdone aillollg
them ; and a t the leust nttem2.1tto rnig~atecawy out
nzy ordersfor the Jilzal exte~nzi~zaiion
of the disobedient
t~ibe.'
Only ten out o f the twelve hostages were liberated, the othor
two having been k i e a ~vlilemaking an attempt t o escape.
of July 1873, from General KaufLetter No. 1217, dated
mann to Generd GoIov&tctcheff.
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On July 33 the column reacl~edthe plain of
Kizil-Talcyr, and on the 25th encanlped withill about
two nliles of Uiali, near some gardens on the edge
of the desert. Here, at about noon, irregular
masses of the enemy were observed advancing
across the desert from the west, and two companies
of infantry were sent forward to dispute their advance, while the cavalry were ordered to prepare
for action. Tlle Turkoinans, however, after arriving within about half a mile of the camp, appeared
to be disinclined to come to close quarters, and
~rlerelycontented tl~emselveswith galloping backwards and forwards in front of the line of Russian
slrirmishers.
While this demonstration from llle west was
occupying the whole attention of the Russians,
another large mass of Turkomans advanced from
the clirection of Iliali, and succeeded in arriving
within 200 yards of the camp before they were
observed. But this body of Yomuds, instead of
boldly attaclring the Russians, halted at the edge
of the gardens, and began to drive off the camels
and l~orsesthat mere grazing near the camp, thus
betraying their position and giving the Russians
Lime to change front to meet the new danger.
They thus lost a chance of almost certain vici,ory ;
for a few inoinents later the alarm was sounded,
and the Russians, who were watcllillg the slrirmisll
on the west of the camp, hurriedly formed in order
of battle, and opened a heavy fire on the slill
hesitating Turkomans. At the same time a partion of the skirmishing line was withdrawn from
C-
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the west of the camp, and doubled across to a
position from whence they could bring a flanking
lire to bear on the enemy, and after this detachment had poured in a succession of volleys the
Yomuds turned and fled.
The horsemen on the west rneanwllile continued to hover about within a short distance of
the camp, and caused consiclerable annoyance to
the Russians, as they carefully abstained from
coming t o close quarters, and, owing to the
superior speed of their horses, coulcl not be overtaken by the Cossacks. But with the defeat of
the main body of the enemy on the eastern side of
the camp all danger was removed, and, after a
little more skirmisl~ing,the last group of nonlads
retired slowly into the desert, and the first serious
encounter between the Russians and the outraged
Yoinuds came to an end.
I n this engagement the Russians lost an officer
and five men killed, while the Turkoinans m ~ ~ s t
have suffered heavilj, altl~oughthey only left two
of their dead on the lield. Many Yomuds were
seen to fall; but their colllrades always carried
them off, even when exposed to the heaviest fire.
This battle clearly showed that the Yomucls
had made np their minds to fight, and this determination on their part cannot be wondered at,
for Golovatche~stroops had throughout their
advance continuously ravaged the whole of tlie
country, and had slaughtered large numbers of tlie
tribe, who, being unable to pay the fine imposed,
were guilty of no greater offence tllan a desire lo
'
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migrate into tlle desert and so to escape from the
punishment which mas threatened in the event of
non-navment. Finding that escape was denied to
them, while their continued stay in the country
merely meant massacre and the utter destruction
of their homes and possessions, it mas only natural
that the nonlacls should have eventuallv turned
against their oppressors; and the fact that they
(lid figl~t-and fight bravely-can in no way be
held ally excuse for the relentless manner in
which the Russiails hunted them down and encleavoured to exterininate them.
After this repulse of the Turkomans Golovatcheff's force remained in its camp near Iliali, while
information was being collectecl as to wliere the
main body of the enemy hacl taken refuge. I t
having been ascertained that their camp was some
five or six miles distant on the opposite side of
Iliali, Golovatcheff on the night of July 26 gave
orders ,for an advance to be made at one o'clock
on the following morning, hol3ing to surprise thein
by a night attack. During the night, however,
several alarms were caused by Turkomans who
were prowling round the camp, and who were
from time to time fired on by the Russian picquets ;
and, fi~lding that his movemeilts were being so
closely watched, QolovatcheE a t the last moment
issued orders postpoaing the aclvance for a couple
of hours.
At three o'clock ,on the morning of the 27th,
just as the force had fallen in ancl was awaiting
orders to advanc,e, a series of wilcl, unearthly yells
C - d
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suilile~~ly
broke the stilllless of the night, and, before any one had time to realise what was happening, a Inass of Turkoman horsemeu burst into
the camp and inade a furious onslaugl~ton the
astonished Russians. Por some moments there
was a confused hand-to-haail struggle ; the Cossacks, who had a few minutes before marched out
of the camp, fell back in disorder, and the Turkomans, pushing their caps over their eyes, penetrated
the Bussian line in several places aild fought with
fierce determination.
Golovatcl~efTwas wouiided by a sabre cut on
the .arm, Colonel Friecle, the chief of the sta;ll;
also received a bullet wound in the head, and a
panic and massacre were immineilt; but the
Russian infantry, encouraged by the cool bravery
and presence of mind of their General, clisplayed
the greatest steacliness, and, pouring in a succesaion of well-directed volleys, soon checlred the
aclvance .of the enemy ; and, after a desperate
struggle, as daylight broke the Yomuds were, seen
to be flying across th.e plain in full retreat. 111
spiLe of the sudden~iess of the attack and the
determinabion with mhich the Turltoinans came to
close quarters, the Russians only lost; forty lrilled
and wounded, vhile their opponents afterw,zr.cls
sckllowledgecl a loss of about 500.
As soon as the sun rose Golovatcheff, carrying
out his original intention, marchecl towarcls t l ~ e
north-west in search of the Turkoman camp.
Passing Ilia'ti, the column advanced without seeing
any signs of the enemy till about nine o'cloclr in
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t h e morning, when large bodies of llorsemen appeared in sight and hovered about on the flanks
of the Russian column. They, however, kept at
a respectful distance, and confined tl~emselvest o
attacks against advanced parties of the Cossacks,
for whom they appeared to have the greatest contempt. Their object evidently was to delay the
Russian advance in order to give time for their
families to escape, and in this they were partly
successful; for, on account of their demonstrations, the Russians could only advance slowly, and
had frequently to drive back with inrantry ailcl
artillery fire such bodies of the enemy as ventured
t o approach too near to the colunin.
The Yomud caillp was hidclen behind some low
sand-hills, and, although Golovatcheff's force passed
within two miles of it, it was not discovered,
a n d tlle column, marching past it, encamped
o n tlie banks of the Aila Murad Caaal, on the
site of a1 old fortified calnp which had been
prepared by Mahommed Rahinl Khan during one
of his numerous wars with his Turkoman subjects.
The Yomuds, finding that the Russians had marched
past them, doubled back, and hastened in a soutlieasterly direction through the count~y which
Golovatcheff had traversed during his advance.
Rut, although tlrey thus gained several hours' start,
t h e Russians got on their trail during the next
day, and, overtakiiig them on July 29, lrilled hundreds of lllelem, and succeeded in capturing 5,000
head of cattle, 119 camels, a i d allout 3,000 arbas
laden with various articles of property.
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I n tlze iiiealzwhile Kaullnann, who had remained
ill Iilli~7a,had received 130 news from G;oIova,tchefF
for several clays, as all cominui~icatiollliad been
cut OK by tlie Turlromans. He therefore left
Khiva on July 27, and inarcl~edto lliali, where
he arrived and joined hands with Golovatcl~effs
cletachinent and the Orenburg troops on tlie 31st.
While there lie issuecl a proclanz,ztion, calling
upon tlle other Turlcoman tribes to pay a fine of
510,000 roubles within a week ; but, on tlle elders
declaring the
presenting tl~smselvesbefore him
utter impossibility of collecting such a large sum
a t so short a notice, he extended tlie period of
payment to twelve days, and permitted lialf'the
amount to be paid in,cainels.
Fearing that they wonlcl suffer the same destruction as hacl fallen upon their kinsmen, these
sections of tlie tribe did their utmost to comply
with the cruel cleizland ; but altllough they gave
up their horses, camels, cattle, and household
goorls, and even though the women strippecl off
their trinkets and tawclry jewellery and gave then1
over to tlze eneizly to save the lives of their husbancls, fathers, anci sons, yet when Kaufnlann lef~;
Tliali on August 1 5 (the day after the expiration
of tlie time granted for payment) one-thircl of the
full amount of the fine had not been paid. He
tl~ereforetook ail11 llim twerity-seven of the elders
as hostages, and con~meiicedhis return march t o .
Khiva. Passing on his way through the lancls of
tlze Yomud tribe of Bairam-Slzali, he imposecl on
them a further fine of 108,000 roubles, and, taking
VOL. 11.
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fourteell of their chiefs as hostages till the sulln
should be paid, he reached I(1Gva on August 23.
Tllus closed this first cainpaign agninst the
TLlrkomans of Klliva, the chief result of which
was that they became imbuecl with feelings of the
oreatest hostility ancl bitterness against the Russians.
h
I t was not probable that a warlike race of uncivilised l ~ o ~ n a dwoulcl
s
readily forget the slaughter
and destruction wl~icbhad been so suddenly and
ul~provoIiecllyinflicted upon them, and there is
no doubt that the savagery and illhlunanity wl~icll
markecl. the Russian operations against these
miserable tribes left a lollg legtcy of hatred and
rexrenge which has not even yet been forgotten.
To satisfy the ambition of one Russia11 commander,
and to compensate a bocly 01 Russian soldiers for
their disappoiiltment in having failed to take a leacling share in the conquest of Khiva, a wanton and
unjustifiable attack was nlade on these people, who
were slaughtered in a wholesale and pitiless manner,
while their l~ornesteadsand property mere, at the
same time, destroyed with reckless barbarity.
Truly, indeed, might MacGahan say that it was
a war such as he had never before seen, ancl such
as is rarely seen in mocleril clays ; for this attack
on the Turkomans of Khiva was carried out in
a manner which was a disgrace to the Russian
nation, and which has le£t an illclelible stain 011 the
'character of the Russian troops in Central Asia.
The Treaty of Peace with Khiva having been
signed on the day after Kaufinann's return to the
cspihal from Iliali, there was no I~lrt~lier
necessity
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for cletainillg the Russian troops ill the Khanate,
and they begail to r e t ~ l r u hon~ewards. The
Orel~burgcolul-t~n,w l ~ i c l ~
at, Ibe close of the Turlroinan cainpaign hacl returnecl to Kizil-Talcyr , re-.
maiilecl there till August 13, and then commenced
its return illarc11 to the Fmba, where it arrived
on October 6, and the various cletacl~mentscomposillg the column, then separating, marclied to
tlieir olcl quarters at Orenburg, Orsl<,and Uralsk.
The Mangisldak cletacbmeilt was the next .to
leave. Quitting Khiva on August 21, they reacl~ecl
Kiaclerly on the 24th of the next 111ontl1, and by
October 1s had all been transportecl across the
Caspian to Pet.rovsk.
The Turkestail column left Khiva on August 24,
and returiled vib Khailki and Shurakhana. This
coluilli~crossecl the Oxus at Ehanki, at which point
the river divides into three channels. There was
only j limited' ancl insufficient number of ' kay~llrs,'
and, in crossing the islands, the baggage had first to
be transferred from the boats into carts, and tllen
back again into the boats after the islallcls, had been
crossed ; the result being that it took ten days for
the whole force to cross the river. Then Kaufmann havil~gselectecl a site on the right bank just
below Shurs-Xhana for the new Russian fort, of
Petro-Alexandrovsl~,the troops were employed in
constructing cclefensive works. A garrison of two
battalions of infantry ancl 200 Cossacks, with six
guns, was left there ullcler Colonel Ivailoff; ancl on
September 1 7 the rest of the Turkestan troops continued their return journey, the cavalry crossing
c2
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the Kizil-Kum Desert t o Fort Perovski, while tlie
illfantry retnrned by the route by wl~ichthey had
advanced, and reached Tasllkellt by October 25.
13ut the Eussia11 forces had scarcely left the
oasis when the Yomuds began to give evidence of
the spirit of liatrecl ai~clrevenge which had been
roused by the severe tlheatinentwhich they had just
received. General Krijhanoffsky, the GoverilorGeneral of Orellburg, had declared that Kaufmallll's atlack 011 the Turhoinails was perfectly unllecessary and likely to cause serious trouble. B e
said : ' It will now be necessary to sencl expeclilions
,zgainst them for ma.ny years to come ; their
coun~,ry
will be a second Caucasus, ancl in the end me
shall be obliged to take possessioil of it.' This prediction mas very soon realised, for in October 1873
tlley began plunclering the villages of the Usbegs
and Icirghiz, ~ 1 1 0had beell friendly to the Russians,
and forced the Kirghiz to migratz to the 'right
bank of tlie Oxus, while at the same time the Tekk6
Turkolnalls of Merv pluildered caravans of stores
intended for Lhe garrison of Petro-Alexanclrovsk.
For more than twelve months, with short
intervals, Colonel Ivanoff was occupiecl in quelling
these distu~ba~lces,
enforcing the p aymelzt of taxes,
ravaging whole settlements, and pntting the inliabitants to cleath ; ancl while lie was thus crushing
an
on
the Turkomans of Khiva, the E ~ ~ s s i authorities
tile Caspian mere silliilarly employed in dealing
16th the nomads on the borders of Persia.
The increasing imporlance of the establishinents
t,he easten1 shores of the Caspian rendered it
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llecessarg that a new military district should be
there created, wl~ichslioulcl be illdependent of the
Turkestan authorities, and be directly ullcler tile
orders of tlie Lord-Lieutenant of t,l~eCaucasus.
Accordingly, wllen the Grand Dnlce Michael, in
Noveniber 1373, submitted to his brother, the
Czar, a proposal for for~llillgtlze whole region
between the Caspian and Aral Seas illto such a
district, snbordinate to the Goverlul~eiltat Tifis,
Lomakill-now promoted to the ralllr of generalwas at once sent to Ifiasuovodslr to settle the necessary clei;ails, ancl to report on the nleasnres vhich
sho.uld be ailophed to develop tlle country ancl
bring the Turkoman tribes into subjection. He
soon had all interview wit11 sollie of the Turkoman
elders, who prolvisecl to meet him again in tlie
following spring, alid to bring with them several
of the leaders of other tribes ; and, in spite of the
opposition of the Russian Poreigli Ofice and Piilance
Ministry, the Grand Duke's project was approvecl of
by the Einperor in an order dated March 21,1874,
whereby the new Trans-Caspian mi1il;ary clistrict
was formed, with L01naki1i as its first governor.
This district included tfhe whole of the eastern
shores of tlie Caspiaii from Mertvii K ~ ~ l t uBay
k on
the north to tlie river Atrek 011 t,lle so.uth, arid as
far eastmarcls as the borders of tlie Xhailate of
- Klliva. All the islancls near the coast were included
in this new disi;rict, and Krasnovodsk was selected
as tlie headquarters of the administration.
Shortly after Lom,zlcin's appoiix1;ment to this
new post, he issuecl a circular to tlie Ak-Ata-Bai
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branch of the YonlucI tribe, informing thein that
he had been illvested with supreme authority over
the Atrek and Gurgen districts, and calling up011
them to ~naintainorcler. Copies of this circular
~l
occuwere also sent to the otlier T u r k o ~ n a tribes
pying the c o u n t ~ ybetween the Caspian and the
Oxus ; and the result m7as that tlie ~ r i n c i p a elders
l
of the Yomuds and some of the Aklial TekkP chiefs
visited Ashurada, a i d declared their friendship for
the Russia11 Government. During the summer of
1874 Lo~llakiiimade a sliort reconnaissance up
tlie Atrelc river froin Cllikishliar, and constructed a
small forl 011 the river bank ; but no other i~iilitary
~novementscould be made that year, as his time was
fully occupied in organising the aclininistration of
his new district, ailcl in opening negotiations with
tlie neigl~bouring
chieftains.
111 spiite of the friendly professions of the
Turlromau elclers, a b a ~ i dof seine 600 TekkBs, i n
October 1874, made a raid on the village of Dashli,
sollle twenty-five miles from Krasnovoclsk, when
they killed 80 of the inhabilants a ~ l dcarried off
150 prisoners. Letters were then sent to Sofi Khan,
tlie cliief of LCizil-Arvat, demanding the release
of the captives, ancI shortly afterwards 90 of the
prisoners were sent back ; alld on February. 19,
1875, Sofi Khan hiinself arrived at Kras~~ovodsk,
with a large followirig of TeklcB chieftaius. Tliese
men were received by Lomakin with great ilistincti011 : lle presented Sofi Khan with a gold ineclal
attached to a ribbon of the order of St. Stanislaus,
and also gave hiin a khalat of silver cloth ; while
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robes of hoilour were freely distributed anong
liis aclherents. The whole party was ta,ken for
a short trip on one of the vessels of the Caspian.
Ijolilla, and they were then sent honle, after the
advantages of Russian rule hacl been carefully
instilled into their mincls.. This visit of Sofi Khan
was a matter of great importance t,o {he Iil;nssians,
for tlzereby they got into friencll~7relations wit11 the
Telrkds OF Ifizil-Arvat, alicl thus to solrle extent
prepared the way for an aclvance into the more
eastern portions of the &<ha1 Oasis.
Shortly before the reception of these chiefs
General Lomakin had visited Tiflis, and while there.
he hacl obtained the approval of the Grand Duke
Micl~aelto the despa-tch of a strong exl~editionary force t;o the Tur1rom.m settleinents on the
Atrek. The Czar, however, refused his consent to
the despatch of ally aclclitiond troops from the
Caucasus, and Lomakin therefore decided to make
a thorough exploration of the Uzboi-the ancient
becl of the Oxns.
This expeclii;ion left Krasnovodsk in two detichments, one of which crossed to Michaelovsk
in boats, while the other ma.rchec1 round by land
to the wells of Mulla Rari. There the .two parties
' re-united, a d the whole force aclvancillg on June 8,
1875, reached the Uzboi three days later. Marchiiig along the old bed of the Oxus, the Russians
reached Igdi on June 20, where a camp was formed,
while n surveying pasty pushed forward, wit11 a,
small escort, through Bala Isbem to Sari-Kamish,
where, in accordance with a previ0u.s arrangement,
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it was met by an escort of Kllivarls ; and afier a
colnplete survey of the Uzboi and Sari-Kamisli
Lalres liacl beell made, it returned to Krasnovodsk
by the direct route through the .country m.liich
Marlrozoff liad traversed in 1871.
In the meanwliile the maill body remained at
Igdi for ten days; during which time sillall detachments were sent eastwards to cover the surveyors
from possible attacks by stray bands 01 Teklr6
Turkomans. 011July 1Loinakiii received news tliat
the topograpl~icalparty had safely reached SariKamish, and he therefore started on his return
marc11 towards Mulla Kari, where the force arrived
011 July 15, having lost only two men cluring the
whole of the operations. This expedition produced
a considerable impression on the Tekkks, who,
tvlien Lomakin was at Igdi, sent in a deputatioil
consisting of several of their elders with declaratioils
of their submission and proffers of service; md,
again, cluring the return march to Mulla Kari otlier
parties brought provisions, carpets, ancl sheep for
sale, and did all they could to propitiate the
liussians.
After givi~ighis troops a short rest Lomakill
niarched soutl~wards t,owards the River Atrek,
e great fresh-water lakes of
passing e n ~ o z ~ tthe
Shairdi and Bugclaili, where he found large
encampments of the Jafhr Bai . and Ak-Ata-Bai
1)rsnches of the Yoinuds, wllo, though forlnerly
hostile, had, since 1874, tenclerecl their submissioi~
and promised t o . raise a force of 500 horsemen to
keep the TelrlrQsin checlc. About 25 iniles to the
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south-east of Bugdaili the Russians came to the
ruins of Mest-Devran (Mestorian), where they found
the remains! of what must have been a large ancl
important ancient city ; and a few miles farther
011, at Musjid, a large number of clilapiclated
temnples and shrines inarkecl the site of an ancient
burying-grouncl of consiclerable extent. Other
signs also were not wanting to prove that the surrou~~cling
region had once been a well-populated
and flourishing district, for traces of a large aqueduct were clearly seen, which a t one time carried
water from the Atrek to Mest-Devran. This conduit was apparently ccarried across the Surnbar
in large earthern pipes over a conple of large
bridges, and there tvas a series of mounds stretcliirig from Chat, past Mest-Devran, to Kara Tep&on
the shores of the Caspian, each of which was
crowned by a small fort, evidently for the purpose
of protecting the water-supply and to defencl the
settlement from the inroads of the neigl~bouriag
nomads. 011 reaching the Atrek Lomakin came
across several more encampments of Yomucls, who
appeared to be frienclly, a i d after advancing up
the river as far as Chat the column returned to
Krasnovoclsk,
Before continuing the account of Russia's
further operations in the Trans-Caspian district, it
will be necessary now to turn once again to the
affairs of Khokand, as serious events there toolr
place which necessi tateil Russian interference, and
c ~ ~ l ~ n i n a in
t e dthe annexation of the whole of tliat
IChanate to Bussia.
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Insurrections in ICholtand-Abilur Rc~hmunAfto1)atoll~~
-Attack on
Rnssiuu Embassy-Battle of Ilrtlrhm~n-Capturc of AnclijanBnnesalion ,of Eholtand to Russia-Tho Alrti Expedition-Ex. plorution and mmexatioa of tho northorn part of the Pamir
ragion.

WHENKhucl.ayar Khan was in July 1865, for tlle
tlliril time, re-instal;ed as Khan of Iiliokand, he
ibmlcl that his cloirlinioiis had beell very consiclerably reducecl in size by the Russiail conquest of
Tasl.ikent, and by the Bokliarail occupation of
Iihojent. I11 the following year Khojent ailrl
U1.a-tepd were wrested from Rokliara by General
Iiomanoflsky, a i d were permailelltly incorporated
in tlie Russian dominions; aiicl Iihuilayar's authority was limitecl. to Fergllaua; or tlie eastern
portion of his former Iriiigclom. But a1tliougli his
power was thus curtaileel, the k'liall, nctilig on the
slil.ewd a,clvice of liis Atalyk (or colnmauder-inchief), Ata, Bek, contrived to keep on gooil terms
wit11 the Iinssians, and retaineel possessioli of llis
throne for tlie next tell years.
When Iianfinalui :~1~iveil
at Tash,lter~lat the
end of 1867 lie inSormeil I<liutlayar ICllan of his

18OS-187G

RUSSIANTI~EATY
U'ITII I<E-IOKAND27

-

1--4ttack

on

pf Andijnn-

If

cdition,~~the P n m i r

15, for tile
Slranc~,
he
1
cousiderollcluest o f
Ipation of
bjent a n d
l y General
:orporated
ayar's (211ie easterll
,bough liis
ng on 1Il.c
nander-inood terills
ion of his

1

nt at t h e
lan of his

appointnient as Governor Geileral of Turlrestall,
a~iclentered into negotiations for the purpose of
conclucling a con-~~nercial
treaty with Kl~okand.
At firs!; Khudayar objected to the conditions of the
proposecl treaty, and wislied to sencl an embassy
to St. Petersburg in oi*der that he might obta1n
'
a
clirecb assurance of peace ancl goodwill from the
Empel*or. But be evelltually wi tliclrew his objections, and signed a treaty whicli was approved of
11y tlie Czar in Noveillber 18GS.
117 spite of this treaty, however, Khudayar's
attitude to~vardstlie Russians during their cainpaign against Sainarlral~dwas very suspicious ; for
he kept liis troops in readiness, ancl was apparently on the look-out for a favourable opportunity
to recover Tashkent slid Khojent. But the rapid
successes of tlie Russian force, ancl the brilliant
defelice of Saniarkancl, caused him to abstain from
hostilities, a~ndfor his neutrality on this occasion
he was invested mith the orcler of St. Stanislaus.
I n December 1869 the temporary cliilic~~lty
arose regarcling I<arategin; and again in 1650
there was for a time a dispute b e t ~ e e nthe IChan
ancl Icaufinann, resulting f ~ o ma delllancl for indemnity on account of an attack which had
been made on Colonel Dennett's force during the
Islrallder Kul expedition. Bul these differences
weTe satisfactorily settled ; ancl had Khuilayar
conducted the internal aflairs of his state wit11 the
an~ouiltof cliscretion l ~ clisplayed
e
in his dealings
with the R~zssians,he would lllost probably have
secured a much lorlger lease of power, and have
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postponecl the annexatiol~ of the Iihanate by
Russia. Ire, however, hail never been a popular
ruler, and had been twice driven from the throne on
account of his cruelty ancl rapacity; ancl. although
after his accession to power for the tllird time lie
refraiwed solnewhat from open licentiousiless and
fresh acts of cruelty, still he appeared bent on extorting as much money from his subjects as possible
for his own aggrandisement. Taxes, unjusltly im-posed, increased year by year, and the hatred of the
p e o ~ l eagczi~isttheir Khan increased accordingly.
For a time open rebellion mas prevented by the
fear of the population that the Russians would
interfere in defence of the Iclian, wlio was believed
to be completely uilcler Muscovite influence. But
eventuall-y, in 1871, the people rose, and altliough
tlie rebellion mas speedily suppressed the cause
was not removed, ancl the popular (liscontellt continued. Khuilayar, instetzcl. of being warned by
this outbreak, continued to impose fresh burileils
on his subjects, 'and in 1873 matters again reacl~eil
a crisis, when the Kara-ICirgliiz of the mouiltaiilous
region soutl~of Osh and Andijnn refuseil to pay
certain new taxes, and even attackecl. tlie ollicinls
who l~acl.been sent to collect them. Troops were
sent to enforce conlpliance, m d after a few slririnislles the ICarrz-Icirglliz retired to tl~cirrnouiitaill
fastnesses, where they were out of reach of pmiisllment.
At this time a sou of Mussulillnil Kuli's, nnmccl
Abd~lrRalimaii, re turneil to Kl~okalidfrom a pilgrimage to Mecca ancl journey to Const,ziitiiiol)le,
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to tv11ich latter place he hacI beell sent by Ilis
brother-in-law, Kliuclayar Khall, to aslc the S ~ ~ l t a n
for assistance in repelling tlie Russians. This man
held the title of dftoba1;cha (i.e. ewer-bearer), anil,
being the son of the great Kipchalc Ming-Bashi,
Mussulman Kuli, he hacl considerable influeilce
amongst the inhabitants of the Khanate. Shortly
after his re-appearance in Hlokancl he was given
the colnmand of the Khan's troops and placed in
charge of the operatioils against the Hara-Kirghiz.
He soon prevailed upon l;he rebels to send forty representatives lo the I(lian to state their grievailces,
in order that an understanding might be arrived
at ; and the Kirghiz, relying on the good faith of
I<huclayar, did so, when, in spite of the Aftobatcha's
advice to the contrary, tlie Khan treacherously hacl
all of them executed. This 'act su enr'aged the
Ilirghiz that they at once recommeilcecl hoitilities,
and quiclcly c a p t u r d Uzlrent and Suk and carried
the rebellion into the Ferghana Valley. But
altllough Klludayar's troops r e r e unable to successf ~ ~ lcope
l y wit11 the rebels so long as the latter confined their movemellts to the mouiitnins, as soon as
they advanced into the low country they found that
i;hey were no match for the Khan's better-armed
forces ; and at t.he commencement of the revolt the
Hirglliz met vith little success in the valleys, large
numbers being lcilled and taken prisoners, while
a chief named Mozuffer Khan, who hacl been put
form-ard as a pretencler to the throne, mas captured
ancl impalecl alive.
But IChuclayar's position was claily becoming
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illore diffic~111;. His Kipchak subjects, ~ 1 1 011ad
beell grouilcl down by oppressioa, were ripe for
rebellion, a i d were oilly waiting for a favourable
opportui~itjrto joiil the Kara-Kirglliz ; while his
soil Nasr-Ecldin was intriguing against hiin. He
therefore sent envoys to Tashkent asking I<aufnlann
for nssistnnce, while tlie rebels also implorecl the
Bussinils to intervene ancl save theill from the
tyrant "110 opl3ressecl thenl. General Koll~akof~slry
(who mas ackillg for Kaufina~lizd ~ ~ r i ntlle
g absence
of the latter at Ichiva) telegraphecl to St. Petersburg asking for permission to occupy Khokallcl
in t,lie event of the rebellioil continuing; but
sanction to tlie ~uovellleiltwas refusecl, and the
rebels began to believe either tllat the Russians
were too weak to interfere, or that they were
secretly supporting the I<llail.
Shortly after this, Osh, Andij an, Uch-Kurgan,
Suzak, a,ndBalilrcl~iwere capturecl by tl~einsurgents;
Abclur Ral~man,a110 frolli the first appears to have
fi~voureclthe rebel cause, soon afterwa~cls shut
himself up in the slllall fort of Tiura-ICurgl~an,
neal- N~llanzgan,and ref~~seil
to take ally further
action ; and tlie rebellion was not suppressed until
the beginning of winter.
I n 1874 the popular discontent was aga.in
ilisplayecl in plots against the Khan's life. The
first of these was for the purpose of placing
I<baclagar's secollil son, JiCahoilmlecl Arnill (or
Madamin Relc), on the tlirone ; but the Khan was
informed of the coi~spiracjr,ancl put the leading
col~spiratorsto death. The Kipchalrs and Kirgliiz
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were not long in finding another claimant to the
throne in the persoil of Abdul Icerim, a grandson of
Fazil Belc, Khudayar's uncle ; but tlie Khan again
received aarning, and requested the Russiails to
remove Abdul Kerim from Xhojent (where he
then lived) to Tashlrent. This was done, and the
Russiails at the same tillie sent Abclul Kaum, who
was Abdul Xeriin's chief adviser, to Chiinkent.
111 this -year also the illhabitants of the
mountainous districts north of Namangai~ ttvice
broke illto open rebellion, b u t on both occasiorls
tlie risings were speedily suppressed.
But the existence of IChokaild as an inclependent state was fast drawing to a close. Altl~ousll
the Kirghiz and Kipchaks llad repeateclly beell
defeated, their clisconteiit and hatred of Khndayar
were daily increasing, and to this was added a feeling of bitterness against the Russians, who had
ref~~seil
to aid the rebels, ailcI who were thus
believed to be on the Khan's side. In July 1875
Nasr-Eaclin, the K11cz1's eldest son, threw in his lot
with the malcontents, and the rebellion broke out
afresh ; and at the sailie time the Russians, by
sending a diplolnatic mission to Xhokand, gave
colour to the popular belief that they were supporting Kliudayar, and thus caused the insurgellts
to enibarlc on a religions war against the infidels.
The despatch of this Russian embassy to
Khokalld was for the purpose of obtailli11.g
Khudayar's coliserlt to the inarcli of a Russian
force through Khokai~dto ICashgar, it having,been
decicled that a force should be sent to punish
,
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Yakoob Beg for his non-complia~ncewith Eussiau
demands. Tlle deputatiolz was led by Mr. Weinberg-,
of the Foreig~lDepartment, wlio was accompanied
by a guard of twenty-two Cossacks; ancl Colcnel
Slrobeleff accompaniecl the party for the purpose
of exploring tlie TereB Devaii Pass betweell
EClloBancl a i d Kashgar. I n orcler to propitiate
Klluclayar and thus to gain his coilserlt to the
Eu~siailclemancls, Kaufinaniz sent Abilul Kerim
\vitli the missioli ancl handed him over to i;lle
Kliall. This youllg mail was tlie relation of
Khuclayar's ~vllorn the rebels had, in the -previous year, attemptecl to place on the tl~rone;
and his gratuitous surrender by Kaufnia~m,who
thus violated the well-recognised laws of asylulu .
x~lcl hospi~nlity, greatly increased the hostility
~f tlze Kipchaks and Kirgl~iz towarcls the
~ussians.
Tlle embassy reaclled Kl~okanil on July 25,
1875; alzcl a few clays afterwards n e w was
received tliat Nasr-Eclclin ancl the Kl~aii'sbrotlier,
Sultan Murad, hacl gone over to the rebels, who,
liaving capt~~recl
Osll, Na~nangan, Margelan, Anclijan, anit Asaki, were advancinlg on tlie capitd,
lecl by A b d ~ Raliman
~r
Aftobatcha, who hail also
thrown in his lot wit11 the insurgents, ancl wllo was
redly the prime mover in the rebellion.
Khudayar at once iizade preparations to
advance against the rebels, and i t v a s arranged
that the inarcli slloulil coinmence on August 3 ;
but cluring the preceding night his seconcl son,
Madamin Bek, ancl nearly the whole of his army
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went over to the enemy, when the Khan, finding
himself thus deserted and rendered incapable of
resistance, placed himself under the protection
of the R,ussian embassy. He was accompanied
by his younger son, one of his nephews, and
by the Atalyk Ata Bek, besides numerous other
followers ancl women, and lie also succeeded i11
carrying off over a millioil pounds' worth of treasure wl~ichhe had extorted froin his oppressed
subjects.
As ally further stay i11 tlie city was out of
the question Mr. Weinberg decided to return to
Khojent, at which place he arrived on August 5
after a perilous retreat, during which incessant
attacks were made on t,he long train conveying
the Khan's treasure and wives. As soon as Kh~zdayar had thus fled from the country, his son
Nasr-Eddin was proclaimed Khan; and although
he ancl the principal leaders of the rebellion sent
conciliatory letters to Kaufmann, expressing a desire to live in peace with the Russians, emissaries
were at' the same time despatchecl with a proclamation inciting the inhabitants of the Russian
frontier districts, as well as those of Khokand, t o
join in a Holy War against the infidels who were
believed to have supported Khuclayar in his unjust
rule.
General Xaufniailn at this time was on a tour
of inspection at Vernoye; but on hearing of the
outbreak he hurried back to Tashkent, where h e
arrived on August 12, to fincl the whole population
in the wildest state of alarm and excitement, while
POL. 11:
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the inost extravagant ruinours were being circulated
and were readily believed.
On August 18 bands of Khokanclians raided
across the Kuraina Mountains, and, occupying
t,he village of Ablilr, descended the valley of the
Angren, hoping to be able to surprise the Russian
post at Tilaou, which was garrisonecl by a company
of infantry aild'half a sotnia of Cossacks. Wncling,
however, that the garrison were on the alert, the
i11surgen.t~did not attack the post, but cont,entecl
tl~ernselvesiuerely with scouring the neighboriringcoulltry and inciting the inhabitants lo join tlleill
agnil~stthe Russians, ahile other parties cut the
Iinssian line of cornmunicat~ionbetween Tashkent,
and Kllojent. Information of these raids rencllecl
Tashkeut at 2 A.M. on Augnst 19, ancl four hours
later General Golovatcheff started for Tilaou with
four and a half sotiiias of Cossacks, ancl at 8 A.M.
a hattalion of illfantry and a clivision of field
artillery marcllecl to his support. On the sa111e
day Lieu tenant-Colonel Garnoffsl<y was sent with
a battalioil of infantry and four gulls to reinforce
the garrison of Khojent, tvhile Colol~elSliobelefl;
a i t h t w o sotliias of Cossacks ancl a rocket division,
patrolled the nortll-eastern portion of the Rurnma
ilistricl, and prevented the iiihabitallts from joining
the insurrection.
In the ~neanwllilea large force of I<l~olinndians
a d v a ~ ~ c ctowards
d
Khojent, and arrived in the
~~eigllbaurl~oocl
of that city on August 20. For
t l ~ enext four cla,-ys llle tow11 was closely l~esiegecl,
:~11(1 (lense masses or the eneinv made r-cpcatctl
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attacks on the principal gates. These onslaughts
were, however, repulsed by the garrison; and,
on the arrival of
Baron Nolde, the
commandant, made a sortie on the 24th a i d routed
the Khokandian army after a hard-fought engagement near tlie villages of Kostalroz and Ispissar.
W l ~ e nRauflnann ascertained the serious nature
of tlie rising, and found that the Klloliandians, not
content with the deposition of Khudayar Khan,
were resolved to wage war against the Russians,
he deternlined to assume the offensive, ancl he
therefore sent orders to GolovntcheK to march as
soon as possible towarcla Kliojent, where tlie expeclitio~laryforce was to assemble. Including the
troops in the Kurainn district and the detachment
which had been sent to the relief of Khojent, the
Governor-General found that the troops available
for tlie invasion of Kholcand consisted of sixteen
companies of infantry, nine sotnias of cavalry,
twenty guns, and a rocket-batteiy, giving a total
strength of only about 4,500 Inen with 1,600
horses. This was by no ineans a large force with
which to ullder take tlie concluest of the Khanate ;
hut Kaufmann knew that pro~npt r~clioil Waf3
necessary, as the enemy's forces were daily increasing in numbers ; and tllerefore, after hastily making
the necessary preparations, he marched to Kl~ojent,
where the force arrived on August 30. The siege
bad by that time been raised, and the enemy had
been driven across the frontier; but information
was received that the main Khokandian army,
about 30,000 strong, was collected at Makhram, a
u :!
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fortified village twenty miles beyond Kostakoz on
the Khokand road ; and, after the troops had been
given a day's rest at Khojent, Kaufmann moved
forward on September 1 to try conclusions with
the enemy.'
That evening the Russian column halted a t the
frontier town of Ab-Khurelr on the banks of tlie
Syr Daria, and at daybreak on the following day
the adt-ance was resumed towards the village of
I<aratcl~kum. As far as Ab-Khurek no opposition
was encountered, and it was not until the force .
had marched some four miles beyond t h a t place
that the enemy's picquets were first seen o n the
right of the line of advance, which l a y tllrougl~
undulating country sloping gradually down from
the mountains towards the Syr Daria. But soon
afterwards large masses of horsemen appeared on
the flanks of the Russian column, and by their
harassing tactics greatly delayed its advance lo
Karatchkum, ancl caused the troops m u c l ~annoyance and fatigue.
By this time it was well known that t h e Hhokandians had made up their minds l o dispute the
Russian advance at Malrhram, where a large square
mud-fort, with high crenelated walls, starlds on the
edge of the left bank of the Syr Daris, the other
three sicles being protected by a deep wet ciitc11.
Russian spies and some friendly inhabitants of the
Tho Russian force whioh left Khojent for the invasion of IUlokancl consisted of fifteen oompnnies of infantry, one dornpnny of'
flappers, and eight sotnins of Cossacks, with 20 p n r r and a, rockctbntterg. The cnvnlry were placed under the commanil of Colonrl
Sltoholeff, nnd WRPO cliviclerl into four divisions of two s o t n i n ~cnch,
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place had also informed I<aufmm~nthat the enemy
had extended the defences by the formation of a
fortified camp on the south-eastern side of the fortress, and that they had inundated a considerable
portion of the road by which the Russians were
advancing.
The commandel.-in-chief therefore resolved to
marc11 round the soul11 of the inuilclatiorls and
take the position in flaulr and rear; and at
five o'clock in the morning of September 3 the
Russian troops marched out of their camp near
Karatchkum in order of battle, with the cavalry at.
a short distance behind their right flank. But as
soon as they had got past the village large masses
of the enemy's cavalry appeared on all sides and
resumed their usual tactics, approaching with loud
cries and yells to within a sliort distance of the
Russian column, and then retiring a t the first signs
of any advance on the part of the Cossacks. But
the distance from Karatchkuln to Maklirm is only
three miles ; and the Cossacks, supported by a few
guns and roclceta, easily succeeded in keeping the
enemy at a respectful clists~iice,ahile the column
steadily pushed forward.
The Russians marched over the low hills to the
south of Makhram until they had arrived opposite
the south-eastern angle of the fort, when the direction of the advance was changed
to the left, and
the troops moved towards the enemy's intrenched
camp. They had not proceeded far in this new
direction when the Khokandian artillery opened
fire, but this was not at first replied to by the
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Russians, who steadily pushed on until they
arrived opposite the extreme left rear of the ene1-n~'~
position. The gulls then took up their positiorl
and opened fire, and, after the bombardment 11ad
lasted for about an hour, two battalions of infantry
advanced to assault the position. After a cluarter
of an hour's shai-p fighting the' iiltrellchecl cainp
was captured, and the Russian troops, tlzea crossillg
the bridge over tlie clitch, threw tl~emselvesagainst
the gates. Wi~houtpaying any attention to the
fire wlich was directed against thein from the
malls, the inen, encouraged by the example of
their ollicers, placecl their shoulders against the
wooden cloors, and, keeping time to the tune of a
soldiers' chorus, sooil forced them open. But little
opposition was ellcountered within the walls, ancl
vithin an hour such of the enemy as had remained
in the fort mere killed or took to flight, arid the
Russian ilag'was unfurled on the ramparts of
. Malchram.
While the illfantry were thus assaulting the
intrenched camp and fortress, the cavalry, under
~lrobelefl, attacked the masses of Khokandian
horsemen which were d r a ~ up
n in the gardens to
tihe east of the fort, and, after a sharp encouliter,
put thein to. flight and pursued them for about
ten miles along the banks of the Syr Daria, when
large numbers were cut down or drowned in their
attempts. to escapk across t l ~ eriver. On returning
from:tlie pursuit the Cossacks c&meacross another
'body of the enemy's cavdry, who were also cluickly
routed by a discharge of rockets. .
'
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The effect produced by this Russian victoyy
was no doubt very great, especially amongst the
s~~rrounclilzgpopulatioa, who sooil came in witll
professions of submission, and also brought provisions for sale to tlie troops. The results were s t 1
tlie time greatly exaggerated in the R u s s i a press,
wliicli appareiitly believed that the power of the
Iiholtandialzs had been completely broken ; aud .
Kaufinann also appears to have over-estimated tlie
value of this success, for in a telegram addressed
to the Czar, reporting the results of tlie battle, he
saicl that ' the impression produced i11 the Iihai~a~te
by lliis battle is immense, but one cannot yet
a,ppreciate all tlie consequences of tlie battle of
Makbram.' It was not long, however, before he
was ellabled to fully redise to what extent the
victory at Mak'nrain had conduced to the pacification of the Khanate, and the discovery prohably
caine solnewhat in the form of a surprise ; for
before tlie close of the year he found himself eiigaged in a contest which fully taxed tlie resources
of the Russians in Central Asia.
Immediately after this battle General Kaufnlarirl
issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Kliokand, pointing out the folly they had commil;ted
in having embarked in a Holy War against tlle
,Russians, and urging t l ~ e mto seize and deliver to
him the ringleaders who, for their own alnhitious
purposes, had brought such trouble on the Khanate.
He advised .the people to return lo their homes
an& occupations, and inforined them that, while
unarmed persons wo~lld not. be interfered withj

i
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all who mere foui~din possession of arins would
be punished; and he collclucled by stating that
Khuclayar Khan had been sent to St. Petersb~lrg,
ancl that he would not return again as their sovereign, as it was known to the Russians that he did
not, possess the affection of the people of Khokand.
The Russians haltecl at Nakhram for three days,
awaiting the arrival of a convoy which had been
clespatchecl from Khojent with reillforcements and.
stores; and on Septelnber 7 ICaufmann advanced
towa~dsthe Khokanclian capital, leaving a garrison
of two conlpanies of infantry and twenty Cossacks
in the Makhram fort, which was made the advanced
base for any further operations that might be found
necessary. Some miles out of Makhram Kaufmann
was met by a deputation from the new Khan, NasrEddin, who apologised for ' the accidental conflict
of troops on the frontier, and the consecluent
unpleasantness.' The chief of this embassy was
Isllan Fszil-Achmet lIagzoun~e,and be was accompanied by Mullall Issa AuliQ,who was one of the
principal leaders of the rebellion and one of the
most prominent opponents of the Russians. Kaufmann refused to have anything to do with these
envoys, and continned' his advance, retaining Issa
Alllit5 as a prisoner until he could give a satisfactory
explanation of the part he had,talcen in the insurrection.
On the evening of the 7th the troops, after a.
march of fourteen miles, halted at the village of
Chaidam-Mazar, and on. the following day they
reabhed Bish-Arik, which is some sixteen miles
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farther on, and twenty-four miles from the city of
Khokand. The country through which the colu~nn
was now moving was extremely fertile and well
irrigatecl, and during the advance the inhabitants
came out to meet the Russians with presents for
the general, and bringing bread and salt in tolren
of their complete s~~bmission
to their conquerors.
While marchiilg from Bish-Arilc to Icosh-Kupir,
~ ~ , ~ ' ~ ~ N
on September 9, another envoy arrived froin the
Kllan, accompanied by the prisoners who hacl been
capturecl at Nau and the various post-stations at
the commencelneilt of the war ; and the merchants
of Xhokancl also sent a deputation deilying cornplicity in the rebellion, and begging for nlercy.
All along the route the troops were nlet by bands
of peasants, who were anxious to display their
friendship and peaceful intentions. The advance
was more like a triumphal procession than the
advance of an army through an enemy's country ;
ancl on September 1 0 the capital of Xhokancl fell
into the hancls of the Russians without any bloodshed, and even without a single shot having been
fired. Sl~ortlyafterwards N&-~cldin paid Iiaufmnnn a formal visit, and, after the necessary
arrangements had been made for the distribution
of the troops, the R~lssiangeneral accompanied the
Khan a short way into the town. For five days
tho Russian troops remained encamped near to
the Djir Mosque, outside the city walls, and during
this time convoys of provisions, felt tents, ammunition, and other necessaries arrived from Makhram.
But the s\.ituation was very unhealthy, and' the
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number of siclr increased so rapidly that ICauf~nall~l
clecidecl to move hlle force to another locality, and
took advantage of this opportunity to overawe the
inhabitants by ~narcllingthe troops through the
But, altllough tlie ca1~itdof the Khailate had
been thus easily captured, the political outlook was
by no means promising. ICaufniann's proclanlatfioi~
inet with but little response ; Osh, Namangan,
Alldijan, a i d the other large tomrns showed no
signs of s~~bmission,and bands of armed inen
collected in tlie hills near Isfara and Malchrnlli,
and necessitated the despatch of flying colunii~s
from Kllojent and I<llolrancl. I t is true that OIL
September 11 Knufrnann received a lelter from
Sultall Mu rad, Nasr-Edclin's uncle ailil Bek of
Margelan, in whicll he declared his entire submission to Russian autllority, and begged that the
former friendly relations might be renewed ; and
that on the followiilg day another paper was received, bearing the seals of Abdur Ralimall Aftobatcha and seventy-five other Kirghiz and Kipchak
chiefs, in mrl~icl~
these leaders stated that, as the
fortune of war was against the Mahommedans,
they trusted that Kaufmann would restore peace
and q ~ ~ i i1e1t the same way as he had done in the
city of Khokand. But these overtures had no
result, for when Iiauf~nannreplied that no one
desired peace nlore than 11e did, and invited the
chiefs to illeel him in his camp before Khokand,
no response was inade to the invitation; but, ou
,the contrary, iiltelligeilce was received that Abdur.
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Ral~manwas busily einployecl in collecting a fresh
force near Margelan, and tlzat he had persuaded
or coinpelled Sultan Murad to join in the rnovenzent.
At first these reports were vague and contradictory, but soon illore definite inforination was
received, which clearly showeci that a formidable
force 11~asasseinbling near Margelan ; and Kz~ufnzann
therefore set out for that place on Septeinber 1 7
to try and put an end lo the Aftobatclia's intrigues.
TWOdays later the Russian coluiniz reacliecl hlliArik, wlfich is about twenty miles froin Margelan,
Abdur Rahinaa being then in occupation or a
lsosition at Gurgil, seventeen miles farther on,
where he had a force of 10,000 nzeil and 18
guns, a i d appeared delerlnined to make a stai~d.
IIe, however, on hearing of the approach of Kaufmsnn's column, lost heart, mid, disbancling his
force, retreated into the nlountairis with a small
band of his most faithful adherents. On tlze 20th
the Russians advanced, ancl took up an excellent
position near Margelan, and in the evening the
city was unconditionally surrendered.
That night at about nine o'clock the indefatigable Skobeleff continuecl the pursuit of the
Aftobatcl~awit11 a flying column, composed of the
Cossacks, and two companies of infantry in couiltry
carts, with four gune and a rocket-battery. Advancing rapidly with his cavalry along the road
to Asaki ancl Andijan, he reached Niaz-Batyr at
'five o'clock on the following morning. He then
hear3 that Abdur Raliman had turned southwards
towards the nlountains, and therefore, without
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halting, continued the pursuit with his Cossacks
towards Ming TepB, where he had a sharp ellcounter
with the enemy, who left forty dead on the Geld,
and fled in disorder towards Osh.
By this time the continuous hard marching
had begun to tell on the Cossacks' horses, and it
was iinpossible for the chase to be at once continued. The party was therefore obliged to halt
at Ming-TepB for some llours ; but during the night
Skobeleff once more started off towards Osh, where
he arrived at nine o'clock on the following morning. The city at once surrendered, and by tell
o'clock the Russian general was installed in the
Bek's palace, where he received the subnlission of
various chiefs and notables. Here, however, he
only halted for a couple of hours, and then, with
a hundred troopers, he moved t o ~ a r d sthe Kara
Daria; but as it was reported that the Aftobatcha
had been allnost entirely deserted by his followers,
and as Kaufmann had ordered him not to go too
far, he returned through Asaki to Margelan, where
he arrived on September 25.
This rapid advance of Skobeleff's and his occupation of Osh, which was one of the chief centres
of the Kirghiz and Kipchalc population, produced
an excellent effect. Andijan, Balikchi, Shahr-ikhana, Asaki, and many of the adjacent villages at
once tendered their submission, and Halyk Nazar
Parmanatchi-another leader of the insurrectionwas d s o given up to the Russians ; so that out of
:the three principal instigators of the rebellion,
Abdur Rahwan alone remained at large. As
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the chief totvns in the I<Iialialc hat1 thus surre~idcre(l,ant1 as tlie k<liokantlian fol.ccis liatl l~ccn
defenlecl and clisl)ersc(l,Iiaufiri:~~lri
aurnlnoncrl N:tsrBltlin to Margelan, a i d tl~erecoricluded a trc?:~ty
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to Xaufm:~liti by tlicir pcrsistcnt atlcl prorninelzt
activity in stirring up the people agninet t l ~ c
Russi nns.
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hostility towards the Russians, and had ol~lysent
i n their sulsmission after Skobeleff had raicled into
the immediate neigl~l~ourlioocl
of their city, Kaufinann, nevertlleless, sent two oficers (Mr. Kuhn
and Captain Petroff) from Margelan to Aiidij an
for the purpose of inalring ' scientific iiivestigat,ions.' A inore inopportune momelit for the pnrsuit of science conld not well have been selected ;
and it is not surprising that shortly after Kauflnailn reached Namangan, these two officers also
arrived there and reported that they had been
ill-treated by the inhabitants, and that Anclijan
was once again in a state of rebellion. I t is not
ii~~prol~alsle
that Kaufmann expected this result
from the ' scientific mission,' for he has not generally displayed any lack of intelligence ; ancl it is
inlpossible to avoicl the suspicion that he was not,
altogether clispleasecl with the turn affairs Bacl
t &en.
He at this time had at his disposal a sufficiently
strong force to overcolne any possible resistance
on the part of tlie Ilholrandians, aiicl the oljportunity which thus presented itself of coinpletely
subjugating the Khanate was one which was not
likely to be neglected. He therefore lost no time
in fitting out an expeditionary force to punish the
Andijanis, and on October 10 General Trotzky left
Namangan with five companies of infantry, eightysix snppers, ancl three-and-a-half sotnias of Cossacks,
wit11 eight guns alicl four rocket-stancls-the infantry being carried in country-carts. Coinmencing their march at seven o'clock in tlie morning,
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the troops crossed two branches of the N a y u ;
and then crossing the Syr Daria-here called the
Kara Daria-at Balihchi, they encalnped for tlle
night at tlie village of Chinorat, some five miles
farther on. On the following clay they marched
to the village of Alc-tepd (Xara-Xalpal~),wl~ichis
e
canal,
situated on the banks of t l ~ Mussulman-Kuli
about four anrl three-quarter miles from Anclijan,
and there Trotzky founcl that Abclur Rallmnn 11ad
collected a large army for the defence of t l ~ ecity,
while another consiclersble force was encamped
close by uncler a Kirglliz pretender to the tlzrone.'
Skobeleff, who was invariably to be founrl wherever
any fighting was exl~ectecl,was therefore sent out
on the morning of October 1 2 with a sotnia ancl a
half of Cossacks and the rocket-stands, to make a
careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position.
T11is party fouild that the briclges over the cand
hacl been destroyed, and they were compelled
to keep close to the left bank of the Sgr Darin
until they arrived opposite to the northern face of
the city ; but tlleli they moved soutllward, anil
advancing up the Anclijaili Sar ravine, the intrepici
Skobeleff succeeded in arriving within twenty-fin?
pards of the enemy's outposts before be was cliscovered. Then a heavy though badly-aimed fire
was opened on the Russians Born tlie tops of the
1 This man, who is said to hnve beon a humble tobacco-sollor of
Pisltent, assumod the name of F~~lllad
Belt, and pretended to be t l i ~
son of Atalyk Khan, and grandson of Ali IChon, who hod beell IChas
of ICholtllancl at the commencement of the present century. As n
mfittar of faot, the r e d l"n1~~d
Bolr mafi then living quietly with his
mother in Shmwkencl.
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walls and roofs of the houses, and they were obliged
to retreat to the plain north of the city, where they
were joined by two fresh sotnias of Cossacks from
the camp.
During this reconnaissance Skobelef succeeded
in checking a sketch which had been prepared
by &pfaii~Petroff, and as a result of his report
Genera1 Trotzky issued orders for tlle assault of the
I
city on the following day. For this purpose the
force was divided into three detachments, mrhich
were to push through the city by different routes
and unite in front of the palace in the centre of the
tom~n. A conlpany of infantry, with two guns and
two rocket-stands, was left behind for the protection of the camp and train.
The troops detailed for the assault marched out
of the camp at claybreak on October 13, but they
had not gone far when swarms of Kholranclians,
under the pretender Fulad Bek, made a determined
attack on the camp. They were, however, repulsed
by the detachment which had been left behind ;
rind when the assaulting columns reached the open
ground t o the north of the town the Russian gulls
opened fire to cover the advance of the storming
parties, which steadily captured barricade after
barricade, and, in spite of the stubborn resistance
of the Iihol.=andians,succeedecl in joining hands in
front of tbe Bek's palace.
But although the origiilal orders bad been thus
carried out, Trotzlry found that i t was impossible
to nlaintain his position, as the place was still
s~varmingwith armecl men who kept ~zpa con-
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ti~luousfire on the Russian troops ; ancl he tllerefore decided to retreat, destroyino. as much of the
b
town as possible during the retirement. After
short halt the troops fell back, burning everything
on their way ; but they encountered just as much
opposition while retiring as they had met with
during the advance, and their movemeilt through
the town was simply a ~ u n n i n gfight. The greater
portion of the city was, however, set on fire, a i d
on reaching his encainpilzeilt Trotzky added to thc,
destruction by boinbarcling the place for three
hours.
On the following day the bombarcknent was
resumecl, ancl on October 15 the Russians broke
up their camp and started for Nainangan, burni~lg
and ravaging the farins en ~uz6te. Daring their
marc11 along the left bank of the Kara Daria, and
until they had crossed that river, they were closely
followed by the Khokandians, wllo illacle contilluous
a ~ t a c k son the column, their opposition being of
such an obstinate nature that the Russians took
eight hours to cover the first seven versts (4%miles)
after leaving their camp. Once the river was
crossed the attacks ceased, and on October 17 t11e
colurnn was met by General Kaufn~aln,~ h had
o
rnarched out of Nainangan to assist Trotzky.
This attack on Andijan was without doubt n
failure ; for although Trotzlcy received the Cross of
Saint George and a sword of ~ O ~ O U and
T , alt110ugh
the Russia11 papers represented the affair in the
light of a successful assault, the Russians nnquestionably found it impossil~leto remain in the city
VOL. 11.
E

for more than two or three hours, and their retirement was very naturally consiclered b y the Khokanclians to have been nothing less than a forced
retreat; Tliat the ,Russians had sustained a serious
clieck is clearly shown by the subsequent disturbances in Kholcand, and also in Namangan and
the surrounding district. The people abandorled
their villages, and under the- leadership
-.
of a former
Belc of Namangan, named Batyr 'I'iura, they soon
joined the rebellion, and although several flying
colunns were sent against them they invariably
succeeded in evading the troops.
General Kaufmann, however, did not consider
that his presence in Klloka~xd was ally longer
requirecl, and he therefore left Narnczigan on
October 28, after he had handed over the cornmaid to Sliobeleff, who had beell promoted to tlie
rank of major-general in recognition of his brilliant,
services during the ca~npaign. During tlie whole
of his journey from Namangaii to ICliojent, Kaufinann's escort was iiicessalitly attacked by bailils
of Kirghiz and EFipclial<s, so that liia march had
rather the appearance of a retreat tliail the return
of a victorious commander.
Fresh disturbalices also broke out in tlie city or
-- - . -. . - .
Xhokarld itself, where the inhabitants, on learnillg
the conditions of the treaty of peace, deposed NasrEddin, and forced him to fly to Khojent, where 11e
' . - - .arrived alone, and without property of any liincl,
at the saine time as General I C a h a l l n . After his
departure, Kllokand was occupied by the adherents
of Fulad Belr and Abclul Gtlffar Beli (the I'oriner.
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BeB of Ura-Tep4, who bad made his way to
Khokanci at the colninenceinent of the rebellion
s the IClia~lagainst Khudayar) ; and as thc L: A:~ i r of
a t e were thus in as disordered a conclitioi~as they ,
had been when the Russia~~s
Grst interfered, Kaufmann despatchecl a force to reoccupy &Iakhranl,
and thus to cover the Khojent frontier.
In tlze ineanwhile disturbances continuecl in the
newly acquired Russia11 territory to the north of
t h e Syr Daria, and Skobeleff left Namanpn. wit11 a
considerable portion of his colninand to punish the
rebel balds uncler Batyr Tiura, which were cont,iiluing their depredations in the adjacent country.
Defeatii~gthem at Tiura Kurgan on November 4,
he pushed on as far a8 Chust, but there received
il~telligeilceon the night of the Gthwhich caused him
t o retrace his steps with the greatest possible speed.
As sooil as he Ilacl left Namangan the Kipchaks
hacl entered the city, and, being joined by the entire
populatioii, they began, on the evening of November 5, to attack the Russiaii camp and unGilislled
citadel. The small garrison held out until his
returii at noon on the 7th, and on the following day
t h e Kipchak quarter of the town was heavily bombarded and reduced to ruins, Skobeleff' shortly
afterwards inllicted another defeat on Batyr Tiura's
forces at Balikcbi, and captured that tovn.
By these movements the rising in the Namangan
district waa effectually suppressed; but the disorders
in other parts of the Kllanate still conti~~ued,
and
Kaufina1111 therefore ordered Skobeleff to marc11
throngh the country between the Naryn and Kara
x2
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--Daria, which was considered to be the centre from
which the Kipchak illalcontents carried out their
hostile demonstrations. I t
thought that this
movement could be made with the most telling
effect if it was carried out in the early winter, when
the nomads hacl moved, with their families, illto
their winter settlements, as they could then be
more easily got at, and their escape would be
renderecl dtBcult, if not altogetl~erimpossible, on
accouilt of the deep snow with which the surro~mdingmouiitains would then be covered.
Skobeleff therefore left Namangan on January
6, 1876, with a force of 2,800 men, and crossing
the Naryn river, moved along the right bank of the
Kara, Daria, while a detachment was sent, under
Baron Meller-Zakomelsky, to reconnoitre the countrj7 to the south of the river. The cold at this time
was intense ; but, in spite of the severe frost (15" R.),
the force inarcl~edeastwards, ravaging the country,
2nd burning all the settlements which were passed
tllrougll. The importailt village of Paitok was
completely destroyed, and, while a force was
cletached to operate against the Kipchak villages
in the mountains, the maill body contiilued i t s
advance along the northern bank of the river t o
Yani-Sarkarba.
As the Kipchaks saw that their settlements
were threatened with complete destruction t h e y
sent envoys asking for mercy; a~iclthese men w e r e
informed by the Russian general that the tribes
would be spared if they proved their sincerity a n d
coinplete submission by delivering up the ]leads o f
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the rebellion aild the parties who had incited the
people to enter upon the Eoly War against tlle
Russians. As these terms were not complied wit11
the advance was continued, ancl after sonle skirmishes on January 12 ancl 1 3 the Russians crossed
the Kara Daria at Yani-Sarkarba on the following
day, and established a fortified camp on the left bank
of the stream. A halt was then made for several
clays while reconnaissances were pushed forward
towards the city of Anclijall, where Abdur Rallman
was reported to h ~ v ecollected a force of 10,000
horsemeil and 5,000 foot solcliers, indepericlent of
some 15,000 armed inl~abitantswho had expressed
their deternlinatioil to oppose the R~lssianslo the
death.
Two messages were bheil sent deinallding llle
surrender of the city; but as these were not
aliswerecl Skobeleff determined to assault the place ;
and, advancing on January 20, lie storined lie
village of Iskylilc, and then commenced the bornbardlnent of Andijan. After the artillery had fired
some 500 rounds, two storming columils advailcecl
to the attack and soon penetrated to the centre of
of the town, where another battery was brought
into action aucl continued the clestruction of the
place. By the next day all resistance had ceased:
Andijan, which had inflicted such a serious reverse
on Trotzky's colnmn, was now subdued by the
ever-victoriouu Slcobeleff; and the Russian troops
occupied the remains of the sorely-punished city,
Skol~eleffhinlself taking up his cluarters in the
Bek's palace, .crliicl~TroLzky-in his ailxiety to

nlillirnise liis defeat-had reported to have been
destroyed.
On January 30 news was received that the
Iihokandians who had fled from Andijan were again
assemblillg near Asaki, and Skobeleff therefore
marched out and captured that town after severe
fighting. This baLtle, following closely after the
capture of Aadijan, coillpletely broke the power
of the Kl~okandiane. Margelan ancl Shallr-i-Khans
tendered their submissioil onoe more ; ancl on
February 5 Abdur Rahiuae, Batyr Tiura, Isfend
Yar, and other leaders of the insurrection surrendered theillselves unconditionally to Skobeleff
and threw themselves on the mercy of the Einperor.
By this time also the inllabitnnts of the city of
Khokand found that they were no better off under
tlle leadership of Fulad Bek aud Abclul Gaffar Bek
than they had been under I<hudayar's son, for
these two chiefs, taking advantage of their accession to power, appeared determined to enrich
themselves as much as possible at the expense of
their adherents, while the former also coininitted
the grealest atrooities and seemed to revel in
bloodsl~eil. The people, therefore, sent to NasrEddirl a ~ Isegged
d
h i ~ nto return. The Khan was
then a t Makluam, and after some hesitation he set
out for tho Kbokandia~ capital ; but before he
arrived tbere the Kipchak and Kirghiz acbereilts of Fulad Rek attacked him ancl forced him
to return precipitately to the Russian frontier.
Skobeleff waFj then ordered to occ~zpgthe capital ;
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and this he did on February 20, when sixty-two
gum and a large supply of ammullition and provisions were captured. FuZad Beli in the meanwhile had taken refuge in the mountains to the
north of Karategin, and when captured a short
time afterwards he was justly hanged for his
barbarous actions.
By this time it had been decicled that the
whole of the Khanate should be a~~nexecl.General
Kaufmann had left Tashkent in the previous
December for tlze Russian capital, and on his
arrival there l ~ a dpersuaded the Czar's Government
that such a step wa3snecessary for the security of
the south-eastern frontier of theTurlrestai~proviilce;
and on March 2, 1876, tlie Emperor signed an
order by wl~iclzit was decreed lhat the whole of
Xhokand was incorporated in the Russian Enlpire
under the name of the Province of Fel.gballa, and
that this new province mas to be under the direction of the Governor-Gel~erdof Turkestan, who
was to reorganise its administration by means of
a provisional arrangement such as hacl been introduced in the Amu-Daria and Zarafshan districts.
Ilnmediately on receipt of this order General
KolpakoE~lry,who had temporay coml~landduring IZaufmann's absence, set out for the city of
Khokand, and there proclaimed to the still disquieted inhabitants that the While Czar hacl
' approved of their submission' and hacl decided
to take illern nnder his prolection. Nasr-Ecldin,
Abdur Rahnlrzn, and other leaders of the insurrection were lhen deported to Tasl~kenl,aucl General
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-.Skobeleff was placed in command of the new
.

I
wid
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Thus Russia had at last gainecl her long-desired
object ill obtaining command of the entire course
of the river Jaxartes. Many years previously,
%vl1enthe Cossacks had first appeared a t the mouth
of that river, Russian writers hacl stated that the
accluisitioi~by Russia of the wliole length of the
Syr Dayin was an indispensable part of the scheme
for the effective protection of the Xirghiz, in order
t l ~ a t the Rpssian garrisons in the Steppe forts
might be readily suppliecl with fuel, forage, and
' provisions from the fertile tracts dong the upper
course of the river. This point llsd never beell
lost sight of, in spite of Prince Gortchalcoff"~
repeated protests that no filrtlier ailvarices woulcl
be made ; and by the annexation of Kholcand the
, Russians took up a new line of frontier far in
advance of the one which Prince Gortchakoff had,
I1 eleven years previously, declayecl to be suficient
, for the protection of the Kirghiz, and which was
t o have marked tlie limit of Russian concluests i n
this direction.
Ailthough the Kara-Kirgliiz ancl Kipcllaks of
the plains had by this time been con~pletely
subclued, tlie Xirghiz tribes in the mountaiiis t o
the south-east of the Pergl~anaValley had not yet;
been taagllt the power ol the R~lssian arms.
Beveral clans uncler the command of a chief named
Abclulla I3ek assemhloil in the rnountaii~sto the
soutli of Qulclla, and, as they refused to take part
in ths geneid submissioiz, Slrobeleff was orderecl
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to lllarcli agaiilst then1 and pursue them as far
into the mountains as possible, in order that they
might be taught that their mountaillous retreats
were not inaccessible to the Russian troops.
Nor was this the only reason which caused the
Turkestan authorities to send an expedition into
the inhospitable regions of the Alai and Trans-Alai
mountains. I t was believed that a war wit11
Yalcoob Beg of Kashgar was inevitable, and,
althoug.11 it hacl been postponed on account of the
rising in Khokand, it was still understood that a
force would soon be sent to subdue the proud
Alnir of Kashgaria ; and it was therefore necessary
that the passes between Fergbana ancl Ea9tern
Turkestan sl~oulclbe thoroughly explored. Then,
again, the Panlir region to the south of the Alai
range--a district which had but rarely beell
traversed by Zuropeans, and of which only the
vaguest knowledge existed-was believed by many
to offer a possible line for an advance against 11113s
-if not for a large army, at all events for a small
corps, which might greatly hamper the British
defence-and
it was of the greatest importarlce
that this mou~ltailloustable-laid should be examined ancl mapped.
In accorclance wit11 the instructions which
he had received General Skobeleff divided his
force into three columns, which started from
Uch Kurgan, Osh, ancl Gulcha. ' I-Ie himself
accompanied the Gulcha force, which WRS the
priilcipal one, ancl several scientific ofXicers were
attached to his sta& anlong whom were. Captain
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Kostellko and Messrs. Oshonin and Bonsilorff, who
respectively conducted the geograpl~ical,natural
llistory,
geodetical 013servatims. At the end
of July 1876 a flying column of 100 Cossacks aild
a few mounted infanlry was sent forward under
fiillce Witgellstein to the SharL Pass, and shortly
afterwarcls the three main colullllls pushecl forward
to the Alai plateau througll wild and ruggedregions,
wl~erethe paths in places zigzagged along high
lvountaillous leclges, and wliere numerous frail,
trembling bridges suspellded over gigantic chasnls
and precipices had to be crossed in single file.
The troops, however, reached the Alai with the
loss of oidy a lew pack aniinals whicl~had fallen
over t h e precipices, Abclulln Bek's lnotller aiid
wives were shortly afterwards capturecl, with large
jlocks of sheep and many horses, and illis was
followed by the sublnission of tlie elders of the
Icara-Kirgl~iztribes who wander allout the Alai
plateau. But Abdulla Uek remainecl at large a i d
escapecl lowarcla Kasligar.
During this expedition llle Russians liacl 110
lighliag ; but the scientific and geogr,zy,hical resulk
achieved were ~f consiclerable inlportnnce. The
Alai plateau (that is, llle elevded valley ljetwecn
the Alai and Trans-Alai ranges, and through wliich
the Kizil-Su, or Surld~-al),brnrlcll of tlic Oxus
flows) was lraverseil, silcl I'rinoo Witgciislein's
force was scr~t lo llle Kizil-Yart ilelile in llle TransAlai range, from whence :L gra11~1
view w7;is ol->tnine(l
of the I'atnir region gcncr.nllp, ;lltil l~nrlicul:~rly
of
tlie nor theru l->urlion, cnllecl 111ia Iiliargoshi S'aini~.,
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in which lies tlie Great Kara-Kul Lake. This lake
was carefully explored by Captain Hostenko, and
found to be 13,200 feet above the sea level, rind
ollly 800 feet below the suininit of the Icizil-Yzrt
Pass. Its greatest length-from north to southv a s found to be about fifteenmiles, atid its breadth
eleven ~niles; ancl it is almost divided into two
portions by proinoutories wl~iclijnt out froin its
northern and souther11 shores, ailcl between which
there is a narrow strait coililectiilg the easteril slid
western portions of the lake. After exploring tliis
portioil of the Kliargoshi Pamir, Kosteilko tlieil
proceeded in a south-easterly direction as far as
the Uzbel Pass ; but being witllout a guicle, auci
falling short of provisions, he was then obliged to
retrace his steps. By this recollllaissance the geographical knowledge of the mountainous regions
to the soutll of Khokand was very largely extenilecl,
and the Russian frontier was pushed soull~warils
for some eighty iniles to the southeyn edge of the
Khargoshi Paair.
The Russian troops in the inearin~hiletraversecl
the camping-grounds of the Itcli k'ilik, Naiman,
and Taiti tribes of the Kara-Kirglliz, and the
expedition finally returned to Khokand early in
September 1876, having satisfactorily proved that
a Russian force .of all arms could, during tlie
summer rnoiitl~s,cross the Alai and Trans-Alai
ranges witllout serious difficulty. This knowledge
was in itself of the very greatest iln~ortance,fop
tile chief dificulty in tlie Pamir line of a(lvallc0
towards India is to be found not in the Panlir
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plateau itself, but in the regions immecliately to
the north and south of it. O~icethe Russian troops
had traversed the difficult defiles of the Alai, sild
had succeeded in reaching the crest of the TrsnsAlai raiige, they found that the drop from thence
to the Painir plateau was a trifling matter of 800
feet,' and as soon, therefore, as the suminit of
tlie Kizil-Yart Pass was reached the most difficult
!portion of the journey was over. Once thus established on the northern edge of tlie ' Roof of the
Worlcl,' there is nothing in the physical nature of
the .country to prevent an army of several tl~ousand
men, provicled with mountain artillery, froin contiiiuillg its advance; cluriilg the summer months,
right up to the nortlzern elltrances of the Biildu
Kush Passes, whence cletachmeilts could be pushecl
forwards into Chitral and Gilgit, thereby turnirlg
the right flanlr of the Eiiglish line of defence, ailcl
spreading confusion and clisinay througllout Kashmir and the frontier provinces of British India.
This is the lesson which the Russians parhlly.
learned from Skobeleff's Alai expedition ; ailcl fiom
this tiiile they sedulously strove to perfect their
knowledge of the Painir region, in order that they
rlliglit be able to make a starLli~lgdiversion in Ilint
direction when the time sl~oulclarrive fur the great
final struggle for mastery in Asia.
I
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RUSSIAN INTRIGUI AT KABUL

Rl~ssianconquests in twelve years-Rnsso-Turlrish War-Constantillople in pel*il-Rnssian ssnccesses ill the Asiatic provinces of
Twkey-131.itish Fleot passes the Dardanelles-The Treaty of
San Stefaao-Enghbncl on the verge of way-Agents born Rusfiia
in ICabul-A Russian agent sent to India-Preparatione for
Russia11 illvasion of India.

SINCBthe annexation of Kllolcand and of the
northern porlion of the Palriir plateau, Russia has
made no further conquests in the countries to tlze
east and north of the River Oxus. There indeed
remained but little territory in that portion of
Central Asia which she could have appropriated
wit2lo~1tbecoming embroiled in a war with China. ;
for by the time General Skobeleff had returned to
IChokand after his Alai expedition the towns of
Urumchi andManas had been recaptured by Chinese
troops, and before the close of the following year
Yalroob Beg hadceasedtolive, andEastenlTurBest,a~~
hacl become a province of the Chinese Empire.
The Russians, however, had no cause to be
dissatisfiecl with the resnlt of their work. In
twelve short years from the time when Verefkin
ant1 Tcheraaie~l'mmaclc their si~nultalleousaclvnnce
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against the nortl~erntowils of Kliokand, Russia had
succeeded in conqueriilg the tliree Khanates df
Kholrand, K l ~ v a and
, Bolchara. Khokand had been
completely absorbed into the Russian Einpire ; large
slices of territory had been wrested from Khiva
and Bokhara and added to the Czar's dominions,
and the rulers of those states, though nominally
inclependeilt, had beell reduced to a condition of
com~letesubjection ; and, ill addition to these great
achievements, Russian troops were firmly established on the eastern shores of the Gaspiail Sea, nilrl
had penetrated for soine distance into the Akhal
Tekkd oasis on the nortl~ernfrontier of Persia.
But, wlile the Czar's troops .in Central Asia had
been thus advancing from victory to victory, dark
storm-clouds were gathering inTurkey, and before
the sunlmer of 1876 had passed the troubled coiidition of tlie Chrictian proviiices of the Ottoman Einpii-e hail become so serious as to endanger the peace
of Europe. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro
mere in revolt against the Portlea Bulgaria became
the Bcene of a series of atrocious massacres perpetrated by the Christian and Moslem inliabitants against each other. On Julie 22 tlie Priiice of
Servia declared war against the Turks, and tell
claye later the Servians crossed the frontier at
tliree different points. The Serbs, however, in
spite of Russim~ assista~~ce
in oilicers, men, and
Ohe of tho Servisn columna was under tho command of
Canera1 Tchernaieff, the conqueror of Tashkent. About 500 Rusrian
a
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sonie fighting, were forced to abanclon their positions on the Morava, when Alexinatz fell into the
hands of their enemies. At this moment, whel~
there was notl~ingto prevent the Turks from marching to Belgrade, Russia stepped in, and General
Ignatieff- he Russian Arnbassador at Constantinople-informed the Porte that if within two days
it did not accept an armistice of six weeks or two
months' d~iration,and clid nol at once arrest military operalions, diplomatic relations between Russia
and the St~bliinePorte would be broken OK
At this time, wl~enwar between Russia and
Turkey appeared imminent, the Czar, oh November
,
2, 1876, at an interview at L i v d i a with Lord c i . . i d
Loftus,
--"~.
the -+Brih& Ambassador, ' pledged%
$ 4 )\..;
sacred word of honour in the most earnest and
solemn manner that he had no intention of acqairing Constaiitinople ; and that if ilecessity shoul(1
oblige hiin to occupy a polllion of Bulgaria, it
would only be provisionally, ancl until peace anrl
the safety of tlie Cliristian population were secured.'
'Intentions,' he saicl, ' are attributed to Russia of n
future conquest of India and of the possession of
Constar1tinople. Can anytlling be more absurcl ?
Wilh regard to the former, it is a perfect impossibility ; arid as regards tlie latter, I repeat again
the most soleillii assurances that I entertain neither
the wish nor tlie intention.' Such were the words
of the Czar Alexander 11. of Russia, and yet, as is
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Serbs ; thonsalids of nnssisn volunteers and 1,800 Cossnolrs passed
tllrough Roun~nniaon their way to join tho Servian army, and
batieries or artillery, mitraillours, rifles, and ammttnitiou wero fiont
f~o11.1
Iiussis to nssisl in tho rclol~ionagainst tho Otlomaa Empire.

v-mm.*--

*

RUSSIAN
INTRIGUE

AT

I~ABUL

1877-

-

now well known, many months had not elapsed
before the occupation of Constantinople by a
Russian army was only prevented by the action
of Great Britain ; and Russian columns actually
marched towards the frontiel:~ of India, if not
for its conqnest, at all events for the purpose of
shalcing the
of the British in that country.
Eleven days after this meeting at Livadia
orders were issuecl for the immediate mobi!isatiou
of a portion of the Russian army ; ancl although n
conference of the representatives of the Powers
was held at Constantinople in the following Deceinber ancl January, no satisfactory settlement was
arrived at, and, after some further futile correspondei~ce,the Czar, on April 24, 1877, issued a mnnifesto in wliicl~ he illformed his ' faitliful and
lselovecl subjects ' that his ' desire to ameliorate
and assure the lot of the oppressecl Christian popu-.
lations of Turkey' had forced him to have recourse
to arms, and therefore, invoking the blessiiig of
God upon his ' valiant armies,' he gave the orcler
to cross the Turkish frontier. Thus Russia once
again waged war against the Porte, and for a brief
space there was a pause in her attacks against the
outposts of the Indian Empire.
Before daybreak on the very day on which war
was declared, Lieutenant-General Skobeleff, the
hero of so many daring exploits in Central Asia,
pushed forward with the Cossack cavally across
the Russian frontier, and, after a ride of nearly
sixty-five miles, seized the bridge over the river
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ing. Three days later a Russiaii corps had occupiecl Galatz and Braila on the left bank of the
Danube, ancl tlie Russian army of invasion began
to aclvance through Roumailia ; before the end of
June the Russians had crossed the river Danube at
two points ; and by the middle of July Nicopoli
had been captured, the Dobrudja was at the mercy
of the invading armies, a large Turkish force was
hemmed in in the Quadrilateral, and Gurko, after
crossing the Balkans by the Hankoi Pass, had
made a raid on Yeni Sagra, scoured up the Tundja
Valley, and had recrossed the mountains by the
Schipka Pass.
But an unpleasant surprise was in store for the
12ussians. Flushed with their easy triumphs, they
became over-confident, despised the military capabilities of their enemies, and neglected the most
obvious precautions for securing the safety of their
armies in Bulgaria. Although tlie existence of a
large Turkish force in the neighbourhood of Widdin was known to the Russian heacl-quarter staff,
no steps were taken to guard against a possible
attack from that quarter ; and mhen a force was
eventually sent to occupy Plevna, after the capture
of Nicopoli, it arrived too late. What follows is
almost too well known to need relating. After
three unsuccessful attempts to capture the Turkish
position, in which the Russians lost 601 officers
and 27,397 men, it became manifest that it would
be necessary for them to remain on the defensive
in all parts of tlie theatre of war until Plevna h a d
been captured.
VOL. 11.
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But as soon as Plevna had fallen, the Russian
armies once more continued their marc11 towards
tlie south ; the Turlsish positions in the Etropol
Balkans mere turned, Suleiman Pasha's army was
defeated and dispersed among the Rhodope moun.
tains, tlie city of Adrianople was occupied by a
Russian army, and on Jaiuary 31, 1878, all armistice a a s concluded, on the understanding tliat the
Turks were to cede Kars and Erzerouln to the
Russians, to recognise the independence of Roumania, Servia, and 13ulgaria, and to evacuate the
fortifications of Buyulc-Tcliekinedje, which constituted their last line of defence. Constan~ino~le
was thus at the mercy of the Czar's victorious
troops, and all Europe waited in a slate of intense
anxiety to see whether the British Cabinet would
adopt any measures to avert a Russian occupation.
While tliese events were talcillg place in the
European portion of the Sultan's domiiiions, the
Asiatic provinces of Turkey were also being invaded by the armies of the Czar. On April 24,
1877, while SlcobelelT was hasiening to seize the
bridge across t,he Sereth river, four strong Russiali
columns crossed tlie frontiers of Arinellia and
moved forward against the Turkish fortresses of
Kars, Ardehan, Batoum, and I3ay:~zicI. 110ulclltar
Pasha, fearing lest he might 'be shut up in Kars,
fell back, with a small force of 5,000 men, to tlie
Sogllanli Dagh, and .there awaitecl the arrival of
reinforcements. Raynzicl was occupied by the
Fxivan troops, under General TergoulrassolT, on
April 30, anti sevent,ee~z(lays hter Arilalln~lwas
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carried by assault after a brief bombardment.
Tlius witllin the short space of three weeks two
of the most important frontier towns in Armenia
had been captured, and defeat and ruin stared the
Turks in the face.
But just as the brilliant defence of Plevna
stemmed the tide of Russia11 invasion in Bulgaria,
so in Armenia the whole military situation was
suddenly c h a ~ ~ g e dby the clever strategy of
Moukhtsr Pasha, and by the natural genius for
field fortification which the Turks seem to possess.
As soon as Moukhtar heard of the la11 of Arclaha11
h e fell back from the Soghanli Dagh, and occupied
a position stretching from Olti on the north to the
Delibaba Pass 011 the south, where he guarded the
a,pproaches to Erzeronin from Ardahan, Kara, and
Bayazid. Here the Turks remained ullmolested
for a whole month, and during- that time they
received considerable reinforcements, and threw
up formidable lines of field-works at Zewin, which
lies midway between Olti and the Delibaba Pass.
111 the meanwhile Tergoulrsssoff liad been
pushing forward from Bayazid, and on June 1 6 he
routed a Turkish force wliclz attempted to oppose
his march. He, however, failed to seize the passes
of Delibaba, through which the Turks had retreated; and as it was reported that the Russians
showed no signs of advancing from the direction
of Kars, Moukhtar Pasha resolved to strike a
crusl~ingblow against Tergoukassoff before he
could receive reinforcements. He accordingly
concentrated a considerable portion of lus force
B 2
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on his right wing, and, after seizing the Delibaba
Pass, he, on June 25, assaulted the Russian
position at Tahirkeui. Tlle battle raged for ten
hours with varying success ; but at niglltfall the
Russians still maintained their positions, and the
Turks were obliged to fall back to their positions
of the morning-exl~austed, short of ammunition,
and believing that the action had not been a
success.
But while this indecisive engagement was
being fought on the Turkish right, a more irnportant battle was taking place at Zewin. General
Loris Melikoff, the Russian commander-in-chief,'
hacl h e a d of the movement of Turkish troops
towards Delibaba, and he rightly assumed that
Moukhtar Pasha intended to attack Tergoukassoff.
As there was no time 'to reinforce the Erivan
column directly, or to oppose Moukhtar's rnovement, Melikoff decided to attack the Turkish
position at Zewin. Misled probably by the remarlcable collapse of the Turkish defence at
Ardahan, he believed that Turkish troops could
not possibly withstand the attacks of the Caucasus
infantry ; and, with but little artillery preparation,
he gave the order for a frontal attack on the
T~lrkishentrenchments. Such reclrlessness coulcl
only have one result. As soon as the assaulting
columns emerged from their shelter behind a low
ridge which existed in front of the position they
The Russian forces in Asia Minor were nominally under the
supreme oommand of the ,Grand Duke Michael, but General Loris
Meliioff Was practically commander-in-chief.
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were received with a murderous fire, and altllougl
the brave Bussian infailtry returned again and
again to the attack, the task which they had been
called upon to perform' was quite beyond tlleir
powers, and by nine o'clock in the evening Melikoffs army was retreating in confusion towards
the frontier.
This disast'er rendered it necessary for Tergoukassoff to abandon his isolated position, and he
therefore fell back during the night. Tlle ~vllole
Russian army hurrfedly retired to its frontiers,
Bayazid was evacuated, the siege of Kars abaudoned, and nothing except Ardahan and a strip of
territory in front of it remained in tlie hands of tlie
Czar's troops. Zewin has well been called tlie
' Plevna of Armenia ' for this battle brought about
a .collapse of Russian strategy in Armenia which
was no less remarkable than the paralysis which
followed Osman Pasha's victories at Plevna.
But the parallel between the E~uopean and
Asiatic campaigns does not end here. Just as the
Turkish commanders in Europe threw away their
opportunity by neglecting to undertake combined
aggressive movements after the Turkish victories
at Plevna, so did Moulchtar Pasha fail to reap the
full advantage of his success. I t is true that he
had but little cavalry, nild that such as he had was
bad ; but nevertheless he must be blamed for not
having followed up his victory by a pursuit of the retreating Russians, and for not having assumed a bold
offensive, wllcreby he might have carried the war

even if he could not have entirely prevented, their
subsequent aclvance. Instead of doing this h e
contented himself with slowly advancing to the
neighbourhood of Kars, and there took up a position on the Aladja Dagh, some fifteen miles to the
east of that city.
Nor was this his ollly fault ; for after his victory
at Zewin he cominitted s series of mistakes which
completely neutralisecl the effects of his previous
souild strategy, The Russian army haltecl in a position facing the Turks, and there awaited the reinforcements which were being rapidly pushed to t h e
front. At first all went well ; but on the night of
October 8, snow having already [allen, Moukhtar
appears to have imagined that the campaign was
over, and he fatuously abandoned his stroilg
advanced positioils and concentrated his force o n
the Alaclja Dagll ancl on the ileighbouring heights
of Vizinkoi and Avliar. This was the Russians'
opportn~lity.What did these hardy Northmen c a r e
for snow ? As a matter of fact, winter is the season
most favourable for their military operations, f o r
their troops, who are inured to all the rigours o f
frost and snow, have then a considerable advantage over the less hardy nations of the south. O n
the night wbicl~followed Moulrhtar's abandonment
of his advanced positions, Lieutenant-Generafl
Lazareff lnoved froin the Russian camp with 15,000
infantry, 22 squadrons of cavalry, and 70 guns,
and coinmeilced a flank march which was intended
to bring hiin in rear of the Turkish position.
The movement was well coilceived and b r i l -
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liantly carried out. As Lazareff advanced, a, line
of field-telegraph was unwouild, and he thus
remained in coilstant communication wit11 the
Russian headquarters. The Turlrs remained in
ignorance of this turning movement until Lazareg,
on the 14tl1, reached the village of Bazarcljik, some
miles in rear of Moulrhtar's position. Here some
6,000 Turks barred the way; but they were
sooil driver1 back, and by that eveiling LazareK
had established hiinself in rear of the left flauk
of the Turlrs. A message was then seat alolng
the wire to the Grand Duke Michael, who al;
once issued orders for a general attack. At
daybreak on October 15 the battle began, and
from the very first the Turks had no chance. The
right wing of their army was caught in a trap and
forced to capitulate, and Mouhhtar Pasha, with
the remnants of the left and cenke, was driven
in dire confusion to Kars.
This was the decisive battle of the war in Armenia. Kars was again invested, and, after a short
; bomlsarclinent, was carried by assault on the night
ofNovember 17 ; Moulchtar's army was once more
defe,zt;ed on tlie Deve Boyun heighlis ; and Erzerouill
was closely besieged until Februa~y 22, 18'78,
when, in consequelice of the terins of the armistice
which llacl been conclucled at Adrianople, the gates
of the city were opened, and the capital of Armenia
was occupied b~ R~1ssia.ntroops.
The Turks had thus been once nlore defeated
and hui~iliaL;eclby Bussia. All their fortresses in
Armenia were in the hancls of thcir ene~nies, and

a Russian army was encamped within a short dis-

tance of the Golden Horn. But at this juncture,
when a Russia11 occupation of Constantinople al3peared imminent, the British ileet, under Admiral
Hornby, passecl through the Dardanelles and anchored off Princes' Islands at the western entrance
to the Bosphorus. This inoveineilt was followed
by the Russian occupation of the village of San
Stefano, and, as the Turlcs clelayecl to sign the
treaty of peace which was deinanded by the Russians. it seemed as if the war between the two
enemies was about to be renewed, with England
acting in alliance with the Turks for the defence
of Constantinople. But after a fortnight of anxious
snspense the Turks came to terms, and on March 3
concluded the Treaty of San Stefano, which brought
the war to an end.
The relations between England and Russia,
however, became daily more strained. The British
Cabinet insisted that the Treaty of San Stefano
should be laid before the great Powers of Europe
1
congress, who shoulcl determine how each
article separately, or in coiijuiiction with the
others, affected the previous treaties of 1.856 and
1871. Russia objected, and both nations prepared
for war. A credit for 6,000,0001. was deinanded
by the Beaconslield Ministry in order to be prepared for extreme measures if no agreement could
be arrived a t ; the reserves were called out on
April I, and seventeen days later it became known
that two regiments of cavalry, two batteries of
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and six regiments of native infantry had been
ordered to Malta from India.
The Russians also were not idle. They were
startled at the despatch of Iudian troops to the
Mediterranean, and decided to lnalre a dernonstration against India in order that the Englisl~might
be fully occupied in the defence of their Eastern
empire, and that their action in Europe might
be thus lia~nperedand wealcened ; a body of Baltic
seainen were quietly embarked in a hired steamer at
a harbour on the Esthonian coast and conveyecl to
America, where vessels were bought and collverted
into cruisers to ruin the British commerce in the
Atlantic ; and while the naval and military authorities in Russia made preparations for the expected
outbreak of hostilities, a committee was formed in
Moscow ancl subscription lists were openecl in
every town of the Empire for the purpose of forming a volunteer privateer fleet which was to prey
upon the vast mercantile marine of England.
I t is only necessary here to refer to the Russian
demonstration against India, which is an imnportant episode in Central Asian history.
In the spring of 1869 the Russian Chancellor
declared that Afghanistan was ' completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called
upon to exercise her influence,' and in the following November he informed Sir A. Buchanan that
' he saw no objection whatever to English officers
visiting Kabul, though he agreed with Lord Mayo
that Russian agents should not do so.'
Yet, in spite of these assurances, General Kauf-
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man11 in 1870 sent Russian agents to Kabul with
letters to Shere Ali, the Amir of Afgl~anista~.
This correspondence between Tashkent and tile
Afgllail capital was continued in a desultory
inalmer mltil the year 1874, when it began to
assulne a more important aspect, for in the sprilg
of tliat year General Kolpakoffsky, in Kauflnann's
111rote a letter to Shere Ali which was
very significant in tone, references being made
tlierein to ' devotioll' on the side of the Amir and
grace ' on the part of the Czar. After this there
mas LZ brief pause in the correspondence ; but in
tlie following year fresh letters were sent to the
Alllir, and from that time they became more frequent aild more significant in tone, Kaufmann even
noing
so far as to propose to Shere Ali that he
a
slloulcl sign a treaty of commerce, and also enter
into an offensive and defensive alliance with the
Russian Government ; ancl, in spite of the catenorical denial of Prince Gortchakoff, the correb
spondence was continued, and after two years more
of secret negotiations it became, evident to the
Indinn Government that Kaufmarln had succeeded
in tiurning Sliere Ali from his alliance wit11 the
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a halt at Samarkand, set out for Kabul on July 14,
accompanied by six officers, twenty-two Cossacks,
fifteen Kirghiz horsemen, and four servants. The
niission proceedecl through Guzar, and, traversing
the famous defile known as the 'Ikon Gates,'
reached the Oxus a t Chushka-Ghuzar after a
march of five days. There the Russians were
cletained for some days owing tb the refusal of
the Afghan commandant to permit them to cross
the river until orders had been received from
Kabul. The necessary permission was, however,
eventually received, and the embassy reached
Kabul on August 10,l where it was received with
every honour. On the following day StolietolI',
with the oEcers of his staff, paicl a ceremonial
visit to Shere Ali, and, after the usual formalities,
presented two letters to the Amir-one from the
Czar a i d the other from General Kaufmann.
During the envoy's stay in Kabul he reviewed
the Afghan troops and had many private interviews with the Amir, during which he pressed
Sliere Ali to agree to the following proposals on
the part of the Bussian Government :(1) Tllat the Anlir should permit the location
of Russian agents at Kabul and at other places in
his territory where it might be deemed necessary
The Rz~ssisnaccounts agree in the statement that Stolietoff
lef* Sewarkand on July 14 (now stylo), and reschod Kabul on
Azzgnst 10. Thcee dates clo not, howevor, agree wit11 the English
accounts, which give July 29 as the date of the embassador'fi a~rival
a t the Afghan capital. The English accounts also state that tho
firsl formal interview with Shore Mi was held on July 26, and
that the review ot tho Kabul garrison (22 battalions) was held on
August 2.
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~to locate such agents of Russian nationality, and
that these agents should be vested with the powers
of Consuls.
(2) That permission be accorcied for the location of Russian troops at four convenient points
on the fi-ontiers of Afghanistan, and that the Amir
should engage to protect such garrisons.
(3) That the Russian Government should be
permitted to construct roads from Sama~lcandto
Kabul vid Katti Kurghan, Khojah Sale, and
Balkl~;to Berat 'wid the course of the Hamun
River (Oxus), the Plain of Andkhui, Bala Murgllab, Maruchalr, Pandi (Panjcleh),' and Piroz K o l ~';
and also from Herat to Kaudallar ' by the .Garmsir
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(4) That when necessary the Kabul Government would permit the passage of ltussian troops
proceeding to India by such routes as might be
considered desirable.
( 5 ) That telegraph wires might be set up between Samarkand, Xatti Kurgan, Ralkh, Kabul,
Kandhax, and other places where the Russialz
troops or agents were stationed.
(6) That when necessary Russian troops should
be supplied wit11 provisions and transport on paylnent of reasonable prices.
( 7 ) That if it became desirable that the Russian
Governlnent should send an expedition io wage
war in India, the Amir sl~ouldfurnish supplies
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Thus, in 1878, the Russians in their dealings with Shere Ali
eoknowledged that Pandi (or Psnjdoh) was in Afghan territory,
This point appears to have been forgotten a few years later.
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to the Russian troops on payment, and that the
Afglian Government sliould establish agents at
the capital of Russia and in Tashkent, &c.
In return for these concessions the Russians
promised :(I) To guarantee the contilluance of the
country ol Afghanistan to the representatives,
successors, and heirs of the Amir in perpetuity, in
accorclance with the will of the last sovereign and
legal rights.
(2) I n no way to interfere in the internal affairs
of Afglianistan, or in the aclininistration of the
country.
(3) Always to afford assistance for the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan, and against the
external or internal enemies of the principality.
(4) To consider the enemies of the Ainir as
their enemies.
It will be thus seen that Stolictoff's niission to
Kabul was the result of seven years of intrigue
which had been secretly carried on by Xaufmann's
agents at the Afghan capital. The ground had
been most carefully prepared beforehand, ancl
when the time arrived for Russia to show her
halid she a a s able to do so with considerable
effect. Stolietoff marched into Kabul unopposed,
was tliere received as an lionoured guest, and persuaded the foolish Amir to enter into an oEensive
and clelensive alliance wit11 Russia for tlle express
purpose of making a joint attack on India.
Nor was this the only step taken by tile nussian Government for the~purposeof weakening tile
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British position in Hindostan. While Stolietoff
was hastening towards Kabul a t the heid of his
impsing embassy, another Russian agent, named .
Pashino, was sent to India for the purpose of sowing
possible ; after which he was to have gone on to
Kabul to help Stolietoff with the considerable
lrnowledge of Afghan politics which he had sccluired during tlie two years which he had spent
in Samarlxand as interpreter to Abdur Rahinan
m ~ a n . This emissary-if his own statement is to
be believed-was despatcl~edto India a t the instigation of General Skobeleff, and he actually succeeded in reaching Pesl~awarbefore his progress

In the meanwhile Kaufmann was busily employed in the preparation of an army for the
invasion of India if the Afghans could be persuaded
to join in the attempt; or for the occupatioll of
Kabul if Shere Ali refused to take up arms against
the English.
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PROJECTED INVASION OF INDIA

Sl~obcleff'ascheme of invesion-Adoption of some of Sltobelcff's
suggeatione-Betlin Conference-British envoy stopped ai tho
Afghan frontier-British invseion of Afghanistan-Rl~ssin's
mistake-Fate of Shere Ali-Treaty of pence-Apologists for
Russie-Assurance8 of M. de Giers-Colonel Grodekoff's ride
to Herat.

TIIE Russian scheme for the invasion of India froin
Turl~estanwas no new iden, and was merely the
outcoine of Russia's previous advances ia Central
Asia ; but there is no doubt that one of the most
proininent supporters of this movement was ail
officer who was at that time in the Russian camp
before C~nstnnt~inople This oficer was Skobeleff, and his opinions unquestionably carried great
weight at the conference which was held near
Constantinople to deterrnille what steps should be
taken b y Rufisia in view of the probable outbrealr
of war with Englalid. This brilliant general, i11
January 1877, while in command of the Ferghaila
district, prepared a remarkable scheme for such a11
iiivasion of India in case the troubles in Turkey
should lead to a war wilh England.
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Tliis project, which was afterwards foulid
among the papers of Prince Tcherkasslci, was published at length in the Russian ' Monthly Historical
Review ' for December 1883. The following are
extracts from Skobeleff's scheme :' I ain convinced that we need not anticipate
any serious rising on the part of the natives of
Turlcestan in the event of a war with Turkey.
Therefore if we wage war with the Turks alone, and
if the idea of the aggressive attitude which would
determine the value of Turlcestan in the event of
a war with England has not yet been matured at
headquarters, it would be unbearable to remain
here during the war.
' One of the objects of this letter is to remind
you of my recent independent command on service ;
but its main purport is to candidly inform you of
my opinion that it is advisable, as it is practicable,
to send an expedition from Turkestan in case of
war wit11 England in order to increase the triumph
and prestige of Russia.
'The object I here indicate is of world-wide
importance. No Russian patriot, recognising the
practicability of the scheme and placed by fate i11
a position to carry it out, could hesitate to call
attention to the vast resources which, I will permit myself to say, our Government has accidentally
accumulated on this frontier, and by which-with
resolution and due preparation-it is possible not
only to strike a telling blow at the British in India,
but also to crush her in Europe. All this, I repeat,
can be effected so long as we retain full possession
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of Turlrestall a i d render it cz secure base of operations. I n this I firmly believe, and have ample
proofs of our power and influence so long as-in
Asia more than anywhere else-we
act up to the
maxim, " Waste no words where you lnay exercise
authority."
'Firmly resolved to do my duty in a most
critical time for Russia, I submit Led a memorandum
on December 27,1876, to the Governor-General,
ancl I also wrote to my uncle Alexander. I now
a,ddress you without fear of {,he consequences to
myself, and praying God that attention in the
proper quarter may be given to that great aggl-essive force wliich we possess i11 Central Asia. . . .
' I t has often been said thal Russia can threaten
British rule in India from Central Asia, and that
i t is therefore absolutely necessary that England
should now check Russian advances ia Turkestan.
' If we keep our eyes open we shall see that our
position in Tnrkestan is indeed forinidable, aiicl
that the fears of the English are not without
foundation. We have established a strong base of
operations in Central Asia, with an army of some
40,000 men, from wliich we ca,n always detach a
force of at least 10,000 or 12,000 men for operations beyond tlie fi-ontiers of the province ; at the
sanie time mre call implicitly trust the fidelity of
our subjects, as even now there is not the least
sign of any combination of the Mahommedans of
Turkey with those of Central Asia.
'By reinforcing the army in Turkestan with,
say, six companies horn Western Siheria, with as
VOTJ, 11.
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many Siberian Cossacks as could be spared, with
one battery, ancl with three regiments of Cossacks
from Orenburg, we could organise a column of
some 14,000 or 15,000 men.
' Such a force tllrown across the I-Iinclu-Kush
could do a great, ded.
'Everyoi~ewho has studied the question has
said that tlie position of the English in India is
very precarious. I t has been said that the English
hold India by the sword a,lone, that the llulliber of
British troops in India is only sufficient to maintain
order in the country, and that the alive army is
untrustwortl~y.
' Everyone in referring to tlie subject of a Russian invasion of India has statecl t l ~ a an
t approach
to the frontier would be suficient to lrinclle a
rebellion.
' I t may be said that an enterprise against the
English in India would be full of rislr-that
it
might end disastrously for the Russian force. I
do think, and we must not shut our eyes to Ihe
fact, that tlie uildertakjiig would indeecl be a risky
one. We n~ust,l~owever,remember that, if we
were successful, we shoulcl completely destroy the
British Empire in Binclustan, ancl the effect of this
in Englczild caru~lot bc calculatecl beforehand.
C0mpeten.t English authorities admit that a disaster on the frontiers of India might ever1 procluce
a social revolution in England, because for the
past twenty years Englancl has been tied more
closely than ever to her Indian possessions by
causes ancl pheno~nena,inc;lnilil~g an incapacity

for

--

-

Ill
Hii
do1
SUC

oul
fro
to.
s ta:
an1
be

Em

ext,
in
linf
Tal
Per
bJ'

Par
imp
favc
curl
shol
shoi
the
Asir
cluc
wit1
rise.

4

18:s

-

pared, wit11
~f C o s s a c k s
c o l ~ l m nof

uestioll has
in 111ciia is
t l e~En g l i s l ~
3 l l u n l b e r of
to m a i n t a i n
;ive army is

a g a i n s t the
is]<-%hat il
ian f o r c e . I
eyes to the
3d be a risky
c t h a t , if we
y d e s t r o y the
effect; of this
beforeliaacl.
, t,lmt a dis:ven p r o d u c e
ause for the
?n t i e d more
)ssessions by
11 i n c 21.p
x ity

for war, identical with those observed in France.
short, the overtlxow of British supremacy in
Hindustan would be the cominenceinent of t]le
downfall of England.
' Should our enterprise not result in complete
success, that is, if a rebellioil should not break
out in India, and if we sllould fail to cross the
frontier, we should nevertlleless compel the British
to keep the wl~oleof their Inclian army in E n d u stan, and nlahe it impossible for them to utilise
any portion of it in Europe. They would, in fact,
be compellecl lo transfer some of their troops from
Europe to India. We could, in short, to a, great
extent, paralyse the land forces of England, either
in a, Eui-opeail was, or in the choice of a neTT
line of operations fi.0111 the Persian Gulf througll
Tabriz to Tiflis in conjunction mrith Turkish and
Persian armies-an idea wllicl~has been entertained
by British oficers ever since the Crimeall War.
' The necessity that Turkestan should take a
part in forthcoming events is reizdered a11 the more
imperative by the fact that, in the event or an unfavourable termhation of the war, we should most
assuredly be obliged to evacuate Turkestan, or to
curtail our autl~orityin tlmt region. But even if we
should be defeated both in Europe and in Asia we
should have proved by our disastrous undertaking
the formidable n a t ~ ~ rofe our position in Central
Asia ; and if necesgty sllould compel us to conclude a humiliating treaty, Russia might escape
with tbe loss of Turkestan, which would then h a ~ ~ e
risen in value.
I
1
1

G

2

'There can be no coinparison between the
risk we run i11 inczking a dernoustration against
British India, and the eilormous advantages which
me should gain in the event of the success of such
an enterprise.
(The great difference in the results of success
to us and to our enemies is of itself sufficient to
urge us boldly forward.
As soon as war with England was declared we
should immediately commence in Turkestan by the
despatch of a mission to Kabul and the forination
of a column in Ssmarkand (which for effect should
be called an army), composed of ten battalions,
fourteen sotnias, and forty guns, giving a total of
10,000 to 12,000 men. This should be the lowest
possible strength of our aggressive force.
The object of the mission would be to draw
Shere Ali into an alliance with us, and to open
up co~nrnunicationwith the disaffected natives of
India; and the army should be pushed tl~rough
13amian to Kabul to secure the success of these
negotiations. If it be found that Shere Ali still
adheres to the English (which is not very lilrely, as
he did not accept tlie invitation to be present
among the other feudatories on the occasion of the
proclamatioll of the title of Empress of India at
Delhi, and he even expressed his annoyance at
having received tlie invitation), a claimant to the
throne should be put forward in the person of
Abdur Rallman Khan, who is living at Ssmarkand,
by which means iilterilal dissensions might be
brought about in Afghanistan, wl~ile,on the other
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side, Persia might be conveniently persuaded to
renew h e r claims to Herat. By turning Persia's
attention to Afghanistan, we should divert her
military forces from the Caucasus. The advance of
Persian troops to Heral would call into requisitioll
all the supplies and transport in the country, and
this would effectually paralyse any Eilglish scheme
for an advance from the Persian Gulf to Tiflis.
' As soon as the invading force lzad left Samarkancl, az-~otliershould be forined there, consisting
of two battalions of infantry and sixteen sotnias of
Cossaclcs, wit11 n battery of artillery, for tlie occupation of places along our lines of commuizicatio~l
and for general service i11 our rear.
' Witlzout going illto details, I would divide the
cs~mpaigninto two phases. The first should be
one of extremely rapid action, of diplomatic negotiations wit11 Afgl~anistan,supported by the advance
of tlze colunzn to Eabul. The second, comnzencing
with the occupation of Kabul, shoulcl be a waiting
period, during which we should keep up comniunicatio~iwith the clisnffec1,ed elenzents in Bindustan,
in the
giving t h e iliealis of expressing tl~eil~selves
way whicli would best promote our iliterests (tlie
cllief cause of the failure of the Mutiny in IS57
was a want of organisation on the part of the
mutineers) ; and, finally, as aIso chiefly, lo orgaliise
hordes of Asiatic horsemen, who, to a cry of blood
and plunder, niight be launched against India as
the vanguard, thus reviving the days of Timur.
' T h e subsequent operations of the Russian
cvllllnn ca>nnotbe traced in this plan of campaign.

At best the oper,ztioiis might end in the presence of the Russia11 banners at Renares; at tlie
worst, the column would retire with honour to
TIerat, meeting a force sent from the Caucasus,
wllich should consist of several battalions, with six
guns to every thousand men. An Asiatic force,
especially of Turlroinans, is not formidable in the
open, nncl even tlie illvincible British army w o ~ ~ l d
nielt away very considerably in advancing to
Herat. The English, moreover, are not in a position to move more than 25,000 nien beyond the
frontiers of India, 2nd a large proportioil of these
would have to be -posted aloiig the lines of com~nunication. At the same time, it must not be
forgotten that the Turkestan province is on the
flank of the enemy's lines of comnmunication, and
that we would grow stronger as we approached
the Caspian.
' I liave already stated that tllis undertaking
would bc a rislry one ; but it would be justified by
the greatness ,of its object, and by the stupendous
results which might be achieved. From the standpoint of these results there can be for Russia no
talk of ~ i s k and
,
as for Turlrestan, it is not worth
mentioning.
W e should expect from the troops who shoulcl
be so fortunate as to be selectecl for this campaigil
soniething more than self-sacrifice, in the highest
sense of the word, as it is understood by inilitary
men. On crossing the Hindu-Hush, the column
should, in my opinion, be so managed that every
Illan might feel that he hacl come to Afghanistan

!
I

I

i
I

I

1878

SIKII~LEI'I:'S
SCIIEME
OF INV~ISION
--

he preat t l i e
nour to
Lucasus,
with s i x
c force,
t in t l z e

yWOL~~
:ing to
L a posioild t h e
of t h e s e
of cornnot be
on t h e
ion, a n d
roachecl
srtaking
tified b y
pendolls
le standmsia no
3t wortl1

ampaigl~
highe s I;
military
cola~un
nt e v e r y
hculistarr

C ~

-- --.- .

87

to conquer or to die ; that endl nlan rnigllt understalid that the Czar required even 1 . k death. JVe
coulcl not be repro~~clied
for leaving our colours ill
the enemy's lia~ldsif not a siilgle Rnssian soldier
I-ein,zin.eclalive l ~ y o n dthe Hindu-Icush.
'Such a se11t;iinent; and such n resolve can, in
my opiliioil, be oilly based on tlie feeling which is
cornmo~llycherished by every soldier ill the army,
of an u.nfalterizlg ancl boundless love ancl devotioli
fnr liis sovereign. Tlie dificulty of so raising the
spirit of tlie force in accordance with the nature of
the ullclertalring could be overco~lleby attaching
one of the Erllperor's sons, who, nt the proper time,
might tell tlie troops what was expected of tllerrl
by their Czar 2nd country. I an1 well assured
t11at this force, in tlle presence of one of his
Majesty's sons, ~voulrl do wonders, and would
never dislrrace the Russian name. . . .
O.
' Asiatic
tribes might give us trouble, but they
cannot prevent ldie ~ccomplishlneiltof our purpose.
We have a.rrivec1 at the stage at u7hic11, with
jnclicious am1 systematic actions, writ11 art;illery
and anzmunitiorl in excess of the proportions
required in European warfare, we can strike with
effect; in the open field and in tlie mountmains. I
repeat that we call do this without any loss, being
well versed in military operations. I11 short, with
our present experience, with our splendid and, in
my opinion, s~rlIicientlynunlerous troops, and with
our resources, (;here is nothing in Asia capable of
thwarting the ~vidcststrzltegical design which we
might co~zceive.
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'Our policy during the last ten years has
raised tile importance of Russia ill the world. The
English, as also the people of Asia, are of opiilioli
that tllere are no limits to the great enterprises of
our Government. On this belief tlie safety of our
position mainly rests. I was inucll ilnprcsserl by
a remark made by Colonel Cory, in liis " S11:~dows
of Coming Events; or the Ensterll Mer~ace,"tlint
lle could riot imagine a power in Turkest:111 otlicrwise than in coilnection with Iiussi:~Ly n clil.c!cl,
line of rail betweca Cli~tr:jui, 011 1,llc Osus, :~ild
Moscow. Asiatics at the yreselit in(11lie1itl)(:lic~~e
tliat Bussiails spit lire tvlicil they clinrgc vitll :I
cheer.
' A lmowleclge of tliis provirlce ancl of its rcsources naturdly leads to the conclusion tlial our
presence in Turkestan, in pursuit of linssinn illterests, is only justifiable if vrc strive to solvc the
Eastern Questio~l ill our o w l i'l~vo~urfrorii tl~is
quarter; otherwise tlie liidc is liot wort11 t<lie
tanning, and dl tlie nioriey exl)en(lcil ill 'r~urkcsinn
is lost. We must, 7,e C:L~CSLI~
lest we, 11y our iii:~ction in Asia during L: crisis ill tlie Wcst, rove, tc.)
our enelllies tlic niinlcssricss of our :~nlic~sntio~ls.
Tliis would u~idolul,teillyc:lusc n loss of l)rclsligci,
ancl wo~uldentail in t11.e fulurc a, till Inrgcr ulq~rofitable expenditure, I w.pr?nttlial, ~ v i ~nl llliriilli~ll~l
i
forcc of 40,000 111r:n well lla~icllctl,TV(; niipltt, 1101
only control tlic wliole uf 'l'nrkcst:l11, Ii:~sllg:~r,
:111tl
J3olrllarn coln1,ilicd in nrnI3 :tg:':li~l~(,
116, 21111. \yeb
could even-nntl T. say il ~ I O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ( J V ; 'r1114L ( ~ I I : I
liesla~lallil rtlcollcjllor i[. . . . .
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' We have, no doubt, much to go through in
the future in Central Asia. But the present generation of Mahoinmedans, born under the ~ g i sof
the law of Russia, has first to grow to manhood.
Before the11 an entire class of influential natives
will spring up wlio know us well, and mho understand the secret of our powcr and of our success.
The notorious Nana Sahib was eclucated among
Europeans, anci was received in the best English
society, and it was only for tliis reason that lie
became such a terror to the Englisl~, As yet me
have no such spirits in our midst, and in this circunlstslnce lies one of our chiel advantages over
the English. When political affairs in the West
are approaching a crisis, this important consideration, coilibined with many otlzers, should urge us
to derive as much benefit from Turkestan as that
province is capable of yielding.
"'In Asia, when triumphs cease, difficulties
coinmence."
' This is undoubtedly true. In a political
sense we are now living in a time of triumphs.
Let us take acivantage of it. ,
' You see how much I expect from our power
in Central Asia. Having for a considerable time
shared the hardships of active service with the
Turkestan troops, I have no desire to exchange
service here for any other elsewhere. I could not,
hoxever, remain inactive here while the majority
of our army was shedding its blood in the country's
cause in the Vest. This is why 1 beg j70u again
to remember me in case war is declared.

' MICHAELSICOBELEFF.'

' P.S. .

. . I have just

received the " Golos " of
December 29, 18iG, and I see from the leading
article i n it that " a declaration of war by Russia
against the Ottomail Porte is the wish of our
enemies," that " Ellrope has complicated the question and relies on Russia's impatience," and,
further, that " tlle circumstnnces are such that a
coriiplete and speedy solution of the question is
perfectly impossible."
' To us, who uilderstaiid our military resources
i n Asia, the Eastern Question, of ~vhichthe solution should oilly be fearful to the enemies of
Russia, appears in a difrereilt light.
'So long ago as in tlle tlzird decade of tlie present century, General Field-Marshal Count Moltke
dwell on the impossibility of acllieving rapid results in European Turkey, and considerecl that it
would be most diflicult to carry on n war in that
country without the assistance of a powerful fleet
and complete command of the Black Sea. FieldMarshal Prince Varshafski, in 1829, gave it as his
opinion that aggressive operations in Asia w o ~ ~be
ld
of little use, as there was no great and decisive
object of attaclr, though he considered the traclc
routes between Baghdad and Sciltari to be the
best objectives in this case. The coizstruction of
the Suez Canal has, however, deprived even this
line of its importance.
' I t might, therefore, be positively asserted that
however successful we might be in a campaigil in
European and in Asiatic Turkey, we should still
search in vain for a solution of the Eastern Ques-
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tion. Sincere coilduct 011 the part of England in
accorclance wit11 the interests of our Government
might, so far as I uilderstand the subject, indeed
satisfy our legitimate demands. I tllerefore think
that we should not. have ally doubts as to the
question of a war wihh England. Witl~out a
formal declaration of war Bngland might still be at
war with us through tlle despatch of officers to
Turkey ancl by assisting Turkey v\ri~llsupplies.
' FVould it not be best lo avail ourselves of our
strong strategical position in Central Asia, and of
our better lmomledge of the conlmunications and
resources of Ceiltral Asia, so as to strike a crusliing
blow against our real foes, if proofs of our determination to operate against their weakest point
were insufficient to make tlleilz yield.
' The state of affairs is apparently serious ;
therefore, while resolving to illaint,ain a defeilsive
attitude on the Danube and in Asiatic Turkey, we
could do what we want by landing 30,000 men at
Astrabad for a march to Kabul in corijnllction
with the Tnrkestan troops. In this may we should
deliver the Russian army in Europe and in Asia
Minor from the clifficulties against which it fights
from time to time without success-on several
occasions in the course of every century.
I t is not for me to say how we should defend
the Caucasus against a Turkish invasion, nor how
long the army of the Danube should remain
strictly on the defensive in the midst of the helpless Clristian population of Turlrey ; but it is my
firm belief that :

PROJECTED
INVASION
OF INDIA

' (I)If the invasion of Illclia by a corps of
18,000 men is, under the present conditions of the
extent of British supremacy in Bindustan, possible
and desirable, though attended with risk, an invasion by an army of 50,000 men is absolutely free
from all risk.
' (2) From the cornmencelllent of spring mre
have on the Caspian the means to rapidly concentrate a force of 30,000 inen at Astrabad
completely equipped.
' (3) A large force can easily inarch froill
Astrabad to Eerat and Kabul. By bringing
political pressure to bear on Persia we rnight get
all our supplies roil1 Khorassan.
' (4) The Turkestan military district, reinforced
v i th six regiments of Siberian Cosuacks, three
regiineilts of Orenburg Cossaclrs, six compa~iiesof
iafaiitry, and one battery of artillery from Western
Siberia (mliich troops could reach Tasl~kentby the
spring), could send a force of 18,000 nlen with
artillery to IZabul.
"(5 The troops can be marched from Samarkand to the Hind~l-Kush, arid can be marched
.from Khulin through I-leibak, Kuram, and Bamian,
and across the Kara Kotal, Uancian Shikan, Ak
valley of the Kabul D a ~ i a . Altllough artillery has
been taken over the above-mentioned passes
.without special appliances, I have still given my
attention to this subject in order to facilitate the
passage of the guns. I am iiow able to state that
we have an easy waj7 of transpor~ingg~uis: yesber-
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day a four-pounder was slung under a newlydesigned cart, and a trial with il was successfully
made. We can only give an opinion on the merils
of this method of transport after practical experience in February next, when a trial is to he
made with two guns over the snow-clad mouiltains
in this district.
' (6) Shere Ali, Dost Mahommed's successor,
must necessarily contemplate the recovery of
Peshawar, and it is not difficult to raise all Asia
against India by a cry of blood and plunder."
' (7) Shere Ali is at present dissatisfiecl wit11 the
English.
' (8) These are scarcely more than 60,000
British troops in India at the present time with a
correspoildiilg force of artillery, and the native
army is rather a menace tlian a support to the
rulers of IIindustan.
' (9) The very appearance of even a small force
on the frontiers of India is sufficient to kindle a
rebellion, and to ensure the overlhrow of the
British dominion in Hindustan.
' I n my opinion all this should be talcen into
serious consideration at the present moment.
Xholtand, January 27, 1877.'

Such was the remarkable scheme prepared by
General Slrobeleff for the invasion of India from
Central Asia in order that the English might be
forced to abandon tlicir opp.osition to Russia's
designs on Constantinople ; and it will be shown
that this scheme was closely adliel-ecl l o at tlle time,
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when war between Great 13ritain and Russia becLme immii1en.t after the coilclusioil of the treaty
of San Stefano, and no better proof call tllerefore
be given that S1cobelefl"s sclleine correctly represents the opinions which were then held by the
Russia11 Government.
Skobeleff suggested that a mission should be
sent to Kabul ' to draw Shere Ali into an alliance
with 12ussia,' ancl this part of the programme was
carried out by the clespatcli of Colonel StolietolYs
embassy. Then, again, he recomi~iendedthat if tlie
Amir still aclllered to the English a,lliance, Abdur
nahman Klian sllould be put forward as a claimailt
to the Afghan tllrone in order that ' internal clissensioils inight be brouglit about in Afghanistan .'
Xven this clotail was attended LO, for shortly before
Stolietoff proceeded to Kabul, Abdur R a l ~ m a ~ ~
h'han-who was the11 living at Samarkand-was
told to submit a petition to the Czar's Government,
'setting forth that he had beell residing there (i.e.
in Samarkand) lznder the protection of the Russia11
Government, for a long tiilie ; that he had often
petitioned them to help him in securing the restitution of his ancestral territory from tlze A~nirof
Kabul, but his prayer had not been acceded to ; that
he had iiow heard that the Rnssiails were preparing
to figlzt against the British Governillent ; that they
liad sent envoys to wait upon the Amir to request
him to allow passage through his couiitry to the
Russians proceeding to Indis and returning therefrom should rlecessity for such a passage arisc ;
nricl that, such being the case, h e offered his seivices,
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in case His Highness refuses to grant the request of
the Russian Government, to capture Balk11 with a
small assistance from the Czar, and then to s~zbdue
the whole of Afghanistan, which is not a difficult
taslc.' Thus did the Russian authorities actually
take steps to carry out Slcobeleff's recommendation
. that Abdur Rahman Khan should be put forward
as a claimant to th.e throne of Kabul in case Shere
Ali was not found to be sufficiently pliant.
I t has also been' sliown how a Russian agent
was sent to India to commence the agitation which
the Russians believed-and
still believe--m~ould
cause the people of t.liat country to rebel against
the rulers who, for Inore than n century, have
endeavoured to raise them out of the depths of
ignorance i11 vr~hichthey live, and who, by good
goverl-iment and the peaceful development of the
resources of the country, have brought Inclia to a
conditioil of prosperity and conten.tlzzent which
has made the British rule in Hilliiustan to be a
marvel to other nations and a glory to the British
race; and it is only necessary now to show how
Skobeleff's proposals for the clespat.chof an expe,ditionary force towards the frontiers of India were
adhered to, even in so far as the strength of the
invading army was concerned.
011. April 25, 1878, the Russian Minister of
\Tar issued an orcler for t,he organisation of three
columns for the invasion of India from Central
Asia ; on the 15th of the foll.owing mont,h another
order Ijras issued for the formntion of eight battalions of infantry reserves for the reiilforcelnent of

'

1

f

the Turl~estanmilitary district, and for the augmentation of the Bashkir cavalry; and on Map 26
General Kaufmann published the following ' orders
of the day ' :' I n accordance with the orders of His Imperial
Majesty conveyed to me by the Rlinister of War
in his despatch of April &%, Sub. No. 10, three
active detachments are to be preliminarily formed
out of the troops uilder my command; the head
detachment a,t Samarkand, that of Ferghana s t
Margelan, and that of the Amu-Dariil at Fort
Petro-Alexandrovsk.
' The chief detachment;, under the command of
Major-General Trotzky, is to be colnposed of the
3rd, 5th, Gth, '3~11, and compound Turlcestan and
3rd West Siberian line battalions, and of two
companies of the 17th Turkestan line battalion ;
of the wllole Turl<estan Rifle Brigade and Sapper
Company ; of tile 4th ~ o r n ~ ~ o Orenburg-Ural
unj
Regiment of Cossacks ; of four sotrlias of the 2nd
Orenburg, aid of two sotnias of the 5th Co~npoun.d
Orenburg Regiment of Cossacks; of the 1st
3rd battery, and hdf-battery of the 211d battery
of the 1st Turkestail Brigade of Ar~illery; of thc!
mobile exercising battery; the 1st and fjt,llOrenhurg H,batteries, and one rocket battery.
'The Ferghana detachment;, under the command of Major-General AbramoF, ii$ to be composed of six companies of rifles, two sotnins of l;'he
5th compound regiment of Cossaclts, six pieces of
the Turlrestan mountain battery, and a division of
a rocket; battery.
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' The Amu-Daria detachmeu t, under the command of Colonel G~.otenhelm,is to be composed
of six companies, two sotnins, and four guns, to
be selected by the commancler of the Amu-Daria
district.
Tlle first detachment is to be concentra,ted at
Samarkancl, and to march from thence en dchelons
to Jam, and further, accordi~lgto instructions.
' TBc second detachment is to be organised at
Margelan, to msrcli through Vadil to the Valley
of the Kizil-SLI, and further, according to instructions.
'The third cletachnlent is to be formed at
Petro-Alexa~~drovsk,
and to march along the AmnDaria to Charjui, whence it will advance accol-diilg to instructions.
'The time of forination and advance of these
detacliments will be determined accordiilg to
exigencies, and vill be fixed by special supplementary orders.
' (Signed)
KAUFMANN.'
The principal column, which was intended for
the advance on Kabul, consisted of some 12,000
men of all arms, with 44 guns and a rocket
battery; Abramoff's corps, wl~ichwas to occupy
BadaBshan and Wakhan, and to make a diversion
in the mountainous districts round Chitral, was
1,700 strong ; and Grotellhelm's detachment, which
also consisted of some 1,700 men, was to have
operated against Merv and the Herat district,
Thus the whole army of invasion consisted of
YOL. 11.
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some 15,500 men, with 54. guns aild a couple of
rocket batteries-not
a very formidalole force, it
,is true, but one which, with Afghan assistance,
might have caused much alzl~oyanceto the English
that, if they loushed forward even :t sinall force to

/ horsemen.
While these colun~lls were being organisecl,
!
M. Weinburg visited Bokhara a d obtained the
Amir's promise that he would assist the lZussians in
every possible way; Colonel Maieff was sent forward to explore the country a i d routes b e t ~ e e i z
Salllarkand and the Amu-Daria; and Colonel
Matvaefl was also sent to Ballih ancl Badalcslian to
prepare the
for the aclvance of Abralrlofl"~
col~lnlll.
%.?
p*.,
The first &chelon of tlie 1nai.n colmnn commenced its march 'piom Tasllkeilt on June 13,
ancl after a march of nineteen clays, reached tlic
village of Jain on the Rasso-Bolcliara~~ifron.tic+r.
Tlic otlier detachir~entsfollowed shortly af'terw:u.cls,
In nddiiion to thcxe three columns opcrnting from Tnrltehhnn,
rtnothor force undcr Colonel Lornaltill s o t ont froin the R ~ O ~ GofA
tlie Ctlspinn 8cn for the purposc of o1)cmLing in tho Turkorrlr~n
country on tho northcrnfrontiers of Porsir~. 'l'liis expaditinn, wliic:l~
will be briotl y descrihccl in tho following cllnptc!r, wnf, l ~ o w c ~ c:Lr ,
miscmble 6~il[lrc:.
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and the whole of Trotzlcy's force was concentrated
at Jam and Sarikul,' where orders were received
that no further advance was to inade until the
result of the Berlin Conference was 1~1101n1. There
the troops were attacked by clyseiitery w d
typhus, ~vliilecases of suilstroke mere of daily occurrence ; soldisrs' fuiierals mere to be mitilessecl
every day, aiid ciuring tlie short halt in camp on
tlle Bol~haraii Srontier the Russiails lost on ail
average two men per day fro111 sickness alone.
Grotenllcl~n's detachmeilt had, if possil~le, a
more trying experience. Leaving I'etro-Alexudrovsk 011 July 27, the force proceeded along tlie
right bank of the Amu-Dwia over heatecl sancly
plains, encountering violent storins of wind wllich
raised great clouds ofsand, andwit11 the teinperature
at 42" Rkaumur. The drifting sand proved the
greatest obstacle to the inoveiiient of the troops,
the soldiers and horses sinking deep illto the friable
sand at every step, while the wheels of the guncarriages 53111~ almost to the axle-trees, which
rendered it extreinely clif%cult for the tired horses
to make allyprogress whatever. But in spiteof
these difficulties the Inen pushed cheerfully forward, in the belief that tliey would easily be able
to march to Inclia, and there gain a share of the
spoil which tliey were told was aaaitiiig them in the
rich cities of Lahore and Dehli.
But their hopes of gaining wealth at the expense of the rich merchants ancl i~ativeprinces of
India were soon dissipated, for, when they reached
This is a village noer Jem on the R~zsso-Bolrharnn
frontier.
rr 2
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Kizil-Robat!, news was received that the famous
Berlin Congress hacl concluded its work, a i d that
the representatives of the Great Powers hacl signed
a treaty whereby peace was securecl, and which
necessitated the abandonment by Russia of any
immediate attack on the British possessions in
Hindustan. The detachment; therefore retraced
its steps, and by August 30 the last troops of the
main column hacl also returned to their cantonments, and the projected invasion of India thus
came to an encl.
But although the Russians arrested the advance
of their troops, they had succeeded in raising a
storm on the' frontiers of India which led to a bitter
war between the English and Afghans ;for, as soon
as it became known that Shere Ali hacl received
the Russian embassy at K a b ~ ~arid
l , hacl publicly
discarded the friendship of the English for the
sake of a Russian alliance, the British Government
decided that a British missioil s h o ~ ~be
l d sent to the
Afghan capital to counteract the dangerous influence which Stolietoff was seeking to establish over
the Amir. On August 14, 18'78, Lord Lytton
therefore wrote a letter to Shere Ali, in which he
:mnounced his intention to send a mission to
Kabul under Sir Neville Chamberlain, tmd aslred
that it might receive safe conduct through Afgll:~n

By this treaty M U R R ~ Dobtainod the territories of Ardnhan,
ICars, and Batourn in Asia Minor; but was obligocl Lo relincluish
tho valloy of Ala~cl~lrnrd
and the tow11 of Bayazid, which had beon
cedod to tior by Arliole 19 of tho Treaty of Ban Rtchlo. The iown
1~[1(1
territory of I<hotonr, which hi~dlong bosn in dispute botworn
Tmlrey end I'prein, were t ~ l coded
~o
to the I'srainne.

-

. .-

-__

187 8

-

le f a m o u s
, and t l ~ a t
lac1 s i g n e d
znd wl1ic31
i a of a n y
jessions in
: retracedlops of t h e
:ir cantonIndia t h u s
he a d v a n c e
1 raising zt
1 to a b i t t e r
For, as s o 0 1 1
d received
id p u b l i c l y
s h for the
Iovesnmenl;
sent to the
erous i n f l u ablish o v e r
)rd L y t L o n
11 which lie
mission to
ancl aslc c?c1
1gh Afg11: L1 I
!s of A r d n h n n ,
1 to relinqu i s h

vhich had b c c ? r ~
UO. The f i 1 > \ ~ 1 1
ispute botw c: r a n

1878

BRITISHULTIMATUMTO SHEKE
ALI

101

I

-

-.---

territory and be properly received ; and again, on
Llie 23rd of the same month, he wrote a second
friendly letter offering his condolences on the death
of the Amir's son and heir. These letters, however, remained unanswered. The mission reached
Jamrud on Septeniber 21 ; but when Major Cava~ n a r irode forward with a sinall escort to Ali
Musjid to demaild permission for its advance
through the Kl~ylserPass, Faiz Mahomrned Khan,
the Afghan governor or the fort, stated that, he
liad received orders to oppose its passage by force
of arms, arid tliat, but for his personal frienclship
for Cavaanari,
he would have at once osenecl fire
on him ancl his aartv.
What follotvecl car1 1se told in a few words. An
ultiinaiurn was sent. to the Ainir, demanding an
apology for tlie affront tvhich had been given
to tlie British Government, insisting on the
recept:ion of a perinanent British mission in Kabul,
and claiming reparation for injuries which had
been inflicted on the Afridi tribesinan mlio had
attended the British envoys illto the Khyber Pass.
Sllere Ali was informer1 that unless a satisfactory
reply were receivecl. by November 20, he would be
treated as a declared enemy of the Indian Governrncnl;, and war would inevitably enspe. 'In the
ineantvhile the military ax~tJ~ositics
were not idle.
Troops were pushed Eor~vardtowards Peshatvar,
Thal, and Quettn, ancl preparations were made for
from those three points, if
a n iliinledinte arl\~:~~ice
the Ainir adhered to his llostile attitude. : : . .
But Nov~niber20calne and pafled without any
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reply from Shere Ali, and telegraphic orders were
therefore sent to the various military coinmanclers
to cross the Afglian frontier. Sir Salll~~el
Browne,
who comllla,ilded the Pesha~var field force, left;
Jamrucl at daybrealr on the Zlst, and attackecl tlie
enemy's positioil at Ali Musjicl, when a sharp
fight took place, t'he position being aballdoiled by
t11.e Afghans dui:ing the follomri~~gnight. Daklca
was then occupied without resistance, and on
December 20 Major-General Mnucle's clivisioil
entered Jalalal3ad. While the Peshawar column was
thus successfully advancing tllrough the ICllyber,
t.he Kuralll Valley field force, under MajorGeneral Roberts (now Lord Roberts of Kandahar
and Waterforcl) on December 2 defeated an Afghan
army which had taken up x strong position at the
Peimar Kotal, and 1;11e11 General Roberts pushed
reconnaissances as far as the Sliutar Gardan Pass,
which was the last mouiltaill defile which barred
his way t o Kabul. I11 t.he South, also, the Kanclahar field force, ui~derLieutenant-General D. M.
Stewart, pushil-tg forward across the Khoja Amran
range, reached the village of I<ushab (some seven
miles south of ICanclahar) on Jnlluarp 7, 1879, and
as Stewart there learnt that the Governor and garrison of the. southern capital of Afghanistail had
abandoned their charge and fled towards Herat, he
took possession of the city on the followillg day.
While the British forces were thus rapidly
advancing into the heart of Afghanistan, the miserable ruler of that Priilcipality gradually begail to
perceive that in allying l~imself wit11 R'ussia he
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1 1 ~ espoused
1
the cause of a treaclierous l ~ r o p l ~ ,
and
placed his trust in a ilation which is
perfidious in its dealings with its pohel-rul
neigllbonrs, and is therefore 11ot likely to lieep
its promises when the betrayal of a wealc ally
would enable it to esc.;lpe from a false and
darlgerous position. On account of the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin, Colollel Stolictoff left
Kabul on August 24 ; but even. then, mhell the
entire witl~dratvalof tlle lniesioll aucl disavowal
b y Russia of any further interference in Afglian
affalirs nzight have saved Shere Ali from the clisaslrous consecpences of his folly, a i d have avert,e(l
the iilvasion of Afghanistan by British trool3seven then, Colonel Rosgonoff ancl four other officers
re~nain.eclin the Afghan capital wit31 their Cossack
escort, ancl the Alnir was still lecl to believe that
Russia woulcl help him against tlle English. Thus,
cluring tile critical period \vhich preceded the outbreak of the Afglian mTar,the greater parl; of the
R~zssian elnbassy still rema,inecl ill Kabul, and
Shere Ali ~ v a ssupportecl by Russian advice in his
macl policy of defying Ellgland ; and then, wheii
the country was iizvacleil from three points, nncl it
was manifest that nothing could plrevcn t the ral~irlly
nclvancing British forces from seizinn the caljital,
P
the 1.ernainder of the 11-iission was wltl~d~:arnn,
al~d
Shere Ali in his hour of t~:oublewas forced to 11y
wit11 the111 towarcls t.21e liortl1.
I t is ilnpossible to unclerstand what Russia
expected to gain by this. action. i3acl the czar's
& ~ ~ . ~ r l l l u determined
ent
nt ill hazarrls to support
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Shere Ali and to assist hinl against the English,
their policy, however risky, could be appreciated ;
but by thus embroiling that ruler in a war wit11
: England, and then leaving hiin to his fate, the
Rnssians committed a mistake such as they
, had never before comrnittecl. in the whole course
of their Central Asian policy. Their action was
: nothing less than a gross betrayal of an ally, aiid
',the history of Stolietoff's mission will long be
rememberecl. in Afghanistan to the discredit of
Russia and as a lasting prool of the t~qeacheryand
faithlessness of the Government of the Great
White Czar.
On December 1 Shel-e Ali, on receiving news
of the fall of Ali Musjid, sent his family to Mazari-Sherif in Afghan Turlrestan, and twelve days
later he llimself left Kabul and started northwards,
accoinpaniecl by the E~xssian embassy. E e intended to go to Tashlrent, and, if possible, to St.
Petersburg to lay his case before the Czar, but on
reaching Mazar-i-Sherif lle brolre dotvn, and there,
died on February 21, 1879, an outcast from his
people, and bet~ayedby the great nation whicli
had used him for her own ends, and the11 cast him
aside when he was no longer useful. The wretched
fate of Shere Ali will long be remenibered in
'Afghanistan, and the day will inevitab1;y come
when Russia will have cause to regret that, in pursuit of her own ambitious designs, she once proved
to the Afghan people the worthlessiless of Russian.
promises.
ShortJy before Shere Ali fled from Kabnl, he
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-.-released his son, Yalroob Khan, from the confinement in which he llad for many years been lrepl,
and appointed him to act in his name. For several
weeks the Indian Governlnent lrnew nothing as to
the intentions of this 'Regent,' and as there were
rumours that he intended to continue the war, the
operations of the three il~vading armies were
carried on. While the Peshawar and Kuram
columns mere occupied in subjugating the tribes
in the neigllbourhood of the Khyber Pass and
Kurain Valley, General Stewart advanced northwards from Kandahar and occupied Kalat-i-Ghilzai,
while General Biddulph marched westwards to
Girishk on the river Helmund.
Rut in February Yakoob Khan at lellgtll nlade
overtures for peace, and after some interchange of
letters he eventually announced his intention of
proceecling to Ganrlamalr for the purpose of entering into a conference for the settlement of the
terms of peace. He arrived there on May 8,1879,
and was received with tJze greatest honour and
hospitality, and on the 26th of that month he
signed in the British camp a treaty of peace, by
which it mas agreed that in return for British
support against foreign aggression and an annual
subsidy of six lakhs of rupees the Amir would
conduct his relations with other States in accordance with the advice of the Indian Government,
and would permit a, British resident, accoinpanied
by a suitable escort, to reside in Kabul, while
other British agents could also be sent to the
northern frontiers of Afgl~anistanon special occa-
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-~ i o n s .I t was also stip~latedthat the ICura~~i,
Pishin,
and Sibi Valleys should be assigned to tlie Britisli
Government, the Alllir receiving the surplus revenue after payineilt of the expenses of administration ; a11cl t l ~ e13ritish autllorities were also to
have complete coiltrol over tlle Khyber a i d
niichili Passes, as well as over tlie iildepeildeilt
frontier tribes in whose territory those passes are
situated. Telegraphic c o ~ ~ ~ i n u i ~ i cwas
a t i oto~ ~l ~ c
established between ICal~ul and India vih the
ICnram Valley, and a separate agreeinelit regartling conimercial facilities was conclucled for a
period of twelve moatlls.
0
1
1 tlie conclusion of tliis treaty the two
northern clivisioils were at once withdrawn withill
the linlit-s of' the new frontier, but it was arranged
tlixt the evacuation of Kandahar sllodld be delay eil uutil the followiilg autumn, in order that;
tlie troops might be snvecl froin tlie sickiless
and llardsllips to wliicll they would liave been
exposed if they had been fol.cec1 to rlzarch through
the Bolan Pass during tlie great heat of tlle
summer montlls.
Thus eiicled the Afghan War of 18'78. Shere
Ali, driven fi-om his throne, had fallen a victim to
Russian intrigue and treachery ; the cliploillatic
lnissioli wliich had been sent .to Kabul 'by the
rRussian Governiiieilt in the hope that the British
'
power ill India might be shalren, had beell a c,om2
plete failure, and Russia had been discredited in
the eyes of a11 the peoples of Central'Asia ; . a.nd
the Euglish, by their ~ i c t o r i o u s carnl-mign in
'
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Afghanistan, had secured a better frontier on tht:
north-vest, and had overt11~0~11
the B , ~ z s s o - A f ~ h ~ ~ ~
allinlice.
Before leaving this subject it is llecesssry to
refer briefly to an argument which has beell freely
made use of by certain people in England, vlio
illvariably try to find sollle excuse for IZussia's
actions in Ceiltral Asia, even if such actions are
notoriously ui~scrupulousand clevoicl of any real
j~zstification. These persons, in their aiuriety to
clefend Russia, do not even hesitate to disparage
the actions of the British ailcl India11 authorities, Pr
a i d at times have given cause for h e uzlpleasallt
suspicion that Russian roubles can bbuy the s1ip110rt
01 men wlio profsss to be true British subjects.
When Stolietoll?~lllission was sent to Irlabul, and "
during the sullllller montlis of 1678 wl~eiiwar
ancl peace were hanging in the balance, there were-+%s
1
many sucli apologists of Russia, who strove to
inculcate the doctl-ine that the Czay's Government '
were perfectly justified in cloing what they did, '
with a view to tlie immillellt outbveczli of hostilities i'
i
between England ancl Russia.
It is not the intention here to cliscuss wlletlier
the Russian Goveniment under such circn~nstallces
were justified in violating the agreement of 1873
ancl the solemn assurances ~vhichwere give11 in
1869, and repeated time after tillle since tliezithat ' Alghaizistan vas con~pletely outside the
spliere within which Rnssia iilay be called upon to
exercise ller influelice,' ancl that ' Russian agents
sl~ouldnot visit Jilabnl.' On this l~ointopinions
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may differ, although it is possible that Englishmell
miglit unallimously object to a Frellcli occupation
of Belgium.in tlle event of a crisis arisil~gin the
reliltions between France and Germany. But,
whatever doubts there may be on this point, it is
clear that as soon as the Treaty of Berlin had been
signed tlie Russian mission should have been. at
once withdrawn froid Kabul ; and as these friends
of Russia have carefully avoided all reference to
the continuance of Russian officers and Cossaclcs
in the Afghan capital for five months after the
conclusioa of the Treaty of Berlin, it inay be
' interesting
- to nlei~tion a few facts which will
display the absurdity of their arguments, and
ml~icll shoulcl prove to unbiassecl minds that,
altllough the Russian Government in the Grst
illstance seiit Stolietoff's nlission to Kabul 011
account of the probability of war with Great
Britain, they, even after all danger of war had
beell removed, coi~tii~uecl
in their violation of their
previous solemn proillises of coinplete non-intervention in Afghan affairs, and strove to improve
their positioil i n Central Asia at the expense of
their good name.
On July 2, 18'78, Lord Loftus had rn interview
with M. de Giers at ' S i ~ e ~ r s b u r gwhen
,
the
British ambassador inquired
any Russian
envoy h a d beell ordered, either b y the Imperial
Government or by the Turkestan authorities, to
proceed to Kabul. To this question-although
Colonel Stolietoff had left Taslllrent for Kabul some
six weelrs previously-M. de Qiers replied, ' Tfmt
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the words used permitted of' only one iaterpretation. The Russia11 seiistor said : ' Everything has
been stoyy~ed-the political as well as the military
~xecautions.' Tllus it, call well be believed that
Lord Salisbury was astonished ~ v h e nCo~zntSchouvaloff, in the course of conversation on Decelnber
1 0 following (four months afterwards), casually
1 1.einarlrecl that ' altllougli the Eussian envoy who
had bee11 sent to Afghsnisttln had been recalled
to Russia, the Russian mission still remained at
! I<abul.'
I t is doubtful diether any episode in the whole
history of Russia's dealings in c e n t r a l Asia wore
clearli establishes the truth of Prince DolgorulcofYs
~vorcls,that in Russia ' slavish subjection and arbitrary force reign from top to bottom ; and throughout there is developed, in formidable proportions,
the official lie-the
lie erected into a political
institution. ' Before the sigliature of the Treaty of
Berlin, and long after Stolietoff had startcd from
Tashkent, the British Government were told that
no such mission had beell or was intended t o be
sent to Kabul; then, a month after the conclusioii
of the Berlin Congress, they were informed thal
all political as well as military precautions had
been stopped, and they vere thus led to believe
that the Russian mission to Kabul had been withdrawn; and Ilien, four months after tliis last declaration, it was casually reinz~rlced by Coulit
Schouvaloff to Lord Salisbury that, although
Stolietoff liad returned lo Tashkent, the Russian
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e!nbassy still remained in Kabul in spile of the
,repeated assurances tllat; Russia u~ouldnot interfere
in Afghan affairs. Who but a paid Russiall agent
call be found to attenlpt any justification of .L;lle
prolonged stay of tlie Russiall lnission in t'he !
ifgha11capital nfrcr tlre sigllnture of i e 'Treky of 1
I3erli11? Aricl can anyone, even in tlie pay of ':
Xnssia, be fouild xrho
be bold enough to say
:iiiytliing ill defence of the ~l-~islcading
st~ate~iie~zt
which mas mczde to Mr. Pluillcett on August 14,
1878, by M. de Giers?
Russia, in violation of lier previous pl-oniises,
retained tlie R~lssia~i
eri1b:~ssy ill Icabul for five
mont;lis after tlie coilclusio~lof tlle Tre:~t,yof Berlin.
Nor was this all. When tlint treaty llad beer1
conclucled, and after the troops for the l~rojectecl
invasion of Iilrlia llarl reLurned to their cantonments, Colonel, GroilelroiT, tlie chief of the staff' of
the proposecl iiwailiilg arniy, left Snmarkancl wit11
General I<auii~iann'sperillissioll on October 9, 1878,
and, tr,zvellirig in his uniform a's a Iiussisil s t a r
ofElice~.,crossed tlie River Oxus nine clays later, :111cl,
l~assiingthrou glxMzzar-i-SherX,S.iripul,and Maimcznn
with an esco1.t or Afghan troopers, made
way
a, -cvarm reception
to Herat, mllere he
from the Afghan g0~7er110rBIIC~iullabitants. Tliere
lle rei~iaineclfor tlil.ee clays, during which period
lie was perinittecl to exalnine the city and to make
a. thoro~zghsurvey of its forLi.ficatjous ; and then
he leisurely continued liis jourriey to Meshed, and
t,llei~ceto .Astrabad. This o:ffic-,er,on llis ~-et,nrnt,o
Russia, TVRS 110t gre(:teil with t , h ~oflicial ~ ~ l ) u l < i ! s ,
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which have been accorded to many British officers
who have unclertaken sirnilar journeys in their
desire to advailce British interests in the East. ; but

another Russian move towards the frontiers of
Thus it will be seen that Russia's nlovements
in Central Asia in 1878 caiznot be attributed solely
t,o the necessity for precautionary measures with a
view to the outbreak of hostilities with Great
Britain, wlnicl~was then imminent. The Czar's
Government seized the opportunity to make
another step forward i11 the direction of India.
But the bold policy of the Beaconsfield ministry
provecl. that they had been premature in their attempt to establish themselves in Afghanistan ; and
d t h o u g their miserable and deserted ally, Shere
Mi, justly paid the penalty for his defiance of the
British Government, it must always remain a disputed point whether Russia should not also have
been called to account for her wanton violation of
her promises, and for her open support of an
enemy of the Indian Gov.erameat.
Since this was written Gxodekoff has been transferred from
the Syr Daria District.
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UNSUCCESSFUL CCdfPAIGN AGAINST TTTE TI<ICI(I?S

R~~ssia's
L n ~ i s s i' oin
~ ~Asia-Lomalrin's expodition-Retreat alld
disaster-Loss of Rusfiian prestige-General Lazareff's expeaition against the TelrlrBs-Lasareff's death-Loinnltin talsos $110
commmd-Misrnaaage~uer1t and hcompetency-Thirsthlg for
a glorio~lsvictory '-The ' Colossns of May ' and tho ' p i p y '
of September-A bravo defencc-'rho
slanghter at Dengl~il
TepB-Reheat-Lomalsin's
last chance lost.

SICOBELEFF,
in his faillous project for the iiivasioil
of India, suggestecl. that wlzile the columils from
Turkestan were advancing across the Hindu-Kush
Mountains, another force, consisting of ' several
l)attalions, wit11 G guns to every 1,000 men,' should
be despatched from the Caucasus, to operate in the
Turkoinan couiltry on the northern borders of'
Persia ; and this recommendation was not lost
sight of by the Czar's Governlllent vhen h e y
resolved, in 1878, to malce a cl.emonstration agaii~sl
India. But altl1oug.11 the Turkoinail expeditioil oS
1878 v a s tiined so that the Caucasus troops, by their
ahrailce into the Alcllal country, could keep the
Tel&Bs in check, and tllus in a, measure protect
t l ~ eright flalllr of the Turkestan columns, this
campaign luust be considered in conllectioil wit11
T'OL. 11.

I

b

the great design w h i c h for many years formed a
postlion of Russia's p o l i c y in Central Asia, and
which had for its object t,he subjugation of the
whole of Turkomania and the absorption of a11 the
remaii~ingterritory to t h e south of the 0x11s'which
was not included w i t l i i n the recogilised limits of
Persia and Afghanistan. The nussinns had, from
the time of their first perinanent occupation of
I~~asnovodsk,been m o s t persevering in their
efforts to get a footing in the Alchal country ; ancl,
while they annexed little or nu territory to the
east and north of t h e O x u s since the conquest of
I<holraad, there was no peace in Turkonia~liauntil
Skobelefi crushed the ~ e k l r h s at Pengllil TepB,
and till Merv itself had become a ~ u s s i a i
town.
I t is therefore iiecessary to again revert to
the consideration of t h e actioils of the Russian
officials i n the Trans-Caspian Militaly district, aiid
to review briefly tlie operations of the various expedi tionary forces which were from time to tiine
sent against the T e k k 6 Turlcomans.
In the whole h i s t o r y of the Russiall advance
from Europe towards the borders of Hiizdustan
there is n o phase ~ v h i c l is
l more worthy of careful
consideration than the Russian operatioils which
1.esulted in the c o n q u e s t of the Turkomans of
Alrlial and Merv, and which ellcied in the establishrrlent of Russian g a r r i s o n s within easy striking
distance of Herat, the ' Key of India.' For this
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display in their endeavours to extend their Enlpire
in Asia, and the manner in wliich they aclllere to a
certain fixed line of policy in spite of repeated
checlss ancl disasters ; it is full of exalnples of the
manner in ~vhicllthey violate their pledges when,
by so cloing, some territorial aclvarltages can be
gained ; it clisplaj~sthe subtlety with urhicll they
gain tlie subinissioll of liostile tribes ancl obtais
possessioil of important strategical centres by
means of carefully-conducted intrigues, and by the
ernploymeilt of so-called ' traders ' as diplolnatic
agents ; it affords a lessoil as to the lllanlier in
which they carry out their ' civilising mission ' in
Asia by the remorseless butchery of innocent
l~Tomelland children ; ancl it also shows how the
Eaglish people, in their intense anxiety to avoid tho
horrors of a great mar, actually per~ilittedtlie
Russians to appropriate a portion of Afghanistan,
and allowed them to take up positions from wliich
they will be able to o c c ~ ~ pthe
y fertile valley of
Berat hefore a single regiment can be llloved
west of Kandahar.
Before describing these eveilts it is necessary
to mention that oil April 5, 1575, Prince Gortcl-~alcoff inforn~ecl.the British Government that ' .His
Imperial Majesty has no intention of extending the
frontiers of Russia, such as they exist at present i11
Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on
the side of Ifi~c~s7zovodsslc
and of the Atl-ek.' This
declaration was made at a time wheu no particular
anxiety was displayed in England ou account of
Russia11 moven~eiits in Cel~tralAsia, and it W:LS
r 2
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therefore acceplecl as a proof of the Czar's sincere
desire to abstain fro111 furtl~eracts which migilt
create suspicioii or darn1 in the miiids of the
English. Such assurances, however, have frequei~tlyheen but the preface of renewed aggression;
and in the follom~iiigpages it mill be shomln how
this promise r a s broken, nut1 how the Einperor did
extencl his frontiers beyond Krnsnovodsk.
As has been already related, General Lomakin
i11 the autuilin of 1875 inarched doag the barilrs
of the Atre]., and, after visiling several encampments of the Yoinud Turlromans, aclvaiicecl as far
as Chat at tlie confluelice of the Atrek and Sulnbar
rivers. Shortly after he had returned from this
reconnaissailce the Tekkks of Akhal warned the
other tribes of Turlroinans I T ~ O inhabited the
country between Kizil-Arvat aizcl the Caspian Sea
that they would Be extermiliated if they eilterecl
into friendly relations with the Russians; and
therefore in the autuinn of 1876 a Russian detachllleiit was once more sent to Kizil-Arvat, where it
was illtended tliat a permanent garrison should
be establisl~ed,ostensibly for the protection of tlie
tribes which mere friendly towards the Russians,
but in reality for the purpose of extending Russia11
influence over the Akl-~al
TekkBs theinselves. This
expedition, however, was not a success ; for tlie
TeklrBs asseinbled in force, ancllnade snch persistent
attacks on the Russian column that the coininaiicler
was forced to return; and after he had reached
Krasnovodsk tlie Tekkds pillaged the settlements
of the tribes m~hiclifavoured Rnssian rule.
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Lo~nalrin, therefore, on Felsruary 16, 1877,
issued a proclaination to the elders and chiefs of
the Yomud Turkomans, cleclaring his intentioil of
advancing against the Telrkds to punish them for
their attacks on the tribes wllicl~clwelt in Russia11
territory ; announcing his deterininatioil to construct a fort at Kizil-Arvat, and to retain a perlnanent garrison at that place; ancl calling upoil
thein to supply 1,000 camels for trailsport purposes.
Thus, while the Chancellor of the Russian
Empire was declaring that there was 110 inteiition of extencling the Czar's doininioils f~-omthe
direction of Krasrlovodsk, the Governor of the
Trans-Caspian Military district was loudly proclaiming his intention of marching against a
neigllbouring tribe, and of establishing a perlnallellt
military garrison in one of their chief settlements.
Such is the rnanner in which Russia has operated
in Central Asia for tlie last thirty years, or, more
correctly, throughout the whole course of her
Asiatic history. While the Ceiltral Government
have been preaching peace, the frontier oiEcials
have bee11 waging war ; and meanwhile the Czar's
Empire llas been steadily expanding, and all the
petty States in the heart of Asia have been
swallowed up to satisfy the Muscovites' insatiable
lust after territorial aggrandisement.
Early in the following April Lomakin left
Krasnovodslr with a large force, and carried out
his intention of occupying Kizil-Arvat.
Noor
Verdi Khan, tlie leading Akhal cl~ieftaia,theu
assembled a large force of Telrkds, and on May 24,
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with some 6,000 men, delivered a determined
attack against the Russian detachment ; b u t t h e
nomads, in spite of their bravery, could not s t a n d
before the fire of the Russian artillery and breechloaders, and, after a fight which lasted about four
hours,. they were driven back in hopeless confusion, after some 800 or 900 men had been lzilled,
wounded, or taken prisoners. But, although they
liad been thus severely defeated, the Tekkks llaci
no intention of abandoning the struggle. T h e y
shortly afterwards re-appeared in greater force,
and after besieging Lomakin in his camp, finally
coinpelled him to bury his gulls in the sand
and retire in disorder to Krasnovodsk, when t h e
Turkomans hotly pursued the retreating Russians,
nncl even b~oclsaclecl Krasnovodslc for several
tveeks.
This reverse occurred just at the time when t h e
prestige of the Russian ilatioil had been g r e a t l y
wealcened through Osman Pasha's victories a t
Plevna, ancl on account of the precipitate r e t r e a t
of the Russian armies i11 Asia Minor after t h e
battles of Halijas (Tahir Keni) ahd Zewin. No
troops could be then spared to reinforce t h e
garrisons on the eastern shores of {;he Caspian,
dild the knssians for several months were obliged
to maiiltaiiz a strictly defensive attitude, ancl t o
rest content with the bare occupation of t h e i r
fortified posts on the sea coast. But before t h e
close of the year all danger had passed away.
The Turkomans, finding that they were unable to
drive the Russians into the sea, retunled i;o t h e i r
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homes; and when Kars had been captured, 2nd
the tide of victory llad once more set in in favour
of the Bussians, Lomakin was sumlnoned to Tifjis
to receive the Grand Dnlce's orders regarding a
fresh campaign against the Alclld TelclcBs, which
was intended to obliterate all traces of tile previous l%ussiail defeats, ailcl to permanently establish
3lnscovite influence tllrougllout the wester11 portion of the Tekk6 country.
111 accorclnnce wit11 the instructiolls whicl~
were then issued, the greater portion of tile
Krasnovodslc garrison was reinoved to Cl~ilrishli~r
in the early spring of 1878,ancl additional troops ,
were also sent to that place from the Caucasus;
then, as the clouds on the political horizon grczcl.ually became blacker and more threatening, the
'l'raiis-Caspian forces were still further reinforced ;
and, fiiielly, when the Russian Government resolved
to coiiililence a hostile' movement towards the
frontiers of Inclia, the small expeditionary colurn~l
wliich had originalIy been inteilcled for the occupation of Kizil-Arvat, and for tlle prevention of
raids by the TelclrB Turkomans, became transforlried into a considerable force, which was to act
as circ~unstaicesmight require in connection with
I<nufi.naml's irivaclirlg columns. ICrasnovodsk and
Chiliis1ili:a were soon crowded with troops of d l
:urns, ailcl Ijy the encl d July everytliing was reacly
for tlle projected invasion of Turlcomania by a
Xussir~rlforce of some 6,000 men and 24 guns.
Ei~rlyOIL tlle moriling of August 3 the camp at
Chilrisliliar was struck, and the column co~rimenced
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its march, screened by strong bodies of Cossacks,
Kirghie, and Tnrkoman militia. Karaji Batyr was
reached at ten o'cloclr on the following morning,
and there twenty-seven wells, containing excellent
water, were found at the foot of a ilunlber of
liillocks which rise out of tlie surrouncliiig tract of
friable sand. Having talren in a goocl supply of
water the column left this camping-ground on the
next day, and, after a l ~ l a r c of
~ l ten miles, arrived
at the post of Raiat I-Iaji, on the banks of the
Atreb. There the troops relnainecl for a weelc,
nnd tlien contiriued their advance aloilg tlie riglit
bank of the river, past Yagli Olunl alicl Dairanl
Olum to Chat, which is situated at the junction of
the Atrek ancl Sumbar rivers.
The Russiaus reluaiiled at Chat for over a
week, during v~liicliLillie General Lomaldn llialle
a reconnaissance along the upper valley of the
Atrelc to ascertain if it mould not be possible to
reacli Asltabacl, and to l~enetrnteto the eastern
limits of the Turltoinail co~ul~try
without being
obliged to fight liis way along tlie plains to the
ilorth of the Kuren Dagh range. I t would have
1,een a iiinller of tlie greatest advantage to tlie
lZussiaiis if an easy route could have been found
dong tlie Airel< Valley, for they coulcl then l~nve
sirnck a suddeil blow at the very I.ien,rt of the
Teltk6 settleineizl,~withont being exposeil to lengtlly
arid harassing operations against the Turkom:~ils,
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But althougli Lomakin found that the c o ~ u t s y
was eininei~t~ly
suited for military operations so far
as forage and water were concerned, it was soon
seen that an aclvance could no1 be made in that
direction unless several months were first spent in
road-malring. For a distance of about thirty-three
iniles beyoncl Cliat no difficulties were encountered
by the reconiioitring party ; but at a place called
Su-Sium they came across two enormoils rocks,
which rose abruptly out of the bed of tlie river,
mcl sharply defined the change which there took
place in tlie geological formation of the country.
According to a ct~rrespondentof the ' Moscow
Gazette,' who was apparently attached to Lomakin's
staff, the Atrek, which below Chat was of a clisty
green colour, 'here became clear, tlie becl stony,
aiid the banks coverecl with rich vegetation ; the
grass here grows up to one's waist, and whole
copses of oak clot the surface of the country.
Wild grapes also grow in abundance, and pheasants
are also numerous.' But althougli the country
was pleasant to look upon, ancl appeared to be a
perfect paradise to the Russian soldiers, who had
just crossed the sandy desert and saline marshes
which lie between Chikishliar and Chat, it was
foui~clqnite unsuitable for the passage of an army ;
for at Su-Sium the road becmne impassable for
camels, ancl seven iniles further on it became
difficult even for horses.
Lomakin, however, still pushecl forward, in hopes
of finding a less difficult country farther on, and it
was nol until he had marched 72 miles beyvnd
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Su-Sium-that is, to a point 105 miles above C h a t
-that he eventually determined to abandon t h e
Atrek line of advance, and to march northvr7arcls
towards Kizil-Arvat. Retracing his steps, he t h e n
marched down the river to a place called Alun
Yalc (14 miles from Chat), and thence marched
across the Sugun Dagl~range, which rises to a
height of 2,000 feet above the sea level, and forms
a mountainous wedge between the Atrelc a n d
Sumbar rivers. The main column had in the
meanwhile moved along the ba~llcsof the Surnbar
to Khar Olum, and was there joined by the reconnoitring party, and, after a night's halt;, the whole
force advanced past Sharol Dau to Belr Tep&, a
prominent ridge-one of the spurs which run o u t
from the Kuren Dagh range into the country
between the Sumbar and Challclir streams.
From this point it was necessary that the movement should be collducted with the greatest caution,
for the route to the Akhal country passed through
a series of long ancl dangerous defiles, which are
' severally known under the narnes of Dairon,
Nisl~ikSund, Turugai, and Kuvmius,' and which
' present most dangerous places for caravans,' as
' the road winds tlirough them dong steep ascents
and descents ; and only two horses can proceed
abreast at one time along it.' Lomakin, however,
successfully carried his column through these
passes, and on September 2 encamped at Klloja
Kala, which is described by the correspondent of
the ' Moscow Gazette ' to be ' an old deserted eartliwork in the shape of a regular quadrangle, Banked
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by two conical crenelated towers about fourteen
feet in height, the upper platforms of which are
protected by a low wall pierced with apertures for
musketry fie.' Two nziles to the south of this
there is another similar fort of smaller climensions,
ancl will1 one flanking tower, standing in the centre
of cultivated and well-watered fields, the water
being obtained from a small rivulet which flovr7s
tllrougli the neigl~bouring bushes and reeds and
ul~i~nately
reaches Khoja ICala.
Froin I<lloja K d a detacliments were sent out in
all directions : Icizil-&vat was visited, and reconnnissailces were pushed forward towards Eami and
Ueurina ; while otlier parties visited Bendesen, and
from neigl~bouringmountaills obtaiiied good views
of the Althd oasis, and were able to examine the
Teltki! forts of Bami, Beurma, and Kara Kala.
But Lomakin's position was at this time one
ol consiclerable difficulty : his supplies hail run
short, and Ihe neigllbou~ingTurkomans of Kara
Iialn aucl Tarsakan ref~lsecl to comply with tho
Iiussian requisitions; the force suffered greatly
fi-om sicliness and disease; ancl large bands of
hostile Teltkds soon appearcd in the neighbourlioocl ancl obliged tlie Eussians to withdraw their
:~clvnnccclparties, and to concentrate in the neigh1)ourhoocl of Ir'ara Icala. Even tliere Lomalcill
fh1111cl that he could not possibly maintain his
position, and he Ihercfor e infornzecl the Teklrds that
lie would retire to the Casl~ianif they would permit
llirn to hoist the llussian flag in their country and
le~ivea garrison to protect it. Tlie nomscls, how-

ever, scornfully rejected this demand, and, gathering in thousands round the Russian camp, closely
blockaded it for several days, and eventually
forced Lomakin, on September 20, to coininence a
retireineilt towards the Caspiaa. T l ~ ecommencement of this retrograde step was the signal for
more determined attacks on the part of the Turlcomans, w11o harassed the column during its retreat
tllrough the defiles of the Kopet Dagh, and continued tlieir attacks until the cleinoralisecl Russia11
troops gainecl shelter behind the intrellchineilts a t
Chat. There a short halt was made, and then,
leaving a garrison of GOO men at Chat, Lomaliin
continued his retreat towards the Caspian. Unt
as sooil as he hacl marched out of the fort the
place was closely besieged by large masses of the
TekkBs, ancl the main column was also chased past
Raiat Haji and up to the very guns of Chilrishliar,
where the remnants of the Russian army arrived in
a completely demoralised condition. Hundreils of
soldiers diecl from disease alone during this ~mi'oortunate campaign, aiicl many more were lost during
the retreat ; while the Turlcomans carried o r large
numbers of camels froin the immediate neighbourhood of Chikishliar. Througl~out tlie followirlg
winter the small garrison at Chat were closely 1x3sieged in their intrencli~nentsand cut off froni a11
comillunication with the Caspian. Tlie Tek1ti:s repaired the fort of Khoja Kala, and for some tiirle a
large body of tlie noniads remained t'licre in expcctation of a renewed allt,zclron tlzeir settlemerlts; thry
rxiacle constallt raids down the bu~llrsof tllc iltrck,
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and even appeared before Chilrisliliar, 011 olle
occasion forcing the garrison to abanclo~lthe place
and take refuge in their boats.
Thus ended this disastrous calnpaigll against;
the Teklcds of Alrhal. IZussian prestige in Celltral
Asia had indeed faller1 to a very low ebb, and it
is necessary to go baclr to Simonitch's attaclr on
EIerat a i d to Perovslri's disastrous expedit;ion

to Caspian on the west, it was know11 that the
ambitious designs of the Great White Czar 11ad
been frustrated. The rendition of far-distant
Kulja was claimed by the Emperor of China, who
threatener1 to wage, war if his cleinancl tirere not
complied with ; Afghallistan was once more occupied by British troops, a11cl Shere Ali, driven from
his throne and deserted by his treacherous allies,
was flying for safety towards Bolrl~ara,accompanied by the members of the Russian mission
w110 had offered so rlzuch but had done so little
when the time arrivecl for the fulfilment of their
pledges ; the Rnssian columns wllicli had beer1 sent
forward with so much ostentation, and which were
to have carried the Russian banners to the gates of
Dehli, liad returiied tritllout even crossing the
Oxus, ancl then stood fast in their caiztonments,
while the British armies clrove tlie victim of
Russian treachery- fro111 the throne of Afghani~t~nn;
the Russian army whicb had beell sent to crush
tlle Telik6 Turkomans hacl heel1 driven baclr in
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disorder to its base; and, in addition to these
many troubles, it was iloised abroad tl~roughout
the Mahommeclan states of Asia that the British
Government had stepped forward to save Stalnboul
from a Muscovite occupation, and had forced the
Russian armies to fall back wheil tlie defenceless
city lay almost in their grasp.
Rut, although the campaign of 1878 against
the Ald~al Telckd Turlromans had been most
disastrous, the Russians had no intention of submitting to the defeat without making an effor~
to regain their lost prestige. The very illagilitude
of the disaster, in fact,, compelled thein to at once
talce steps to break the power of the Telrlrds ; ancl
when the result of Lomakia's last campaign became
known, i t was decided that General Lazareff l
should be sent to take commai~cl of the army
whicli was being asseinbled on the eastern shores
of the Caspian for a fresh advance against the
Turkoma~ls. The newly-appoiatecl commander1 This was the officer who made the brilliant march round
tIie righi, flank of Moukhtar Pasha's position on the AladjaDagh in the last Russo-Tnrlrish war. He was born in 1819 at
Sheesha i n the Trans-Cwcasian province of Elizabetpol, and
saw a large amount of fighting during the operations against
Schamyl, t h e famous Daghestan chief. He was a man of gigantic
stature, and powerful in proportion to his size ; he was full of
enorgy, breve almost to recMessness, and invariably led his troops
to the attack in the same manner as Skobeleff did; but he had a,
most violent temper, which a t times broke out in perfect storms of
H e had been twice wounded in action, m d had been
presented wit11 the second and third classes of the Order of St.
George, besides numerous other decorations; and at the close of
the Russo-Turkish war was prolnoted to the rank of AdjutantG-enerd, and made Comuander of the Second Caucasian Army
Corps.
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in-chief set out from Baku early in April 1879,
and, after a passage of forty-cight hours, landed
at Chikishliar, where h e was received wit11 the
usual salutes, and was welcomecl. at the pier-head
by a body of friendly Turkomans, who presented
bread and salt and sacrificed six sheep in toke11
of their friendship towards the Russian general.
He, cluring the day, liberated soille Turlcoinan
prisoners who l~acl.been seized by Lonlalcirl as
hostages for four Russian soldiers who had been
captured by the Telrlcds ; and at daybrealc on tlie
following morning he set out for a rapid reconnaissai~ceof the country between Chilrisliliar ancl.
Chat. Accompanied by an escol-t of two sotiiias
of Cossaclcs and eighty irregular horse, the
general and his staff travelled at express speed in
a couple of carriages past Ksraji Batyr ancl Yagli
Olum, ancl. reached Chat at noon on the following
day. There he remained for twenty-four hours to
settle the details for the advance of the expedition ; and after reviewing the garrisoil he returned post-haste to Chikishliar, ancl witl~in an
hour of his arrival on the coasl lle had elnbstrlced
on the steailier ' Ural,' of the Caspian flotilla, and
w,zs steaming nor~hwards towards Krasnovodsk
to confer with Lomalcin as to the conduct of the
approaching campaign. Proin Krasnovodsk he
returned to Tiflis to arrange for tlie clespatch of
troops and stores from the Caucasus ports to
Chikishliar.
Owiilg to general mismanagement, as well
as lo the difii(;ull,y in obtaining camels, a con-
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siderable delay occurred, and it was June 18
loefore the advallced guard, uilder tlle cornma~~d
of Prince Dolgorou.lcofl', set ofI' fro111 Clhikisliii:~,
and August 11 before tlle main body started.
The total st;rength of the force coilsisted of
164. battalions of infanLry a i d sappers, 22 so(;nias
of cavalry, and 24 guns, giving a 1;ol;al of
18,000 men of all arms. Tlle advanced
passing through Clmt, reached DUZ 01~111 0 1 1
June 29, where the troops at once colninenced the
coi~structioilof a bridge across tlle river.
The main body inarched along the banlcs of the
Atrek, vid Bevou~lBashi, Gudri Olu111, and Baiat
Eaji, t,o Chat, m~l~ich
was reached on August, 18.
The main body of the expeditio~laryforce did
not remaill long in this inhospitahle region, but,
pushed on rapidly towards Khoja Iinla. Duz
Ollznl was reached by h e infantry c)il August 21,
and the cavalry brigade reached Lhe same place
on the following day. The advanced guard in
the meanwhile llad push.ed forwarcl towarcls the
Alrhal Oasis, and on August 20 Prini:e Dolgoroukofl
encamped at Bendesea, sixteen iniles to tlle east
of Klloja Kala. On the following day lle pusllecl
across the passes with his cavalry and a conlpany of infantry, seized the Telrkd Iorts of Ba~tli.
and Reurma, and, marching throughout; tlie wholo
of the following night, surprisecl a Tu~~Icolila~~.
eilcampment at the Niaz wells at datvil 011 tllc
2 3rd, when, after a short engngemerlt, some 3 0 0 ol'
the nomads were killed or wonnilcil, anzd :1.,20(1
camels and G,000 sllr?ep were! cal)t,urecl.

DEATIIOF LAZAREFF
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Just at this tirne, when the Russian troops
were arriving 011. tlie Inorders of Lhe Aklid counLry,
a, melsilcholy event occurred, which for a time
threw a deep gloolll hver (;he whole force anil
over~llelmecl all rnnlrs of the army with grief
const;crnation. Qenernl Lazarell', R ~ I O mras
grea,(;ly beloved hy his soliliers, nnil who 110ssessed in n remarlialole degree the: confide~lceof
all ranks of liis followers, was destined to be
one of the first victims of I;he l)oisoneil air and
impure water-supply of tlle clesola1;e e11c:~mpment;.
on the borders of the Caspian Sen, where Ille
army had bee11 forc,eil to remaill cluring the mont11,r
of June and July. Shortly hefore t-,lleinnin coluin~l
left Chikisliliar he was at,taclrecrl by a pniilf~ll
lualacly, and, in spite of an operation, it was
founcl that his systein had l~ecomeso cnmpletely
l~oisonecl tllat; llollliiig shnrl; of c,ornplete rost;.
ancl careful trentmellt could lmssil~lyrestore Ilillx
to health. This, 2io11~ever, would have n.ecessitateil the reliilrluisliii~entof his coinm:~ncl-at all
events, for n considerable time-and, as lle could
the enterlrisr:
not; bear the itlea of :~lnn~iiloning
which he was al~outto cnmmencc!, ;LIIC~which he
l,ulicvc(l he r:onld successfully ncconiplish, 11(!
macle up his illiilil to 1111~11forward so long :LH
he had strength to move. A few (lays nfi;ar t,lio
ol~erntioiilinil beell l~e~f'o'ormetl
he comlnenccid t l ~ e
i;rjrillg jounley to Cllnt; :md, a1t;liough the dist,ance
was Lr:~rrcrseilill an ol)c~rcnkl,cho, lie was so 111.0lie1l
do~rlzwith pain :111.(l H ~ C I C I L ~ S S01.1 llis arrival at
i , l ~ ~(lcs(,)lat,c!
~ , t ~ sl)oi, idl:~I, i,ll(, soldi(?s,s11:~l1;o r;arlsy
VOIi. IT.
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him from the carriage to the commandant's tent.
The strain proved too much even for his once
powerful frame, and before the next clay had
dawned Ivan Davidovitck Lazareff, one of the
bravest soldiers of the Czar, had passed auTaya victim to his unflinching fortitude and constant
adherence to duty.
After LazarefYs death the command devolved
upon General Lomakin, who was the next senior
oficer with !;he force ; and tllus, by an extraordinary piece of good fortune, Lomakin found
himself in a position to wipe out the memory
of his previous defeats, ancl to re-establish his
reputation as a military commancler. Ue, however, failed to seize the opportunity, and the overwhelming disaster' which soon befell the Russian
army before the Tekki: fortress of Denghil Tep4
obliterated his last lzopes of obtaining military
distinction, wiped out the memories of his successful advance against Khiva, and caused his
, name to be mentioned in Russia with indignation
9,
,I and contempt. Lomakin., indeed, possessed but
',it,little talent for command. When he ailvancecl
rI 'i towards Khiva from the Kinderlinsk Bay, in 1873,
' * there were many brilliant oficers attached to his
column, who, by their energy and military alitributes, ensured the success of that undertal~ing;l
but since then, when these officers were enlployed
in other parts of the Empire and he was left
I t is sufliciont meroly to mention tho n e n ~ e sof Slrobeleff and
Grodekoff to show lh&lLomnlcin wtts served in this anrnl1nig.11 by
n
some of tho best oficers in the R n s s i ~ ~nmnly.
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to his own resources, he was almost uniformly
uns~~ccessful
in his military ventures.
Ldzareff had intended to conc:entrate his force
near to Khoja Icala, and there to halt until supplies
ror two nloilths had been accumulated at an aclvailced base on the horclers of the Akllal country,
so that the army could be free to act against the
mosh clistailt orl lions of the Telrlrd Oasis, aild
even penetrate to Merv itself if such a slep mere
founcl to be necessary. But after his death this
plan was abandoned ; and on August 31, when
the wl~oleof the expeclitionary force had arrived
on the frontiers of the Akhal Oasis, a council
of war was held, at which it was decidecl that
a sinall coluinll should cross the Kopet Dagh
Mountaills by the Kozlinslri Pass, near Bami,
and, by a rapicl and unceasing forward movenzent,
force the Telrlrds to a general engagement, in
which it was expected that they would be clecisively defeated and subjugated once and for
ever.
I n accordance with this determination the
scivancecl guard of the 'Akhal Teklrh detachment' illarched out of the camp at Bendesen at
daybreak on September 3, and on the following
inorlliilg the main body also commenced its marc11
lowarcls Bani. According to General Loinalrin's
report of the operations, the force whicll was
einployed in the actual illvasion of the Akhal
c o u n t ~ yconsisted of 2,467 inrantry, 850 cavalry,
271 artillery, ,znil 202 militia, giving a grailcl total
or 3,790 well, will1 12 guns slid 8 roclcet-stands,
Ir 2
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The rest of the army was left s t various l~oints
011 the road between Chilrishliar and Bendesen
to protect the line of commuaications, artd, as
AliklisnofF very truly remarked, 'the Colossus
of May had by Sel~teiuber 9 becolue recl~~ced
to the cliineilsioils of a veritable pigmy.'
The i~lunclers which had been illnde nf; tlte
co~nluellcementof the cainl~aignsooil bore frnit;,
and the Xussians were about to real) n t c ~ r i l ~ l c
harvest from the initial mistakes of the milit,ary
oficials and because of the iiicoinl~etence of
Lazarefs successor.
I-Iad Loiuaki~l adllered to IJazareff s origiital
design the force .would probably have l~eeii
obliged to halt in the vicinity of IChoja Iialn for
some ~nonths,2,s-with the inadecyuate supply of
transport animals-the large quantities of stc)~:es
tliat were necessary coulcl not possihly Iiave 1,een
accumnlated on tlle frontier before the close of the
year. fIe was amrare that he only llelil the command temporarily, by virtue of his superior 1.ailk,
and that a new comrnai.~cler-in-chiefwould sooll
arrive 011 the scene, when he ~vo111illose llis last;
chance of distinction ; ancl as he was naturally
anxious to wipe out liis previous disgrace, it c:ul1101; be woilclereil at that he sl.tould have cleciilud to
try and silatch renomrn by rl~nkiilga suilil[?~l
i1;~slt
al; the Teli'lrk stro~~ghold.I11 this ilecision lie TI~:IS,
no clonl~t,slzpl~ortcdby tllc nclvice of tllc :~n11:1i1;io~1s
Court-soliliers by mrlloln lie was sarrc~u~~tlotl
; :uttl
as there w:~s1leiLllc:r t r : ~ ~ ~ s l )ilor
o r t s~qq~li(:s
1,w i,Itc
T11o CII~LLI
C I LIN
~
IJILLL~O
of' 1)o11:hi1 llol)h,
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farther advance of the wllole army, it thus
happened that a weak brigade puslled forward
from Benclesen to try conclusions with the brave
people who had on so lllally previous occasions
preve,nted the Russiails from establishing themselves in the Akhal country.
Passing througl~Bami, Beurnia, and Artchinan,
the advanced guard, 'under Prince Dolgoroukoff,
reaclled the Telrkd settlement of Dnrun on Septelnber G , after a slight brush with seine 300 TekkBs at
a place called Begreden. The Turkomans, who were
unrler the leadership of one of their most renomiled
chiefs, namecl Kara Uatyr, had merely aclvanced
from Denghil Tep6 for the pul-pose of observing
the illovellieilts of the Russia11 column, and as sooil
as t11e Cossacks pusllecl forwarcl to meet them they
llastily fell back alld got away without any loss.
The main colupn, under Count Borcll, reached
~ u r u non the following day, ailcl oil September 8
tlle whole force aclvancecl as far as the small Tekkd
fort of Yaraji, which is tllirteen miles to the west
of Denghil Tepd, where it was well known that
the TekkBs hacl resolvecl to make a stand.
No one .iu the lZussian camp at that time knew
how far the enemy's stronghold really was, sild
while some saicl it was only nine miles distant,
others declared tllat it was three times as far.
Bxsggeratecl rumours also began to cil-culate as to
the strength of the enemy, and it was reputed that
fifliy thousand armed men liad been gathered
together to dispute the further advance of the
Russian column, ancl hacl solemnly vowed to con-
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quer the infidels or to die in the attempt. Every
man in the force felt that the task which was
before them would not be an easy one, and that
unless they gained a victory over their desperate
foes they would be in a perilous and, perhaps,
inextricable position.
During that afternooil anotlier couilcil of war
was l~eld, and it was then arranged that the
advanced guard should comnlence its marc11 tomards the Tekk6 fortress at three o'clock on the.
following morning, and that the main body should
follow an hour later. But, in spite of the orders
-to this effect which were issued, Prince Dolgoroukoff -accompanied b y General Lomakin, Prince
Witgenstein, and the headquarters' staff-marched
from Yaraji with the advanced guard a t two
o'clock on the morlliilg of September 9, while the
main column, uilcler Count Borch, did not start
~ultilG A.M. ; and thus, although Loinakin Phew
full well that the eneiny was only a few miles
distant, the marching orders were, for some inexplicable reason, igaorecl, and the small Russian.
army advanced up011 the enemy in two detachments, separated from each other by a four-hours'
march. Can anyone who possesses the most rudiThe baggage-train~consistingof 3,500 camels-advanced a t
n short distance behincl Borch'a col~unn. It was escorted by six
companies of infanhy, olio sotnie of Cosseolts, and two mountain
guns, the whole under the command of Captain Iccgemoff. The
advanced guard consisted of some 900 infantry and five sotnias of
cavalry, wilh six guns and eight rocltet-stands; slid the main
column was composed of about 800 infant~y,two sotnias of
Cossacks, and a detachment of irregular horse, with four guns..

I

I

;Ii
Ij

!!

I

11
I/
1

.

i

!I

-1879

A SERIESOF I ~ L U N D E R S

I35

mentnry knowledge 01military matters be surprised
tllal a disaster occurrecl when the day's work
began with such an extraordinary blunder T
Tlle remarkable :tdvnilce of the force fro111
Y:iraji to Denghil Tep6 w:is the first mis t,alce which
rllarlrccl tlic 11:ijr's l>ro~cei[iilgs;but it was not
the o~ilyoilc, [or cl~lsiiig tllc s~~bser~ucilt
battle
Tloin:ilriil, ill his grc:it ailsiety to will a ' glosious
vic:lory,' :ic:l.ed wit11 ,z sec:kless walit of jndgmeut,
wliich brongllt :ibout his owl1 discomfiture, c~illlil
turned wI~:LL
sliol~ldhave bccn a certaiil viclory
illto :in ovcr\vlicliliilig del'e:ir;.
It is a 111:~xinlill C:inc:isi:iu warS:tre tllal wllerl
an c ~ ; : i i i i i t is nt,tac:lred one side sllould
always Lc lclt opcn to perinit the defenders to
csc:nl)(:, in orclrr i;li;~tt l l ~ y111igllt tllcll be attacked
ill tlle ope11 wliilc retrcnting. I3ut olic of Lomakill's
lilxt : ~ c t s (311 ;irriviiig wit11 t l l ~ac1v:incecl guard
1)eforc tdle TekkQ strol~gliolclwas to sencl the
c:~v:ilry ru1~11(1
Lo the soulll-cnslern angle of the
lortress, t u dkhl)rive the 1101n;~ds
of 1J1~ir011ly liiie
of rclrcln(,. Ilaviilg tt.lins1)eilllccl iIhem in 1.llcir illtre1i(:li11~(~1its,
lle co11nllc:ncctl the 1,onll)arclmcnC of
ill(! l)l:~c.cj,:ind 1 ) o ~ ~ nr ~1)erf'
d e'cc~train of lnissiles
11110111,11c: rlelise 1li:Lsses or liul1i:u1 I)eillgs ~rllowere
l~~~tltll(:tl
tog~t11(>1+
1)cllilld ill(! low (11:iy ramparts.
'l'llr! c~llilc~t
ol' this 1ir.c: was trc!lllcwtlous ; each shot
lwot2uc~ctl 111(? ~ I ' c ; L:S~
L ~ (l(!v:~st:itio~~,
the ki1)itlr:rs
IVOIY! Lorn 1 o l)i[j(lc!s,:iri(l t l ~ o
sl:iiigllt(~rwas 11orril)lo.
'l'l~(! I ~ I ~ I ' u ~ ~~L~IoIiL~ :l :~t11(!11
~~( ,l s~triixl
! to l~r(h:~k
out o l
I],,! :LII~,'
:LTI(I
I ~ ~ ; L S ~ OS
C : Stll(8111 wcw?soc!~ito I)(; 11yiilg
I oiv:wtls Xsk:d,a(l. 1 3 1 ~ tI licly \v.\r(!r(!r[l~i(:Ir[ysl.ol)l)c(l
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by the cavalry ancl. forcecl. to return to the forlrcss,
wliich was still niacle tlie target for the Xussian
shells. TelrmB Sirclar, a 1.enegaile Turlroinaii chief,
who was at the time i11 tlie Russia~lcamp, tllcii
begged that the bol~ibarcli~leilt
iniglit be disc011tinued, in order that he might proceed to Dengllil
Teyk to iiiduce his cou~ltrymeilto al~aili[oil tlie
unecl~xalcontest. His offer was, liowerer, ~*eSused,
ancl the fieaclish slaughter coutinued. Tliis ~ v a s
the state of affktirs at tliree o'cloclr i11 tlie nfternoon, wheil Count Borch's colnmil arriveil before
Deaghil Tepk.
After these troops had restecl for a short wliilc,
they were placed in positioii along the nortllerll
front of the fortress ; a~lilat 4 P.M.-IV~ICI~ the
l~o~iibarclment
had lasteil for nearly four hoursthe Turlcoinan women aud children streaine(1 out
of the ' aul ' in the hope of passiilg tlirougll the
Xussian lines ailel escaping; ancl a t aboul tlle same
time a deputation arriveel before the Russinii
l~ositioii, aslring that the artillery might cease
firing ailil that negotiations iiiigllt be entereil into.
' The beautif~~l,
swarthy Telrlr6 wonien tllrew thcnlselves on tlicir lrilees at the feet of the llussiail
i,roolwrs, liolilii~g forth iii their haids suclrlii~g
l)abes, a11il iinploring the soldiers in nil urllriiowi~
tong:.ue to have iilercy on thein. llows of cainols,
l~envilyladei~,lay exteiiclecl alongsiile, c~lle~ving
tllc
cud aiicl llowling wit11 their i[isagrucal)lc voices.
Tlie weeping ol' tho ol~ili[reil,the? crics ol' tllo 01(l
men, llie il('ip11i11gof I,IIc ~ ~ O I - S111(1
C ~ 1111111(
S , 1 ~ 1 'of
the canlion a11c1 riflc firi~lg,1lii11glcclall in Lerril,)lc+
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rmi~ble.' Such is the descriptioil of this piteous
episode which was given by tlie corresponcleilt of
the ' Novoe Vreinya.' But the writer then goes on
to relate that all were turned baclc to the " aul."
Arecting were these scenes ! But tvar will always
reinain war.' Such, indeed, is war as waged by
nussia in Ceiltral Asia. Inoffensive women alld
1it;tle chilrlren were rutlilessly hulltecl back into
t,lle set,tlement, so that the butcher's bill might be
increased at the exliense of humanity, ailcl in order
l;liat the very ~nagnit;udeof the slaugllter miglit be
pointed to in proof of the greatness of the expected
viclory.
The Telrlrd cleputatioil was also turilecl back,
:~il~
after
l
the bombarclinent hacl been mnintained
wit11 iilcreasecl fierceness for anotl~erhour Lomakin
gave orders for the place to be stormed.
This decision ancl the rllailller in which the
assault was delivered were the crownillg mistakes
of the battle. I t was little short; of machess for
1,400 Russian troops to attempt to assault a
fortilied enclosure clefendecl by some 15,000 men,
who were cut oE from all cllailce of escape, who
lalew fuCul well that they coulcl expect no quarter,
~ I L wlio
L I hacl beell driven to desperation by the
.terrible rnassacre of their wives %nil children.
rl?licbonibar~lmeilthad clone its work ; and if the
:~ssaulthad not been clelivered tlie Teltlcbs would
(

c

Altho~~gh
tlio IZn~eicmform boforc Donghil Tcpd was aomo
8,000 ~trong, only 1,400 lrian ntlvnncod to tho a~tlanlt. 'rho
roiri~~i~liler
coalprisod 111 cnvdry nncl tlio oticorL of tho buggagetrain.
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cert;ainly have either surrendered at discreti011 or
have endeavoured to escape during the night, in
which case they could have easily been overtaken
by the cavalry long ere they reached Askabacl.
But as the ' Moscow Gazette' very sagely
remarked : ' In giving the order to sLorm, tlie
disposer thought, as the oficial statement puts
it, " that the combined and prolonged action of
twelve guns could not but inflict; enormous losses
un the enemy, and produce on him an overwhelming impression ; " in consequence of ~vhichthere
was reason to believe that "the population and
clefeiiclers of Denghil Tep4 were dreacly recluced
to an extremity which would force thein to dfer
US complete submission."
Rut this is dl worclsmere words. Reduced to preteiided " ext;remity,"
" struck with panic," the eneiliy " continued from
the walls everywhere a strengtl~ened fire," wliicli
could hardly have been accepted as a symptom of
cleinoralisation. This .strengthened fire was more
against the advisability of an attack than in favour
of it ; and the same also with the " news received "
of the intention of the enemy to abandon the " aul."
I t only remained to increase tlie cannonacle an<1
to take inensures to overtake and disperse on the
open plain the infantry of the enemy, wlio, as
tlie aKair at Denghil Tep6 clearly deinonst,~nt,cd,
could not withst,and 121e shock of our infalltry.
T l ~ edisposer seemecl to be f~igl~tenedlest Dcngl~iZ
Tepk sl~oz.dd come into OUI- possession zoitl~ozdt uu
ussclzdlt.'
Precisely so. An assault was necessary in
-
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order that the finishing touch might be
to
the ' glorious victory ' which was expected, ancl so
that Lomakin and his lieutenants migllt p i l l
clistinction.
But although the assault was a mistake, the
lllaniler in wliicll it was carried out was still more
faulty. Ills tead of concelltrating his force allcI
niaki~lga determined attack at one point of tlle
works, the 'disposer' puslied his troops forward
in a long weak line, without nny supports, and
even without scaling-ladders, although nunlbers of
these useful articles hail been brought forward
froill Y araji, nlld could have been utilised cluring tlle
assault. Tlius, wllen tlie attaclring soldiers reached
the first line of obstacles, they soon got separated
into small detached g~oups,and, in spite of their
brave efforts, were qnickly cut down or driven back
by tlie overwllelming numbers of their enemies.
The fall of evening put an end to the battle, and
tlie reinrln~ltsof the Russia11 army then gradually
concentl.ated in a camp about a lnile from the
fcirt1-ess,where they spent the night in momentary
fear of attack. But the TekkBs were too fully
occupied wit,h their own inisfortunes to have any
dasire for further fighting. The night; thus passed
ill silcnce, a~zlwhen the following morning dmvned
Illo Ti~zssi:~i~s
were ill full retreat towarcls Ihe Atre'k.
r.I.hns
>
eiitlecl this clisnstrous coinpaign of 1879
;l.p~insl;1;11c! Tolrkd Turliomans of the Akhal Oasis.

All !.llr: Russian troops were soon afi;erwarcls sent
I..,;~ctlr1.0 t,l~c!C;':~ucssus,will1 the exception o' eight'
bllttaliolls whicll were left to guard the line of
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fortilied posts between Cliikisliliar and Duz Olu~n;
ancl on January 8, 1880, General Tergoukasoll;
who had been appoiiited to succeed Laznref,
arrived in Tiflis to confer with the Grancl Dulre as
to 'the arrangements wliich had to be inade for a
fresh cainpaign against the brave clefeiiclers of
Deiighil Tepk.
Loillakin had thrown away his last chance, a i d
he soon disappeared from off the Ceiltral Asiaii
stage amid the execrations of his countrynien, ancl
with no one to defend tlie feeble tactics ancl merciless concluct which were clisplayecl by liiiii 011 this
nieinorable 9th of September, and which were the
chief causes of the terrible disaster which then
occurred. Alikhanofl', who was present during the
action, has said that ' the ~.vholecourse of the battle
of the 9th of September, fioni beginiiing to encl, was
in defiance of the coinmonest elelneiltary rules of
the art of war,' ancl such uncloubteclly was the case ;
axid, in addition to this, the whole course of the
by such pitiless severity, ancl
action was ~na~rked
by such a wanton aiicl unnecessary destruction of
human life, that Loinalii~l's cliscomfiture call oidy
be collsiderecl to be a just retribution for the cruell;y
which ninrlrecl the clay's proceeclings.
Such is the story of t h e iiiiserable failure 11ofore tlie Tekk6 settlement of Denghil Tep6. The
whole expedition had been lliisrrlanagecl from l ~ e ginning to end : the troops llncl beer1 collectccl
at the base before they were recluirecl, t l ~ etransport arrangcinents llacl bee1.1hulty, :mil ~11011i l
siviall detxchrx~eiitwas eventually brougllt face to

1
I!,
I

I
I

face with the enemy, the Russian solcliers were
sncrificecl tlirough the feeble tactics ancl incompetence of their lcncler. The 'glorious victory '
xrllicll had heen expectccl was ilot won, but in it,s
steacl a cr~slliilgclefeat llnd beell sustainecl ; the
eilorlrlous clcstruction of huinbil life and the
wailtoil inassacre of iiiiloceilt women nilcl cllil(Ire11 llnd unexpccteclly f:iileil to czdv,ance Russian
interests; arid tlic close ol l,l~eyear 1870 foui~il
i,lle Telrlr6 Tnr1coni:~llsof Alrllal still inclel)cni[ci\t
of Muscovite coiltrol.

CIIAPTER XTrl
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Murder of Sir Lonis Cavagnnri at Icabul-British
operation^ in
Afgllanistan-March to ICandallar, ancl dofeat of Ajrub I<l~nt~'s
army -Controvoxey on the retention of I<andahm-British
withdrawal from Afghanistan-New Russian aspedition against
the Telclcb Tnrlcomans-Trans-C~apiail Railway cominencodSkobeleff's ndvance to Dengl~ilTepd - Capture of Ihe fortress
and slangllter of the TelltBs.

WHENthe treaty of peace between Great Britain
ancl Afghanistan was signecl by Yakoob Khan at
Gandainal~011 May 26, 1879, it was generally
believed, both in Xngland and Russia, that British
supremacy had been definitely re-established in
Afghanistan, and that there was no immediate
prospect of any fresh collision between the English
and Afghan armies. I t . is true that no one expected that the new order of things would be
accepted b y the whole of the turbulent inhabitants
of Afgl~anistailwithout some clisplay of hostility
towards the Amir, for it was well known that
there were several factions which were opposed to
the new ruler of the kingdom of Kabul. Such a
co~iditionwas, however, unavoidable, and the probability of civil war would bave been equally greal;

if any other claimant to the throne had been chosell
instead of S11ere Ali's third son ; for no chief ever
{rained possession of tlie Afghan throne until he
b
first cruslied his rivals ancl. t11u.s demonstrated llis
aljiliLy to upliold liis position by force of arms.
13ui; al~houglithe onlbreak of intertribal Tvarfare ancl. faction fights was believed to be by no
i1leai.s improbable, it was nevertheless generalljr ,
consicl.erer1 that, among all the possible claiinants
to the throne, Yalcoob I(1ian was the one who m~oulcl.
prove llzost capable of mnintaining his l~ositional~cl.
authority ; ancl. tllere were reasonable grounds fo'or
tlie belief that he would wisely abstain from furtller
cluestionable correspondeizce anci iiltrigues with
the Russian authorities in Central Asia.
I
1
1 Russia, dso, the settlement was believed to
be so advantageous for the English, and therefore
so unsatisfactory from a Russian point of view,
that tlle Muscovite press was flooded mitll articles
on the triuillph of English policy in Central Asia,
i11 wllich tlie writers were unable to disguise their
lnortification at the cliange wliicll 11d tklcen place
i11 the political situation. They displayed consic1er:thle alarm at the resullts which had been
brought about by the sigr1al;ure of the Treaty of
Ganclamak, aiiil soine even went so fnr as to suggest tlie possible extension of British i~ifluerice .
tlrrouglioul; E ~ ~ s t c rTurkestaii
n
rind as far north as
the 'l!lliaii-Sllan Mo~ull;ains.
13ut ~vliile the Ellglis21 were concrratulating-~g
P
tlici~~sc.lves011 the suc:c:osd~~lco~iclusion oi' an
alinc~sl;blooilless campaign, nnil wliile llie JX~ussinns
'

were discussing the best means of counteracting
the advantages which had been obtained by
Englancl, intelligence was received from India of a
terrible event, mhicli caused a profound sellsation
tl~rougl~out
the civilised world ailcl recalled to
memory the dark days of 1841, ~ v l ~ eBuriles
n
and Macnaghten were treaclierously murdered a t
Kabul, and when Elphinstone's brigade was aanihilated in the wild passes of Eastern Afgl1ai1istai1.
011 Septenlher 3-i.e. six clays before Lomakin's
defeat at Dengliil Tepd-Sir Louis Cavagnari, the
newly app oiatecl British Resident at Kabul, together with the oficers of his staff and the whole of
his escort, had beell slain by the fanatical populace
and solcliery of the Afghan capital.
I t is not necessary to enter illto details of this
treaclierous deed, or to describe the sulssequenl;
military operntioi~swhich were carried on fAr the
P U ~ I O So
~f avenging Llie murcler of the British
elivoy and his devoted companions, and for the
re-establishment of British supreinacy tliroughout Eastern an(! Nortl~ernAfghanistan. I t is sufficient merely to state tllat by the 11th of the
following lnoilth tlie Kuraili Valley field force,
under Sir Frederick Roberts, had twice defeated
the Afghails and liacl occupied Kabul ; Yalcoob
KIlail was del~osedand serlt to India ; ailcl, after
the British troops llad occupied the couiltry for
several montl~saiicl had sonie severe figl~tins,it,
was filially decided that Kabul slloulcl be evacuated
slid hailcled over to Abclu~Rahman Khan, wllo
would be recognisecl by the Iililiall Govcrnmellr; as
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Amir of Afghanistan,' but that Kandahar tvould
be placed uncler tlze independent rule of a Barakzsi
princes2
But five days after Mr. (now Sir Lepel) Griffili
had p~lbliclyannounced ill a clurbar at S1lerpur
tlzat the Indian Government recogllised Abdur
Rahman Klzan as Amir of Kabul, Ayub I<han,
with a large army from Eerat, defeated Burrow's
brigade a t Msiwancl ; I<anclalzar was shortly afterwards besieged by the Eerat troops; and Sir
Donald Stewart, who was corninanding the British
forces in Northern Afghanistaiz, received orclers to
despatcl~ a strong division, under Sir Frederick
Roberts, to relieve the garrison in the southern
capital ancl also to scatter tlie forces of the dangerous Herat chieftain. While General Roberts
Early in 1880 it was rumoured that ~ b h u rRahmau Khan,
wl~ohad for ,so many yews been a refugee m Russian territory, had
left Samarkand, and it soon became known that he bad crossed the
Oxus and was endeavouring to gain the support of the pe0pl13 of
Afg11o.u-Turltestan. The British authorities at Kabul shortly ufterwar~lsentered into negotiations with him ; and, althougl~he at first
&splayed a very considerable amount of mistrust as to the intentions of the English, he eventually advanced slowly towards Kabul,
and on July 22, 1880, it was formally cleclared, at s, grand d ~ ~ ~ b a l at Sherpux., that the British Government ' publicly recognised Sirdar
Abdur Rahman Khan, grandson of the illustrious Dost Muliommed
Khan, as Amir of Kabul.'
I n April 1880 Shere Mi, the Afghan goverilor of Kdndahar,
and cousin of the Amir of the same name, was informed, in n, lotter
fioin the Viceroy of Indin, thaL he wns recognised by th6 British
Government as the independent ruler of Kanduhar. He was told
that a railway would be constructed to connect his capital with
India, that a British Resident would be appointed to his court, and
that a British force would be mainiained at Kandahar. He was
styled the Wali,' and a monlll later be was invested with the
insignilt of hie dignity.
VOL. 11.
L

was hastening soutl~wardsAbclur Rahn~anKhan
reached Kabul, and Sir Donald Stemrart, with the
remainder of the Bengal troops, evacuatecl his
positions and marched towards Inclia.
Although Sir Frederick Roberts, by his brilliant
forced niarch to Kandahar and subsequent victory
over Ayub's army, relieved the British garrison
under General Primrose a i d removed all imneiliate danger froin tlie direction of Hernt, the
recent events causecl the Governnient to reconsider
the question of the retentioil or abandoilmellt of
Kanclallar. In the previous April the Beacoilsfield
Ministry had been defeated, ancl had beell succeeclecl b y the Liberals, who viewed with serious
misgivings the forward policy of their predecessors
with regard to Afghanistan. I t was cleclared that a
prolonged occupation of Kandaliar would endanger
the stability of British rule in India, on account
of the increased expenditure wliich would be incurred, and because it was believed that % u c l ~an
occupation would lead to still further extensions
of the British frontiers in the clirection of Herat
and towards the Hindu - Kush, with incessant
military operations and constant conflicts with the
inhabitants of the countiy. The press, both in
England and India, was floodecl with articles on
the subject. Everyone who had any knowledge
of Central Asian affairs, ancl many xho had none,
joined in the controversy ; ancl while some
adduced reasons to show why the retention of
Kandallar mas of vital importance for the safety
of Inclia, others endeavoured to explain hotv the
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Indian Empire would assuredly fall .to pieces unless the Government decided to scuttle from the
country and revert to tlie old line of the Indus.
I t was not long before the Glaclstonian Ministry
announced its deternlination to witlldraw Prom
every portion of Afghanistan, and tl~isdeclaration
was soon followed by corresponding action. The
Khyber was handed over to the marauding Afridis ;
the Kurum was placed in charge of the Turi clan ;
and soon afterwards K a n d a l ~ aalso
~ was evacuated
and cominitted to the care of Abdw Rahlnail
Khan, the new Amir of Kabul. Strategical aclvantages were abandoiled for political considerations.
The idea of a Russian invasion of India was said
to be a question which oiily coilceriied future
generations, as it was stated that ' the probability
of our having to slruggle for Herat or to clefella
India from Kaildahar is so remote that its possibility is hardly worth considering ;' ancl, in accordance with these optimistic ideas, orders were issued
for the discoiitinuarlce of further work on tlie
proposed railway towards Kanclahar,
Such was the state of affairs in the early spring I
of 1881 ; ancl while the British Governmeat were
thus flinging away the fruits of the Afghan War,
which hacl cost tlle country soille 18,000,0001. and
hundl*eclsof valuable lives, nem7s was received that
General SkobelefY hacl captured the Tekk4 stronghold at Dengllil TepO, and had coinpletely broken
the power of the TL~-lcomms
of the Akhal Oasis. -1
When the Russiall govern men^ received intelligence of Lomakin's defeat at Dengllil TepQ iu
L

2

September 1879, they at once began to prepare for
a fresh campaign against the Telrkds. For the
next few months Tergoulrassoff was busily engaged
in withdrawing the sickly ancl. demoralised troops
who had taken part in the expeditioli, and i11
making arrangements for the safety of the Russiail
posts between Chilcishliar ancl. Duz Olum. In tlie
following Marcli General Slrobeleff was appointecl
to the command of the field army in the TransCaspian region, and on May 7, 1880, he left Tiflis
ancl. proceeded to the eastern sllores of the Caspian.
Profiting by the experience gained in the previous TekkP, campaigns, Skobelef determined to
advance cautiously and systematically, and to
make no decisive attack until he had prepared an
advanced base at the western extremity of the
Akllal Oasis, and hacl there collectecl. such troops
and stores as might be considerecl. necessary for a
prolonged cainpaigii. In accorclance wit11 this
idea he, shortly after his arrival in the TransCaspian Province, proceeded up the Atrek, and,
pushing forward with a detaclinlel~tfrom the advanced post of Duz Olum, on June 9 ot:cupiecl
Klioja Kala, and after a furt;lzer march of two days
reached the TekkP, forts of nami and Beurma,
which were hastily abandoned by the inllabitnnts
on his approach. He then c o ~ n m e ~ ~ cthe
e d csection of a fortified store clepbt at Bami, ailcl on
June 28 made a reconilaissniice ia the clirectioii of
Artchnian, which was evacuated by the clic:my
afber a sliglit skirmisli.
111 the meanwllile tho Russia~ls cxpc~;icncetl

-1881

TRANS-CASPIAN RAILWA<' COMMENCED

149

great difficulties on account of the scarcity of
camels and other means of transport. To overcome this, General Petrusevitch, who had succeeded Loinakin in the civil administration of the
Trans-Caspian district, devised a service of traction
engines and wagons for the carriage of stores from
the Caspian to the advanced store depbts. Tliis
scheme eventually expanded into a more ambitious project for the construction of a tramway
between Chil~ishliar and the AMlal Oasis ; and
finally, when Skobeleff decided to make Krasaovodsk his base of operations, General Annenkoff,
tlie Controller of Military Transport, suggested
that a regular line of railway sl~ould be constructed froin Michaelovsk to Yizil-Arvat. This
proposal was approved of by the Russian Government, and as one hundred miles of railway plant
were lyiag idle at Bender it was decided that this
mathiel should be utilised for the purpose. In
this way the Trans-Caspian Railway was begun,
and althougl~it was originally intended as a temporay line for use during the war, and was looked
upon as a very doubtful experiment, it has 'since
developed into an excellent broad-gauge railway
connecting Central Asia with Buropean Russia, by
nleans of which the military resources of the Caucasus can be speedily transferred to the borders of
the Herat province of Afghanistan, and which thus
materially increases the aggressive power of Russia
in Central Asia.
But allhough some *forty miles of line were
laid by the middle of November, Sliobeleff 11ad to

depend on camels and carts for transport purposes,
and it was not until December tllat he was ready
for the final advance against the TekkB stronghold
at Denghil TepB. He, however, made another recollllaissance from Bami in July, with three companies of infantry, tluee sotnias of cavalry, four
field guns, two howitzers and n rocket-battery, and
after some skirmishes with the enemy's cavalry at
Artchinan, Durun, and Ak Kala, he on the 17th
occupied Egl~ianBatyr, and on the following day
macle a close exmination of tlle TekkB position.
According to the Iilvalide R~zsse,'' the Rnssian
force was inet by considerable numbers of the
enemy's cavalry, and fought its way to within one
thousand yards of the outworks of the fortified
auls ;" uilcler their cover a reconnaissance of the
fortifications was effectecl, as also a survey of the
locality ; on the conclusion of which-at 1 P.M.
-the Russiatl force retired. Notwithstanding
tlze repeated attacks of the enemy's infantry
and cavalry, d u ~ i n gwhicl~ hand-to-hand fights
occurred, the sanie evening the columli reached
Eghian Batyr Kala without sustaining any loss ;
and having at claybreak on July 19 repellecl a
fresh attack of the TekBBs, the force returned to
Bami after destroying a considerable aiiloulit of
crops and quantities of stores at the " auls " on
the line of march.
'During the nine days the casualties on the
Russian side were three soldiers killed and eight
wounded; they also lost eight horses killed and
thirteen wouncled. Sncll illcoiisiclerable loss is

'
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explained by the long raiige and iilaccuracy of the
firing. The injury done to the elle~ny by tile
clestructioi~of the crops, &c., in the vicinity of
Gok Teph, where about 10,000 Telrkds are concentrated, x h o have been joined by 700 Merv Telrkds,
General Skobeleir reports, is felt in the difficul1;y
the Teklrds expe~iencein obtaining supplies and
in the outbreali, of c:zttle plagne. Moreover, in t l ~ e
engagements of July 18 arid 19 several TelrlrB and
Merv chiefs were l<illecl.'
Bllt while Slrobelefl was gradually pusl~ing
forward trooj~sailil supplies Lo tlie advanced base
at B m i , the Turkonians did not remaill idle, and
rnade frecluent; attacks on tlie Russian patrols and
convoys. Tllus on July 3 a band of some 300
Teklti!s attaclred a small party of twelve Cossaclrs,
and, after killing or wounding eight of the number,
retired as soon as liussiall reinforcemellts arrived
in tlie slinpe of a conlpany of infantry. During
August repeated attacks were made against the
Bussian lines of commu~iicatioiibetween Duz Oluln
and Bnmi, ancl also on a Eussiall post near the
Aiilin Wells. Siiriilar raids occurred during tlie
montlls of September, October, and November ;
z~nil eve11 on Decernl~er 23, when SkobeleiT was
preparing for his decisive attaclr against the
'I'ur1rom:ul strongholtl at Denghil Tepc!, a force of
some 1,000 !I'ckl;i,r; suddmlly attackeil a Iiussian
train of 2,000 cnlncls wliicll was being convoyed
by lialf a c:alnp:Lny o l tlic! A~isl.ieronliegii~ient.
llic snsprisc W:LS ~oir~~)let(!,
nuil tlie Tclikds snc-

r l

ceederl in driving ulr thc cnlllels ; b u t llslf a s o t ~ ~ i a

-

of Cossaclcs quickly pushed forward froill the neighbouring post at Kazanjilc, and, after a hot pursuit
for ten miles, eventually overtook and defeated
the nomads, and recaptured the valuable transport
aaimals. In this affair, hom~ever,the Iiussians lost
twenty-five nlen killed and eleven wounded.
By the commencement of December, 1880, the
necessary stores had been accunlulated aL Bami,
and troops were then moved forward to that poi~lt
in order that the fiilal blow might be struck. On
December 9 Colonel Navrotsky, advailcing along
the u$-per course of the Sninbar river, captured
the Telrlc8 fort of Kariz Kala ; and a few clays
later Artchman, Durun, and Eghian Batyr I h l a
had all beell occupied by Russian detachments,
and were speedily converted into advancecl provision dep6ts. The last-named fort, which was
afterwards called Samur, was selected as tlie base
and point cl'cypa~ifor the further decisive movcment against the fortiliecl Tekkd villages of YangliiIcala, Denghil Tepd, and Gijlr Tepk, and for this
purpose it was considerably strengthened by the
addition of new defensive worlcs. I t was situated close to the foot of the northern slopes of the
Kopet Dagh range, and was 13+ versts, or 9 miles,
distant from the great Tekkk fortress.
On arrival at this point Slcobelell* receivecl
illformatioil that the Alchal Telrlrks had gained
considerable reinhl.cements from Merv, ancl. that
40,000 warriors were asscinbled behincl the fortifications at Deaghil Tepb, here t,liey hacl resolvecl
to make an obstinate resistance. 111 order to test
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tlie accuracy of this report, and for tlie purpose of
completii~,ntlie information which had been gained
in the reconnaissance of the previous July, Slcobeleff
moved out of Sainur at claybrenlc on December 16,
wit11 rz force of 1,600 me11 and 1 G guns, a11d, rnarclling by the road which runs parallel to the 1110~11tains, occupied Ihe high ground on the lelt banlc
of the Selcyz-Yab stream wliicll flows past the
Teklcc'!position.
Pronl this point great masses of the eilemy
vere ol~servedto be nlaniling llie ra1npal.t~of the
main positioll at Denghil Tepc', in evideill expectstioil of an attnclc, while large lluinbers moved
sout1iw:~rds to Ynliglii Iinla, and begail i;o close
rouncl the fl:~nltsand rear of the Russian detachment. Sliol~eleiI', however, illovecl slowly northwards past the wester11 front of Denghil TepB;
mlcl after he h:ld carefully examined the defences
and liatl bonil~arded tlieivl for s short time, lie
nave orilers for the force to fall back towarcls
h
Sarnur. As so011 ns the Russians began to retire
t,hc Tek1ii.s rcdoublecl tlieir f i e , arid, issuing i11
dense lnnsses from tlieir intrenchments, comnlenced
,z series of onslauglits against the flanks and rear
of tlie column, which were coiiti~lueduntil darkness
put an end to tlie conilicl.
011 1)or:mnl)ol. 23 alltl again on tho following
diiy f ~ ~ r t l lsc~c:o~ln:~iss:~ncles
cr
were mnile, and on both
occasitras i 11e T(tlik4~
violerll,ly :~tt:~c:lrecllhe liassian
dcl.:iclu~zcnts.The Gglitirig on tlicse clays, however,
W:LS l r ~ s(;vclre
s
tllari it 11x1 hecliz on tlle lOth, and
8kohclcff gnin~ilinfonuntion 1~11irllenal~leclhill1 to
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make final dispositions for a decisive attack on the
Turkoman stronghold.
I n the meanwhile fresh troops were daily
arriving at Samur, and by the evening of December 31 the total force at that place consisted
of 35 companies of infantry and 7 sotnias of
cavalry, giving a total of 4,020 bayonets and
750 sabres, with 61 guns and 2 rocket-troughs.
Among these reinforcements there was a small
contingent of Turkestan troops which had made
a remarkable lnarcll across the Kara Kum sands
from Jflliva. This detachment, which consisted of
three conlpanies of infantry and two sotnias of
cavalry, with a division of mountain guns and a
rocket section, was under tlie commalid of
Colonel Kuropatkin, who had served under Skobeleff in the Kllivan and Khokandian campaigns
and had acted as his chief of the staff during the
campaign in European Turkey. After an arduous
march from Tashkent to Khiva this detachment
had to cross the Kara Kum Desert by an calmest
unknown route ; but, in spite of the great dificulties of the undertaking, it accomplislzed the
journey in a remarkably short space of time, and
arrived at Bami on December 20 'clean and
trim and fresh as a claisy,' ' having traversed a
distance of 400 versts (or 267 miles) in eighteen
days, over a sandy desert, starting from the lower
course of the Amu Daria, and proceeding by way
of, Ortakuya, Igdi, and Kizil-Arvat, during which
march only two Inen fell ill.' This splendid body
of me11 reached Salliur on December 27, and froin
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that luolncnt Liusc~l3nLkiribecame one of the ledillg
spirits ill tlie 01)crntions npixist the Teklcd fortress.
F r o ~ nllie various reconnaissmces which had
bectl 111:itlc, it W:LS fonnd that tlie Telrkds were
occupyiilg n posilioll of considerable extent, vllich
lind 1,ueil grenlly strcngtlicned by tlle construction
or r~idcf'orl,ificb:~Lionsat various points. On the
north of lllc liilc! tllere was a huge fortified enclosure rountl t11t2 hill of De~igllilTepd .wllicl~constitutccl tliu key of' tlic: wholr? position. This enclosare xT:.:ls :Liililc lollg Sroin irorth to so~itl~,
and had
n grcnt,c:st wid111 c)S sol~ie 1,100 yards. It was
surround(:il 1)J' i1~:tssivc clay minparts, in which
tlic!re were iluniarons eiitrnrlces 011 the northern
sl~cleaslnrl~f:lc:r!s, : ~ l ~OIL
r l the outside of this wall
i,llcrc ~ v i i s:L ~11:~110\~
dry (lilch about five feet cleep
allil sislcc!li Soc!t, witlt?. At various points to the
~vcsl,nrlcl cast of this fortress there were several
snr:~11f i r t ~ :.:lriil
, : ~ :tl)out
t
2,500 yarcls to the south
tllcrc \\r;~s tlici I<islilali uf Yanghi Kala, which was
also stror~pljrfol.tiGvt1, and was siinilarly supported
ljy snlall outlyil~g' 1r:d:ts ' of varying strength.
11s it m:\s c.viiloi~t;11i:lt ihe fortress of Denghil
T(q~t\tro~l'l(ln o l I,(: 1:ikcn willlout a regular siem
"'
Sk111,rllr~Jl'
il(!rbiilvtl to lirst cnplilre Yalighi Kala, in
crrtlcr t11a1, iuigli[ o1)taiil 1)oss~ssioll
of' lhe waters1qrl11y:tr~rl t llr.c~:~l
oil tllc! c~lcliry'sline of retreat
lowartls iZsk;\I);~tl. 1)uring the reconi~aissmces
w\.l~ic~li
w\.circrlz:ttl~ill I lo('t!lk~b(!r ilwas see11 that the
'I'cilckt'~ 11:~d:1 t ~ l ) : ~113'
~ t110
~ n illtention of offering
:I,
sl.1111l~r~rri
rosist,:ulc:c: on the sidc of Yallghi Kala,
1)ut irl(cllirlt!il f ( 3 c30ilc:tlnlrnlellleir cilcrgics on 111e

'
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defence of the large enclosure at Denghil TepB,
and Skobeleff therefore determined to carry the
works a t the southern end of the position by storm.
The assault was successfully delivered on January 1,
1881; and by sunset the troops were securely
established in an intrenched camp which was constructed at a distance of about 2,000 yards from
the southern wall of Denghil TepB.
On the following day Major-General Petrusevitch and the commanding engineer made a recollnaissance of the eastern and northern fronts of
the fortress, and as it was then decided that the
south-eastern angle of the enclosure could be most
easily attacked, Golollel Ku~opatlcin,011 January 3,
seized a couple of outlying Kalas on the southeastern front so as to secure the riglit flank of the
approaches, and he also drove the enemy out of
the gardens and fortified enclosures farther to the
north. The first parallel was commenced at dawn
on January 4, at a distance of 700 yards from the
walls of the fortress ; and in order to divert the
attention of the enemy from the working parties
a demonstration was again made against the gardens
on the north-eastern side, which had been re-occupied by the Tekkks. There a desperate encounter
took place, and although the Russians gained a
footing in the ontskirts of the gardens they were
unable to expel the defenders from their main
position, and, being in turn attacked by masses of
Tekkes who sallied forth from Deilghil TepB, they

* These were afterward8 named the 'Right.flenk Kela' and
Grand Duke Kale.'

-1881

'epd,
tll e
3rm.
'Y 1,
rely
con-

usere,s of
the
nost
Y 3,
1ththe
t of
the
LWll

the
the
ties
ens
CU-

ter
1 a

rnd

\

SIEGEWORICSCOMMENCED

157

were at last compelled to fall back, after they had lost
three officers and nineteen men killed, and one oficer
and forty-nine men wounded. Among the killed was
Major-General Petrusevitcll, who commanded the
attack, and by his death Skobeleff was deprivecl of
the services of an extremely energetic~assistnl~t,
ancl
Russia lost oilc of her bravest and most distiaguishecl officers in Central Asia. When the Russian
columil had reached the fortification which formed
the key of the Tekkds' outlyiilg position, Petrusevitch dismounted, and, placing hinlself at the 11ea.d
of the leading troops, rushed into the gateway of the
fort. The entrance was speedily carried ; but as
the assailants were forcing their way into the courlyard beyoncl they were received by a. heavy
volley from the Telckds, who were hidden beI~ind
a cleverly constructecl ambuscade. Petrusevitch
fell mortally wouncled, and with hill1 another
oficer, and several privates were either Irillecl or
wouncled. I n the evening a funeral service was
performed over the bodies of the officers and inen
who hac2 fallen in the fight, a~zdat the moment
when the words in the Russian burial service
' eternal remembrance to the dead' were repeated
the whole of the artillery fired a volley into the
fortress,. from whence ' cries and groans immediately issusd, showing tliat the iron tears had
not been shed in vain.'
Whilst this denlollstration was taking place on
the right flank, 1,260 men were busily employed
in tlze corlstructioll of the first pardlel ; and
berow dawn 011 the following day this had been

completed, approaches lisd been made to it, aild
three redoubts and a couple of siege batteries
had d s o been finishecl. and armed.
From this time the approaches were steadily
pushed forward, and, in spite or the constant
sorties of tlie garrison, the reniaiiiing outlying
forts on the south-east front were capturecl; ancl
g January 22 the sappers had
by the e v e n i ~ ~of
reached the ditch of the fortress, and a mine gallery had been driven uiicler the ramparts at the
soutli-eastern corner of tlie defences. 011 the following day 2,600 pounds of gunpowder were laid
a t the head of the mine, alicl during the next niglit
the tainpiilg was commenced, ancl. orders were
issued for the grand assault of the fortress, whicl.1
was to take place on the illorili~lgof the 24th.
The orders for the attack were briefly as
follows :(I.)At 7 A.M. a column, under LieutenantColonel Haidaroff, consisting of four and a quarter
companies, two volunteer detachments, and one and
a half sotnias, with five guns and five rocket-stands,
was to move out of the cainp and attack the ' Mill
Kala' aud other outworks on the wester11 side of
Denghil Tepd ; and when these had been captured
it was to operate against the interior of the fortress
with a heavy rifle and artillery fire, so, as to divert
the attention of the garrison from the main attacking columns under Kuropatkin and KozelkoK.
(II.)Wliile this detachment was thus engaged
tlie whole of the artillery was to open fire on the
fortress, and to iliailitail~the bon~bardment until
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the signal for the assault was given by the explopion of t l ~ egreat mine.
(111.) Colonel IKuropatlcin was placed in comm a i d of orie of the storming columns (consisting
of eleven and a half companies, ancl one del;achment;
of volnnteers, with six guns ancl two rocket-stands),
' ancl his orders were to cal~turethe breach made b y
the explosion of the mine, to erect a juncbion wit11
I<ozellcon"s p u t y , and to inl;rench lliinself within
the south-easten angle of the fortress.
(IV.) Anotliel* stormiilg party, consisting. of
eight and a quarter compaiiies, and two detachments of volunteers, with three guns ailcl two rocketstniicls, under Colonel ICozelkofT, was at tlie same
time to capture the breach \vl~iclihad been made
by the artillery four clays previously at the extreme
southern angle of tlie fortress, and after i t hacl
forrned a junction wit11 Kuropatlcin's force it was
to intrench itself in general co-operation vith that
column.
(V.) The reserve, uilder tlie personal command
of General SkobeleK consisting of twenty-one cornl~anieswith twenty-four guns, mas to assemble at
the r c c l o ~ ~on
l ~ t tlle left of tlle first parallel for
elnployme~ltas might be found iiecessary ; a11d the
remainder of tlie force (i.e. four corn.l3nnies, nntl
two auil a half sotni:~~,
wit11 forty-one gu~is)was lielcl.
in re:~dincssf01*tlie dcI'(+nceoE the camp and lines.
I n accortlauce a i t h these orders H:~iilaroK's
column moved out of tllc canip &at 7 A.M. on J a n u a ~ y
24, :lncl wil;lii11: L I ~1101:~~:and n half tlie Mill Kala
11een c:~pl;zzrecl ancl
:~(ljoi~ling
out,~)osI;s1
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placedin a state of defence. The guns and roclcets
attached t o this party then bombarded the southern
corner of the fortress, and at the same time twentyseven guns opened fire on the breach at the southern extremity of the enclosure, so as to complete
it and make it practicable for the storming party.
Notwithstanding this terrible fire the Tekkbs made
heroic attempts to repair the breach, and continued tlleir endeavours up till the moment of tlle
assault, in spite of the hail of shrapnel and coininoil
shell which was poured ince~sailt~ly
upon the spot.
The slaughter at this point was fearful, and
this appalling scene of destruction and death was
coiltinued until twenty minutes past eleven, when
a trelnendous roar was heard above the, din of the
cannon and rattle of musketry, and, mhile the
earth was shalren by a violent concilssion, a dense
colunin of inud and smoke rose high above the
ramparts on tlie eastern side of the doolnecl
fortress.
The mine hacl beell sprung, and a
practicable breach had been formed nearly fifty
yards wide.
Almost before the smoke from the explosion
had cleared away Kurop,ztkin's column issued
from its cover and advanced impetuously towards
the breach ; but before they had traversed half the
intervening space they were received by a inlurclerous fire from the Tekkks, who, in spite of the
force ancl unexpectedness of the explosion, had
rushed without any hesitation into the gap which
had been formed in the ramparts. For a few
~nornents the Russian column hesitated, and

I

I

i

appeared to stagger under the storin of lead which
tore through its ranks ; but on fresh troops being
sent to its support the advance was cluiclily renewed, and, alter a fierce hand-to-hand fight with
S , breach was won,
bayonets, lances, and S W O ~ C ~ the
and the mlalls to its riglit a i d leIL were occupied
by the brave troops of tlle Shirwan Regiment and
1 3th Turkestan line battalion, who were gallantly
assist,ecl ljy a detachment of dismounted Ural
Cossaclrs and n party of volunteers uilcler Lieuteilaiit Voropaliofl'.
Wllile Iiuropatkin's coluinil was thus successfully assailing tlle breach on the south-eastern face
of the fortress, similar eilcoullters were ttllring
place a t otller points of the clefeiices. As sooil as
t,he mine exploded Iiozclkoff's party issued from
the trenclics aild aclvaizced at a run towards the
breach on the south, mlhich tliey soon reached in
spite of tlie hc:~vyfire ~vllichwas kept up by the
TeltkCs. On arriviilg at the foot, of it, however,
~
ancl tliey lay down in
their p r o g r c s s w : ~ checlied,
the ditch and maintained an obstinate engagement
with the defenders until reinforcements were sent
forwsrcl from the reserve. When these fresh
troops arrived the advance was once inore contfinueil, anrl mliile the main body forced an
c?nlraricc at tlia bre:icli, otllcr 11:~r~ies
on the flanks
clsca1:lilcil tlic: walls l ~ ynlcniis of scaling-ladders
xnil soot1 joiucdl 11nnil~wit11 Rurop:~tkin'scolumn.
1I:~iilaroffs t rool~s; ~ t1lie saine i iiiic sc:~lctl tlie
ramparts on tl~ct~~osi,c!rri£ ~ c L ! ; i ~ i i i l1)y 12.30 I).~I.
l llc I ~ I L S S ~ : Lll:ti[
~ ~ S f o r ~ ~:LIZ
( 1 ('I ltvy i~lfo i he lor1rcss
VC)J,. 11.
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!
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a t three points, a i d tlle Illtimate success of the
operations v a s fully assured.
I n accordance with the orders which had been
issned the troops at once began to intrench themselves a t the points wliich liad been captured ; but
as Sbobeleff saw the undonbtecl success which had
been gained by all tlle columns, he at once decided
to follow up tlie attack by a general advance on
t . 1 Dengllil
~
Tepe hill, which was the tactical key
of the fortress. By this time the TeliliBs hncl
begun to give n7ay at all points, and, seeing the
hopelessness of further resistance, a tlisorderecl
crowd of men, women, and children began to
stream towards the llortheril walls of tlie fortress,
a i d thence contilluecl their flight into the desert.
The fighting was over, a i d ~ 1 1 a tfollowed was
ilothiiig less than a merciless massacre of an unresisting mob. The infantry contiilued the pursuit
for seven miles, and the cavalry carried it on for
another four miles ; and when clarliness put an end
to the sla~lghterit was founcl that 8,000 TekBQs
of both sexes had been slain during the pursuit,
while 6,500 corpses were also foulld within the
enclosure. Slcobeleff himself estimated the total
loss of the Turkoinans during the siege at 20,000
-or, in other vords, half the defendcrs of Denghil
TepQperislied.
Thus encled this great campaign against the
TelskB Turkolnans of Alihal. The brilliant Skobeleff had comp1et;ely avengecl tlie previous clisasters
which had beell brought abont through the incompetence of his predecessors ; and after a long
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series of cllecks ancl defeats the might of the
troops of the Great White Czar llad been at last
clearly established before the mrilcl races of Cent~al
Asia.
As soon as Dengbil Tep6 had fallen, Slrobeleff
pushecl rapidly eastwards in pursuit of the two
Telr;k6 leaclers-Tekmi!
Sirdar and Malrlldum
Kuli Khan-who
had escapecl, and were flying
towards Merv; and Askabacl, the capital of the
Akhal country, and Annau, a Tekbh fort sake
few miles farther east, were speedily occupied by
Russian cletachmeats. Any further advance ill
the direction of Merv, however, mas at that time
impossible on acco~ultof the heavy losses wl~ich
had beell sustained by the Russians during the
~ a m p a i g n ,and
~ it was oilly for this reasou tllat

' Telnn6 Sirrlar surrendered to Skobeleff at A6knba~lon tlie
9th of the following April, and, having tel~(leredhis sulbmission, he
was sent to St. Petersbr~~g
with his soil and t h e e otlior Telrlri'!
chieftains, in order that they might obtain an insight into tlie rosources of the Einpire of the Great Wllitc Czar. The deputation
reached St. Petersbnrg on May 27, and nine days later the chiefs
were presented to the Emperor at Gatchina, when they were
cordially received. Dwing the interview the Czar with his ow11
hands gave to Telcmk Sirdar the silver epanlettes of a major of
militia, and informed the chieftain of his elevation to that rank
in the Russian service; ant1 he slrortly afterwards received nil
appointment in the Civil Administration of tho newly-ecquired
territory. Malclicl~imlIuli Kllall, however, held aloof and rejected
111&11yoffers which'were made to hiin by the Itussian secret agents ;
and it wns not ~ u ~ tAlilcl~nnoff
il
visitod the Merv Onsis i l l the
spring of 1882 that this chief eventually decided to throw in his
lot with Russia.
During the ol~erationsholn January 1 to 24 the Ilusfii~ns
lost 1 G officers a i d 267 men Icilled, and 55 oficeus and 770 nicil
wounded; or a total of 1,108 out of e force of nbout 5,000
men. Thus, aftor gai~isoilshad been l~rovidedfor Dongliil Tep;,
a1 9

Merv was not then attacked and annexed to the
Czar's dominions.
Aekabad, ana other points dong the route, Skobeleff couild n o t
have mustered more than 2,000 or 2,500 ~nellfor active operations
against Merv. His ammunition and provisions had, moreover,
become nearly exheusted, end the transport nrrangelnents could
not have borne the strain of such an extension of the cctmpaign.
I t will thns be seen that Merv escaped beiulg attaclred on account
of the ailfitness of Skobeleff's nrmy for further fighting on a, lnrgo
scale, and not because the Russian Government had any regard for
Engliah susceptibilities.

CHAPTER
ANNEXATION OF MEIW
English fears regarding Morv aild Russian assurances-The
Trans-Caspian Territory '-RUEEO-Persian frontier lineRussian intrigues at Morv-Commsrcial treaty with the Turlromans of Merv-Russian ' traders ' and ' scientific explorers 'Tricks to hide aggressive intentions-lLessar's explorstionsThe Atak Oasis-England's
hour of trouble R ~ ~ s s i a 'oppors
tunity-Annexation of Merv.

INEngland, where the exhausted eonditioil of
SlcobelefYs army was at the time unlmown, it was
commoilly believed that an advance was about to
be made on Merv immediately after the taking of
Dengllil Tepd, and the general anxiety was therefore solnewhat allayed when the Russian Government aililounced that they had no intention of
undertalciiig any further military 01)erations in that
direclion. On January 26 M. de Giers informed
Lorcl Dufferin, the Britisli Am11,zssador at St.
Petersburg, that as tlzc power of tlie Tekk6 Turkomans hail been signally broken, the time had come
for tlle Russian Government to show its moderation, and to take care not to allow itself to be
entangled in ally filrther military operations in that
quarter of tlie woulil;' and, ill order that there
(

--

-

lnigllt be no misconception, the Czar's entire
approval of this declaration was shortly afterwards
conveyed to the British Ambassador. Nor weye
.Ihese the oiily assurances which were then given
that Merv would not be occupied, for on March '7,
after similar proiilises had been made to Lord
Granville by the Russian Ainl~assaclorin London,
M, de Giers once again told Lord Dufferin that h e
11ad beell authorisecl. by the czar to declare that
his Majesty had no intelltion of advancing towarcls
Merv. ' Not oilly,' said M. cie Giers, ' do we n o t
want to go there, but, happily, there is nothing
which can require us to go there.'
The word of tlie Russian Enlperor was t h u s
pledged that Merv m~oulcinot be occupied, ancl,
as Sliobeleff sliortly arterwxds returned to Russia,
the Ellglish people believed that tlie Russians st
last honestly inteilcied to abstain from further
conquests. They forgot tliat similar pledges hacl
been given on illany previous occasions, only t o
be broken whenever it suited R,ussia to do so ;
and althougli a large slice of Khivan territory h a d
been annexed to Russia eight short years before,
i11 spite of an Emperor's solemn promise to t h e
contrary, yet some people were still to be found
in England who believed, or pretenclecl to believe,
that Merv would not be occupied because the same
Emperor gave a similar assurance that he had n o
intention of advancing beyond the limits of t h e
territory already occupied by Skobeleirs army. It
was undoubtedly a pleasant and convenient theory,
and eiialslecl politicians in Englancl of a certain
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class to point to tlze moderation of the -reat
P
Russian Emperor, and to explain to admiring
audiences that this happy condit;ioa of affairsmas
due to the conciliatory policy of the Gladstone
Cabinet in having ordered the evacuatioil of
I<a.ndaha~,little dr eanzing, lzowever, that while
-they were exl~oundingtheir comfortable doctriiles
Slsobeleff mias 'sending agents illto the bazaars of
Central Asia to spread tliroughont that region
the report that it mas tlle WBit,e Czar who had
compelled England to evacuate Bfgllanistan.'
It vas merely a repetition of tlie old farce
which had been playecl so often on the Central
Asian stage ; and on May 24, 1881, a final touch
was give11 to tlle comedy by the publication of an
Imperial Ukase, in wl~icllit was annouilced that;
the territory of the Tekkd Turkomans which was
then occupied by Russian troops was annexed to
the Czar's Empire, and that this new tract of
country, together with the Trans-Caspian military
clistrict, M~ZLStl~enceforth to be known as the
' Trails-Caspian Territory ' and forin s portion of
the Caucasus admninist~ation. Thas, at the time
when a series of fresh promises was being readily
give11by tlze Czar ,md his ministers with regard to
Merv, previous engagements of a sinlilar character were being deliberately set aside by Imperial
edict.'
I t must bo remembered, 8s mentioned in Chapter XV., that
on April 5,1878, Prince Gortchdroff, in 9, letter to the Russirtn Ambnfisaclor in London, uinieil : ' His Imporid Majesty has no intontion
of extending tho frontiers of Ruesin, wch RR they exist nl; present
in Centrsl Asia, either on the side of Uolrharo, or on the aide of

Such is diplomacy as understood by Russia,
and such it will remain until the patience of England is exhausted; and then-when a clisplay of
force takes the place of blind belief in the pledges
of Muscovite Czms and statesmen-a period will
be put to Russia11 advances to~vardsthe British
Empire in India. Until such a Lime arrives-as it
sooner or later must-there will be a conl;inual
display of restlessness at one or more poiilts on tlie
Russian frontier, some sore will always be kept
open, ancl Russia will be ever ready to nzove forward ancl secure some fresh strategical posil;ion
whenever the attention of the I3nglisli people is
attracted to some other portion of their vast Empire.
This fact must be clearly understood ; for Russian
promises albrd no guarantee for the peace alld
safety of the liiclian Empire, arid the time is near
at hand when further aclvailces must be resisted
by force unless the Eiiglish people i~lteildto maclly
respond to the cry of 'Perish India,' and ileciclewhich they assuredly will never do-that peace
with dishonour is preferable to a war in clelence
of the great Empire which their forelathers have
built up, and which i~ the pride and mainstay of
Greater Britain.
I

Ihasnovodslr and of tlio Alrolr.' h i 1 yot, aftor six yoars spont i ~ i
incessant inilitrtry operation8 bnyond tlio froiitior, an orilor appo~~rod
annexing a largo slico of torritory, nncl ndvancing tho frontior lino
to a pnint 370 milcs e a ~ of
t Hra~novodsl~.
Sir Goorgo 13irilwoocl, in l i i ~ititroilnction to Tltc First Lcttcr
Book of thc Enat Inrliiz C O ~ ~ L J1600
I ~ ?1010,
~ , u t ~ ~ t oLli~~t
s it was
tlio Cornpnny'ti PORHORH~OIIof Iliilil~~vhic110111~1)lodI':llfil~~tiil,
I L ~tho
comrnonoemon~ of tho prcsolit contmy, to : I I I G C L I U H ~ L Ir~o~ JsJi ~ ttlin
mnchinntions of N~~poloon
I., a11d hc docluros tlint tho continucd

the year, and no definite inforination 011 tliis point
could be obtained unt,il a convelllion had been
signed a t Teheran on December 21, 1881, in which
the Russo-Persian frontier line was fixed as far
eastwarcls as the fort of Baba-Durlnaz. '
But, althougll it was a matter of considerable
satisfrtc~ionto the Eilglish that this portion of the
frontier had been thus definitely laid clown, the
general feeling of relief which had been caused by
this settlemeilt of one section of the Busso-Persian
boundary was sooil followed by a fresh revival of
inistrust when it was realisecl that the lnost important portiou of the frontier line (viz. that in the
clirection of Merv and Herat) liacl been omitted
from the treaty. It, moreover, gradually became
known that Russia intended to contest Persia's
unquestioliable rights over the Atak, which is the
strip of fertile territory to the north of the mountains stretching from the Russian froiltier at BabaDurmaz to the neighbourhood of Sarahks ; and
sinister rumours were also heard of Russian intrigues at Merv and of movements of Muscovite
agents iil the vicinity of Herat itself.
This Convention contained nine articles, the first of which
describecl the new $ontier line. The other articles provided for the
appointment of comlnissioners to trace the boundary in detail, and
settled other nlinor points regnrdillg the water-snpply from the
streams which flow &om the mo~mtainsinto the Akhd country, kc.
Article 111.contained a strange proof of the high-handed manner in
which the Russians laid down the hontier line ; for in that article it
was expre~slystipulated that the Pwsians should evacuate t h e forts of
Germab and Killsilab within one year from the dale of the retification of the treaty, tt being thus tacitly acknowledged that those
forts were within the former Persian frontier lino.

Soon after the occupation of Aslrabad secret
emissaries were sent to Merv for the purpose of
creating a pro-Russian party amongst the more
influential chieftains in the oasis. These agents
encouraged the Telck@sto visit Askabad to traffic
in the bazaar which the Rrrssians had opened at
that place, and before many weeks had passed
numbers of the inhabitants of the Merv Oasis were
to b e seen bartering in the sliops of Askabad with
the Armenian merchants from the Caucasus, who
had found their way to the Akhal couiltry in the
hope of establishing a lucrative trade vith the
countries beyolid the borders of the new Russian
province. When the first arrivals found that
they were well received and obtained high prices
for their supplies, they were followed by many
others, and in course of time the more influential chiefs also followed suit, aiicl in this way
the Trans-Caspian officials gradually gained tlie
friendship and support of a by no means inconsiderable section of the population of the Merv
Oasis.
But while the Askabacl authorities were thus
preparing the way for a Russian occupation of
Merv, the T~rrkestan officials were also busily
engaged in similar intrigues from the direction of
Samarkanil and Kliiva. The Turkestan administration had up till this time taken a leading part in
Central Asian affairs, and as Kaufmann and his
subordinates viewed tlie rapid growtli of a rival
adniinistration in Trans-Caspia with a certain
anlouilt of jealousy, tliey also adopted tlie same

nieasures as were being so successfully einployerl
by General Rohrberg.'
The Tekkks of Merv at this time clicl not grasp
the fact that the Turkestan and Trans-Caspiari
administrations were oFs1ioot;s froin orie and Ole
same Central Government, and, in their ignorance,
niany of them saw i11 the overtures from Turkestail
a l~ossiblemeans of escape from the more clearly
defined danger which threatened tl~emfrom the
direction of Askabacl. Thus, while Russian agents
from Akhal were engaged in their encleavours to
create a pro-Russian party in Merv, a deputatioll
of the elders of the 0l;amish tribe of TekkQTurkomans went to Fort Petro-Alexand~ovskand there
concluded a treaty with the Governor of the Amu
Daria province, whereby they agreecl to place
themselves under the protection of tbe Bussian
Government as represented by the commandant
of the Amu Daria, and promised to receive any
agents who might from time to time be sent to
them by that officer.2
Gonoral Rohrborg succeeded Slroboloff in tlio acbinistmtion
of Lhe Trans-Caspian militmy district in tllo spring of 1881.
"urno~us
concorning tho riogotiation of this Lroaty soon
roschecl England, and whon Mr. Wynilhnni drow M. do Giors'
attontion to tho mattor tho Rnssiau Boroigu Miniator iloniccl tthnt
thoro ~ I L any
R
trutli in tho ~ ~ e p o rthat
t
such a treaty wn.r bciilg
nogotiatod with tlio Turlromans of Qlorv ; and Baron Jonlilli 11180
statod that no formal nogotiations woro talting plnco for a trcaty
with tho Turliomans of Morv. I n tlio ~uinmorof tho following
year (1882), homovor,tha Britieh Ambassnclor at 'I1oheranfforwnrilod
a copy of tho troaty to Lord Granville, togotl~orwit11 oopios of a
coilplo of lottor8 from Baron Aminoff, tlio cl~iof of tlio ~ t a f tl ~ t
Aslmabnil, in whicl~that officor conjiratnlatcil tho ICli~~ile
nnil rlrlcrs
of Morv on tlloir h a ~ i n g' u,t l r ~ u,\volcc
~t
to tlloir tr11oilltorosLsl 1)s

1
1

The Turkestan authorities thus scored the first
success in the game which was then being played
as to which of the two rival Russian administratioils in Central Asia would obtain the honour of
being able to lay the submission of the people of
Merv at the feet of the Imperial master ; but it
was not long before the Trans-Caspian officials in
their turn aclopted measures which proveci far
more effectual in gaining the desired object. When
news reached Askabad of the conclusion of the
convention between the Otamish tribe and the
commandant of Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk, Colonel
Rohrberg-the
governor of the Trans-Caspian
district-had left Aslrabad for St. Petersburg to
confer with the authorities there on matters concerning the administratioil of the newly-acquirecl
region ; and ill his absence Colonel Aminoff thought
it advisable to make it clear to the elders of Merv
that Turkestan and Askabad were portions of the
same great Empire, and that therefore the fact that
they llacl sougllt the protection of the commaildallt
of the Ainu Daria arorded much satisfaction to the
Governor of Trans-Caspia, as being a proof of their
desire to solicit the friendship and protection of
his master, the.Czar.
Having thus hinted to the Tekkes that they
were in a helpless condition between two outstretched Russian arms which were graclually
l~eingdrawn towards each other, and which would
envelop and crush everything that lap
scelriug the protection of the Czar. The tl*utll of the origins1 reports
Tvas t1111s clearly established in spite of the 13nssian deniale.

between them, Baron Alnilloff then decided to send
Russian officers in disguise to Merv in order that
a survey of the Oasis might be secretly prepared,
and in the hope that more of the inhabitants might
be won over to the pro-Russian party.
The method in which this idea was carried out
was quite in keeping wit11 tlie time-honourecl
traditions of Russian policy in Central Asia, and
affords an excellent exalnple of the manner in
which the Russian authorities employ so-callecl
' traders' or ' scientific explorers,' as a cloalc to
hide their aggressive designs against the milcl
states of Central Asia. .VVllenever they find that
they have (zrrivecl on the borders of a state or tribe
whicli is unusually s ~ s p i c i ~ ~
01.u resentful
s
of interference, there coines a pause in their oizm~al.cl
advance, and then a scientific mission or trading
caravan starts off-of course purely in the interests
of peaceful and
of science, or for the cle~~eloplvent
cominercial enterprise. The scientific missioll
generally consists of some topographers and other
oficers, accompanied by an escort of Cossacks, ~ 1 1 0
make a reconnaissallce of the country; 1~11ile the
trader is usually accompanied by surveyors sent
for the same purpose. I n either case intrigues are
carried on with the inhabitants, wllo are given a
glowing account of the advantages of R ~ ~ s s i rule,
an
and are iinpressed with the dangers of resisting
the authority of the Great White Czar ; the country
is quietly mapped, and its rcsources are carefully
noted; and thus preparations are rnacle for its
subsequent annexation. In some cases tllc leacling
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chiefs or rulers are persuacled to volnntarily tenrler
their submission, and the cduntry is tllen qnietlg
occupied ; bnt as ofteii as not an attack is ruaile
on these parties, when the ultimate result is tlie
same, for tllereby n plausible pretext is obtained
for armed interference, such attack being held np
as s convincing proof of tlie barbarity of tlie state
or tribe in question, ailcl of the ilecessity for estending to it tlie blessings of civilisation.
This may appear to be an cxngger,zted descripc l i Russiails
tion of one of the irielhocls ~ ~ ~ h ithe
frequently ailol~tfor the exteilsion of tlieir frontiers
in Central Asin. Such, howevel; is not tile case,
for fi-om the earliest days in wliich they liave ]lad
any denlings with Asiatic races they have had
resort to similar-auci even inore quesliousblesubterfi~ges for tlie purlme of ailvitncing tlieir
interests at Llie expense of tlieir weaker ncigW~ours.
I t has already been seen how tlie merchant Kliludoff combine(1 diplolllacy with trnclc, and was sent
to Eastern TurBesta~~
at a time wliell Yskoob Beg,
b y his dignified independence, put n stop to
Russiaii encroacliments in the direction of Iiasllgar. Since tliat time this metlioil of spying out
the strength of neighbouring states lias bee11
frequently adopted; and it is only necessary to
mention the names of Aliklianoff, Lessal-, and
Naziroff to coinplete the proof of the accuracy of
the above description of one of the tricks of the
Russians to llicle their aggressive designs under
the mask of civilisatioi1, science, ailcl commerce.
Alikhanoff's recolinaissatlce of the Merr Oasis is

ail excellent example of tlie way in w l ~ i c Russian
l~
explorers i11 Central Asia frequently gain their
object while inasquerading in tlie clisguise of
traders.l But while he was obtailliilg illforillation
regarding Merv, another party, uncler tlie young
engineer named Lessar, was carefully exnniiniiig
the couiltry between Askabad and Herat ' i11 the
interests of science.'
The Trans-Caspian Railway, wl~ichhad been
co~nrnenceclduring Slrolnelefl"~caillpnign against
the Telrlrc!s, mas coillpleted as far as Icizil-Arvnt
by the micldle of September 1881-nine nlolzths
after the capture of Deilghil Tepi. ; and as General
h~iienkoff,tlie original desigiler of tlie line, llad
a, short time previously pul~lished a b ~ . o c h ~ ~in
re
vhich he proposed that the line slioulil he contii~uedthrough Sarakhs anrl I-Ierat to join t,lle
Indian railway system in the neig1ll)onrhood of'
ICandahar, advantage was tnlren of tllc iclea to
obtain a thorough survey of 111c country between
Askabacl and Herat,.
At the beginning of October 1881 Lessar, accompanied 11y an escort of Cosxac!lrs, coinmcncecl
the survey of the first sectioil of the proposed line
from Icizil-Arvat to Askabad aiicl Sarnlrhs, and
having thoroughly cxalnined the wholr, of t.11~
intervening conntl.y aiid fouild thn,t it was :dnlost,
perfectly level anrl wcll nd:q)teil for ih(: co~lst,r~~r*tion of n r:lieal? railway, he tllc~l rc!Lul.nod to
Askd)acl in Uer'cinl~cl-,vi5 Mcsl~c~cl
;tilil M:~l~onlnlc)F o r a11 inlorofiting acco~mtof tllis rcconnai~snnro, ~ r oY'ltr
Rrlsainne nt J f c ~ ~n7~rZ
v I I c ~ n l1, 1 t~h e It~loMr. C:IIILI*IL!H illi~r\.il~.
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~l:li)atl,wd so011 nf1er1vnl.d~ploc(vdt~(l10 ]<LInllxJ
t o 011taiii the latest n l a l ~
of the count1.g tllrclupll
urhicll liis subseq~ienttravels I\-ere to
llln(lc.
h l t h ~ u g l lorily four lllo~illlsel:il)secl l)etIv\.ccll
llis first and secolld jollnleys, yet the st:~tcof :LGlirs
011 the Russian border 1i:ttl gre:itly (+11:111p(ldurillg
the interval, for the TelrkPs and otl~c~rtri],c~d
iillial~itingthe Atdr and districts l~!-onil S:~r:lk11~
h:ld becoine Illore accustolnetl to tl~cirlirw llcigIll ~ o u r s , and the country bet~rccn Ask:~bntl :~ntl
Sal.alths liad become so pncifictl t1i:tt tr:LvclIers
could move about witllout nrly larger escort t l l : ~ ~ ~
1 ~ : ~necessary
s
for their protectioa against c:isual
1.ol)bers. For this reasoil lie dispensed wit11 :~ny
r e g u l a r military escort :~ncl urns nccon11,allicld by
twent;y well-moulited hlieli Turkc,mnlls fioin tlltl
T\'nl~liasettlement,, wllo supplied their ow11 f(10~i
:111(l fodder for Ilieir llol.ses, but rt2rei~rrilp:~yluc~nt
for t h e i r services at tlle rate of forty roul~lrspcr
iuontlz. Tell of these 11ie1l ?rere sul)l~lied ~vitli
Berclaa rifles, nrllile tlle others c~rriecltlluir oIrn
muzzle-loading gulls ; and, iu :~(lclitio~r
to tl~cse
weapons, each man ca~ricil011 hi8 l>ersr)ii :L ~vllrrle
: ~ r s e n a lof pislols nncl lmives.
Leaving Askabad on t l ~ eevening of Apl-il SS,
1682, Lessar travellecl over tlie gouild wliicl~lie
liad previously surveyed, and reachrcl S:traklis oil
May 3. There he halted for a day as the guest
of the Persian comn~ancl:~lit,and then, crossil~gto
the rigllt bank of tlie IIeri-Rud,' continued liis
T l ~ i sriver I~nsits
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jourlley toma~clsIIerat through districts mllich
had never before been traversed by Europeans.
A marc11 of about 150 miles through an undulat,iilg country, covered witjh rich grass a i d
numerous groves of pistachio and mull~crrytrees,
brought the explorer to the h o t of the 13urlrliut
range, which is a portio~i of tlle I'arol~amisus
Ilountains-the
mytllical barrier which for 1nol.e
than half a ceiltury was believed to constilutc ail
almost impossible obstacle to auy nilva~icc: on
Herat from the norill.
There a great surprise was awaiting him ; for,
instead of finding n great mountnin-cllniil barri~ig
his further progress, he met wit11 no greatel. .
obstruction than was to be foounil in an infignificant range of hills traversed by a pass whose
summit was only 000 feet above the s ~ ~ r r o ~ ~ i l c l i i ~ g
locality, ancl not illore than 3,100 feet above the
level of the sen. The ascent of the pass from the
north ' presented no cliificulties, atiil the clesceilt
towards Kusan on the soutllern side wns Illore
sloping and convenient than the ascent,' nilcl c;onlcl
even then have been traversccl l ~ ycarts ; wliile the
entire defile-if
such a llalne can l ~ enpplicrl to
such a ridiculously easy crossing-conld with but
Sonnet1 by llio junction of tlic Koh-i-Balm, Snfctl-Roll, r~llilS i ~ ~ l i .
Bol~rangus. Tllcro aro two priilcipr~lt r i l ~ ~ ~ t n r i c ~ -T- t~l iI~~ ~ I 11,
L1111
~-IL~I
llio Jul~~~il-r~l)-wliicll
uriito nc!nr tllo poet of 1)iurltrt-Yor. Icro111
tEint point tho rivcr I I O C O I ~ ~ O1H~ 1 1 0 ~ 1by
1
llic! IIILIIIO IIcri-Iill11~
IUI~,
flowirlg in IL wc~torly tlirtlrtion P I L H1110
~ forlrcn~o~
of IIur~itnntl
Bhuri~m,il turn^ townl-il~ti110 north nt Rnsl~ri,~ ~ r laftor
d , prrtising
St~rnlclis,flown in n nortll-wutilorly clirt!cLion, r~utllir~t~lly
~~HILPPOIL~H
iri IL ~ o r i of
c ~swampH i l l tlie R~vt~.lcniti
1)u~crt. Uclow (i.1: to thc
ntlrtli o f ) S n r l d ~it ~is cnllcd tlic 'L'c~je~lrl.
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-little 1nl)our liave been illacle travers:J,le by x~lieeled
vehicles. At about half-may dotvil [lie soutliern
slope, wlierc tlle track talies the form of a regular
roadway, there is a sweet-water spring naniecl
Clioinbon, from m~lleiicetlie same gentle descent
contillnes for another six versts (four miles), after
~ ~ b i cthe
h road divides, one brniicli leading to
Pesli-Robnt (Toinan Aga) on tlle western 1,anli of
tlie IIeri-Eud, vliile tlie otlier goes to I<usan, boll1
ruiiiiirlg tllrough level country.
Lessar, in his report, after clescrihing tliis roulc,
tlleil goes on to say :The road tlirough Choinbou is the iliost conveliient for wheeled traffic. In addition to it
there are several other routes vliicl~illso rill1
l)ei,ween the Beri-Encl and Murgliab from north to
sonth, ancl mrbicll are conaected with eacli other
by lrailsvcrse roads.
' I collected information rcspectirig all tliese
roads. As a possible road for ~vheeled~iel~icles
Srom Merv to IIerat, tlie liiost i~lterestiiigis t1i:tt
~vhiclibranches ol'f from the roacl traversed by IXIC
at tlie Robat-Kunprueli ruins. P1.oin that point
the road runs to Ak-Robat, a locality al~ouiidiug
i r ~fresli water, wliicli is obtainecl from wells r ~ ta
depth of' not more tllsln seven feet. These wells
may be dug allnost anyvhere ancl water will he
obtained. The roacl then passes throng11 Guilen
(Gulran) and Chilime-Souz (Clieshina-Sebz), two
streams yielding a plentiful supply of fresh water.
The pass over the Rarkllut range near C1iesli1ii:~Sel~zis saicl to be of the same cliarncter ns that 31
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Chombou. Beyond the pass one road leads to
Kusan along a perfectly level country, and another
to Shekivan over inconsiderable elevations. This
road from Nerv to Ak-Robat first runs along the
River hlurghab, then along tlie Kushk river to
Cllamail-i-baid. After this it strikes off in the
direction of Ak-Robat, and passes the 1sli1-n
Springs. By this route the Paropamisus Mountains
are avoided, as is also tlie pass a t the source of the
Kushk River, which gave rise to the supposition
that the road from Merv to Herat was impracticable for wheeled traffic on a large scale. The
whole distance from Merv to Herat by this route
is about 580 versts (2553 miles).'
Suclz was the information gained by this
young Russian engineer, who by his intelligent exploration ' dissipated the fallacies which hitherto
obscured the subject of a direct line of communication between Russia and India, and gave us for
the first time a true contour sketch of the face of
the country between Askabad ancl Herat.' As Sir
Henry Bawlinson very truly remarked, ' the
" great mountain chain" which, according to the
optimist school, was to serve as a palladium for
India, turns out-on the showing of M. Lessarto be a mere paltry line of sandstone hills, not more
than 1,000 feet in height, which cortld be crossed
by a carriage-road in a couple of hours, and
which wonld crumble before the touch of a
Xussian railway engineer.' The Paropamisus
,myth had been exploded, and, thanks to the
energy of M. Lessar, the people of England at last
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begall to realise that there were 110, patllless
deserts ' or ' stnpei~clousillonnt,aiil ranges ' betweeIl
the Russia11 frontiers in Trans-&+a
alld the
British outposts in the Pishin Valley.
After having mecle this i n t e r e s t i l ~and
~ valuable discosrery, Lessnr proceeded to tlie Afghan
town of K ~ ~ s awhere
n,
he was hospitably receiyed
by {;lie co~nitlaliclailtof the fort, alld thence he
went eastwards to the fortress of Ghurian, forty
~nileswest of I-Ierat. There he had to remain for
a, couple of days until permission liad been
obtained from tlie Goverilor of I-Iernt for him to
cross over into Persia ; but on May 1 2 he resumed.
his journey and marclled tl~rougliKhaf and Turbet-i-I-Iaiclari to Meshecl. After a short rest there
he once again moved towards tlie Afghan frontier,
and marclling along the rnain trade route between
Meshed and I-Ierat, tlirough Turbet-i-Shaikh-Jam,
reached the Heri-Rud at PesBRobat, whence he
returnecl to Sarakhs ancl Askabad by the direct
route which runs along the valley of the 'River of
I-Iernt .'
I n the following September this young explorer
travelled thro~ighDeregez ; and, after making excursions in vnrious directions between the HeriRucl 3 r d Murghnb rivers, he went from Sarakhs
to Merv, where he was cordially received by the
Tekkds. Froin tlleilce lie proceeded along the
0x11s to Khiva, ancl returned to Askabad through
Shaikh-Senem, Bala-Isllem, ICazi, and Durun. Even
then he was not satisfied with his labonrs, andfilled wit,h a spirit of restless energy-he in the

following moat11 explored the couiltry between
Askabad and the Tejend Oasis, again visitecl Merv
a t tlle invitation of the Kllan of the Sitcllmaz t,ribe,
a1113 drew up careful reports of the various routes
leacling to that place from the Akhal Oasis ; and
finally, in November and Decen~ber,he surveyed
the - mountainous districts of Icelat-i-Nadri and
Deregez, and obtainecl complete iilforlnatioil regarding the irrigation of the Atak country.'
In addition to Alilchanoff and Lessar another
Russian officer perforllzecl a very l ~ z a r d o u jouriley
s
from AstrLzhad through Meshed, Merv, and Cllarjni
t,o Tashkent. This explorer was Lieutenant Nazir
Beg (or, as he was called in Russia, Naziroff), a
Caucasian, m~hoserved under Slrobeleff jn the Alai
expeditioi~,and in 1878 went to Kabul as a topographer attached to StolietofYs mission to tlie
Court of the Amir Shere Ali. He, wit11 two companions (one a Persia11 and the other a native of
~ a l r u )penetrated
,
to Merv in disguise, thence went
on to the Oxus, surveying e n ~ - o z ~ tthe
e intervening
desert ; ant1 having thus accomplisl~edthe object
of his mission, he quietly rode on through Bolrl~ara
to Tashkent.
Thus by the close of the year 1882 the Russians had obtained complete information concerning the various routes from Askabad to Bokhara,
and from the Arsll Sea to the borders of Afghanistail ; while, in aclclition to this, the independent
L

Pro111 April to Deccmber 1882 M. Lessar travelled over 5,000
versts, and gained important information conceining the geography
and politioJ condition of the countries between Iihiva, and I-Ieret.

Turlioman tribes graclually became accns toil~ecito
the presence of Russian visilors, aiicl tllc way was
thus prepared for f ~ ~ r t l auiie~stioiis.~
~er
In tfie menllvhile i t had lsecolne evident that
t121e Russian GCoverninent iiite~ldedto displ~tethe
Shah's claiiu to sovereign rights over tlie htalr
Oasis ; and, arhile they wese protesting Lliat llley
woulcl. not aclvalice beyoilcl thcir present positions, it was clear that they llnd resolved to $eel)
open a sore on the Tersinll I'rontiel- in oriler
{,hat an excuse for n f ~ ~ r t h eadvance
r
inight, be
available whenever a suitable ol)porluriity arrived.
This district hacl loiig formed an inlegral portio~t
of tlie kingclom of l'ersia, ancl no oiie liail ever
clreaint of disputing a fact wliicll .tlTasbased ou
a long-cont;inuecl occupntion, a11cI proved by tlie
habi~ualpayment of taxes by the iiiliabita~lts lo

'
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Among the Tckkh chieftains of Morv the one who at tlri~Linio
was most obdurate in his ho~tilitytowards tlie Rn~ttinns was
Makhiltlm K ~ d Khnn,
i
who, with Teltnl6 Sirdar, hncl conduclod tho
defence of Denghil Tep6 in 1881. After tho cnpture of that placo
Mnkhdurn ICuli fled to Merv, and at first rojocted n11 offers of friendship fiom the clirection of Asltabad. But when AlikhanofT visited
Morv in February 1862 he foimd that t h i ~chiof rvns alrcady ragretting that he had not followed Tolrln6 Sirdnr's exnnlple in su11mitting to tho R ~ ~ s s i mwlioroby
s,
he lost a share in tho bellofits
which hacl boon conferrecl on his more discreet kinsmnn. IIo &t
t h t time made secret overtures to tllc Bussinn officer, and stated
that ho would like to visit Asl~abad,butt fearocl that ho might be
punished for having led the defence of Donghi1 TepB. Alikhnnoff,
after his r e w n to Aslmbad, lnaintrrined close relations with JInlthclum Icu~li,and evontndy, in tlie nutumn of 1882, persu~dedh i n ~to
visit the Russian headquastors, where 110 took the oath of alleginnce
to the M1hite Czar. By his suibmission the Russians got rid of their
chief opponent, nnd froill that time there was not much danger that
they woIlld have t o storm the @'eat fortress of I < ~ u s ~I~hall
I I ~ itl
order to gain possession of the Merv Oasis.

-

the Sliali's officers. But when the British Foreign
Minister pointed out to the Russian Goverilnlent
that the Shah had an undoubted right to this
district, and suggested that an arrangement should
be arrived at between Russia and Englancl, recognising this fact and determining the limits of
Persia towards the northern deserts, the reply was
made that 'the Russian Governlneiit could i ~ o t
acquiesce in the proposal made by I-Ier Majesty's
~overnlnentthat the Atak country from Sarakhs
to Baba Durinaz and between that line and the
River Tejend should be handed over to the care
and into tlie possession of Persia.'
Matters reinailled in this unsatisfactory state
during tlle spring and summer lnontlls of 1883,
tlie Persians being practically prohibited from
exercising any control over the Atalr Oasis, while
Russian iletachments inoved at will throughout
the district; and towards the close of tlie year
General KomaroffY1the new governor of the TransCaspian district, sent a force of' 1,000 infantry,
500 caval~y,and 1 0 guns
to occupy the Tejend
Oasis, while reillforcements were at tlie saine time
sent from Turltestan to Khiva to talte part in tlle
occupation of Merv as sooil as a suitable occasion
for such a step sboulcl. arrive.
Nor was it long before ~ u c l ian opportu~lit~y
u7;\.asafIorcled 1)y the embarrassme~ltof tlie ljritisll
Governnlent 011 account of seriolzs t1.oul)les in the
Soudan. It was at this critical perioil-wl~etl the

' Genornl IComui40il fincc~ododGoi10r1~1Iiohrbo~gin tlic ~ ~ r i ~ i g
of 1888.

-1854

RUSSIA'SOPPORTUNITY

185

--

Mahdist insurrectioll was spreadillg in the Easterll
Soudau, when Balier Pasha's arnly had beell grievously clefeated near Trinkitat, and when Gorclon
was ill difficulties at Khartoum-that the British
Ambass2zdor at St. Petersburg, on Febru3ry 15,
1884, telegraplled to Lorcl Granville tliat His
Imperial lMajesty the Czar 'had determined to
accept the allegiance which the representatives of
the Merv Turkomalls had sworn at Askabad, and
to send an officer to adilliilister the government
of that region.' The time was well chosen.
Zi~gland's hour of trouble was Russia's opportunity, and this opportunity was not allowed to
pass, even although tlie advantage was gained in
direct violation of repeated pledges, and at the
expense of tlie last remaining shred of any reputatioll which remained to Bussia for honesty and
straiglltforwardiless in her dealings in Central
Asia.
I t will be well to explaiil briefly how this
submission of the representatives of the Merv
Turkomans hacl beell brought about, and how
I<omaroffshortly afterwards took po~sessionof the
Oasis, As soon as it was decicled that the fitting
opportunity had arisen for striking the final blow
Alilcllanoff was again despatched to Merv with a
s r n d escort, and accompailied by Makhdum Kuli
Khan. On arrival there he convened a public
rneetiilg and called upon the Mervis to beg for
rncrcy and to subinit to the rule of the White
Czar, ernpEiasising l ~ i s cleinan(1s by calling their
attention td tlle force which had been assembled

in the Tejencl Oasis, and llinting that it mas nierely
Ihe advanced guard of an army wliicll mas moving forward for the occupation of their country.
Makbcl~lumKuli Ifiali apparently joined'his exhortatioils to the tlireats of the Russian oficer, and, as
by t,llis h e there was a strong pro-Russian party
in the oasis, Alikhanoff eventually persuaded some
of the principal kllans a i d elders to sign a document tendering their subniission to 12ussia. This
having been satisfactorily accomplisllecl, tlie party
returiiecl to Asliabad, accompaniecl by a cleput,ation of four chiefs and twenty-four other 11otal)lq
M-110,on the morning of February 12, 1884, took
the oath of allegiance to the Wliite Czar in tlie
presence of eeneral KoniaroK.'
A fort;night later General Komarol~leftAslrahad
for tlie Tejeild Oasis, accoinpaniecl by an escort of
al~out100 men, aiid shortly afterwards four other
detachments, nuinbering in all sollie 800 men, were
sent forward to Kari Be11.t. On arrival there the
whole available force commenced its nlarcll on
Merv, preceded by the chiefs ~ 1 1 01 i ; ~ ljilst tellilered their sublnissio~land who were sent on a1le:~cl
Geiloral IComaroff announcod tho sulbmis~ionof tho Morv
Turlrornn;lls in n; tologram to tho Czar, detotl Fobrnary 12, 1884, of
which tho following is e trtmslation : ' I ]lave tho ho11ow. of reporting to your Mejosty thtrt tho lrhnns of the four tribo~of Mcrv
Turlromans ttlld twenty-fonr deputies, ench rcprcsonting 8,000
ltibitlms, ~ I ~ Vtlliu
Q
dt~y,t ~ tA~ltnbad,forrnt~llyLalten tho oat11 of
[~llogiancoto your Miijeuty, for thorusclvcs and on bohalf of nll t l ~ o
pcoplo of Merv. The l<l~nnannd rcpresontrrtivo~~ t r ~ tthet
o tho
bIervi~hnve decided on tliifi utcp 11oi11gco~lecionsof tlioir i ~ l a b i l i ~ ~
to govern tllorn~elv~s
find C O I I V ~ I ~ C C ! LllnL
(~
yolir MI~~OHLS'H
pon,oyl111
Govorlln~entrrlono ifi cr~rlnblc(IT ctiL~~blitil~ii~g
1111~1c ~ ~ i s o l i i l n toy11er
ii~~
and prosperity in RIorv.'
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-- ---. - - - - to prepare the n a y for the entry of the Iiussi:ul
troolbs. But there as still a strong lxlrty ill tllc
0:tsis n.hich ol~jectedto n Wussiarl occul~:iiioii,:111rl
ns soon as it becnnle kno~vn tllnt n force m:ls
>~pprn:~clling
for that purpose a multituile of annril
r>
lurlcoi~innss:kllicil onl; Iiopiiig to drive b:~cl<tlie
in trnclers. Tlieg, bos~ever, were too 1:l tc, and,
nllliougli some sllots were fired n u 1 the :~[l~~a~lc,t!
was tcmpornrily dclnged, they 11:1c1 no time to
c~rgaidse:I defence of tlieir great fortified euclosulr~,
and oil the monling of lfarcli IG tlie 1lussi:ul
coluiiul mnrched in nnd occnpied the fortress of
I<ausliut 1<11ai1.
111this Iuanner vas lIerv, ' 'I'llc Quce11 of tlie ,
IVorlcl,' annexed to the Bussinii Ein11ir.e ; nilcl il
will be well to close this c1i:~ptcrof' Iiussialii ~ I L triguc and perfidy by cluoting Blnr~rin's opinion
regarding this inci(1eiit. Ue says : ' If Alilili:i~lun's
cliplomacg a1 Merv was slladg, it -\\.as not onc ~vllil
ilmrker in hue tlian tlie cliplonlncy escrcist~dby tllc
liussiail BIiilister for Foreigtl hlY:~irs :lt St. I'etcrsburg. The nllllesntion of M e n \i7:ls dcli1)er:~tcly
l)lmi~~~ed
by tlie Russian Governrnc?~lt,n~iilcarricil
out ill strict nccorc~aiice wit11 its orders. 'Uhe
c o t 9 cle muin wns tot:~lly wiprovokecl by tllc
Tek)<&; it was done in violntioll of ,z whole scrips
of solemn assurances to E~~glxnd
; slid tlie blo~v
nq,s struck in a treacllerous n11d co~~~ar(lly
manner,
disllonourable to natioll th:~thad produced sllc'h
hard-liitting, fi~ir-figl~ti~lg
hero ns Skobeleff.'
- --
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~
t r t tlrc Gates of Ilernt, 11y t h late
~ 3Ir. Cherlcs
Marvin.

CHAPTER XVIII
1884-1885

TIIE AE'GHAN BOUNDARY QUESTION
bclventeges to Russia horn the occupation of Merv-The Afghnn
frontior-The
Bonndary Commission-Ru~sia gaining timelComaroff's intrigues-Uneasiness in Englmcl-Soieure of Pul-iIChatarn-Explanation of ha. de Giers-The IZiver Murgl~abDistrict of Pmjdeh-Russian movements near the frontierNew Russian proposals-British counter-proposd rejected.

BEBORE
describing the serious coinplications which
followed tlie ailnexation of Merv, i t will b e well
to briefly consider the eflect which this occulsatioil
had on the general military position of the Russians
in Central Asia,
While Cossack detachments were being pushecl
forward across the Kirghiz Steppes, and even nntil
the capture of Samarkand, Russia had no footing
on the south-eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. It
is true that she held the islaild of Ashurada, ancl
from time t o time tried to gain n fooling on t h e
mainland in the neiglibourhood of Gez ; but these
attempts were invarid~lyfrusijl.atecl by tlze cletermined oppositioil of the Shall's Goverimlent,, supported as tliey were in this matter by (3reaL
Britain. Th~zs, ll~ough tlle Russia11 advances

S~l~h?'E(;~('ril.
V.\T,UIC
01: >rl'l:y
1 SO
- -- --tlirougli I<liolrtnlcl 2nd 13oklinr:l c:tusclti Illu,.ll
anxiety iu Enplnnd, they in tliriuselvcs (lit{uot
c~onstituteally very serio~lsnlennc1e to Tlrc1ia,I)(,c:tnse n Russinn army ndvnncillg to\n.:~rdsI Tudllq
fro111 tllnl direc,tion ~vould11:~vcto cross tllc gipnlltilb
mountnin range of the IIinilu-I<usll, : u ~ dtvonltl
even then he obligcd to tr:lversr dillic~nlt, defil(.s
l~eforcit coulcl debouc~hinto the 1)lnins of PilcIia,
t ~ h e r eit would be quite ~uifitted :iftclr its toiIscnnc~
)narc11 to enter 11pon s series of y.cl:lt c:ulll,nipll.:
fur tlie coilquest of Hinilustan.
Unt wlie~lthe Russians oc~cul~iotl
ICrasnovotl~k
in 1869 tliey corlznleilccil a nenr Inovemrbut ~vllic*li
was of far greater danger, for tllcy tlier.(~l)yseizthtl
the western extremity of a lint of :~ilvm~cc.l)p
M-llichthey could move lot~\.nrcisI I t ~ a t I<--:iiidaIi:ir,
,
anrl the lower Irlclus williont encout~lcring:in?
snch obstacles as would hnve to l)e tr:~vtll.scd1.,
an invading force rlloviilg from t l ~ c t di~+ci'tion01'
Turkestan. Tlic full nieailiiig o f this tlr~vdcvc~lo1)mcnt was not at first rcnlised ; hut when Skol)t~l(~A'
conquered the ABllal Tekli;s, nlld as soon as 1,t~ss:ir.
had exploded the I'aropnmisns myth, tlw pooj)lt>of
England began to anrake to n serlsc or thr grc,:tt
d'znger which threateilecl Iuilin, nl~il fc~untlt h a t
R~zssiawas in a position to make a11 : ~tack
t
on tllr4r
most
possessioiz from t ~ v ocliRerent tlircilliol~s.
But so long zs Merv xsas unronrlucretl, nntl
remained in the possession of inclepen(le11t arid
llostile tribes, these two TZussian nnnies (in Tr.:nlsC:gjpia, alld Tllrkestan) %\?ere~lliablcto :kf7t t ogrt]lel., separated as they Irorr
sOIlltJ 200 lllilrs 01'
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independent territory ; and thus in the event of a
war with Ziiglancl Russia woulcl a t the outset have
been obliged to ulldertalre tlie concluest of Merv
at a time when she could ill spare troops for such a
purpose, or she would have been compelled to hold
back a considerable portion of her availaljle forces
fi-om the attaclrs
to, protect her coi~muiiicatioi~s
which would undo~~bteclly
have been made by the
iiiliabitants of tlie oasis on the Murghab.
By the occupatioll of Merv, however, aU t,llis
has been changed; tlie Turkestan troops then became available for use if necessary on the HeratKandallar line, and free ancl di19ect con~illunicatio~~
was obtained thronghout the Russian provii~cesin
Cerltral Asia, from the Caspian Sea to tlie fardistant borders of China. Nor is this all : for,
before Merv mas annexed, reinforcemellts for the
Turlrestan army coulcl only reach Tasllkeilt b y the
teclious route from Orenburg to Kazala, or by the
equally trying journey from Krasiiovodsk to Klliva,
a,ncl thence either to Kazala or u p the Oxus ; ~vllile
now, Russian troops can be sent by the direct
route tlirougli Askabad, Merv, and Charjui,
whereby several weelrs are gained.
Thus the possessioii of Merv has stre~~gtliened
tlie strategicd position of Ilussia in Central Asia LZ
hunclredfolcl, and sirnilai. advantages have also resulted from a. colnmercial point of view ; for since
Sillce the construction of the railway through Merv and
Charjui to Samarkand the saving in time may be colnputed in
months as. compared with tho old post route across the ICirgliie
Steppes, or even by the shortor route t h o u g h Khivs.
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tllis ( I i ~ c tLrncic routo 11:)s 1)tlell g ; l i t l ~ y l (-'tl~ltr;tl
Asian cottotl : ~ t l i l otllc'r prorlu~t:: ( * : I I ~
c;\sil!trnnsferrc~iltto tllc Europ:ul uiurk~ts,~vliiltbclir.alr
cottoil fal~rics:lnd otllcr 1iussi:ul c.otllnlo~litio.:( h : t ~ t
11otv l)e ljroiitnbly c ' o n v ~ ~ yto
~ ~C'clltr:tl
d
:lsi:i 1i,1.
sale in the 11:lz:~ars of Uokllar:~ : ~ t l t l the c1ist:irrt
Fergharl:~TT:~llc~.
$11~11 were tlle results n.llii.11 n-cre to 1)c cBspected from tlle Ilussinn a~lnes:itiollof I l r r ~ . I h t
alt,11011gll this step pointed c.lc:lrly t ( ) :ut ti:trly :crlcl
consiclern71le increase of 1iussi:i's l)o\vrr for at t:ic+lcing Iilcli:~, tlic inuucc1i:ite sourcaei,f tl:ll~g~r
1r:is to
forincl in tlic stlildeil :ipl)rar:uic4c1of Kr~ssi:t~itroop.;
in close prosilllity to the frontic1.s of iifgllnlli~t:tll
a t a point wherc those f~ontiers\veyti impcrf~*c*tlg
definecl, and where there were, thilrcfc~rc,~ullillliti~tl
o ~ p o r l u n i t i c ~for
s flirther coiiip1ic:~riolts.
I11 the Anglo-liussiml n ~ r c ~ c n i cof
~ t3873
~
tl1c1
territories and bonlldnritls o l tll:~l l)ortioii of tl1i1
Amir's doillillions ~jdliclilies l,et~vec~ntlie C)sus :illti
tllc frontiers of l'crsi:~were tlefi~l~tl
ill the follotvilig \vorils : ' The internd distric-ts of ~tk(*ll:t,
Siripul, Maii~lann,Shibergllan, : t ~ i t lAiiclkiii, tlle 1ntli.r
of wliicll would be tlle estrcine Afgllan frorl(iilr
possessioll Lo the nortll-~~lcst,
tlie Descl.t bclyoi~d
belonging lo indel,eudent tribes of Turko~n:uls.'
I t will be see11 tllnt this dciiilition of tlie itorlhwestern fronlicr of ~lfglinnist:tll\\-:IS 1 ) 110
~ llle3llS
satisfactory, in tllat the chief border provi~lc~rs
were only melltioltetl, wllilc the nctunl, or eve11
llortllern liillits of these districts were
in 110 % T X ~Sl,e(~ili~(l.
l)Oillt, 1 i O l V t 8 ~ ( * l ' , 1V:lS
1

~

1

1
L

clearly statied, and that is that the Desevts beyond
the borders of these provinces belonged to the inclependeilt Turkomalls, and by this it was clearly
implied that the Afghan districts tl~emselvescorn-"
___._--.-prised all the cultivated lands and pastures up to
the southern edge of the deserts i11 question.
For years after this agreement was concluded
it was geilerally understood, both in England allcl
Russia, that this porl;ion of the Afghan frontier rail
in a nearly straight line fro111 ~ l l o j aSale on t h e
Oxus to a point 011 the Persian frontier at, or in
the immediate neigl~bourhood of, Saralchs ; t h e
frontier was thus shown in Euglisll and Russian
official maps ; and the Czar's Goverilnient unquestionably accepted this interpretation of the clause
of the agreement.
In orcler that there might be no mistalre
regarding this point, it is as well to mention t h a t
so lately as February 22, 1852, the Russian Anzbassador i n London informecl Lord Granville t h a t
his Government acknowledgecl the validity of t h e
agreement of 1873, and he also stated that, as t h a t
agreement 'was incomplete,' they were ready t o
supplement it by a settlement of the frontier of
Afghanistan 'from the point where it had been left
undefined as far as Sarnlchs ' ; and again in t h e
following April 81. de Giers himself informed S i r
E. Thornton that, ' in view of preventing disturbances on the borders of Afghanistall, he consiclerecl

'

The Ambt~ssadorhere meant IChoja Salo. East of Ichojn,
Sale tho northern frontier of Afghanistnn is mnrlred by the couree
of the River Oxus.

it, to be of great iiuportance tll:it the 11omltlary of
that c,oulitry fi.on~Ichoja ,711112 to the I')L'~:sit~~~~,fi~ollti,:r
in the neiyl~buz~~~hnod
fl , S i ~ i . ( ~ k.shoi~l~t
h~
h~ bfi~rriz~illy
alld tlcji~~itdy
Iuid tlorcn.'
Tllus it is evident from tlie ~~rorclsof tlle
Eussinu Foreign Millister llinlself t11:tt until Jlerv
llntl l~eeiioccupiccl tlie Russi:til Govclnincnt clenvljr
uiidel~stoocl and ack~lo~vledgedtlint the northwestern froi~lierof Rfg11:uiistttn ~ v x suinrkcd bjr a
line ruinling from Iihoj:~S:~let.o Snr:~klls. But,
sliortly after Merv hnrl been aiulcsed a new ill:^^)
was preparecl by t l i ~St:lff' of [lie 1Zussi:ul :Lrmy,
wlllerein the boundary between Merv n~tdXfglimiststi W:LSinarkecl by a colourecl line, which was
clrs~vnso ns to meet the Beri-Rucl at :L point far
tn the south of Sn~nklis. Tlic first sign was thus
given that the mi1it:~ryl~artjrill Eussia i~ltcildeclto
coillest the valiility of tllc olcl recogniscd frontier ;
l ~ ueven
t
then, tvhen the British h~ub:issadorshowed
the riiap to M. de Giers, he W:LS ass~~recl
tlmt it
coald ?lotbe co~lsidercdas oficinl,' as tlle boulkilnr~
I n nddition to this map, n copy of which wns nont to Lord
Granville by the British Alnlsnasnrlor at St. Potorsbnrgon Mt~rcli26,
nnothor mq) of Asintic Russith and the adjoining conntrios WHS
p ~ ~ b l i s h o tinl the following blny by tho hlilit~lrg Topographicel
Department oE the Russinn ChieE Staff' Oflico; and in this lnter
produotion, which wns declared to be oilicial, the frontiers of Persia
and Afghtlnist~nfrom Babn Durmaz to Iihoja Sale wero shown by
a, line traced in tho following manner:Frorn Beba Dnrrnnz tho north-eastern frontier of Iillorassan
followed the mountain rnnge which forn~stho south-\vestern
boundnry of tho Atak Oasis, lenving Lnftnbad und Iielnt-i-Nndiri
t o Persia, but depriving tho Persinns of control over tho fitrerblns
watering the Atak. Tho frontiur thon roac!led the Tejend River I L ~
R short distance to the north of tho Perfiinn fortress of S ~ ~ r n l i I ~ s ,
VOL. 11.
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line so drawn was not in accordance with the
ideas which he had exchanged in conversation
with the Russian Minister of War ; aiicl the Foreign
Minister then added that the frontier would be,
more or less, a line from Khoja Sale to Sarakhs,
but he, on this occasion, qualified this remark by
observing that there would, perhaps, be some deviations to the south so as to meet the m o h t a i n
ridges.
I n spite, therefore, of M. de Giers' continuecl
assertion that the boundary would run from Khoja
Sale to Sarakhs, it was plainly seen from the production of the map in question, and from the
Russian Minister's reference to ' deviations to t h e
south so as to reach the mountain ridges,' that the
Russians intended to dispute the Ainir's claim to
certain lands to the south of the central portion
of the old frontier line-i.e.
on the banks of
tlie Murghab river -and
this belief received
and then, without orossirlg the rivor, followed the course of the
stream up to a point about 184 miles north of ICz~san,whence,
leeving the river, it followed the ridge of the Peropamisns as far as
the Pass of Araevan, ahozct 16$ miles t o the nmt72 of Herat.
The eontier, as shown on this map, then turned due north
along the road leading to Msrv, and crossing the Eushlc nt ChnhilDolctar i t followed the right bank of that streem to within about
49 miles of Icala-i-Msnr,and then, trending in an easterly direction,
passed 9 miles to the sowtlz, of Mariich~k,17 miles to tho north of
Maimena, 5 miles to the north of Andlthui, and finally roached the
left bank of the River Oxus at IU~ojaSale.
This oflicial map appeared three weeks nftor Lord Granville
had suggested that a Joint Colnmiasion should dotarmino tile
point8 on the frontier, and it thus became perfectly olonr
from the earlieet stage of the negotialions thnt liussia inlended to
insist on nothing leas than a reconsicleration of the whole quostion
of the north-western frontier of Afghanistan.

confirmation in a well-authenticated report tlint
Russian reinforcements had been rlespntched to
Merv, and that Russian agents had been sent to
tamper with the Sarilr tribe of Turkorzans who
inhabit the oases of Yulatan and Pailjdeh. The
British Cabinet, therefore, decided that it .would
be advisable to accurately clefine the northwestern frontier of Afgharnistan with as little delay
as possible, and Lord Granville accordingly, on
April 2 9, 1884, informed the Russia11 Government
that England was prepared to accept the proposal
put forvard in 1882-aid since repeated by M. de
Giers-for the delimitation of the frontier fro111
Khoja Sale westwards, and suggested that tlie
principal points on the boundary line should be
laic1 down on tlle spot by a Joint C~rnniission,~
wliicli
should comlllence operations in the following
autumn. After a short interchange of cornmunications this proposal was approved by the 12ussians,
and October 13, 1884, was nained as the approxinii~tedate on which the two Commissioners were
to meet at Sarakhs on the lefb bank of the LleriRud.
I n accordance with this understancliag, MajorGeneral Sir Peter Lumsclen was appointed British
Commissiorler for the delimitation of the Afghan
Lord Grmwille in this note suggested that the Commission
should include an Afghan representative ; but the Russian Government objected to this, and it was eventually settled that an Afghan
official should merelybe attached to the Boundmy Commission ne
an expert to furnish explanations on questions of detail t~ndpurely
local matters whenever tho Commissioners of the two great Powers
might wish to consult him.
0 2

Boundary, several distinguished officers were attached t o his staff, and arrangements were made
for the despatch froin India of a suitable escort
of native troops. Sir Peter Lu~nsdenand such
inembers of his staff as were in Engla,nd a t t h e
time left Lolldon early in September, so as to be a t
Sarakhs on the appointetl date ; but as the escort
from India. had to march by a long and ilnpcrfectly
explored route through Beluchistan in order that
there iniglit be no possibility of coinplications with
the fana~icalAfghans, the Russian Government
~vasinformed on September 1 5 that Her Majesty's
Cominissio~lerwould probably not reach Sarakhs
before November 7. The Russia11 Government h a d
in tlie rneai~while llomillatecl General Zelenoi a s
their Commissioner, and at the end of September
it was understood, both in England and Russia, that
the Joint Comlnission would commence operatioils
tturly in the following November.
13ut although the St. Petersburg authorities
agreed to the principle that t,l~e frontier line
should be definitely fixed by the officers thus
a~pointed,they soon showed that they had no
desire to have the question speedily settled, by
entering into negotiations regarding trifling matters which both wasted time and retarded t h e
co~nmencementof the actual delimitation of t h e
boundary.
Thus, although it was abundantly evident to
the meanest intellect that the most important
the frontier was that lying between
portion
the Eleri-Ruii and Murghah rivers, and tlia,t it
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was, therefore, desirable that this portion shoultl
b e first cleiined ill order that clulwrous complicaP
tions might not arise, the Russia~i Goveriunen~
nevertlleless iiisisted thaL the demarcation of the
frontier should be coinnlenced at Khoja Sale,
and that the Boundary Coinnlissioners shoulif wo~lr
from east to west ; and they olily ~vithdrewtllcir
objections after illally valuable -il.eelcs had beell
wasted ill the discussioll of Illis point.
This, however, was but tlie colilmeiicenleiit
of the series of subterfuges by whicll the 1Xuscovile diplon~atistsei~deavoured to gain tiine uiilil
they had pushed forwarrl reinfbrcerneilts to Askabad and Merv, ancl had seized the most important
points in the territory which they were cletermined to wrest from Aighulistan. A second *
example of this trickery will not be out of place.
Altl~oughthe Russiall Goveriln~enthad coilseiltccl
to the nppoiiltmcnt of bou~ldary commissioners
in the previous April, and liacl 1)rolnisecl tllatl
tlleir representative pvoulil be ready to m e t
Sir Peter Lumsdell at Sarakhs in tlie follo~vii~g
autumn, M. de Giers, oil October 2, iiiforir~cd
Sir E. Thoriltou that General Zeleiioi would not
be able to reach Sarakhs ever1 by November 7 ;
and he then proposecl that, as owiug to llle
severity of the climate nothing coulcl be done
till February, the Commissionei~ssliould meet 011
January 27, 1885. He at the same time objected to Saraklis as the place of meetiilg, and
suggested that some other place fnrtller towards
the south, such as Pul-i-KllaLun, should be
-1885

-

RUSSIANS
GAINING T I ~ I E
-

agreed upoil instead.' General Zeleiloi hacl been
seized a i t h a convenient indispositioa, and was
therefore unable to study the question or to
receive his instructions until it was too late
for him to join Sir Peter Lumsden before the
commencement of winter.
In the meallwhile the British Coln~llissioiler
and his escort from India mere hastening towards
the borders of the Herat Province.'
Gell.eral
1 As the British Government objected to changing the locality
at which the Commissioners should meet, M. de Giers on October 21
once again agreed to their cominencing work at Sarakhs.
Mr. Condie Stephen, C.B., C.M.G., and Captain A. P. Barrow,
of the Bengd Staff Corps, accompanied Sir Peter Luusden from
England; and on his way to Sarakhs he was jolned by Colonel
C. E. Stewart, C.I.E.
The Indian contingent consisted of 4 British officers and
200 men of the 11th Bengd Lancers, and 3 British oficers a n d
250 sepoys of the 20th Punjaub Infantry. The caval'y were under
the command of Major W. I. Bax, and the infantry were commanded by Major W. Meiltlejohn.
The following staff olEcors also accolnpanied the mission :1. Lieutenant-Colonel (now Sir West) Ridgeway, who acted a s
Assistmt Commissioner to Sir Peter Lumsden, and snbsequently
became Chief Boundmy Commissioner.
2. Caotain E. L.Durmd
, \
3. Captain C. E. Yate .
. .
4. Mr. W.K.Merlc, C.S.
. .
5. Captain F. de Laessoe .
. . ,1
6. Major T. H. Holdich, R.E.
.
7. Captain St. G. 0. Gore, R.E. .
8. Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E.
9. Captain P. J. Maitland
Intelligence
10. Captain W. Peacocke, R.E.
.
officers.
11. Surgeon-Major J. E . T. Aitchison, C.I.E. Naturalist.
12. Surgeon W.Owen, C.I.E.
'
'
la. Surgeon R. H. Charles . . . . Medical o E c e ~ s ,
14. Mr. C. L.Griesbach
.
Geologist.
The contingent left Quatta, under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Ridgeway, on September 22, and marching v i b Nusbki,
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Lumsdell reached Sarakhs on November 8, to find
that the Russians had not o ~ l established
y
themselves in the neighbourhood of Old SaraHls, on
the right bank of the Heri-Bud, but had also
seized Ph1-i Khatun, some forty miles higher up
the stream, while a similar advance was made
on the Murghab, through Yulatan, towards Panjcleh. The true meaning of Zelenoi's supposed
illness and of the Russian desire to commence
the delimitation of the frontier at Khoja Sale
then became clearly apparent. The Muscovites
had been trying to gain time in order that a
sufficient force could be assembled for the purpose
of seizing the chief avenues leading to Herat ;
the necessary delay had been obtained by the
various pretexts which had been put forward
by the Russian Government, and then the mask
was cast aside and Russia once more appeared
before the world in her true character.
When Komaroff visited Merv in March 1884
agents were at once sent southward to Yulatan
and Panjdeh for the purpose of obtaining the
submission of tlie Barik Turkomans who inhabited those places. The result of this action
Galicha, ILhwaja-Ali (on the Helmund), Kale-i-Fath, Kala-Kin, and
Zighin, reached Iinssn on November 17, having thus traversed
767 miles in 57 days, which gives an aversgo day's march of 184
miles.
By this maroh it was proved that enot,her fairly easy line
of advance was eveilablo for an army moving towmds the
Lower Indns from the direction of Herat, and one edditional
proof was thns given-if
enoh were necessary-of
the danger
which would inuvitably rosult from a. Russia11 occupation of the
EIeret Valley.

was that the people of Yulatail sent a deputation
to Askabad in the following May, and there swore
allegiaiice to Russia before Prince DondoukoffKorsalroff, the Governor-general of the Caucasus,
who was making a journey to the Akhal and
Merv 0ases.l Their kinsmen at Panjdell, however, held aloof, for they had long been tlle subjects of the Anlir of Kabul, and, having no desire
to become the vassals of the White Czar, they
dismissed the Russian agent wit>hthe declaratioil
that they owed allegiance to the Aiilir Abdur
Rahman Khan.
Having thus cominencecl fresh intrigues anlong
the Sariks on the Murghab, Kornaroff himself
started off from Merv with fifty Cossacks and some
TekkP, horsemen, and went to the sinall Fersiail
fort at Old Sarakhs, on the right bank of the
Heri-Rud, and some seven miles from the Persian
fortress of the same name which stands on the
left bank of the river. There he fouild a garrison
of forty Persian soldiers, whoill he unceremoniously ordered out of the place ; and, having
proclaimed that the district was Russian soil, h e
left a Russiail detachineilt in possession, and made
his way back to Askabad.
When news of this fresh movement reach.ed
England the greatest uneasiness prevailed for a
At this t h e also M. Lessar went to Yulaten, and then,
pushing southwards along the banlrs of the Murgheb, visited
Panjdeh, from whence he travelled np the Kushlr Valley as far a s
Chaman-i-baicl. There he turned woatward to Ak-Robot, aurl,
skirting the salt lakes o f Yer-Oilail, returned through ICoy~ul-kui
to Yulalan.

.
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short tinie, until it was stated that the Persian
fortress on the lert bank of the Heri-Rud had not
been interfered with, that the Russinils had no
intention of going there, and that as for Old
Saral~hs,which haci been occupied by Komaroff, iit
was notl~ingbut a mass of ruins, and was a place
of but litlle import,zuce. The fact was ignored
that the value of the district consisted not in the
strength of any wretched Persian f o ~whicli
t
existed
therein, but in the strategical importance of the
locality itself to an army moving from AsBabad
towards Her at.
However, although Merv, Old Sarakl~s, and
Yulatan had all become Russian possessions, none
of these clistricts were to the south of the olcl
rccognised frontier line extellding from Saral~hsto
Khoja Sale ; and it was not until the Russians in~cle
their next move in 'the game of grab' that the
full significance of their designs became apparent. This move was the sudden seizure of
Pul-i-Khat-un and the advance of Russian detachments towards Panjdeh, while Sir Peter Lumsden
was journeying towards Sarakhs, a i d while the
Russian Government were raising obstacles to
the early cornme~~cement
of the demarcation of the
boundary.
General Lumsden first Ilearcl of these movements when he reached Meshed on October 31,
and he at once reported the matter to Lord
Granville; but i t was not until he had reached
Sarakhs a fews days later that he received confirmation of the report from ari ,4fghan officer who
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had been sent, with an escort of 100 horsemen, to
meet him at that place. He then also heard that
General KomarofT was at Old Saralrhs, personally
clirecting the movemen.ts of the Russian cietachments ; but as the Governor of Alrhal, with a
remarkable want of courtesy, at once made
arrangements to leave, to avoid meeting the
British Commissioner, Mr. Condie Stephen was
sent to inquire wheth.er the Eussiails liad thus
advanced into Afghan territory by orcler of the
Czar, and he obtained the reply that Pul-i-Khatun
had been occupied as an outpost in accorclance
with instructions received from Prince DondoukoffKorsakofT
Now, in forming an estimate of the true
character of this movement on Pnl-i-Kllatun it
must be borne in lniiid that in 1882 the Rnssian Government proposed that the north-western
frontier of Afghanistan should be accurately ciefined froin Klloja Sale ' as far as S~a.alcl~s
;' that on
March 26, 1884-or some six months before this
violation of the Amir's dominions took place-Jt.
cZe Giers had again declared that ' the boundary
wonld be, more or less, a line from Khoja Sale to
Sarakl~s,with, perhaps, some deviatiolls to tlie soutli
so as to reach the .mountains ; ' that il; 11311 beell
arranged that the Boullriary Colninission s21uuld
meet at Saralrlis, as that place was : ~ tone end of
the frontier line ; and LhaL ever since January 1873,
and until the suirmer of 1884, Saralrhs h:~d been
recogrlisecl l)y 110th tlie nril;ish anrl tlie liussia~l
Governmen~s:as tlie l~ointin tlle neigllbourhood of

I
I
\

which the frontier line of Afghanistan shoulcl meet
that of Persin.I
By this sudcle11 occupation, homrever, all these
previous understandings aere set aside, and, because Great Britain was embarrassed elsewliere, the
Cossacks aere pushed forward to a point some
forty miles south of the locality wllicll hact been
repesteclly mentioned by M. de Giers and other
nlembers of the Russian Government as forrniligthe extreine wester11 extremity of tht: Afgllati
boundary. M. cle Giers endeavoured to explain
away this uilwarrailt,ed act of aggression by stating
t h a t as Russia ' had succeeded i11 establishing trailquillity in the Turkoman Steppes, she mas forced to
seek means to consolidate the state of aEail-s thus
created, and to take stepmagairist the disorders
which there was every reason to npprelienil in
consequence of the considerable milita~ypreparations of the Afghans on the northern border of
E e r a t and the approach of llle Uritisli escort, the
numbers of which greatly exceeded what had beell
agreed upon.'
He, however, cleclarecl tllal it
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I t was only k December 1884 that the British Govenln~out
were definitely informed that Russia deoided to abandon tho idea
that Smdths should form the western terminus of the frontier lino.
In the previous Mny, howover, the official map was published,
showing the oilt tier line hawn holll a, point close to Kusan, and
that date therefore has been taken as the time when Ru~siafirst
showed signs of upsetting tho previous understmding.
a I n August 1884 Sir E. Tliornton was inforxned that tho
strength of the Russian escort would consist of froill 200 to 250
Cossacks, dopending on the strength of tho sotnias, and it was
apparently understooa that the British esoort should be of similar
strength. As the troops from Indis, had, however, to n~nrch
through an inlperfectly explored aountry, exposed to tho possible
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would be quite iinpossible to witliilraw the
detacliinent, and tlie lZussiails tlius reniained in
possession.
I t is ahnost superfluous to poilit out tlie
absurdity of tlie reasoils given in ilefeilco of this
step by the IZussiaii Foreign Millister; for if llie
Eussiails were to mass troops on the borilers of
Asiatic Turlrey, would tlie Go~7ernor-C3ciieralof tlie
Caucasus be justified in seizing Erzcro~ulior T3:xyazid
because the Porte commenced inilitary preparations
to safeguard ils frontiers f'roni tlie lliresteiled
attack ? Or call it be for one momelit maint,aiiieci
that Russia was justified in seizing a llortion of
Afgha,n territory merely because tlie Turkorllans
on tlie border might possibly be iillecl with dnrin
on hearing of tlle :~pproachof a few srpoys and
sowars from Iiiclia ? No : M. ile Giers' explana t'1011
of this inoveinerlt was the best he llail to give ; ant1
its very absurclity proves the wenlrncss of llie
Russian case.
Leaving tlie Russiniis tlius est:xl)lisheci at Olil
Saral~llsand Pul-i-Iihat,un 011 tlic Beri-Rucl, il is
llecessary now to exl)lni11 tlie situ:xtion 011 tlie
Murgliah at the time? wlieil Sir Teler T J ~ ~ ~ n s i l ~ i i
reached Snrnklis a i d rct:eivcjd rcl~ort,s tlinl, :t
Russian cleLac1~ilment11:~il l~usllcilul) tlic! 1)nrilrs of
that river in the clircctioll of l';~~ljclcli,
attack# of El~llr~ticnltril)~c;nic>n,
tho Tnrlil~n nntllorilic!~ firorl tllo
nzunbor of Lllo osco14 ILL 'LOO c~rvulry1~11112fiO illfi~t~Lry,
I I H I)(+illgt110
sllllillonL 1 ) 1 ~ ~wllicll
ty
oo11111bo ~ ~ ~ H ~ ) I L Lit1o IHILL'OL,~.
I ~ ! I I 'l'll(3 I I I I ~ I I ~ ) ~ ' ~ ~ R
wore nt onco H O I I ~ to $110 ~ ~ I I S H ~ I L( I~II I \ . ( \ Y I I I I I O ~ I for
~
Lllc\ir inf o r ~ n a t i o n ;I ) I I ~Llloy 11id not I't~iltrl IIIILI;~ ~ 1 ~ p i to11t
~ 1 1of tllu I I ~ I I ~ L C I ~ ,
t ~ t illuti boo11 huu11,
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The river I\iIurghab, which rnaters the Merv
Oasis ancl the11 disappears in the szl~~clsof the
k{ara-I(uln Desert, takes its rise in the Inass o l
llloulltaills which connects Llie eastern extremities
of the snfecl-Koh a11cl Tir-Band-i-Turkestan ranges,
and, flowing in a weslerly clirectioil l;l~rough the
great valley separatiiig those moulztr~in-chains,it,
afier receiving the waters of nnmerous tributaries,
turns towards the north-west, and passes tlie
Afghan fortress of B d a Murghah and the post of
I<arawal Kllana. At this latter point it receives
t,he waters of the ICaisar amucnt, and, contilluing
in a nortll-westerly direction, flows past the Afghan
fort of Maruchalc (on the right bank), and Panjdeb; ancl Ak TepB (botlz on the left bank). At
Ak Tep6 it is joined by the I<ushk river, which
rises in the Paropai~~isus
range, ancl fro111 this
point the Murghab runs in a due nortlzerljr
The Kas11a.n stream joins the M~rgElabat e short distance
below Mari~chak.
2 There are two places of this name, viz. Old Pe~ljdehand
New Panjdeh. The former, which a t this time was a mere
of ruins, was built by a Haznsa chieftain, nimed Bumyad
ICIlan, on the left bank of the Mnrghab, at a, distance of sollle
twelve ~nilesbelow the Bnnd-i-Nnciri. About two miles further
d o m ~stream, snd a t abollt the same distance from tho river, is
situated New Panjdeh, wliich was b d t by the Sarilzs some time
betmeen 1875 and 1880. I t wns a great inc~osuro 01. fort, the
ralllpasts consisting of two walls a fow paces apart, with the
illtenoning space filled up with enrkll so that they might resiat
artillery fire. I t was of sutficiellt size to enable the whole of the
popula,tion of the oasis to take reCuge in it, in case of attack; but
there were no houses inside, aud the people generally lived in reedhuts or felt-tents in the vicinity. Such is the description of
Panjdeh, as given by Colonel stewurt in Marcli 1884, before the
Afghan frontioi*troubles commenced.

direction past Yulatan to Merv, and thence into
the desert.
The unclulatiilg country betveen the Murghab
and Heri-Bud, and extending from the northern
slopes of the Paropainisus range to the desert, is
callecl. Badghis-a well-favoured district, covered
with grass and groves of pistacllio and mulberry
trees, wild rose a i d blackberry bushes, and watered
by numerous rivulets. I11 early times this district
of Baclghis, which has always been connected with
the Herat Province, included the oasis of Yulatan,
but, a t a later period of its history, the tract of
cnltivation between Panjrleh and Yulatan remained
~ ~ I O Wancl,
,
beyond the traces of early canals,
presen1;s no vestige of former occupation, and has
become a desert. One of the most important
portions of Badgllis is the Panjdeh district, m-llich
is watered by an extensive sjrstein or cailals issuing
from a dam called the Bund-i-Nailri, which was
thrown across the Murghab at a short clistance
below the Afghan fort of Maruchak. The most
direct road from Merv to Herat runs dong the
bailks of the Murghab as far as Ak TepQ-at the
junctioii of the Kushk and Murgliab rivers, just to
the north of Panjdeh-and then, followii~g the
valley of the Kusllk, crosses the Paropamisus range
by either of the passes of Ardevan or Baba. Thus,
Panjdeh is a most important strategical point
which must be held by a force advancing on
Herat from Merv, and its value to the Russians is
increased by the fact that it covers the left flank
of an army niarching froin Askabad by the easier

.
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routes, along the Heri-Rucl and vi8 the Cllombou
Pass.
The district of Panjdeb, wllicll comprises the
country 1)etweeii tllc ICuslik ailci Murghal~rivers
from tlle Bund-i-Nadri t;o Ak Tep6, was formerly
subdivicled i i l h five zoiics or parislles, and from
this circurnst~ni~ce
its name of tlle ' Five Villages '
was ilerivecl. It, together mritll the otlier portions
of Baclghis, formed a part of tlie I-Ierat Province
ever since Afg1ianisi;an l~ecanlea kingdom ; and
eve11 wlierl the old empire of Allmed Shall becarne
split up mi(1er tlle feeble rule ancl divided couiicils
of his descenda~lts, Bndgliis ancl Tanjcleh still
reillnilled liillieil to IIesnt, ancl tlieir inhabitants
loolrecl on tlie ruler of tliat province as their
master. I11 former ti~iles, a11d during the first
clnmter of tlie present century, Palljdeh was
.
occupiecl by tile tJalnslliclis or Hazaras, according
as tlie Jarnsllidi cliief at Kusllli or the Hazara
ruler of Ical:~Nail was at the time most powerful
or tlie most; in favour at I-Ierat. Towarcls tlie close
of tlial; period, Ilowever, soille Turkomalls of the
Ersari tribe-whose sct;tIements are scattered along
the hnliks of tlie Oxns, 1)etween Clln~juiand Balkhnloved to P:~iljclell, and ol)tnisle,d pcrrnission to
settle tllese oil paymciit; of a regular tax to the
Afgllnn autlloriticis.
At t,llis tiilie Mcrv was occnpied by the Sarilr
tril~o of 'I!u:.lioll~iti~s,who were in some slight
(l(?grcc?s ~ ~ l ~ j cto
! c t tile 1<11:~11sof ICliivn ; arid the
c:trniltry ill t l ~ i: ~ ~ i g l ~ of'
l ~Old
~ ~Saraklls
~ ~ ~ (on
r ~ i ~ ~ ~ l
the &yi-:lt,nci) K:LS iill~al.)itedl ~ ytlic S:tlor tribe.
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In tlie year 1832, however, Prince Abbass Mirza
of Persia, as has been mentioned in s previous
clia~ter,attacked the Salor fortress at Old Saralrhs,
and, having overcoine the resishnce of the Turlromans, slaugliterecl a large number of the defenclers
aricl carried off some 5,000 prisoliers. The Khan
of IChivx then ofkrecl to ransoin the captives, and
the Persian Crown Prince conseilted to liberate
t.hein on receipt of 50,000 tonians, on the understandiilg that tlie people of the tribe unclertook to
preveiit the Tekkbs ancl Sariks from raiding iiito
K2ior'assan ; or, if tliey were unable to do so, that .
t11.ey should, at all events, give tirnely notice of
any threatened ' alai7nai1,' or foray. During this
troublous period many of the Salors fled to Merv
and Yulstsm., wliile a few other fanlilies settled at
h n j d e h on the same conditions as the Ersaris ; and
for sollie years after this the E ~ s a r iand Sslor
settlers at Panjdeh paid tribute to the Herat
authorities, either th.rough an Afghan naib, or
deputy-governor, who resided ainong them, or
through the Hazara chief of Kala Nau. .
In 1857, however, the Ersaris withdrew, and
retur~ledto the settlements of their tribesmen on
the banks of the Oxus ;, ancl at the same time the
Salors were attacl<ecl by the Sariks, driven out of
Merv and Yulatan, and forced to seek refuge near
Zurabad, on the left bank of the Heri-Rud, while
Inany families also fled to Panjclell. Soon after
this the Sariks were themselves forced to leave the
Merv country by their more powerful n e i g l ~ b o ~ r ~ ,
the Telrlrks, and, moving southmrards, they occupied
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Yulatall : ~ i d Fn~ijdeh, a~lrl coillpelleil the &lor
falllilies to migrate fio111 t;he latter pl:lc:e t,o tile
ljalilis of tlie %xi-Racl.
Ali;llo~ighh e ilistrict; of I'ai~jclellliad from tjlne
t,o time bec?il c.)ccupied by various tribes who
fled t11el.r: to 01)t:~ili~21'I'ctyfrom their enemies, yet,
in spite nl tllcse frcqaeilt ch:~nges,the iilhabitai~t~
or tlie cliutrict-nrlletlier J:unsllidis, 01- I-Iazaras, or
Sariks, or Snlors-iiivari:~l)ly :~clrnowledged that,
t,lley were on Afgllsn soil, aiid nearly always pnicl
revellac in solilc form OT other to the Afghan
flovenlineiit. Being 11ot;hing better tlinn savages,
~srllocleliglitcd in violence., and whose chief occnpatioil coilsist,ecl in ~naliiilgforays into tlie neighl~ouringcouutries for tlie purpose of carrying o f
slasres, it c:~llnc~t
1je ~vonderecl at tllnt their payilleilts of' revennc to the Afqhan oihcinls svere lllacle
in nn irregnlnr nlanller. \Vllei~tllcre were troublcs
in ~llgllai~ist:~n
they paid little, and at times even
p:~icl nollli~i(,~
; l ~ n wllcn
t
there was a stroilg ruler
in h-al)~11tliry lxlid n regular tax, and although
tl~rly: L ~ T V : L ~ S I r i ~ ~1.0d pay as little as possible, they '
still nc:lili~~~lctlg~:tl
tlicir lial~ilityto pay a lalld tax
of 2 3 per cc!~it,.of their agl.icultural produce, ant1
one in forty of their cnttlc.' Tlicy occ:~sionally
clvc?n sul)l)lic~tlt,~+oops
to t llc Afghan Goverili~lelit,
On A p ~ i l!), ltiH4, (Ioloncl Sto~vartreported nti flrl1ow~:- ' I
L_

11nvn nricert~iinntltlltrt tlrr! ravonno actually colloctpd 1 : ~ yoar
~ t by
tllc! Afglrnn r~uthoritic~i
fro111 tllo Turkolnun~of .l':~ijclcll W ~ 13,000
A
t
T ~ I I ~itFwill
I bo Reon thaL
II~ILIIH. h l c r ~ ~isl i worth r ~ b o r ~ninrbponco.'
tho 'L'rirkoll~nnu of l'nlljil(1ll pi~idnbont 4871. Lo tho Akllnna dl~ring
tlio Spar i ~ n m t ? d i a t oprcroding
l~
LhnL in which Merv WILRonrlc~xetll)y
~ ~ I I R R At
~ I Ltllis
, ti1110 thore wlro fiotne 4,000 tvnls ill tllo dintrict,
rr.prct;olting n pr~ptll~ltiot~
of ~ ~ h o 10,000
ut
~0111~.
VOI,. If.
1'
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and so long as they paid a little to show their
aclsno\vlecIgaleilt of Afghan rights, they were left;
alone by the frontier officials, who looked up011
tllem as a convenient barrier against the more
powerful and turbulent clans further to the north.
The Goverilor of Herat
posted a
Naib, or Deputy-Governor, at; Fanjdeh to collect
taxes, and to represent the central governlnent ;
and in 1883, and up till the time when Merv was
by the Russians, the Afghau representative there was Mir Osman k'han. He, however,
returned to Herat in February 1884 to report that
the Sariks would only pay a portion of the revenue.
due from then^, and the Governor of Herat then
wrote to Yaluntash Khan, the Jamshidi Chief of
Bala Murghab, reminding him that Panjdeh was
under his orders, and ordering him to make the
best settleineilt he could ; and two months later,
when a Russian agent visited Panjdeh, the Sariks
wrote to Yaluntasli Khan begging that solneoile in
authority might again be placed at Panjdeh to
prevent Russians visiting the place, as they would
be unable to do so without Afghan assistance.
From the above facts it will be seen that
the district of Radghis, and its most. important
portion, Pailjdeh, had long been under Afghan
~uule. During the first quarter of this century
Panjdeh was occupied by the Jamshidis or Hazaras,
both of which are undoubtedly Afghan tribes; and
a'lthongh during the last seventy years tile district
was inhabited by various Turkoinan tribes, still
these always acknowledged that they had settled

-1881;

AFGHANTROOPSI N PANJDEH
.

211

-

ill Afghan t,er.ritory, they as x general rule paid
some tax ill recogliition of this fact, and all
Afgllan Deputy-Governor generally resided alllong
them as tlle representative of the Afglian Goverllor
of EIerat.
Sucll being the case-and tliese facts have been
estal~lisheclbeyond cloubt-it was only natural that
tlie Alnir of 1C:~l)ulsllould have tnlren steps to
vindicate his sovereign rights over the Panjcleh
district as sooil as it hecaine kilown tliat tlle
Russia~is llacl oc.:cupied Merv a i d liad begun to
tainper with his s ~ ~ l ~ j eonc ttlle
s Murghab. Troops
were 1)11sbecI forward to Maimana and Bala
Murgllnb iii April 1884, and by tlle commenceillelit of tlie followiilg June an Afghan garrisoii
occupied Pai~jcleliaiid took possession of Alr Tep6,
1v11el.e tliey began tlle construction of a fort on tlie
huge t,uinulus at the juilction of the Kuslik and
Murgllal~rivers wliicll gives its name to tlie locality
(' Wllite Hill ' ).
As soon as the E~lssianGover~~ment
heard of
t.liis ~novementon tlie part of the Afghans, tliey
: ~ h once prott?sl;c!ilagnillst tllc clespntcl~of Afgh:tn
1,roopsto I'n~~jclcli,
nild disputed the Amir's claim to
t,ll:tt p1:~ceon tlle ground tlmt it dicl not form a portion of 1:11(!tcrl*itoric!s (rf tlle kingdoin of k'abulm~hich
werct. :~ctuallyin l~ossessionof the Ainir Sllei-e Ali,
: L I ~t,ll:~tih tllerr!f.in:e was not included within the
1-)oun(lariesof Af'gl~nr.~istan
:IS iisecl by the agreeI
f ,
'l'l~cy invil;ed the attention of the
nrit.isll Gc,varrirric?l~
t to t l ~ :f : ~ tthat it was only
in cu, lsccluancx: of 1;hc engagement which Great
F

a

Britain had entered into to use all its influence to
prevent the Amir of Afghanistan from committing
aggressions that they had ultilnately agreed to the
limitary line as set forth in the agreement of 1873 ;
2nd as it had been arranged that the delimitation
of the frontier should be carried out in accordance
rnitll the terins of that agreement, they expresseil
n hope that the Anlir would be led to understand
that the best guarantee for the secu~ityof his possessions was to be found ' not in the exlension of
his own possessions, but much more in a friendly
understanding between the two Great Powers.'
Fronl the preceding accouilt of the Panjdeh
district and its various inhabitants, it will be seen
that tlle Russia11 Government were incorrect in their
statement that Panjdeh did not form a portion
of Afghanistan during the reign of Shere Ali.
Although Afghan troops had noL been permanently
located there, the Turkornan settlers had nevertheless always recognised the Amir's sovereignty,
and Shere Ali's authority in particular was upheld
by n Naib named Kafar Beg, who was placed in
charge of the district by the yonilg Governor of
Herat, Yakoob Khan. The fact that the Afghans
had not permanently nlaintained a garrison in
Pmjdeh was no proof that the district was
illdependent of Afghanistan, ancl afforded no reason
why the Amir sllould not have sent troops there
whenever he desired to clo so ; for if a permanent
garrison is lo be considered as the only true test of
possession, there are no frontiers in the world
which could not be violated on similar grounds.

Panjdell liad been Afghan territory for a long
course of years, slid llussia knew it, and acknowledged it in tlie reign of Sliere Ali, and to that very
Amir Ililnself ; for wllen StolietofY visited I<abul in
:878 for tlie purpose of concluding an offensive
and defensive alliance wit11 tlle Arnir Sllere Ali,
one of his requests mas that the Eussians should
be permitted to co~lstructa road ' to Herat vid the
I'Ianun Biver (Oxus), tlie plain of Iiidlrho (Andhkui),
13a1a Murghnb, M,zruchak, Taiiili (Panjdeh) a i d
Firoz Koh.'
If I'ailjdeh did not l~cloiigto Sliere
Ali, 1vhy did Stolietoff aslr: tlie Amir's permissioii to
construct a road t~liroughthat district? When it
suited Irlussia's purpose, she ack~iowledgedthat
Panjdeh v a s an rlfgllan possession; but wlien
times llnd cllangcd, axld slic found it to be to ller
advantage to c:dl b1:~:lckwhite nncl to clispute facts,
she founcl tliat slie was well served by inen who
liar1 frequently p1:yecl the same game on previous
occasions, and thus the Afgllnn Pnnjdeli of 1878
became i11 1886 n district which hacl never bee11 an
Afglian possession an(1 had never belonged to the
Amir Sllere Ali!
For so~ilcmontlls after the Afgllrhnn occupation
of the I':~ilj~le11district ilotliing oc~usredon the
Murgh:~L to c1ist1zl.b tlie pc:Ice in t l ~ n tportion of
knew that their forces
tlie frontier. Tlle liussi:~~is
at Merv ancl in tlic Alcknl Oasis .tIrcre insuficient
to ennblc tlic~nto inakc, an attcnipt to expcl the
ASgliun garr'isori wliich had est:~blishetli~aelfin llle
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angle between the Kushlc and Murghab strcaills ;
they were therefore coinpelled to wait till reinlbrcelllents arrivecl from Turkestan and the Caucasus,
and, above all, they consiclel.ed it to 1 ~ eadvisable
to ascertaiil if the British escort would bc lsermilted
to march to Herat without molestation, or whether,
as many Russiails believecl, the Afghans ~ ~ o u l d
display their hostility towards tlie Eiiglisll by attacking Colonel Ridgeway's party during its long
and difficult journey.
But while the Russians were tllus waiting for
reinforcements and watching fo'r the commencement of complications betweell the English and
Afghans, Xoinaroff and his restless lieutenant,
Alikhanofc utilised the iilterval by despatcliing
sinall partics along the Murghab, to obtain information regarding tlie strength and position of the
Afghan garrison at Parijdeh, and to secure a footing in the valley to tlie south of Yulata-n. These
movements commenced in September 1854 by tlie
despatch of an oficer with a small escort of Turkoman horsemen, who, under the plea of liuntirlg
for mediciilal herbs, wandered about the valley,
and coi~tinuedhis explorations until required to
leave by the Alghan commandall t. This reconnaissance-for
such it undoubtedly was-m-as
follomecl early ill November by thr, clespatcll of
a~iotherofricer with a party of' Russian. troopers,
and on this occasioii tlie intruclers aclvanced
several miles beyoizil Yulatan, and est:~blislied :L
siviall supply del10t at n place c::~llcil Snndu1;ICucl~an,so111c tell iniles to the 11orll1 of Sari Yszi.

Such was the state of axairs when Sila Peter
Lumsdell reached Saraklls on Noven~ber 6, 1884.
The s i t u a h l was f ~ d lof clan~er; the excitelnellt
P
among the border tribes was increasing in consequence 01 the delay in the arrival of the Russian
cornmissioucr, and because of the gradual allproach 01 Mussian troops towarcls the Afghan
outposts, whilst; the possibility of a satisfactory
settlement of the Lo unclary qllestion waEt claily
becomiug Inore remote on account of tlie bitter
feelings which were rapigly arising bot,h in England and Russia. It seemed almost as if the question of peace or war mas t o be depenclelit on tlze
cliscretion of the Eassian and Afghan outpost
comm:uzdel-s, and in this emergency Sir Peter
Lurnsclen l?asi;enecl fro~iiSarakhs to Kusaiz, and,
after mceling the Iaclian contingent at that place,
he proceeded with an escort of fifty horselnen to
Panj dell.
On reaching AB TepQ the general was received
will1 great cordiality by tlie chief and elders of the
Sarilr Turkomans, by Yaluntasl~Khan, chief of tlie
Jmshiclis, and by his brother, Aminullah Khan,
while General Ghaus-nd-din Khan, the Afghan
conimandmt, came out to meet hill1 at the head
Lumtidon dcficribes Ak Top6 in tho following worde:- 'Ak
Top;, ~vhich covers tho northern npproclches to Panjdoh, is a,
nt~turfill l l o ~ ~ nin
d tho co~ltroof the valley with a command of
xotno 100 foot above tho snrrounding country, but itself com~ntuldcdf ~ o mhoights across tho Murghoh at a distance of gome
1,'LOO ~ I L Y ~ H .It has I L ~801no timc 11ee.n built over n,nd usod ao e
fort, and tho Afghan troops wcra busy at work intrenching the
wholo pobition, vhich ia a strong:ono, excopt agdnst artillery.'

of liis troops, and causecl a salute to be fired in his
honour. I-Ie there fo~~iicl
that tlie inhabitants aiiil
Alghan oiEcials liacl been tl~rowii into a great
state of alarm by fresh movements of the Iiussian
troops in tlie valley or the Murghab. I t appears
that as soon as tlie ' Britisli Cloilliilissioner left
Sarakl~sfor Kusaii, Alilrliailoff set OK post-haste
for Merv, and takiiig wj th liini 150 liorseinen, moved
tl~roughYulatan to the ruins of IIazret Iinaiii,
where he formed a junctioil wit11 General Koma~ofI',
who had previously arrived at tliat place with 300
troopers from Sarak1is.l News of this moveinelit
reacliecl Pailjdeh on November 18, xrlieii Gllans-uddin at once reported the niatter to tlie Governor
of Herat, and o~deredup reiiiforcements from
Marucl~nlcand Bala Murgliab. Yaluiltash I<11a11
immediately resporiclecl to the call, aiid starling olr'
with 400 infantry and 200 horsemen, a ~ r i v e dat
Panjdeh on the 2211il, to find, however, t1i:~t tlie
danger had passed away, and that tlie llussinils
had once agaiii retired toward the iiorlli.
Moving from IIazret Irna~iialong tlie bank of
the river, the Russians-led, be it rememl~erecl,Ly
the Goverilors of tlie Trans-Caspian district ancl
of Merv-occupied Airnak Jar oil November 21,
froin wliicli place Geilc?ral ICoinnroll' sudilcnly rcturned towards Merv, while Alil\rlinriolI' colitiiinccl
liis advance, after lie liacl sent a troopcr on :~lieacl
to illform Gliaus-ud-din of liis d e s i ~ efor :~iiiriter1
view. rllie
AJgl~alicoinnianclei., tliercu~,un,sell1 :L
messenger to st:lte tliut Iic slioulcl 1i:~vcreccivcd
IComaroff loft Morv on Novornlror 10.
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earlier intiination that a meeting was desired, and
informed the Russian officer tllat if he waited
vhere he was the interview mroulcl be promptly
accorded. Alikl~anoff,however, would not halt,
but insisted on moving forward in spite of t l ~ e
repeated protests of the Afghan officials; and i~
was only when he had arrived within a short
distance of the Afghan positioi~that he evelltually
was forced to halt by the receipt of a distinct
wariling that any further advance m7ould be made
at his peril. IIe the11 addressed a most insulting
and provocative letter to the Afghan Colnmalzdant,
ailcl after waiting for a reply, in wliich Gllaus-uddin boldly drew attention to the treachery of llis
proceedings, he, on the following morning, retraced
his steps towards Merv.
111 coilsequence of these tllreatening demonstrations on the part of the Russians, General
Ghaus-ud-clin Khau sent a small picquet to Sari
Yazi for the purpose of obtaining timely warning
of ally further moveinents against his position at
Ak Tepk. In taking this step he merely did what
any good soldier in his position would have done
under similar circ~~mstances,
for he knew tllat the
Russians were padually concentrating troops at
Merv, ancl from tlle advance of armed reconnaissance p r t i e s along the Murgliab Valley towards
Panjdelz he had good grounds for believing that a
serious attaclr was about to be made against his
position in the Panjdeh district. Had he takenno
steps to secure his troops fl-0111 a surprise he mould
have beell guilty of gross dereliction of duty, and

so long as he clid not cross the recognisecl frontier of Afghanistan he was perfectly j~zstifieilin
establishing an outpost well in aclvance of his
maill position. Sari Yazi was within the frontier
of Afghanis tan as generally understood both in
England ancl Eussia a t that time,' ancl Llle establishment of an Afghan piccluet at that place cannot;
therefore be consiclered to coilstitute a reasonable,
excuse for the Russian aclvailce ~ ~ h i cltook
l i placc
soon afterwards.
After the Afghans took possession of Sari Yazi
tlie Russians made no f ~ ~ r t h eadvances
r
for the
next two months, and the chief interest in the
Rounclary Question ouce inore became ceiltrecl in
the negotiations which were beirig carried 01.1
1)etween Lonclon ancl St. Petersburg. On October
15, 1884, Sir E. Thornton llacl all interview wit11
General Zelenoi ancl M. ZinovielT, the IIeacl of the
Asiatic Departmerit in the Russian Foreign Ofice,
when the Russian oIhcers atated that they feared
:that the Boundary Commission woulcl result in
failure unless a zone sliould be first agreed nl~oli
between the two Governments witliin wllicll [;he
Comn~issioilers shoulcl be instl.ucted to consiiler
Evon AlilrlianofT, the Govol*noyof Morv, acltnowl(~clgci1tlial
Snri Y i ~ z WRH
i
at nll ovoiit~not boyond tlio Afglinn fivonLicr, for oil
Xovombor 10, 1884, Sir I'clcr L~mlsclonroporleil thtrt lio lir~illiul
cm iiitorviow oil tlitrt ilny with Aliltlia~iof'f,on w1iic:h oactwioli hlio
B~issianoficor, aftcr a loi~gconvorsrrtion, inforiiicd h i n ~llicrl ' 1110
bomidary balwocii Ynlc~tmirbnd l'finjileh ~ v n sa l Sari Yazi on the
hf~wghab.' Seo altio tho ~tntolnontsiiinilo Iry lior11Q m ~ l ~ * i laliil
lo
Lord Eilmntid Pitzmn~~rioo
o ~ ihlnrch 3, IHHT,, Lllr~tlhn %itlfil{ar
l'nst;, Ali-Robut, Stlri Yazi, and I'111.i.khitiLi woro rrll within Afghr~n
tomilor y,
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where the north-western boundary of Afgl~anistan
nzigllt lie, and outside of which they should not
ex-tend their explorations. This suggestion was
in itself a ~easonableone, but when tlie Russian
Government some six weeks later (November 26)
clefined what they considered should be tlie
nortliern and souther11 limits of t.lle proposed zone,
the extravagance of their proposal at once became
evident, for not only did they suggest that the
norther11 bouildary of the zone should start from
Daulatabacl--a poilit on the f-leri-Rud at some
distance to tlie soutl~,of Saralrhs-but they also
proposed that the soutlleril liinit sllould be formed
by a line followii~gtlie crests of the Paropamisus
Range as far as the Ardevan Pass, and thence past
B d a 1VTurgliab and Aridkliui to h%,oja Sale.'
In spite of the one-sidedness of this suggestiorl
tlie 13ritisl1 Cabinet, in their desire to arrive at a
peaceful solution of the ~ l ~ c u l t accepted.
y,
the
norther11 limit of the zone proposed by Russia, but
they refused to agree to any southern limit, as they
did not wish on the one hand to fetter the freedom
of the action of the Cornmission ia districts as to
the possession of which real doubts might be found
to exist, nor, on the other hand, &d they clesire to
iillply even a possibility of doubt as to the rights
of the Amir of Afgllanistan over the districts so
far south as the soutliern line proposed by 1Eussia.
I t is unnecessary to enter into an account of

'

This southorn limit run solno milcs to Ihc soutl~of Zul6lr~x
and Mni~~chak,
and approclchocl to within sixtoon miles of the cit'y
of EIerat.'.

I

tlie subsequeilt negotiations regarding this questioil of a zone witllin which the Coln~llissionwas to
limit its investigations, and it is sufficient merely
to state that the Russian Goverilmeilt eventually
cleclined to sencl their Comi~iissionerto the Afghan
frontier uiltil the matter had been settled ; and as
tlle British Cabinet. refused to accept their extravagaiit clemands, they, on Jailuary 28, 1885, prol ~ ~ ~aedefinite
cl
frontier-line on the condition that
the Afghans sl~ould not erect fortifications between the line so proposed and tlie crest of the
I'nro~ainisus Range. The memorand~~m
containing this new suggestioll was conveyed to England
by 14. Lessas, and froin that time the discreet
young railway engineer took a prolninent part in
the negotiations.
Tlie line th~lssuggested was defined by M. cle
Giers in the following words : l' Starting from a point on the right b a l k of the
Heri-Rnd situated at a distance of about ten
versts south of Zoulfagar, the line woulcl run by
Kehrizi-Xlias and Kehrizi-Soumk to the rivulet of
Yegri-Gueuk, -would follow the crest of the
heights wliich fringe the right bank of this rivulet,
as far as the ruins of Tchemenibid, and then the
chain of hills from the right
bank of the Kouschk
as far as Havuzi Khan, whence it would run to
I t is interesting to note tho exact wording of the proposnl,
because this bounduy-line, which was rejected as such by the
Gladstonian Cabinet in March, 1885, was, with tho exception of o,
slight modification at its wefitern extremity, procisoly the same a8
the frontier-lint which was eventnnlly accepted by that Ministry
after the Russian8 attaclced and defeated the Afghans at Psnjdeh.

a point situntecl to tlie 11orl;li of Meruchak, ~ ~ ~ l i i ~ l ~
would be left to Afglisiiistan. From this p o i ~ ~ t
tlie line of frontier would follow the crest of the
lleigllts which to the north border the valley of
Hai'sor, ancl to the west that of Sangalak, . and
leaving A~ldllioi'to the east, it would reach Khojs
Sale on the Amou-Da~ia.''
Tliis suggestion meant nothing lllore nor less
tllari that the British Government should agree,
without a prelimiiiary investigation on tlle spot,
Lllat Iiussia should appropriate Pa11jdeh ailcl the
other clistricts to tlie nortll of the proposed boundnrp-line, in spite of tlie fact that tliose districts
were claimed as portions of Afghanistan, and
,zltliough it liar1 been previously arranged that the
true frontier should be laid do~vn by Coiilmissioilers norniilated by the two Governments. It
c:~l~not
be vonderecl at, tllerefore, tlzat on the 13th of
the following Marc11 Lord Granville informed tlie
Russiail Ambassador in London that Her ltajesty's
Govel.nment weye uilable to agree to the proposed
Dontier-line, or to the conditions annexed to it, as,
from the information in t,heir possession,the true liile
of Afghan bounclary voulcl run from Shir Tep6 on
the Heri-Bud to S a ~Yazi
i
on the' Murghab, ancl
thence dong tlie slrirts of the cultivation of
1Mailnana and Aildkllui to fCl~ojaSale. Ee, however, statecl that tlie British Cabinet still. adhered
to their opinion tliat tlie boundary sllould be
tracecl on tlie spot by the British md Russian
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Commissioners, and with this view they were prepared to agree that the frontier-line proposed by
Russia should form the southern limit of the zone
of investigation ; the ilorthern limit being the
above-l~entioi~ed
line from Shir Tepk to Sari Yazi,
and thence to Khoja Sale.
It will be seen that in malring this counterproposal the British Government, in their intense
anxiety l;o avoid war, really assented to a possible
and most probable curtailment of the territories
~ r h i c h they believed to belong to Afghanistan.
For many years, as has been repeatedly mentioned,
the true north-western frontier of Afghanistall was
considered, both in Russia and Bllgland, to be a
line running from Sarakhs to Khoja Sale. But, in
spite of this fact, the British Cabinet first agreed
to abandon Sarakhs and to consent to a zone of investigation which should be limited to the nortll
by a line running from Daulatabad through
ITazret .Imam. By this concession it was made
eviclen t that they would accept sonie frontier-line
which at all events would not be to the north of
those two places, and would, therefore, be more
achantageous to Russia than the old SaralchsKhoja Sale boundary. But this would not satisfy
'the Muscovites. Their outposts were grsdually
pushed southwards ; and then, after their troops
hacl seized important positions in the clel3atecl
territory, and after several moilths spent in negotiations, Ei1gla.nc1 made further . concessioi~s by
placing the northern limit of the zone still more to
the south, and at the same Liine suggesting that t,lle

*
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southern liinit slionld be the line extending from
a point six miles to the soutli of Zulfikar, past
Karez Sumblla and Maruchalc to IChoja Sale.
Tl~rouglzout these negotiations not one word
might very reasonably have been
was said-as
done-of
extending the zone of investigation to
the north of the old Sarakhs-Khoja Sale line, and
th.e Britislz Govenlnient honestly adhered to the
spirit of their former agreements by making no
suggestion that the iilcluiry of the Commissioners
sllould extend over any portion of the country to
the iiortll of tliat line. Witli tlze Russians, homever, tlie case was different. As soon as Merv was
annexed they clisputed the old-recognised frontier,
and the inore the Xnglislz conceded. the more
extravagant becanze tlzeir demaiids ; and thus Lord
Granville's last proposal of March 1 3 was rejected
by tlze Russian Foreign Office, and the BI-itislz
Government was plainly given to understand that
if they wished that the Russian Cominissioner
should meet Sir Peter Luinsden, a further concession woulcl have to be made by their acceptance
of the definite frontier-line proposed in the Russian
inelnorandurn of January 28, 1885.
The clespatch containing this rejection of Lord
Granville's proposal was written on March 27, ancl
tbree days later a serious collision occurrecl between
the Russian aizcl Afghan troops on the Murglzab,
~rlli~11
renclers it necessary that the military movements on the Afghan frontier should once more be
co~lsidel.e(l.

1884-1887
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Ya,zi, about tell nniles to the south of Sanduk
Kuchan, wllere tlie Russian outpost was estttblished.
Early in February 1886 a, party of Cos~acl<~,
100 strong, thrcatened to attack the Afghan
picrluet at Sari-Yazi, and then pushed past it and
occupied Airn:llc Jar, which is some three miles
fartlier to tlie south. By this sudden movement
the Russians deliberately c~ossecltlie line which
AliktlanolT himself had 9cknowledged to be the
t;rue boundary between t,he Panj cleh and Yulatan
districts ; asii as the Afghan picc~uetwas thus
placed in a dangerously isolated position, the
KhanAmir's representative-Kazi-Saacl-ud-din
asl<eclSir Peter Lumsden's aclvice as to whether the
Russians sllould be clriven back by force. The
British Commissioner, however, was most anxious
to prevent any collision, ancl he therefore told the
Afgllans to vithdraw their troops from Sari-Yazi
to some point to tlle south of Aimak Jar, bui;
advised thein to inform the Russians that any
further movement towards I'anjdeh would be
resisted by force. Be at the same time wrote to
hlikhnnoff, poillting out the necessity of both sides
avoiding friction, and proposing that as the Afghans
would limit their patrolling to the country to the
sonth of Orush Dushan, he should in like manner
abstain from advancing beyond Sari.-Yazi.
But Lumsden's pacific overtures were of no
avail, and the Russians no longer attempted to
conceal their int;ent;ion to seize d l the most impor tan t point,s on the principal avenues leading to
VOIJ. 11.

0

1

Herat. Cossack detachments were pushed foward
to Zulfikar and Ak-Robat ; the Afghans were forced
to fall back from Orush Dushaii (on the Murgbab),
and a Russian post was established at Xzil TepB ;
Alilil~anoffbegan to write letters to the Sariks
of Panjdeh, instigating them to rise against tlle
Afghans, and threatening them with the c o n k cation of their flocks of sheep in the event of noncoinpliance ; and on March 1 6 a party of Russians
even tried to push past the Afghan intrenchments
at Ak-Tepd.
As soon as it became known that the Russians
had commenced a fresh movement toward Herat
the British Foreign Ofice made a strong representation to the Russian Government, pointing out
the disastrous consecluences which would i ~ l e v i t a b l ~
result froin such continued aclvances, urging that
orders might, be issued for the witlldrawal of the
advanced detachments at Zulfiliar and on the
Murghab, and engaging that the Afghans on their
side would not advance from their position before
Panjdeh. This cominunication was met by a
distinct relusal on the part of the Russian Government to eva,cunte the points -cvhich had been seizeil
by their troops ; but they at the snllie time declareil
that the Russian troops woulrl advance no farthey,
Rizil Top6 i~ a rnonnil on tho loft bank of tho I<nslllc river,
one mile to tho nortli of Pnl-i-klii~ti,and about tlio snmo distnnco
from the confluence of tho ICnshlc r~nilMnrghnb ~ t ~ + e r ~ i l l ~ .
1'111-i-ltllisti,or tho Briclc Briilgo,' is LL Lriilge or niilo srclios
spanning tllo river ICnshlc nt n (list1~17~o
OP 1~h01lt~ I I P ~ ! o - ( ~ I I I L ~ ~ o ~ ~ H
n, mile to tllc ~ioutli-wosiof Alt-Tep6. I t in c~laocnllod I)nsli.I~opri,
nnd is thns roferrod to ill tho Rnssinu rcgorts.
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h a d been issued
and that the most stringent
to the co~nrnanclantsof Russiw posts to abstain by
dl means from anything wllich could Cause a
conflict with the Afghan troops.
011the strength of this assurance Mr. Gladstone,
on March 13, inaile a statelllellt ill the Youse of
Cominolls to the effect tllat it h a d been agreed
between England and Russia, t h a t no f a r t h e r
advance sllould be made bj7 tile Russian or Afgllall
forces respecbively to poillts withill the debated or
clebatable ground. 111 orcler, however, Lhat t h e r e
mioht be no mistake reprdillg t h i s nlat.l;er, tlie
P
British Ambassador at St. P e t e r s b u r g was instructed t o inquire of M. de Giel-sw h e t h e r he agreed
that the assurances which liacl been given. 1nig11L
correctly be held to coiistit,utea n a g r e e m e n t to t h e
effect stated by the P.rimeMinister ; and n few days
later the answer. was received t h a t ' the R-clssian
forces would not adva~~ce
from the positions t h e y
now occupy providecl that the Afghans should
not advance nor atlack tllein, or uiiless some extraorclinary circumstances should l l a p p e n , such as
a disturbance in Pa,njdeh.' This fresh promise was
given b y M, de Giers to Sir E. T l l o r n t o n on
Marc11 16, 1885, and two days later the R u s s i a n
Foreign Minister again informed the B r i t i s h
A ~ b a s s a d oLllat
. ~ Mr. Gladstone's s t a t e m e n t in t h e
House of Colnmons was a faithful r e p r e s e n t a t . i o a
of the declarations given by tlie Russian Government, and that the agreement t h u s e n t e r e d i n t o
had received the approvd of his Majesty the Czar..
Unfkrtullately, tlle proinise so g i v e n was of 1x0
Q
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greater value than the many similar pledges which
had been give11 011 previous occesioas, only to
be broken one after the other; ailcl it will soon
be shown how the Russian troops not only did
aclvance beyond the positions which they occupied
on March 16, but actually made a deliberate and
unprovolced attack against the Afghan positioil
before Pandjeh.
While the St. Petersbarg authorities were protesting that they had no intention of making ally
further advances, reinforcements were being
rapidly pushed forward up the Murghab, and
on March 25 General Komarofl arrived at Kizil
Tepd with a force of some 1,500 men, with the
avowed intention of driving the Afghans out of
their intrenched position at Alc TepB aiid Pul-ikhisti. This advance of the main body of Russia11
troops, although undoubtedly a hostile demonstration, a a s not contrary to the agreement of March 16,
for the Russians were in possession of Kizil Tepd
at the time when tllat agreement was macle ; but,
as the subsequent movements of the Russians were
directly opposed to the terms of the agreement, it is
necessaryto mention that a h e n M. de Giers promised
that the Russian troops would not advance beyond
the positions they then occupied, Icizil Tepd was
their most advanced post in the Murghab Valley,
and the Afghan position at that time extended from
the right banlc of the Murghab river to a point some
distance to the west of the Pul-i-lchisti bridge. If
Komaro~,therefore, had remained at Kizil Tepd,
and had talcen care to prevent his t,roops from

advancing ally closer to tlie Afghan position, the
subsequent conflict would not have occurred, and
Russia would not have laid herself open to the
charge of having violated the proinise which she
had given that her troops urould ~nalteno farther
advance. He, however, having massed his force
almost within range of the Afghan position, determined to push matters to extremities,and made daily
attempts to provoke the Afghans, ancl thus to induce them to commeilce the conflict. For this purpose a party of about 100 horsemen advanced in
a threatening manner froin Kizil Tepci: towards Puli-khisti on Marc11 26 ; and again on the following
day two bodies of Bussian trool~ssiinultaneously
advanced, puslled past the Afghan picquets, and
tried to turn both flanks of the Argl~anp0sition.l
In spite of these hostile delnonstrations the
Afghans displayed remarkable forbearance and
control, and would not permit themselves to be
clram into a conflict; and when Komaroff found
that he could not provoke them to fire the first
shot, he-on March 29-sent an ultimatum to the
011 this occnsion AliltlinnoTf, wit11 300 ho~scmon, pushor1
tllrougll tho Afg1:hon picquets 11oforoPul-i-khi~ti,snd n t t o n ~ p t dto
runch Pnnjdoll round Iho loft flnnlr of tho ACg11nr1position, but wns
forced to r o t n n ~by n euporior Af~llnnforco rnl~ichwns senl in
pursuit ; whilo r ~ tho
t snttla tirno 250 Xuuuinll infirntry ccro~socltho
Mnrgllnb and n~ovodro~lntltho iqight flnlzlr of tlio po~ition,but thoy
nluo fell L~LCIC
w1ie11 tho ACglin~lsbnrred tlicir wny by rill oclunl
forco, nnil wnrnoil Llio Enrtsinn oflicor thnt if 110 ntlvo,ucod fi~rthor
110 would bo firoil upon. I t A~CILICU
hig1:hly for tho ftrrbonrrnlae
of Llle Afgl~rnlsthlkt thoy on t h o ~ cocca.sione did rlot fir0 on tho
Rllssinns, mlio opnnly cli~pllryodtheir llo~tiloir~to~ltions
by forci~ig
tho picquets and by advnnailig boyond tho flnnlm of tho Afgl~l~n
position.
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Afghan commander, requiring that every single
Afghan soldier should be withdrawn from the left
bank of the Kushlr by that evening, and that the
Afghan posts on the right bank of the Murghnb
sllould not advance beyond the co~flueilceof the
I<ushk and 1Eurghab. As soon as this letter was
received Captain k'ate-wl~o was in Panjdell,
m~~tchingevents-obtained
an interview wit11
Colonel Zalrr-chevski, Komaroff's chief of the sta.ff,
and, after explaining that the Afghans' position was
the same as they hacl occupied on March 1 6 , h e
earnestly asked that the ultimatum might b e reconsidered. Ghaus-ucl-din Khan also sent a letter to
Iiomaroff stating that he was preparecl to meet the
Russian commander's wishes as far as possible b y
altering the position of picqucts and vedettes i n
front of his position, although he was in other
respects bou~idto loyally obey the orders which h e
hail received froin his master, the Anir.
But Komaroff was not to be turned froin his
purpose. He would accept llothing less than the
entire evacuation of the Afghan intrerlchments on
the left balllr of the Kuslik ancl the withdrawal of
their posts on the right bank of the Murghab,
lrilowing f~111well that if his terms were coinplied
with Ak-Tepi! would have been no longer tenable,
and the Afghans mould have been obliged t o
abandon the whole of their position and fall back
to the south of Panjdeh. Compliance with such
an extravagant demand was, however, quite impossible. Ghaus-ucl-din had received distinct
orders to defend the Panjdeh district ; he had been

told by Sir Peter Lulnsden that ally farther
Russian advance should be resisted ; ancl as this
colnmunication from tlie British Cominissioner was
made in accorclance with instructions received from
he without doubt acted
the British G~verilrnent,~
rightly in fefusing to agree to terms which woulcl
have necessitated the abandonment of his position.
What followed is almost too well lcnown to
need relating. On the following day the Russiaus
attacked the Afglian intrenchments, aacl, although
t h e defenders oKered a stul~born resistallce and
suffered a loss of 900 men, they had no chance
against their better arrnecl opponents, and were
soon driven in coi~fusiontowarcls Hernt.2 After
the battle a temporary aclminisl;ration, uilcler
Russian control, was formed in the Panjdeli district,
and the 1311ssiaii forces were then withdrnvrrn to the
le.ft baiilr of the Xushk. The British Commissioner,
with his staff and escorl;, at oxice fell back from
Gulran, and after an arduous inarch over the
Paropa~uisus range reacllecl l'irpul, near ICusnn,
with a loss of three Afghan troopers and eight
followers.
When the news of this iigllt reachecl Ellgland
011 April 7 all llopes of a peaceful settle~lierit of
On Mnrch 3 Lord Grnnvillo wrote to Sir Poter Lnrnsdo~ias
follows : ' 1-Tor M d e s l y ' ~Govorn~nontcitnnol ndviso tho Afglian~
to attncb tho R U ~ H ~troops
& I I in order to clislorlgo thorn from tho
positions Lhoy now occ~~py,
but IIcr i'vInjcrit!l'a (foveriz?newt
coizsido?. lkut t7~of r ~ ~ t l l oadvenoo
.
of tl~o1 3 t ~ s ~ i a SJLOZLZ~,
ns
aubjool
to r n i l i t c r , ~ co?uidr~cttiona,
?~
be ~eBZ'~frd
11y tho AL11han8.'
111 hhin nflnir tho 1%11nr;i1~ns
IWQ R I L to
~ ~ I I I L X lofll
~ ~ one offic~r
(T~wlro~nnn)
end ten men killed, encl three oflicor~find twenty-nine
nlen W O I I I I ~ O ~ .
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tile frontier difficulties were rudely dispellecl,
and a conviction prevailed tllrougllout the country
t,hat war was inevitable. I t was evident that the
question had entered upon a dangerous phase ;
and as it did not appear likely that Eussia would
her troops or ciisavow tlie actio~isof her
agents, n o one was surprised to see tliat the
Millistry was being bor~lc along, i11 spite of the
well-known sympatllies of its leacler, on a roacl
which could have no other issue than the bntt,lefield. In India also, where the sitaatiun was
better understood, the eff'ect of this iutelli; C I ~ C
was even greater; and it was generally believed
that tlie time had at last arrived ~vller~
Iiussia's
advances mroulcl. have to be clieckeil by force of
arms, and that tlie great struggle for mastery in
Asia was about to coinmeIice.
Preparations for war were ral~idly puslieil
forward ill bot,h countries : fast crixisers, selected
from amongst the finest sliipmf the rnercautile
~narine,were chnrterecl by Governnle~ltfor the
p ~ q o s eof protecting Britisli comrncrce, and to
liarass tlie enemy's trade ; tlie troops which h:~d
been sent to Egyl~tfor furtlicr oper:~tions ill tlic
Soudan were stop~)edat S o ~ ~ n l i i:/lltl
n ~ ot,llc~rpni~lls
on the irlni~iro:~il to India ; o~uders.nrere issuecl lor
the rapid slzpplgr uf ariiis ant1 :utu~nrndtion,ntltl ror
tlle p s e ~ ~ a r a t i oof'
i ~ n grc:~t rl:t~r:~1sclu:~'l~.c
I I L lor
oper:~l,iousin Russia11 w;ttcrs ; : ~ ~ l t011
l Apl'il 27,
Mr. Glnclsloue nslieil 111~:TIousc uf Clo~n~lioll~
for a
vote of' credit of 11,OOO,OOO1.l
Of Illis HLIU 4,500,0001. wnb asliuil for to covcr tho eoet of tllo

~
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Oil t h i s occasion, ill the course of a brilliant

slid successful speech, the Prime Minister declared
that h e ancl liis colleagues had laboured, and would
to labour, for an liononrable settlement
by pacific means ; then, after sketiching the outline
of the facts of tlie case, lie alluded to the agreement of March; 10, ailil expressed the opinions of
the Goverllirlent in the followiilg weighty worcls :
I: Sir, it was a very soletnn covenant, involvirig
great issues. 'I'liere were tllousands of men-on
the one side stsiiding for their counttry, a i d on tlle
other sick for what they tliouglit their patriotic
duty-placed in a position of dangerous contiguity
and in rlanger of bloody collision. Tliis engageiiient c a m e between the danger and the people
exposed to i t ; nncl we believed that it woulcl be
recogaisecl as one of the most sacrecl covenants
ever m r ~ d ebetween two great nations, ancl tllal;
tliere woulcl be rivalry betwken the two Powers to
sift the iricicleiits h a t followcd to the end, and how
it caiile d ~ o u t , and who ailcl wliere were the
Ijersons upor1 ~ l i o n the
i responsibility reStec1. -All
this, sir, remains in suspense.
' MTllat liappcneil ? The bloody engagement
of M a r c h 30 follotireil tlle covenant. I sliaU. overstate ~iothing. I shall not purposely overstate
aiiytliing. All I say is this--that t11at woeful
engageluent of Marc11 30 clistinci;ly sllowed tliai; \
operations in the Sourlnn, wl~ilotho romoiiling G,R00,0001.wns
for ~ p o c i n lp r o l ~ ~ ~ r n till
i o cnli~iootion
i~~
will1 tho Afgl~nndillicnlty,
viz. four i ~ l i l l i o i for
i ~ thc nruy, ~lililLWO and a half' millions for tho
navy.

.
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one party or both had, either through ill-will or
through unfortunate mishap, failed to fulfil the
conditions of the engag ement.
' W e considered it, and we coilsicler it still, to
be the duty of botli countries-and, above all, I
will say. for Lhe holiour of both countries-to
examine how and by whose fault this calamity
came about. I will have no foregone conclusion.
I will not anticipate that we are in the right; aild
all;hougll I have perfect coiifidence i11 tlie lloliour
ancl intelligence of our oficers, I vill not now
assuine that they may not have beell mislecl. I
will prepare myself for the issue, and I will abicle
by it as far as I can in a spirit of impartiality.
What I say is that; those wlio have caused such
all engagement to fail ought to become known
to their own Government ailcl to every contracti~ig
party, I will not say that; we are even now in
possession of dl the facts of the case, but me are
in possession of facts wliicl1 create i11 our minds
iil~pressionsui~favou~able
to tlie concluct of solfie
of those who form tlie other party to these
negotiations. But I will cot cleviste from the
strictest principle of justice in cznticipating anything of the ultirnate issue of that fair iiicluiry
which we desire to prosecute, anil are e11cleavour.ilig to prosmxfie. The cause of tli:~i;deplor,zl~le
~vllisioilmay lje wlcertaii1.
' Whose was the provocatioil is n mattcr of
t l ~ eul;inosL c:onscquence. We lruow Lhnt tllc
atlack was a Eussiail attnclc ; we ki1.u.w ~1i:lc;t,11t:
dfgllans s~~lrered
in lift, ill spirit, and in rq>ute;
.______
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kllow that a blow was struck at the credit and
a u t l l o r i t ~of a sovereign-our protected ally-who
llsrl
no offence. A l l I say, sir, is that
we callnot in that state of things close this book
allrlsay, " We will. look into it no more." We
lllust d o our best to have rigllt done in this
m:~tte~-.'
Such were the words in which Mr. Gladstoile
the situation and expressed the views
of llis Cabinet. It was 110 longer a question of
i l e b a t ~ b l efrontiers, but one of national illonour.
Tile agreement of March 1 6 had failed to avert a
collisioii between the Russian and Afgllan troops,
:~nclthe British Government collsidered it to be
the duty, and for tlie honour of both countries, to
exnlnine how, and by whose fault, the conflict hacl
arisen. I t was a clear issue ; and as there was but
litkle hope that Russia would consent to such an
iiicluiry, it was no lollgel- believcd that hoslilities
could be averted, and the actual dec.laration of
war was daily expected.
B u t after a week had passed in anxious suspense t h e crisis came to an end in an unexpected
manner. The &ar declared that he was the sole
judge as to whether his officers had acted in conformity with his orders, and he refused to permit
any inquiry illto the acts of General Komaroff;
but, while he insisted that all further discussion of
the military question should be dropped, he consented to refer to the judgment of a friendly
sovereign ally differences or niisunderstandi~lgs
which might be foullil to exist in regard to the
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il~terpretation of the agreement of March 16.
This offer was made on May 1, and three clays
later Mr. Gladstone announced that it had been
accepted by the British Government as a settlement
of the difficulty consistent wit11 the lionour of botli
States, and that negotiations regarcliilg the delimitation of the frontier would at once be resumed in
London.
I t is not the intention here to iizqnirc m~hetller
this solutioi~of tlze question was a salisfactory one,
or to what extent it was in' accorclance with the
i~iteiltions of tlze Ministry as expressed by Mr.
Gladstone in his speech of April 27. 11 112s been
variously clescribecl as a piece of consurnmale
statecraft, lanzentable vacillation, or abject surrender ; but, while leaving the reader to lorm his
own opinion on the matter, it will be sufficieiit to
state that it was eventually arranged that Panjdeh
sliould be exchangecl for Zulfikar, and that in
other respects tlie f~ontierline slloulcl be practically the same as that proposecl in the Eussian
ineinorandum of J a i ~ u a ~28,
y 1885, and rej ectecl
by the British Foreiga Office on March 13.'
I t must, llowevor, Lo ~~lontioilcd
thnt wlicn tho Rrili~hGovorilrrlont rcfi~soilto nccopt tliis lino tlioy l~oliovc!dthat tlict Arriir wol~ltl
insist 011 tho rotontioil of Pnnjdoli t~liil1'nl-i-k111~t1111,
ILH tho for111(,r
wns known to havo long formot1 n portion of Afghnniutnn, rbrltl wns
tho11 hold by an Afglinn garrifion, wllilo tho Arriir ill 0110 of liis
lettors to S h Peter Lnrnndon strongIy proto~to(l~jinilluttlio l t i l ~ e i l ~ l i
ocoupoCion of Pul-i-Lllc~tnn. Sncl~1111ingtho cnuo, t111)y morn
b o ~ m dunclor tllo otigngonlonts of 1880 lo sttpport whral tlloy
bolioveil to bo tho just c l n i ~ nof~ Cho Alrlir, nil, rtlitlor t h o airc~unlstnncou,they riglilly con~idorodlhl~ttlioy coulrl not occc~ptt l ~ a
lino in quoslion.
On April 4, 1885, howovor, tho Amir, wlio wns thon ot Ilowul
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13ut altllougli the Russinn C3o~rernmentagreecl
to liaild over Zulfikar to the Afgllans in excllallge
for the Pancljeh district, the ~legotiations soon
came to astanclstill o~viiigto a difference of opillioil
as to the illcalling of llle word ' Zulfikar.' The
Rritisli Ministry, who oilly agreed to this exchallge
because the Amir had insistccl on tlie exttenle
importallce of retairlirig command of llie Zuliilxtr
Pass, illtended th J the line should be clraw~lsome
distance to the north of the pass, SO as to leave it
ant1 the adjacent heiglits entirely in tlie hands of
the Afghans. Hut the Russians ol3jected to this,
and contencled that only the old ruined watchtower of Znlfikar on the banks of the Eeri-Rucl
should be left to the Amir, wllile Ihe pass and the
surrounding heights lo the north a i d east were to
be entirely excluclecl from Afgllan control ; and
they ~ o u i l dup by saying that .if tlie British
Government cliil not coilsent to this arrangement,
hifaruchak would have to be ceded to Russia in
exchange for the llills ~l'llichovei-look the pass.
It was a preposterous demand, but olle which
was quite in l~eepingwit11 the attitude which tlie
Pindi, infornlod Lord Dufferin that he did not sot much store 011
Panjdoh, a8 he could not count on the loyalty of tlie Sarilrs; but 110
said that he attachodvital hpgrtance to the retention of RiI~r~ichalc,
Gulmn, and the Pass of Zulfikar. This declaration, of couree,
placed thematte? in a very different light ; but it unfortunately carno
too late to prevent tho fight at Panjiloh and the complicntions which
followocl.
I t is aatisfaotory to know thnt when the Amir was informed of
the settlement which had been arrived at he sent n, most friendly
reply to the Viceroy of India, and said t h d he u~illinglyaccepted
tlie line agreed upon.

Czar's Governmeilt maintained throughout the
whole of these wretched negotiations ; for no
sooner did tl~eG.laclstonianCabinet make any concession than fresh demaiids were put forward : and
so the game continued, England giving way time
after time at all points dong the line, while the
R ~ ~ s s i aoutposts
n
were gradually puslied closer and
closer to the ' Key of India.'
But the time had a t last arrived wlleii a starid
was to be made against any further concession.
The Gladstonian Ministry was defeated on tlie
Budget, and as sooil as Lorcl Salisbury came into
power he inforn~eclthe Russian Ambassaclor that
E e r Majesty's Goveriiinent found i.t impossible
to depart from the position they llad taken up.
The Russia,n Government, he said, liad agreed
in the previous April tliat ' the frontier would start
from zl point on the Heri-Rud a little to tlie north
of Zuliikar,' and no reservation was made as to
a portion of the pass being retained by Iiussia.
Confiding in this engagement, the Anlir had been
illformed that the Zulfikar Pass would be included
in his dominions ; a i d such being the case, Her
Majesty's Government considered that they were
bound b y the declarations thus inade, and could
not assigli to the Russian promise ally vdue which
would detract in any degree horn tlle right of the
Afghans to the f~111possession of the pass w1~ic;h
had been guaranteed to tliein.
This was dl that was requireil. Rnssin hail
been laying ' n pnle of brag,' alicl liad traclecl on
tlie notoriously pacific chmact,er of the prcvions
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;\Iinistry in ordtlr to pct ns c'lo*cl :I.; 11o~sil1le
to tllcl
f:tir v:lllcy of 1I~r:lt. 1311t :LS .SUOII :L* 111,~.Ijriti*ll
(;ovcrnnlcnt took lip n st ~ ~ o npositioi~,
g
:liicl 1)l:~ii11y
iiltiiil:ltc~(lthat tllc liinit ll:~(ll ) ~ ~ b 1 iv:~(~l~c~(l
1
l)cyo11(1
\vIiic:l1 1Iussi:t c20ulcl ilot b i ~l,tin~~ittrtlto l j : ~ ~ ,
3tuscovit c clil)loluncy n-\-:lsr1lr~c'kill:ltctl, :111(11111'
estrav:ig:u~t denlnllds of 121wsin n.rl.cl iuotliGc~tli l l
f:~vour of the :lfgli311s. (Jil Sq)tt*inl)(>r10 t110
g ~ l ~ r line
: ~ l \\-llicli the fro~l~icl.
\\.:IS to tnkt! n.;~.; recordrtl iii n protocaol, nrlcl it was ngr.t~rt1t11:~t tl~c~
r1ct:tils sliouhl
lisetl on the spot :IS c.spc>tli~ic~~~sl\.
as 1'ossil)lc by joint Cloniniissioiiers :~l)l)oi~~ttltl
1)y
the tn.o I'o~vers. Tlle tlt.limit:~tic~i~
of tlie l~ou~id:l~.~w:is to be conimciiccd :LL %uliik:Lr ; :u~tlit ~v:1salso
agrrcid tllnt tlie rscorts of llie Conunissioiicrs slioultl
bc liiriiteil to oile liuri(lrc~tlnl(.n 011 cacli side.
111 nc:clordnriccwit11 the arr:ulgc1nlc~iit,
I 11us 111:1(10,
Coloilel liidgcl\c:~y \\-as :~ppoi~~tibcl
Ijritisli C'oiii~~iissioncr, n~ithA1:ljor 13. 1,. l)uraiid :IS I~is:is~is(:~ilt
;
:111(1 on i l ~ eIiussinn side (:ol011()1I i ~ i I i l l ~XIS
~r~[
nl)poii~tc~dC'c~uullissioiics,wit11 ;\l:l*jor C+ntltlc~oiloll'
:~il(l&I.Lcss:lr :is ~lssist:iiltCoinniissic~ncvs. 'These
rcpresentativos of [lie two ~lovcrrinic~nts~iict : ~ t
%ulfili:tr on Novenibrr 10, tlie d:~tcfisctl it1 the
protocol, anit t\vo claps later tlie first pillar of t 1 1 ~
Russo-Afghan bouiltlnry was erccbtecl in tlieir
presence mil witll Ille concurrence of the Aiair's
agent. For the nest seven weeks the demsrcntio~l
of tlie frontier progressed r:tpi[lly, and hy Deccniher 26, 1885, the line vrns clefillit ely Inid clo~v\.nas
far as the RIurghd~river in the viclillit;v of t l ~ r
fortress of Nnrzrnc~llnli. T3y this tiilir, 11nwevr.l-.tlie
l)ib
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winter had set i n ; and as further demarcation
work was for the time impossible, the British
omm mission went into winter quarters at Charshamba, and the Russian party retired to Panjdeh.
Olle of the most in~portalitand difficult problems which the Commissio~lershad to settle during
the delimitation of this portion of the boundary
between the Heri-Rud and Murghab rivers was
the question of irrigation. The lands cultivated
by the Sariks of Panjdeh were entirely clependent
for their water-supply on the streams which take
their rise in the Paropmisus range, and it was
therefore evident that unless some satisfactory
settlement could be made there would be constant
disputes between the Afgllan and Russia11 settlers
on the two sides of the frontier. Colonel Sir West
Ridgeway, however, appreciated the collsequences
of such a state of things at their proper value, and
attached the greatest iniporta~iceto an equitable
partition of the water in order that subsequeilt
complications might not arise ; and he accordingly
agreed to the maintenance, so far as irrigation is
concerned, of the status quo in the valley of the
Kuslik between Chihil Dlukl~tar and Knra Tappa
Khurd (i.e for a distance down the stream of about
eight miles), and in the Kashan Valley bctwccll
Torshekh and the dam above Robat-i-Kashan ( i . ~ .
for about fifteen miles). I t was then clefinitely
agreed that in the two above-mentioned sectiolLs
the' Afghans should not have tlie rig11t 10 illcrease
the number or exteiit of the canals in actual use,
but that, provided this conclition was observe(l,
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they should retain the use and absolute control of
all existing calzals without interference ; and it was
further decided that if there should at any time be
any de6oiency of water in the caizals whiclz flow
froin Afghan into Rr~ssianterritory, Russia would
not be justified in making any claims, 110 matter
from what cause such deficiency might arise.l
.The Russians also stipula,tecl that they sl~ouldbe
permitted to construct a new dam across the
Murghab in the vicinity of Maruchak,?n order that
they might obtailz a grealer supply of water for the
Panjcleh district ; and this point was also conceded,
on the uizderstanding that tlie dam should noL be
used as a passage, that no military post sl~ouldbe
constructed on it, a i d that the Russians should
have nothing whatever to do with the lnilds on tlze
Afghan bank of the stream, excepting the actual
head of the dam.
As so011 as tlze winter was over tlze Cominissione~sonce ag ail1 resumed their labours, and
the middle of March found them hard at worlr in
fixing the frontier-line between tlze Murghab and
tlie Oxus. Several slight cliffere~zcesof opinioiz
naturally arose, but these were all amicably settled,
and by May 26, 1886, the bounclmy to the north
of Mainlana and Daulatabad had beell marked out
by pillars as far eastwards as the Wells of Imam
This settlement regarding the irrigation of lands between the
Enshlc and Murghab bad subeeq~~ently
to be sliglltly moclifiecl when
the boundary itself was dtered in July 1887.
"The
frontier line follows the conrse of the MurghaL (in
mid-stream) for Yome distance to a point a t the north end of the
i?I,laruclialc Vitlley.
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Nazar, some miles to the north of Andlrhui. There,
however, the work came to a standstill once more, on
account, of a serious cliEculty which arose regarding the precise point at which the frontier-line
should meet the left bank of the lZiver Oxus.
111
tlle Agreeinent of 1573 it was stated that; the
northern frontier of Afghan Turkestan was ' the
line of the Oxus from the mouth of the Kokclzs .
river to t1s.e post of Khoja Sale inclusive, on the
high road from Bokhara to Balk11 ; notliing to be
claimed by the Afghan Amir on the left ba11B of the
Oxus bel.ow Khoja Sale ; ' 2nd from thence the
line was to be so drawn as to leave to Afghanistan
the internal districts of Akcha, Siripul, etc. But
when the Coizlmissioners reached the Oxus, they
found that, properly spealring, no post of Xhojn
Sale existed on the left bank of the river, although
they found an old tomb of a Mahomeclan saint
bearing the name of Ziaret ICl~ojaSale, while o n a
neigllbouri~lgbill there mTas also a heap of ruins
which some of tlze inhabitants knew by the designation of ~ k r a iKlloja Sdle ; and t l ~ ematter was
still further complicatecl by the discovery that
there was no existing ferry across the OXUR
bearing
the name of Khoja Sale, although at the time of
t,he Agreement of 1873 it was understoocl that
such a ferry was actually in use.
Several important facts, however, were clearly
establishecl, the most important being-(1) that
Khoja Sale was the name appliecl to a district on
the left bank of the OXUS,which was divided into
four sub-r1ivi.sionsca,lled h'hai~lid),D d i (including
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Islarn), Karlriil (commoilly called Khoj a Sale), and
Alsjui (including Dogharasi); (2) that this district
of Kl~ojaSale hacl always formed a portion of the
proviilce of Alrcha, and siilce the time whert Akcha
was conquerecl. by Dost MaIioinnlecl in 1850-51 the
disl;rict of Khoja Sale had always remained in
Afghan possession ; (3) that a ferry had formerly
existed at Islaill in tlie Dali sub-division of the
district for the beliefit of trafic between Bokhara
and Maimana, but that it had gradually been
to the east
superseded by the Kilif ferry-further
-until, ill 1872, it practically ceased to exist ; and
that this passage at Islam, while in existence, was
lrnow~las the ferry of Khoja Sale, taking its name
from the district to which it belonged ; (4) that
the Afgl~ansa i d Bohharans, on being informed of
the Agreeineilt of 1873, had conjointly demarcated
the frontier in accorclance with their interpretation
of the Agreement, and had fixed the boundary on the
western limits of Khamiab, which was the extreme
western sub-division of the Khoja Sale cl.istrict,
thus clearly showiilg that they recognisecl. Afghan
rights over the whole of the district of Klioja Sale.
Taking his stand, therefore, on these well
authenticated facts, Colonel Sir West Riilgew:~y
claimed aiat the frontier should follow the line
which had been laid dowil by the Bolsl~aranand
Afghan officials, so tliat the whole district of khoja
Sale shoukd contiil~~e
under Afghan co~ltrol,as it
had been for the previous thirty-six years. He
.u~isheclmerely to p:reserve the stc~tzrsquo, a i ~ las
These sub-divisions are llemed consecntivel~~ Y O I I west
I
to anst.
It 2

3gt ;i j i

%

i~lace
could be found which corresponded exactly
I-with ' the post of Khoja Sale upo'the high road
between 13dlch and Bokhara,' be proposed that
recourse sl~oulclbe hacl to the spirit and intention
of the Agreement
of 187'3, whereby it had been
.,
clearly illteilded by the t;wo goverilnlents tllst both
Hokllara a ~ l dAfghanistan should retain possession
of
. all the territories and lallds they then held, ancl
by which i t hacl been agreed th"at Alrcha ( a n d
therefore all its sub-districts also) should remain
under the rule of the Ainir of Kabul.
The Eussiail Commissioner, however, insisteci
on the question being settled in accordalzce with
tlie strict wording of the Agreement, without any
regard to other considerations. H e therefore
endeavoured to prove that the oficial residence of
the governor of the district was ' the post of Kl~oja
Sale ' referred to in the Agreeinent ; and althougli
it was collclusively proved by the evidence of the
inhabitants of the locality that t11e house in question
was not built till long after the Agreement had
been concluded, he still refused to give way an
inch, and rejected all attempts which the British
Commissioner made to arrive at a compromise.
Thus, matters once more came to a standstill, and
when it a t last became evident that no satisfactory
settlement could be arrived at on the spot, it was
agreed between the two goverilments that the
Commission should at once be withdrawn, and
that the boundary from the Irnaru Nazar well to
the Oxus should be settled by direct negotiation
between t,lle 1,wo governnle~~ts
either at L O I Z C ~ O ~ ~
no--
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or St. Petersburg, on the understanding that no
alteration was to be made, except by mutual consent, in the portion of the Trontier which had been
already demarcated, ancl that everything should
remain in stntz~qz6o in the undefined gap.
In accorclance with this agreement, tlie British
Colnlnissioner left Khamiab wit11 his staff and
personal escort on September 15, 1886, and comi~~enced
his march to Snclia tl~roughKabul aiid
Jaldabad. Eleven clays later, on reaching Heibalr,
he joiilecl hands with the main body of the mission
and escort, wliich had passed the summer in the
mountains near Mazar-i-Sherif, ancl from thence
the party moved in three detachinents across the
Hindu Xush by way of the Chahardar Pass, while
several sinaller cletachecl groups under the Survey
and Intelligence oficers were sent to the right ancl
left to explore the other passes which lead across
the great mountain barrier. The passage was
effected just in time, for a heavy snow-storm was
encountered berore the last range was crossed ;
but Cllarilcar was reached on October 12 with the
trifling loss of two men, and there it was learnt
that the Ainir was encamped a few miles dislant
with a considerable force for the purpose of protecting the Gommission from possible attacks of
the Kol~ist~mis,
who had been the bitterest foes of
the English during the last Afghan war.
During the progress of the Mission from
Charikar to Kabul, Abdur Rahman, with his army,
marched backwards and forwards on its flank to
prevent disturbances ancl any possible outbreak of

farialicisnl on the part of the people; ailcl froin the
date of Sir West Riclgeway's entry into tlie Afghan
capital (on October 15) until he leJt for India (on
the 24th) tlie utmost consideratioll was shown to
every ~neinberof the party, and all were treated
wit11 the most princely hospilality. At the A~nil.'s
special request the stay of the Mission was prolonged beyond the date whicli l ~ a dbeen originally
iixecl. for its departure
; ail address of welcoilze a ~ l d
friendship was presented by his military officers,
who expressed the hope that all former l~ostilities
would be forgotten, and that the two nations
would always be allies in future; decorations
were conferred by hiin 011 all the British officers ;
t,he nieillbers of tlie Mission-including the Sepoys
~ n dfollowers-were allowed to freely visit the
city and its environs; and from first to last they
were treated wit11 an amount of kindness aiid
respect which ernpllasised the satisfaction felt by
:~11 classes of tlie people at the success which hacl.
attended the labours of the Coillinission on behalf
of Afghanistan. .
As soon as Sir West 12idgeway arrived in Eugland, the Russian Governnient were aslced if they
were prepared to enter upon the discussion of the
1Clioja Sale clifficulty. The British Foreign Office
in re-opening tlie cluestion su.ggesl;ed that the
~iegotiationssl~ouldbe resun~edin London by the
same persons who conducted tlie 1~reliininaa.y
negoLia.tions terrni~ial,ingin I;he Frol.oco1 of Scbpteniber 1686 ; buL as M, Lessa~: l.t:~il hccorne
seriously ill from the efkcts of rxlmure 011 [,lie
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it Was (3Ventually agreed that the
should be coliducted in St. Petersbup,
and Sir West Ridgeway was instructed to proceed
to the Bussian capital so as o;t be there by
April 19, 1887, llle dale fixed for the Arst meeting
of tlze ilelegat,es.
It sliould liere be inentiollecl that., before tile
omm missioners sepal-ateti hi tlle previous September, Golollel ICulilberg iriforiilecl Sir West Ridgeway that the 'boundary in tlie u.eighbourhood of
Andlrhui had been irregularly drawn, and lie put
forward a claiiu to certain wells wliich had been
allotted to Afghanistan. This Gonte~~tion,
however,
was resisted by Colonel . Iiidge~vay,who pointed
out that the line had been demarcated by the
Chief Commissioners xfter ail exhaustive inquiry,
and as the settlerneilt lrad been confirmed by the
two governmeiiLs, ancl the froiltier pillal-s had been
actually erected, he very naturally refused to reopen the quesLion which had beell definitely settled
some weeks before. Colonel Kuhlberg, however,
refused, as usual, to give wa,y, ancl as he declined
to sign the inal) of tlie frontier which had been
the Imam Nczzar well, the settlement
fixed as far
of this dispnte was oiic of tlze taslrs wllich was laid
before tlie ileleoates in St. Petersburg ; a l c l thus,
7
when tlie negotlatiolzs were res~lmedin the Russian
capitnl irl April 1887, ~llere were two dis~inct
p o i n ~ sof issue between the British and Russian
(iovemments :( 1 ) li.egi~~~tliit;;r
a ilisLniic.:e of sonic thirly miles
ol' ~.lgl,ta?.,:atodfyo11.1ierto the vest of Luiun Nazar.
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(2) Regarding t l ~ emidefined g a l ~of thilvty-four
miles bet~veenIlnanl Nazar a11d tlie banks of the
oxus.
The llegoti,ztio~ls, Iiowever, were s])eeclily
brought to a satisft~cl;ory coilcl.usior1, nl.lcl on
July 22, 188'7, a filial Protocol was signed, whereby it was agreecl that the Axnir of' Afgllanistan
shoulcl retain possessioil of the mllole of' tlle E;lloj,z
Sale district (inclu~lingI<liaiiiiab), aiicl that tlie
frontier between tlie Kushlr a ~ ~ Mlurglial,
cl
Xivers
shoulcl b e slightly moclified, ill order that tlre Bariks
of Pailjdeli might regain possessioll of certnin cultivated lancls which they llatl been cleprived of by the
clemarcation whicli had been previo~zslycarried out.'
- By the signature ancl coilfir~natioxiof this Protocol tile delimitation of tjhe north-western fi-oriticr
was at East completecl ; aild as illany imagine t.llat
the settlement thus arrived a t tiras nnfavc)u~ableto
the Alnir, il; will be well to quote two opinioiis
on the matter.
The first is that of Sir West Riclge\v:~y,.ivllo
saicl :-' I clo not think t;lie Arnir llns ally reasorl
.to be dissatisfied wit11 the resnlt of tile tlclnarcntion. H e lii~liselfpressed fol* tlla ilc!lirui tntion of
the frontier., nncl lie IiiilzselI' ilec:iileil Ili:tt I'arljjilell
Whuil tho I'1~otoco1of Snpto~nhclr 1HH6 WILHrortc!lndrlrl, it WILH
not ltnown t h t ~ ttho Snriltr; of t't~r~jdoh
IIILC~cxtcuclod tlloir cultivatioll into tho rlido vnllny~of th(3 IClltil~lrulltl Ki~nllnrl, ulllc!rt!
they hncl opcncd c!~~i~nlr;
nnd roclnirllr!(l Inncl, nlLl~o~r~li
Lllc,y till
contiln~orlto r o ~ i d ain tho I'r~nj~loh
Vl~lloy. 'J'llcy wcr.0 ~ I ~ I IdoH
privod of thcir 1nr11lt1i r ~tl18 ICn~l~lc,
I<rr~htcn,i~nrlB ~ I I ~ R I I I LVILII(~YH,
II
with 1,118 osrc~ption of caorleirz plot^ 1111d P I L ~ I I L I Hwl~ic-11Sir \V(!nt
Tlirlgcwny agrccd In Lhrir rulnining in ~ ( ' I I I P I Ilor coll(+(fihhiotlti c11;ll.
whoro.
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was not worth iigllting for. I t seeins to be sup'posed that we forced the Arnir to acquiesce in the
Russian annexation of Paiijcleh, but at the interview between Lord Dufferin arlcl the Amir at
1.awuI Pincli, the Amir-without any pressure by
the Viceroy-clecidecl to give up the valley. His
Highness then meiltioilecl those places which he
colisidered essential for Afghanistan, viz.-Zulfikar, Gulran, ancl Majruclialr. Accordingly, if the
frontier had been cleniarcatecl just north of tliose
three places, tlie Amir woulcl have hacl no cause
of coniplaint. But inucli more lias been done for
the .Amir, and he has gained land which was never
before in his possession. Indeecl, I calculate that,
after allowiilg for the loss of Panjdeh and tlie
lancls i ~ o wgiven up in the valleys of the Kusl~k,
Kashan, ancl Murghab, the territories of the Amir
are increased by 400 square miles. Panjcleli was
lost to the Ainir before the clemarcation began,
but through the cleinarcation of the frontier he
lias not lost; a penny of revenue, a single subject,
or an acre of lxllcl which was occupiecl or cultivated by any Afghan subject.'
Tlie second opinion which it is proposed to
quote is that of the Amir Abclur Rahman Khan
himself, who expressed his approval of the final
settlemerit in the following words :I-' I n the fimt place I feel much obligecl, and am
Soo lotter from tho Amir to tho Viceroy of India clated
AugnsL 16, lBH(j, cmcl w ~ i t t o nin roply to a cornmnnic&tion fkorn
IJoril I)uKcri~l in w l ~ i c hI-Iis EIi,ghnc!ss wn8 lnbrrnoil of tho final
scttlcrrlont ol' Lho nor~h.wcstcrnbonndary of At'ghanislan.
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inspired with hope on accouilt of the great attentioli ancl. fay-seeing and royal consideration of
B e r Imperial and Dignifiecl. Majesty, the great
Queen of Bngland and Empress of India. Secondly,
the good and the state-adorning opinioil of the
representatives of the illustrious government is
worthy of praise and the cause of happiness and
thanks, for the lmots in the thread of discussioii
with the Russian Government, which were tied
with regard to the Afghan frontiers, have been
untied and opened with the tips of the fingers of
excellent measures. They (the Queen and the
representatives) adopted the right policy, whicli
is better than the first one. I know for certain
that the representatives of the illustrious British
Governmeut have, froill the first stage of the demarcation (settlement of the bouildsry) of AIghanistail
with the Rnssiail Government until the conchision
of the cluestion, viz. : the decisioil and settlement of
the clainl of tliat (Russian) Governmeilt to the
I<liamiab district, reached their destination after
having traversed inany h a d ancl. difficult stages of
discussion on the noble steed of minute tlloughts.
I t is oile of the results and consequences of' tlie
sincere friendship of the two parties tliat the
Russian Government, notwithstanding its 1asg.e
number of troops, its power, and its ilatilral iioise
and despotism, has entered the door of refraining
and abstainiag from concluest ancl war wit11 these
two 'anspicious governments, as it knew that the
I~Y
and wonld
war woulcl have a n L I I L ~ ~ ; L ~result
elltail a heavy loss on itself'. Had it not see11 the
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foundation of the frienclship of these two uaite(1
lcingdoins strong and firm, and the basis of the
affection and sympathy of the two goverrimeilts
solid and stable, it would hardly have come dowll
from the palace of its desires and the mansion of
its wish to subjugate Afghanistali and occupy India.
I loolr upon the lcincl frieilclsllip of the illustrious
Britisll Government, as the cause of the flourish of
the tree of tlie Af'gban Government, and il; is
undoubaedly so. I t i s also pli~illand clear in the
gracious sight of IIer Bul~linleMajesty, the great,
Queen, a i d in that of the representatives of the
ill~zstriousgoverninei~t, tllat my person, which
exhibits sincerity, shuns a i d Beeps away from the
course and system of the former Aivirs of
Afghanistail; aiid it will, please God, remain so
lirrn and constant in the ensagements of perpetual
friendship with the said Government, that among
,211 tlle powers it will be famous and distinguished
ill coiisecluence of this exalted name and exalted
char-acter. I agree to, and approve of, the settlenlerlt and decision of the question of Kl~nmiabwith
the Russia11 Goverrunent, viz. :-that the representatives of tlie illustrious British Government have
considered it advisable and good for the time being
to exc1i;nige Llie piec:e of land in which tlie Sarik
flocks are riow grnziiig, ~vitlimy permission. In
:tccoril:~nce with what your Excellency wrote, I
have issuer1 explic:i~orders to the oificials of Herat,
elijoii,i~lgiht?~uto 1n:ike over to tlle Sarilrs t;hat
piece u l lnnd.'

CHAPTER XX

RUSSIAN hlOVJBhlENTS IN TBE PA31IRS
Revolt in Afghan-Turlrestan-Persian concessions to Englnncl, and
Russian jealousy-Secret conventioil betwoen R u s ~ i nnnd Pcrsiu
-Outrage o n Younghusband and Davison-Ruseian nctivity in
the Pemirs-Afghans and Cliirlese bonndnry-Affn,ir nt Sonla
Tash-Riots a t Tashlcenl-Latest Russinn ns~un~ncc~--Fc~rt
on
the Mnrghnb-Chitral and Ranjnt-Rtuuowa end dnngors.

FORtwo or tliree years aRer the conclnsioil of
the liegotiations between England ailcl Russia regardiug the nortli-western bo~ulclary of Aigllaliistan, t,he chief interest of Central Asinn caollcerlls
was centred in the serious rebellions w1lic:ll lxolce
out in Afghanistan, aucl which threntenecl the very
stabi.lity of Abclur Rallman's rule. The l i r ~ st i g ~ ~ s
of disaffectioiz appeared among the Cxllilz:~is,~ 1 1 0
in 1887 broke out into opela rebellicm. Y'liey, 11(1wever, were recluceil to order after n l)r(.)E'r.ac:t,c?tl
campaign., and tlie Amir the11 had leisure to t111~11
his attention to the sul)jlqation of sorat? of 1!11c:
i~ldependent or senii-i~ltle~)e~ldel~t
t,rii,c!s \vlli( 41
inhabit the country to the nortlz of l;h(! Ii'llyljc!r
Pass. But befire this seconi[ carnl~aignwr;is c!otlcilnrlccl, the Amir, who hat1 c:stal)lislzetl his I l c ~ ~ t l qi~artersat Jnlalahad, ur:ks rcc::~llcd to T<:d )ul l ~ y

1<

i

-

1887-1893

REVOLT

---

--

-

-- -

AFGIIAN-TURICESTAN

25 3

-

news of a serious revolt which had occurred ill
Afghan-Turke~t~l.
-During the Ainir's exile in Turlrestan, one of his
, o m p m i ~ ni11siaisfortul~ewashis cousinIshak Khall ;
alld w l l e l ~A b d u r Rahman was proclaimed Alnir of
K~J-,~~~, this chief ]lad cordially assisted him in his
efforts to consolidate his kingdom, and as a reward
for his services was made Governor of Afghan-TurBestall. T h e r e for several years Ishak llad loyally
out his duties, but in 1887 the &nil. began to
have grave reasoils to suspect his fidelity, and therefore s u m n i o n e d him aiid otl~ersuspected chiefs to
~ ~ b u l T. h i s order brought ~nattersto a crisis, for
Ishak Khan not ollly declined lo obcy, but induced
t h e Mir of Maimana to join him in his defiallce of tile
central anuf;hority. I t was an inopportune moment,
for t h e Ghilzais had been suppressed, Ayub Khan
was a p r i s o n e r in the hancls of tlie English, alld
Abdur R a h m a n was therefore able to devote the
whole of his attention to the suppression of t,his
new revolt. Ishak, however, determined to lnalre
a bold bid for tlie throne of Kabul itself, and after
p r o c l a i m i n g himself Alnir lie endeavoured to win
over the garrison of Maimana lo his cause. But
the a t t e m p t failed. Tllze troops which Ize sent ~ O I .
t h e p u r p o s e seized tlieir leaclers ancl handecl tlzem
over to the Herat autllorilies ; and Ishalc, the11 aL
t h e h e a d of a small army of some 7,000 men, made
a bold a d v a i l c e southwards in order to gain possession of the pass at Bamjan. But tliere Ize was
once more foiled by Gholam Eyder, the Arnir's
Commander-in-Chief, wlio had already occupied

the Pass, and who kheii, pushing rapidly forward,
stormed the I<amarcl Pass, and routed a bocly of
rebel cavalry at G1io1-i. Isliak Khan then fell back
ancl coilcenl r;xt,ecl his rorces at Ghaznigak, near
I<hnlru, 1v11e1-e he wa,s a1t aclced 011 Sepleinber 4,
1888. I)lu.ir\g the early portiolz of the day the
l~attlewas agaJnst tlie Ainir, for tlie left wing of
llis ariiiy mas tlefeated and driven from tlie field.
RLI~,
tllinking the victory assured, tlle rebels stopped
to 1dmlile.r the ca,ulp, ancl while they were so eiigaged, Gliola,m Hyder retrieved tlie fortune of tlie
day by lencli~~g
a vigorous charge with his right
wing upon a division comnlancled by Ishak in
person. This attaclr mas coinl~letelysuccessfnl,
ancl the fire froin the breech-loading rifles supplied
by tlze Inclia~zGovernnzent soon forced the insurgenls to fall back wit11 severe loss, when Islial~fled
to Russian territory, and a few clays later his
beaten arniy siu.reizclered at discretion.
After tlie suppression OF this rebellion, tlie A ~ n i r
went in person to Afg1za.n-T~~rkestaizto restore
order in that portion of his clominions. His
presence in the neiglil~ourlzooclof Mazar-i-Sherif
for six rnoi-~tlzsin the spring and suinilier of 1889
was supposed by the Russiaiis to be a inenace to
the peace of their frontier possessions, and tlley
therefore ~trengt~henecl
their outposls on the border,
mcl consiclerable reinforcements were sent to TLW
kestan by the new Central Asian Railway, which
hacl been coinpleted as far as Samarkand on the
27th of the previous May.' Bnt matters gradually
During tlie war scare w h i c h followed the Russian occupation
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cluicted down, aild with the exception of an &ortive attempt at rebellion in Badakslznn, no I'urtlier
d~squieting events occurred in the ilortheril provinces ol' tlie A~nir'sdomininns.
111 the meanwhile the rivalry hetween Eiigla~icl
and 12nssia in Persia aga,il~becaille very keen.
Ill the 1)revious a9utuma (1888), tlie iiew British
Wollf,
Minister at Teheran, Eir Reizry D~umino~ld
iliduccd tlie Sllall to o1Jeil tllle ICar~niRiver to
British merclia;llt vessels, and to refuse permissio~l
for the establishment of a Russia11Consul at Meshed.
The 12ussims were f ~ ~ r i o uats these coilcessions ;
they declared that Nortlierrl and Soutliern Persia
ha(1 fallen coinpletely uilcler British influence, aild
the press me11 welit so far as to all.ude t,o the
episode as a nal;ional disaster coiiipnrable oi11y to
Loinalcii~'~
defeat at Deilghil Tepd. The Russiaii
Fo~eigiiOfice, ho~vever,made vigorous represen-.
tations on tlie subject, and as tlie Shall had loiig
l3eeii tauglit tliat the secnrity of his kingdcliil and
dynasty was depen.dent in a great ineasure 011
the goodwill of Eussia, he soon receded froin t1.ie
of Merv, and whila the Afghan boundary was still under dispute, tlle
railway which had bee11 constrnctad from Michuelovsl~to JCizil
k v x t during Sltobeleff's canll~aignagainst tho Teltltds was extended
through Asltabud, Dushdc, M o ~ vaild C h ~ i j uto
i Surno11'1tand. Tho
bridges over the Tejcnd, Mnrghab, and Oxus Rivers are wooden
structures, but steps are being t(lk811 to substitute iron girder briclges
ovey the Tejend and Murghnb, as has already been done at the
Zarafshan crossing at liara IC1.d. Carzon states that mnch trouble
ha,a recently been caused by tho Oxns having shiftod ~ t channd
s
ruore than half a mile to the eastwards, which has necessitated a
corresponding oxtansion of tho Charjui Bridge. The western terrrlinus of the line is at prcsent at Uzun Ada, but the Ministry of
War a ~11orLtiine ago ailtllorised an extoilsion from Mulla Iiari to
ICrasnovodsl~,which will bc the future terminutr on the Caspian.

positioi~he had talcell up, yieldecl on tlie cluestion
of t l ~ eRllssiail Consu1:~te a1 Meslierl, nut1 issued a
decree before the close of the year (1668), by which
tlle Icarun IZiver was ope11 to the mei.cnnt ilc, lllariile
of tile mllole world, several vexatious col~ilitiol~s
being at llle same lirne i m l ~ o s ~~vliic:li
d
dei,snclt.
greatly hoiii tlle valne of tlle c:ollcc~ssiol~.
BUL tlle Russinlls wcsc iiot cholllcl~lt
~ v i l lthis
~
partial success. They llatl oo lo119 1)or1L :t.c~ctist,olned to liave their own way in llol.si:t., lid tll(!y
resented any increase of 13sitisll iliiluc:llc:o c )vor :uly
pol.tiou of the Sllali's dolniliiolls ; :t.iltl, [ l i : ~ l l i1,o
~
the eil'iorts of their ellrToy, l'ri~LC:(:I)()lgol.onlii, :L
secret c o ~ ~ v c l i l iurns
o ~ ~col1c:lurled ill t llc sl)riiig ol'
1850, ill wl~icllt l ~ cfollowilig coiicessiolis :we snid
to have beell nlatlc :I. Tll:~t,:dl fc~reigilor)~ltr:t.(~[
s for t,lie colisl,i~~l(!ti011 of ~-:t.il~i?:tys
ill l.'c:rsi:~ sllo~ll(2,for live! yci~rs,1~
c o m m u ~ ~ i c : ~to
L (the
~ t 1tussi:ul C ~ O V ( T I L ~ 1)c~fi)l'c
I~(~~I~
t,lieir nv(~c31)1,:~~l(;i?,
: L I N ~ t 1i:~L litlssi:i~l ( ~ ) 1 1 t
om
s11o11ld hi? given [lie liinsl~'cf'usalfor soc.11 work.
11. T'1i:t.t I'ersi:~slloultl l)(!rlliit, I ~ I I s s ~V: ~LS~S ~I I ~ S
ljrj l'reely ~i:~vig:t.[,(+
l l i r ~l'Illrtl-:~l),or l:igoo~~
ol' b i x l i , ; ~ i i c l :t.llo~irTVII:L~~V(~S: L I I ( ~ t l ~ ~ ~ fto
i l s1x1 oo11xl1-uct(ltl t llrrc!.
In. 'I'II~LL l'(>i*si:t.s I L ( ) L ~ ~ ( ~ t'11(*[ :I 1 1 i ~ l 1ro:~(l
fro111 I'ir-i-1jnz:lar lo 'I"ollc~*:ui
; :u ~ ( :LISI)
l
)1111)1(11(:
~vil,li(~~iL
(lel:~-y1 ll(:ir )r[i( )il ol' l J l i ( ~~,o:i(
1 l c d : ~ ( Ii11g
fl~)l11
A~li:t.l~:~(l
I I ) lillsll:~~~.~
(+(
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Prince Dolgorouki is saicl to have tried very
hard to induce the Shah to give up Kelat-i-Nadri
to Russia, but the ' king of lrings ' would not hear
of such a thing, allcl the great natural fortress still
re~nainsin Persian hai~cls,but is in such a neglected
conditioil and is so iriaclecluately garrisoned that it
nlust fall to Russia as soon as she clecicles on making
a fresh move in the direction of Meshed.
I-Iavii~gobtaiiled a fool;ing close to the Herat

Ceiztral Asia where imperfectly deGilecl f~ontiers
would enable them to advance closer to the outposts of the Inclian Enlpire. I t has already been'
mentioned that, when the Agreement of 1873 was
coacluded, tlle north-eastern and no~:tli-western
limits of the Amir's clominions had been defined
with an ainount of laxity which rendered future
coinplications possible and even inevitable ; and it
has been shown how Russia took advantage of this
state of affairs to clrive a wedge into Afghanistan
in the neighbourhood of Herat. But after she llad
gained as ~nuclias she wanted in that direction for
the time being, and as soon as the frontier froin
the Heri-Rud to the Oxus had beell accurately
i

and Hernt. They nt this timo induced the Persiz~llsto unclertalre the
portion to tlie sontll of the frontier ; but nlthough tho worlr was commenced, it profiressed so slo~vlythnt the Russians in 1888 thought
it time to i n s i ~ ton its early completion. The Porsinns, on the
conclusion of this secret convention, commenced work in real enrnest, but fiom rocont accounts the W O Y ~ Cappears to hnve been very
bndly done, and n very soconcl-class road has resulted.
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demarcated, slie hed to hold llcr hslld SO far as tlie
north-l\~estern borders of Afghanistan were concerned, and she tllerl commencecl s similar movetllc fiontiel.
ment fartller to~vardsthe e:tsl, \\~ll~:l.e
had been clefiuecl m~illlnil cvelr $rl-c:~t(~r
:ln~ouiltof
o ~ v i ~to
l g the 11nfortall:~tc~
oirlissiorl of ;L
line ill T,ortl arnnvillr's t1esp:~t of ( )clobcl. 17,
1872.
Ever siilcc Sliol)(~l(~lI"~
Al:ii c1sl)edilioll i l l Itj'j'Ci,
~ l l l e n the ilol-tllcnl portion o l tllc P:li~lir 1-egioi1
al~uexecl to t , l l ~ 0z:n's tlonlillio~~s,Itn.c;si:11~
:~gelltshave Lecil :~ctivcblycl~~l)loyclcl
ill c s l ~ l o r i l ~ g
tdle couiilry at, t11~llc1:~ill\~stckrsol' ill(, ( )XIIS. 'l'lic~
task Llli~s(~oi)l~rrt~ilc(ld
11:1s11~(111c:~i'ri(vlollt ill L ~ I C
nlost thorough I L ~ ~ ~ L I ~f Oo lI- ' ,wllile ch.c.c6lvy
rnoimt,aill

1

ry l l : l ~ (l)o(~i
* I giv(ali glowi~ig: i ( 1 ( 8 0s ~l l)f'~ ~ ~
tlie !)~~iwIits
o S l t l ~ s s i : ~I Y~I iI ~ A : I I L ~( JI' t,11el l ) o ~ ~of
(~r
t,11(~C 1 l ~ : ~Wllilo
t
( ' z : ~:r :111(l
H ~ ~ I CtI~(1
~ I I .I':LI~I~L'
l ~ l a t c nit.scllT
~ ~ lint1 I,cie~i cbc )n~l)l(htc~ly
c~s~)lol.otl,
tllc~sc
Illnsc:o~-i~o
~ ~ ( J I1)1is11(1(1
I ~ S
H~1'111or
:~lir*ltl,
:ml a (J~Jss:~cI<(,:I I ) I : L ~ I I 11~~1110(1ir0111l)(~1\~1\.~Ii,j.
( h ~ ( 4~ 1I ~I X I ~ O ~ I ( ~ ~
:LC~*OSS
t110 lli11(111
I ~ L I S I I :111tlI N ~ ~ : L I1 I0 i ~ ~ f ~ *jvi[11
ig~tt~
t,Ilc> l ~ ! t I yl~l~i(:St:ii~~s
011
i ~ o l * t I ~ tl)ortl(~~-s
~rr~
ot'
1 I<asl~i~~it..
' 1 p o 1 ~ fi J I I ~jr(l:~lbsIllis ofIi(*(~r
( * o r ~ i I, Ii ~~V1~
llis so-(~:~lltvl
IY~S(~~:IIY*II(JS,
( l t ~ ~ . i\ \~~ ~l ~gi ( ~110
1 1 \Y:IS
1~osl)it;~l)ly
c111[(~rt:1i11t~(I
011 q ( l v ( L ~ 1a :o(~(~:~siotis
l
l)y tllc?
cllirlf 01' 11 I I I I Z : I , wllo Ii:itI c ~ ~ ~ [ ~ ~ r~sl)ous(~(l
) l ~ l ( a l yt l ~ r *
l i ~ ~ s s i n( :~: Ll I I ~ { ~111~1
; it \\':IS IIOL t l r ~ l i l
: L I I ~ I I I I I 01'
I~
l8!J 1 t11:it~ 1)11l)li(@: ~ t , t , ( b ~ ~ t i o t \\I:LS
l
:LI tr:~v~tql
to I I I ( ~
r l ~ o v e ~ i u col'
~ ~I~i u~ w
s i : ~( ~I ( ~J ~ : I ( ' ~ I I I ~ ( ~ it1
I I I Stllis 1ittlp.tlle

I
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known corner of the world by the receipt of news
that Rritisl~officers hacl been ruclely warned off
the Pamirs by a Russian colo~lelof Cossaclrs who
had been sent therc with a small expeditionary
force.
Captain Youngllusbancl, who was on special.
duty in, the Intelligence Department of the. Goverrlmeilt of Inilia, liad for some time past been
enga,gecl in exploring tlle country to the north1 of
the ~ i m a l a y a s ancl
, had spelit the previous winter
in Iiashgar. There he was joined by an aclvent;urous young subaltern named Davison, and in
July 1891 these two ofbcers started to return to
India by way of the Palnirs and Gilgit. They
fblloweil the most direct route vi8 the Gez de.lile,
and on reaching the Bulun-Kul Lake they partecl
company, Davisoil travelling towards the Alichur
Painir, wliile Y ounghusband continnecl his march
soutlzwarcls through Tash-Iiurgan and the Taghclum-Bash Palnir to the clesertecl village of BozaiClumbaz
---.in the Wakhsn Valley, which he found
occupied 11y a small party of Russian soldiers, who
were joined n f e v days later by another cletachment of t ~ ~ ~ e rue11
n t y uniler the comrnancl of Colonel
Y s11off.
The first meeting l~et~ireen
the two oflicers was
of a friendly nature, and after t h e Eussiail colonel
and his s t a r hacl had tea ancl wine in the British
oficer's tent,, Llley rotu~:neclt;hc 11ospitalit;yby inviting lliln to clin~ler. Rut these ple:r,sant relations
dirl not last long, and Yoii~gl~usband
was sllortly
af~erwardsinformed t,hat the Governor-Gene~alof
8
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Turkestan lind issuecl orders fir him to be nr1.estecl
and conducted t,o Mnrgel~n, ullless 11e gave n
written promise to quiL tlie i ~ e i g i o o at
o o~lce
ancl not to travel in wllnt tlie Russi:~nofficer stylc(:l
' newly nccluired Russisll territory.' IJllilcr tllc
Cnptain Yom1gln1sl):~1icl\ir:ls ~?oiripelled to yield to snperior fiwc~?,:lnd lic. :~ccol+tIiilgly left Bozni-Gumbar: ailil ~-c?tni-nctl
to t31icTnrrlidurn-bash Pnmir, wllere lie relu:~il~etl
for s i s ~ ~ t ! c B s
ailcl was able to lenrii tll:~t tile Iii~ssinl~s,
rlfter
their i~rrirnl at Bosni-G~~in~I)nz,
11:~d r:rosscrl tho
/ IIindu Iiush by tlle I<ornl.)hat I1ass, : ~ i l i [ :~i'l.c:!r
' jonrneying for soirie clistancc tllrougl~tl~tt'4':~ldlrnL
Valley clistricl; of the C)liitr.:ll St,:lle, tl\ci~~-ccrossc!(I
the Hincln Iinsll 11y tlie R:irogllil 1':~s~ni~rl~jouri neyed nortll.cvnrils Ihrough AI"g1l:~nt-,erritory to tlie
Alicllur Pa~nir.
I
1
1 the ineanwliile Thvisol~linil mc!t in tlie
Alicllur P:~rnira Clli~lesegc?~i~'r:~l
who was cag:~gctl
in builling n small fort for one of t11(! Cllit.icse
Jctncllinc!l~t,s ~vliicl~Ilacl for irlarly y(!:~rs LIC.C!II
cst:~l.)li$herlin t11:~t1):u.t (.)f tllc X'atnir rc~giui~
; ns~tl
wliile thcrc tllc: 1lussi:~ns :~rriilcilli.oi~~
tl~cirrnicl
:leross tllc 'I:.Iiliclu Ku'u.ii11. Ck:)l()11c;l?iT:t~lc)/T
t,li(~ret~,l)o~i
~:l:~,inlccl
tlic: (listricl, 2s :RLISS~:~IL
t(:rrit(:)i,y,( ! 0 1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ~ ~ c l
t1.x Clli~ic~sc!
to itl~i~~c:(li:~~(:ly
~ s i ~ ; l ~ i I ri:~~l~~v~( ,1, l ; t ( , i ~ ~ g
Ilii;utcii:~~ltJ ) : L V ~ S
1111ilc.~
~ ~ L :LZ'I,OS[:,
(:ul~voyt*(l11i1i1
towardg Margr!l:tii, I ~ u t cvt!t~tnally wt, I l i l n
belixc r~:~(;11ii1g
t.11:~~
~ J ~ : L ( I'.t'11(;
C ! . J - U I I I I ~ :IihlgIisl~rrlatl tl~c?nnl:ulc! liis w;ty tvnlnrcls K:~sll~:tl~in
:111(Z
rejc)inec1 Y ~ ~ I I I I ~ ~ IOLI L I ~[.II(!
~.~
I ~l 'I: I~(g~l ~ - c l , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - l ~ :
1':unir on ( )c!t.c)l~c!~. 4, wl~c?t~
ill(? t.tvo o n t r:~gclc'l
I.,

1
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officers lllade their way back to G-ilgit, arriving
there in safety eleven days later.
Now, although the north-eastern frolltier of
Afghanistan was defined in the ilgreemeat of 1873
in a inanner which permitted of considerable
divergence of opiilioii as to the true inenning of
the pllraseology therein adopted, it is nevertheless
perfectly clear that liussia cannot, by ally possible
interpretation of the clause in question, lay claiin
to any portion of the country which lies to the
soutll of .Llie branch of the Oxus which takes its
rise i11 Lilre Victoria (Sir-i-kul). The deserted
village of Bozai-Gumbaz is many miles tro the
south of that branch of the Oxus, and the Russiails
therefore have no shadow of a claim to that portion
of the Pczillir region, and Colonel Yanofs action
was nothing lllore 110s less tlzan a piece of effrontery
which surl3nssed ally of the outrageou.~actions of
Iioillaroff a i d Alilrhanoff; for it must be remembered that he not only made a prisoner of one
British officer and ordered another OR ground
11~11icli was uncluestioiiably within the recognised
limits of British influence, but he moreover
m.arclzecl across the Hindu 1C11sh with a considerable detaclirrlent of Cossacks, alld th,en prornenaded
tllrough the valleys on the borclers of the Kasbinir
SLate, passing the whole time through territoxy
wl~icllwas recogriisetl as being I"ar 1.1eyondBnssia's
sphere of action in Central Asia.
I t t11us I)ec:ame perfectly (:].ear that altlthouph
'ILnswi,z l ~ rel~euteclly
d
agreecl not to interfere in
ally way y,~itlli;lie States to the soutll of the limi t:vy
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line laid clown ill 1873, rlo i~elia11i:ccol~lclbe placecl
o n the promises so given ; anti the Indit~nG o ~ ~ e r n 1nen.L was tller&re c;oinpcllocl to tnko ste11s to p:,ut
;LI~ encl to ally furtlier t : ~ i ~ i l ~ ( ? \~~ r' .ii ~
l , ll~g
the petty
chieftains to the soutli oT t'llc T3iniln Icusll. J\ s ~ u : ~ l l
forc,c wns n c c o ~ ~ l i ~ iseilt
g l y :~l,r:~illst
the? c:o~.~l,um:~c:ioils
chief of IIuiizu, ~ 1 1 o1 ~ : ~il(:)t
s ( ) 1 1 1 ~~lotul~iously
frienclly Lotvards the IYSuscovites, l)llt-ill :~,ll(litio~~
~:,ollis political ~rlisdcc:tls-g;~i~~(?cl
:I I ' c ~ ) ~ I ~ :for
L~~oTI.
cold-blootled crirue ' nncl l~lisgovenu~i(:~lt
~vllicll~ ~ ~ 1 1 dered his punishment ant1 ~ c ~ I I o T IIC:CC!SS:LI'~
':~'~
for
the pence of the bode].. After :a 111.icf'but lrrillia,nt
little c;~mpnign tllis uiirlcsi~.:~l,lc,neig11l:)our w:l,s
drivel1 ont of his col11lt~i.y
; nntl :~ltll(.)~lgll
f~u.tllcr
operations in tlicse ~vilclmounl;n.ii~I ' C ~ ~ O I \vr,re
~S
necessitate(l on :LCCC)II lit of serio~isI;I.OL~~.)~CS
id
coinp1ic:~tions in Clii trtll, t,llc.! si tllntion 1 1 : ~l)c?c:~r
steicclily ii~lproviilg,:~ildIIOTV tli:~1;:C 131qil;is11
rcsicle1l t;
lias becii : ~ p p o i ~ ~ tn,t;
e dC11it:i':~l it, is to 1x3 1~011~'il
that not oilly 1 ~ : ~t,llc:
s cloor l)cct~lsl:rn~nlc~d
i l l tlic.! f:lc.c?
of Xussin,V)nt. t,llnk it, u~illl)c Ii~l>t,
fir1111yclosotl
for t,he ~fl~tllrc,
T3nt mliilc t l ~ o1ntli:ln ;uitJio~.it,icviweiv tllus
taking mci:lsurcs to gu:rr(l 1110 Tli~l(lulillsll ~):Lss(~s
and to 11r~vc11ti~11-yf'~ii+t,l~rlr
I ~ L I S S ~iiiLc~rl'(lrc~il(:c~
:LI~
Y o n n ~ $ l n ~ l ~rolntcs
~ ~ i ~ lt l ~ n tthis cliirf ~~l~lr;lorc~d
lliq li~thcv,
poisoneil l l i ~~rrntlrnr,111111tlirow l l i ~t w o 11rotI1(~1,n
over l~r(!(%ij~i(*o~i,
nntl tliril runuo~l~lc~c~d
l ~ ~ i~ l~i ~ ( l to
r o liis
r l ~n~lx('rcii~i,
tlltr RL~~linl*~~j&
of
I<ntlhrnir, i11 I,l~ofi)llowi~~ji
L O ~ I I I N : ' 1 1 tllo
~ G~-IZC($or (iod ~ L I I {1I111' ilc(319(>11
of flit0 my ft~lllsrant1 I foll nut. T h n k t l i ~
initi~~tivo
nticl~oCtladLlro
maltw, 1~1rr1
IIILVO
~~lrrcc~(l
111yfio1fon tlln t l ~ t . n ~ol~ oluy R ~ I P O H ~ O ~ H , '
Tlln Il~l~nilin
T'rilaw ( i n l i l r i ~rirlrilo
~ , imvvlli~,gin l~illind l l r b g
f ' tho cold wortltI~ornf 3H!)1 92, rr~~narlcc~rl
~ r i t h~c.f(~ronco
to 1110 rrcerrt
'I expodition to 'I.ln~~sn.l\'n,nn~*:
' Ilt, oilt ft>r~rlc;
IIL l~orlonu nox.'
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with (;he pebly States to tllc south of that range,
the Muscovites redou.bled their efforts to gain
possession of the whole of the P n m i ~platean, and
also took advanta,ge of (;he disturbed state of

across t'he recently clemnrca,tecl boundary aild
temporarily occupied ail Afghan torn.
It was in the Pamirs, however, that the Russians
displa,yed tlie greatesl; signs of activity. They saw
clearly that the time was approacliing for set,tliilg
the frontier cluestion, which had for so ilzxny years
been in dispu.te, &d they evideiltly coilsidered tl~at
the simplest manner of securing an advalltageous
settlenient was by resortil~gto the same tactics
which hail been einldoyed with suck signal success
on tbe Heri-Rud and Murghab in 1884 alld 1885.
The me~lioclsadopted were simple a i d efficacious,
and mere perfectly falniliar to those who had
studied the history of Russia's conquests in Central
Asia,. On Julie 14, 1892, Colonel Panoff again set
out fro111 Margelan at the head of a force of some
3,000 men of all arms,' ancl accompmiec~by a

.

+.,% I:

bt:

.pi,*
,wj,

T l ~ eaccounts in the St. P e t ~ ~ s b ~and
u r g IVIoscow jomnala fix
the nnmbers at about double the nurnber.of tPoop8 here mentioned.;
:Ll.ldaltl1011gh the n.ct~~sl
st~sngthd the ~ o l u m ac~~l~lnot
bc ncc~~c~ttely

9'
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~luillberof volunteers, naturnlists, geologists, and
otllers who were iiltei~ton scieritific rcscnrcl~.. TIie
infantry formed the aclqniice gu.nl*rlof tlie forcc, 3n.d
bile whole of t.lle trool~swere escell.c?nllyecl~~il~l.)ecl,
with t.11~exception of the :ul;illery, mrhicli is dnscribed as mediocre 11ot;li in qunri~il-jrn~iilc~il:l,lity.
During 1;he ninrch x r o s s t11(! Al:ii L L Irl'r:~ils-l\.l;~i
~ ~
ranges the expeilit;ion 1i:iil to cncotzuter solllc viol.ent
storms and heavy rain, wliidi 1n:~dc tllc ro:~tls
almost impnssal~le211d drcllcheil tllc 111~11 tliro11g11
and through. I11 one of tliesc stonns 11111li'hersof
telegraph l~osts,ilewly ererttcil ljy i;he 1;rooy)s :IS they
advanced, were blowu do~irii,and n s'licll is said t,o
liave been exploded l)y liglitiiiilg ill 011e of tllc
camps. But although the meiri1,ers of the cspe(lition hncl to put u p mrit'll the grcat;est har~lsliips,
the l.,nnlis of {.lie Mur~glinl)1.1ytile
micldle of July, ntiil t1icl.e Ynnoff' fc1~11lil
11i:it tlic?
political sit~zn1;ionliail grctntly cl~nngc:(l since hi,.;
foimer visit.
Tl.ic liinits of the hfg1i:lri and C'!liiilcsc lmssessions i n the centre of tlie P : ~ n ~ i1)l:~t
r c!:zn, l,c!twcc:il
tlie M ~ : ~ r g l i :arid
~ l ~ Alj-i-S':zr.~j:ll~,11:tvc ~ic;vc!r I.~cc:~i
ilafined, foi* tlie sinll~lc sc:r.son i.li:~L;1lc?i111(~
tl le
Afglians nor Cllinesr! cvc!r trou1)lccl ~ . I ~ ( ? I I z ~ ( ! ~ v c R
mnch :~I)ollttliis region IIII t.il t.liey S:LW t,li:lt {:I l ( i
nussi:xns ilitc?~~(le(l
to t:ilrc! adv:tllh:lgt! of' 1.11(!ir11ogl(?(:I;
by ocr:nl)yiti,q t.11~t:crril() r y i,ii. t . l ~ ?(Iz:u*'s 11:11nc!.
r
L Ci
i i i i i ~ icl 1 1 i t 1 I ' 1
Vie:..
tOrin l'~:~lcc?
(Sir-i-1;1~1)113s 1 ~ ( ? 1:L i sort. 01 ( k l ):L( :il )I(:
I

nacclrtninnrl, thorc! in n n iloubl; thne nt 1cn~L;i1,0110
t h e oxpoilitinn.
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land between China and A~ghanistan, although
there appears to he little doubt that the true
boundary between the two States is a line passi~ig
close to Lake Sasik SCul in tlle Alicllur Pamir.
A Clliilese outpost; had long been established at
Burzila Jai, in the neigl~l~ourl~oocl
of tllat lake, and
when PwnofY visited the Pa~nirsin 1801 he found
t l ~ eChinese in occupation. But after Yanoff expelled the Chinese, tlle Afghans appeal: to have
stepped in, and when the ~iussiailofficer in 1892
revisited the scene of his previous filibu~terill~
expedition, he fou~lclthat tlie Afghans had established a post as far eastwards as Alr Ta,sh, in the
neigl~bourllooclof tlle Neza Tnsh Pass, and had also
placed a stray picquet at Soma Tash, a little to the
west of what appears to be the true bounclary
between the Afghan and Chinese possessions. I-Ie
accordingly at once inacle up his iniild to expel tlle
Afgllaus fro111 the whole ~:egionbetween the Murghab and Alj-i-Panjal~; and, starting off from his
camp on the Murghab wi~lln large force, he reached
Soma Tash at daybreak on the mori~iilgof July 26.
I t appears that the Afghans were, at the time,
asleep in their camp, and before they had auy idea
of the near approach of 3 hostile force, the Afghan
commandant's tent was surrounded by some eighty r
Cossaclrs, the ~:emainderof the FLussian detacllineilt t,
being concealed from view a sbort distance m a y .
Shams-uil-Din Khan, the commander of the Afghan
post, then advxncecl :~ndinquired what the IZussinns
were doing on Afg1.1:~nsoil ; but a:ker a sllort con.versation he was illformed that his inen nlust lay
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down their arms. T11is demand was haughtily
rejected by I h e ' ~ f ~ h awho
n , declared that he held
the post for I~ismaster, the Amir, and would obey
the orders of no one else. YanoF tlleil ordered
him away aild appears to have used violeilce towards him, whereupon he drew his pistol :mrl fired,
tlle ball piercing the Russiall ofice~'s belt ancl
wo~znding a Cossack who was behinil hiin. A
scuffle e n s ~ ~ e din, which Shanls-ucl-Din and six
otller A-fghans mere at once l~illecl,while t'lle remainder of the pa,~tyAe.il belliild tlleil* tents, n,nrl
conti~znedto fire on the 12ussiai1s from behind the
cover thus obtaine(1. Tlie fight, however, mTassoon
over, and in the end nine more Afgl~answere killed,
two wounded, and one drowiled in the Alichur
River, wl~ilesix men were tnlcei~prisoners, aild the
lviesseilgers who had beer1 de~~~atcliecl
oil horseback
with a letter to the Governor of Baclt~ltshaiiwere
~ U ~ S L a,~zd
I C ~detained in the Iiussiarl camp for two
or three clays. In this afhir blie riul;sisn losses
were very trifling ; oiily t11.rt.cme11 being ~vo~utdetl,
one of whom was the Cossacl<-ct-110 was strucli by
the first ~1101;whicl~was fired.
While Yal-loff was tllus disposi~~g
of the prinipal Afghan o~ztpost nt Sonla rl':~.~l~,
anothel-'
ussial~. dctachrnent m:~rched e:~stw:~rclstowards
the Tngh-dunz-I3:~shS'amir for tlic! pilrpose of expelling tlic sirid1 AfCll:ul ilctaclnric!~~t;
wllich ll.:~d
established itself : ~ Alc-!Casl~,
t
()1.1t11c left '11:~nlc o1.1
the upper MT:L~;C:~Sof the iN11~g11;~l)
st~ea111--tll(?ri3
called tllc Ak-an. 011, :~rrivt~lg
t l ~ i ~tlic
! , I.~IISS~:LII
comrtix~ztlerl~ehnrreilill l~rcciso'lytlic same way is'.:
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clo~11jthave had to b e withclrnmn Z~eforethe wj.nter
set in, but the disturbances in Russian territory
hastened their departure, a i d by the eilcl of September 1892 the force ret'~.lrllc.ilto Margelan, a
cletachment of 165 illell 1111cler ;L ~a11~:~iil
bei11.g
left in a sn.lall fort on the Wurgllnl) to cniphasisc?
Enssia's clnilrl to the suwou~lclingc o u ~ ~ l r y .
Tllese serious ilemonstratioi~s ill llic I:':/iuilregion caused the Britisli Foreign OIlice to e n t e r
iiito negotiations for L11.e l)ulaposeof linviilg tlic
Eusso-Afgllail frontiers in that park of tlie ~ ~ ~ o r l t l
accurately definecl ; but as tile ~legatiatioilshtivc:
dragged on for inany ruout,lis ~vitlioutany L):isis
having Lee11 laid clown fc>r a Joiiit Coi~iillissioilfor
the deillnrcatiou of the bonnclnry, it appears only
too p~.obnblcI;liat the 12nssi:tiis arc rc+pcating tllc
tactics 1~~1iichthey so s~~coessful.lyp ~ ~ r s n e tin
l
1884-87 ; 2nd it is very lilrcly tlint in the nexr
Ellt~wcnwliwal-tl complicatioils will :wise olx a c c o ~ u ~ t
of their aggressive clcsig~ls011 the counttry to t;he
11ort11 of tlie C1litr:~lState. 111 tllc luc!:~n~vliilet,lle
rl u
i ~lcestan
autllorities : L ~ CI-aliiilgsteps to strol~gl;llc!il
their position by the coilshnctio~iof n ucnr rc:)nill o
the M.ta.gl;ll:~bPork, 311d by tlle estal,lisllmc?~ltof
anokl~.erpost in the Al:~i1'l:itcau ; :~riilfrom tinzc to
time sillis tier rumours ol~t'idi
1 (:ir(;:~il:~ti.oil
:LS to t'lle
rnoveruenL of Rassinl.l trool~sin tlic: I':LII~~~s.
:l!'trl*the ~)rc!soi~t,
lic~wevc!l+,
tllc gc~rtc:rnl.fc!clil~g()I'
u~lcasilless:IS ko ~11:11: :Iiussi:l's llcst II~(>VI!will hi;
11:~s1)ccli so~nc?wl~:lt
: L ~ ~ : Lb X
yC
S~;:L[(~TLIC!IZ~S
~
11l:lilc 1.1~'
Sir I<,Gr(,*yin t,llc! ~J'cII.Is(! (IS ~ ! C ) I ~ ~ Ic In l~ ~hi1:/-y
. ) I I2S
and Snlgl 1.3, .I. 893, to t,licr efIi!c:~! 111:1(.'ITc:r Jl;~jr.st.!''s
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Governinent ' have received a solemn promise froln
Russia in the most exl~licitterms that during the
present year, and wliile llegotiatioils are pentling,
no expeditioiz vhatcver wou.ld be sent to tlze
Panlirs.' I t is sincerely to be hoped that tllis promise will be Icept ; but from previous examples of
t,hc value of 1Zussian pleilges, one is forced to confess that it -cvonlil not be a cause for much astouisllnient if Ilussinn troops mere once more pu.shec1forward into tlze ilebatalble territory, in spite of the
assurances so given. Excuses ibr such inovements
cou.ld readily be found, ; ~ n dtlze iliplomntists on the
Keva ~ ~ o u lfinc1
i l no dificulty in once again repeatting the cry that they had been compeller1 to advance iliuclz against their vishes, and in spite of
tlzeir intense desire to (lo nothing which might
irritate or alarm their friends the English.
Nor is this Palnir question tlze only one mhich
miglit lenil to p a v e complications between Ellgland
and Russia, ; for, althougli the north-western frontier of Afglzaiiistan has only recently been defiiiecl,
vexed questions have already arise11 regarding tlze
llse by tlie Afglinns nnil Russians respectively of
the watel. of the various streams which flow from
Arglinn tervitory illto the Czar's iloininions. At
tlze tinle of the Afghan S3onnilary Conlmission this
irrigatioil qneslion was c:a~ef~~lly
considered, and a
settlcl~~ci.nt
was tllen :~rrivedat which was accepteil
by both 1)sl.ties ; ljut, since l;llen, complaints have
\,een fiyyluently nlaile by tlic liussians t1ia.t tlze
iifg11ar1.shail ~ ~ n i l u tapped
ly
the strcains, and that
c o n ~ e ~ ~ i c ran
~ tins~~lL(;ieizt
ly
sul)ply of water reached
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the Turkoman settlements upon tlie nortliern side
of the border. Tliese complaints linvc recently
so serious $11 aspect, t h t t h ~Viceroy
:
of
India sent, Colonel Ynte t,o inquire into 1;lie luatt,er,
in comm ~lnicati0111vit1.l :Ln olfic.c.1' wllo 1 1 : ~been
~
silnilarly appointed by tlie liussiali (ic-)~rcll.liurent
;
but, no i~lbrll~ntiori
lins y(?tI)CCIL ~'t!(:c!iv(!(I:LRIo 1;1i(:
~ n n ~ ~ in
n ewllicl-i
r
the ilisputc! lins bccli scl tlccl.
From tllis it will l ~ cseeu tli:~t 1 . 1 1 ~~I.IISS~:LI~S
sucr,eecl in keeping 112, n 1~rp"t":~ls~:L~;c
01' 1;6!iisioli
:~11 along the Afglian l~oriler. 'I.'hey :L~I\~:L~s
li:~v(:
two or three petty tlisl>utcsr~:~(ly
nf; I ~ : L I~\rliicl~
I(~,
they can tun1 into serious cluesLiniis wlic!llcvc?rl.1ic.y
particularly desire to nniloy or cliscluiet tllc?1 l ~ t l i ; ~ n
:tutlioritics. 'I'lley, nloreovei:, hnvc ~unliii-iil:rclsc:opo
for intrigues wit,l~t,lic ~)cl;tyc:l-iic!f> :uiel tril )cs o11
l;he fro11tier ; nntl, altho~igli tllcy ]lave rclmif vil.ly
promisecl t,o aljs1;niti fiolii int~i!rli!reiiccc:ill i\:fgIiail
affairs, and linvc ilc~clarcil ~.]I:L.I: tlicy will 11ot
commuilicate wit11 t,lle h m i r o f 'Ii'nl)nl, t11r:y wo~lltl
find it dificullt t;o cletly 1;li:~bsc?c:rc.:t :rgtlilt.s l~nvc!
reccnLly beell sc11l; to tlic ci.~pil.:alof' i~.rpl1:ti~1ist,;111.
Thus, :LS e;xch yc:w IJ:LSR(:S it\v:l.y, 111~:. (1;~ri.gc:rs
on tlie ~~orLl~-~\~c?st,c?rii
fr(,)ilti(~rs
or T~u'li:~
gr:~(ll,:~lly
increase ; and it is tinzc l;liu,l; I,lic l)r?ol)lcr)t' Il:ngl:ni(l
slioulil nw:rlre to Llic [:I,(::[;l;ll:~CI.lloy liarrc! :L l~1y!r:io11s
iuherit,ancc left., to tllr!ir lic?c?l~il~g,
t\rliic:li is ill tl:aig(,!r
of \);L~".llfi ~ ' l l tr)f ~;ll(!il' ~ J : ) O H S ( ! S S ~ O I ~ . I I T I I ( ~ S S
~~naninloilsly,
:~t-i(ln7it;llria lu~c!c!t.t::~i~l
\.oiclcl, tl~!crl:~t!
t,hnt ICussic~Ilns rc!:~.c:lic!tl1:11(! I,i~l~i[:.r
0'1l~(11.
(,h ~
1)is(!
' i ~ in
(:et~.tr:ll Asia, :~iid nus st I)(? rOt+(*(il1.0 c~l,st!l.vc! ] 1 ( ! ~
c!n~f:i,gc~~~ncnl;s,
anil osp~~:i:~lIj1icti. pro11lisc.l~1.11;1,I slio
f l l ( 1 ~

I'E.IL'E
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will not interfere in any way with the counlries to
the soutli of the limitary line fixed by the Agreement of 1873. If peace is to be maintained, and
if the Czar's Governincnt do nol desire to kindle a
disastrous anil cleploral~lewar, wliich woulcl echo
and re-echo for years tllroughout the wild countries of Central Asia, a i d 117ould leave lraces which
coulcl not be wipecl out by centuries of subsequeiil
peace-if
the Cz:tr lionestly c'lesires peace, tliese
I~roinisesmast, 1)c Iiepl. Englnnil never will, nor
will she ever 1i:lvc niiy desire to, aclvnnce across the
line of den~arcalionagreecl upon in 1873, nor will
she, unless forcecl by lhe greatest political necessity,
ever aclva~iceinto any 130rtioil of Bfgllailistail.
Let this 1)e clearly understood ; But let it also
l,e, known thnl the British people have inacle up
their ~ n i n d s that tlle complete inclepenclence of
Afghanistan from anjT forin of Russian inlerference
is essentially necessary for the peace and safety of
t]leir 13astern Ellipire, ancl tlint they will, if necessary, take U P ar111s to 1)revelit tlie slightest violation
ol' the A~nir'silonii~~ions.Znglancl has no intention of interrerii~g11~itl1,or :~clv:~ricinginto, tlie
count,ric.s 1)cyo11d the OXUS, anil mill use her
is~[lneuccto induce the Amir to abstain from
: ~ ~ ~ r e s s; i but,
o i ~ slie claims-nncl her claim has
I~cenrecogniscil l)y IZnssia-l11;~t she has the right
to yrcservc order :mcl pence in Alghanistan. If
1Il(1 Amir, c:~rric>rlaway by x sense of his own
irn~)ori,nu(~~,
or c:hcrjslling 1,hc hope of foreign assis(,nllchc~,
tlispl:~ys 211y liosLilit,y toura,rrls the Incliarl
( ~ O T ~ C Y I ~ T ~ I Cor
T ~ ~cornmils
,,
w r ts wllic.11 :Ire inron-
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sistent with his position as the ruler of a protected
State, England has every right; to interfere, a i ~ dif
necessary to replace liinl by a chief who mould
ilrove rilore tractable ; slid there is no more reason
why such action shoulcl alarm or irritate Bussia,
than that; tlie English should take oflence if the
C~ar's Gorernrilent shoulcl see fit to depose a
13oliharan Arnir ~ l i osrovecl himself lo be notori-
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a ~ filibustering
~ d
beyoizd their frontiers,
- expeditions
lhen there will be peace; but if they wantonly
violate their promises, nncl interfere wit11 the
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CONCLUSION

INthe preceding pages an attempl; has beell made
to place before khe reader a brief descriptioll of
the manner in which Rnssia has gradually pushed
forward tlirougli the wild countries in the I-Ieart of
Asia uill;il she has at. last established herself w i t l ~ i i ~
striking distance, of the outposts of the lizclian
Einpire ; and it may now be well to consider to
what extent British interests in Asia are endangered by this Muscovite advance, and to note how
tliose interests can be safeguarded in the future.
Tliirty years ago, when it first becaille hlown
in England that the Czar's troops were engaged in
serious military operations against the Khanates of
Kholraild and Bol~liara,there were rriaily people
who professed to believe that 1i;ussia was forced to
advance in Asia in spite of herself, ancl mdlo loudly
~roclaimedthat such advaiices were to be looked
upoil as a matter for congratulation, as ' the blessings of civilisation' would thereby be showerecl
clowil upoii the barbarous inllabitants of those
litble known regions. These persons scoffed at the
fears and warnings of experts ; those who lleld
contrary opii~ioilswere set down as ' vision.,zries ; '
soldiers wlio hail ilevoteil their lives to the maintel.la1.1ceof Rrit,isli supremacjr in the East, an.rI,who
V U L . I1.
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for the defence of India, yere credited with
personal and ambitious motives ; and' tlie policy
of ' masterly inactivity ' was in full swing.
The control of Indian airairs was at that tiine
entrusted to a, statesman wlio had rendered conspicuous service to his country during the dark
days of the Inclian Mutiny, ancl wliose position
anlong Anglo-Indian administrators was of such
an excep~io~lal
nature that his opi~lionsregitrdilig
Central Asian xFdirs generc~llj7passed uncll:~llenged. When this popular Viceroy st:ttecl that
he was 'not at all certain Lhat Rnssia might not
prove a sxfer ally, a better iieigllhour to Inili:~,
tlisli~the Mahornmeclan races of Cent,ral Asia,' '
and steadfastly set his face against ally iilterferclice
with the States on the north-wesLern frontier crf
India, the disciples of tlie ' do-not,llii~g' school
became confirineti in their beliefs, ancl few of t;henl
paused to inquire whether it was iutleecl t n ~ et;liat
the extension of Russian power to the borders of
Inclia, would acltZ to the peace arid prospeyiLy of
tlie native population of that comltry, or wlictliel.
the near aap~roncliof a great Europea~lP u t ~ c l would not, on the contrary uive rise to L: stat:(: of
'P
unrest ancl scnw of insecmlty wl~icllmroaltl ]I(:cessarily ten.d to check the ilevelol)~lzc~lt
of L ~ L C !
country arld cause grent eli~b:~rrassmr!ll~;
I.( 1 tl.lr!
Goverrnncut of' L;1i:tt great ilepentlonc:y,
Tlicse wo11.1d-l~c;
pllilaiitl~rol~ists,
.clrl,ilc .i\.c]pr)luSoo ' P I L ~ ~ O
ralntinfi
IR
to (lantrnl ~ H ~ nlld
I L Qnottrcr,'p n b l i ~ lby
~~~l
ardor or tho XIon~c!oE C o ~ n m o ~Vi ~o ,b r ~ ~ ~25,
c ~1878,
y
p. r i l ,
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iilg tlie possible extension of civili~,ztionaillong
t'he scattered inhabitants of Central Asia, failed to
realise tliat although the few in Turkestan might
receive some benefit, there was also n grave possibility that the niultitudes in India might lose all
they hacl already g,zined, and that the Einpire
which for inore than a huilclrecl years had elljoyed
the blessillgs of the 'pax Britannic,zYmigllt becoille
a fielc, for wide-spread intrigues and the theatre
of a desolating war which woulcl destroy much of
the good wl~ichhad been brought about by years
of careful administrat,ion.
These followers of 'mnsterly inactivity,' while
asserting that the Russians had been coinpelled to
advance against their will, never seriously considered whether there was ally paranlount necessity
wl~icllobliged the Muscovites in the first instance
to cross the hundreds of miles of barren steppes
which separated tllern from Khiva and Xholrand,
or wlzelher it was true t l ~ a tthe Russians were
uilwilli~iglyforced to seize the Kholrandian forts
of Ak-Mechet, Aulie-ata, Elazret-i-Turlrestan, and
C h i i ~ ~ k e n tThey
.~
failed to grasp the important
fact that although these barren deserts afforded
the Russiails an excelleilt barrier against serious
'at~aclrsfrom the p0we~f~11
Central-Asian I<haiiates,
and preveilted that contact with bm-barous States
1 While considering this point, it will also be well to inquire
whether Russia seized Ashurada end Ihasnovodslr ruerely from
civilising and commercial motives, or whether she did not rather
do so with a view to fiutl~er~ggression,and with the full intention
of extending her empire at t h e expense of Persin end the vnl-ion~
petty tribes and States between the Caspinn Sen, and India.
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which inevitably leads to continned conflicts and
extension of territory, the Russians nevertheless deliberately decided to cast aside that natural defence,
aud after moving across the Kirghiz Steppes, provoked collisioils with the independent races to the
south, who-bitterly resenting the seizure of their
strong places-naturally resisted until they had
beell completely crushed by the superior power of
the intruder.
I t is possible that these siinple-iniuded clefenders of the Russia11 advance would have been
very much surprised if they had been told that
they were unwittingly actiug tlie part of Russian
agents, and were merely repeating excuses which
originated, not in their own mincls, but i n that of
Prince Gal-tchakoff. If they, hom~ever,will carefully study the clever circular despabch issued by
Prince Gortchakoff on Novenlber 21, 1864, they
will there find all the arguments which they have
so frequently forced on the attention of the English
people, and they will thus see that they have
merely been acting as the mouth-pieces of the
Russian Foreign Office, wllich has always found
inany creclulous Englishmen ready to cllampion the
cause of Russia.
These excuses for the Russian illovements in
C!entral Asia, however, fulfilled their purpose for
many years, by lullillg t h e suspicioils of the
English alld by tlius enabling Russia to nlove
forward step by step towards the goal of her
ambitions. But when these pretexts had dolle
their dnty, and il M~LLSffollild tliat L11ey aoulcl 110
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longer obtain credence, a fi-esh theory was started
-again in Russia-ancl was speedily seized upon
by that section of the British public which knows
but little about Eastern affairs, cares less, and is
ready to accept any plausible excuse for ' putting
off the evil day.' This last explanation of Russia's
advance is to the effect tllnt llussia does not want
India, but merely wishes to get as close to the
borders of that country as possible, in order that
she might paralyse the action of Great; Britain in
the event of complications in Eastern Europe. In
other words, Russia wants a free and uncontrolled
passage into the Mediterranean, and mill nlake a
clemonstration against India if England attempts
to interfere; but if she be permitted to bold
Constmtinople and the Dardanelles-and she won't
be content with one without the other-she w d
then cry ' Quits,' and trouble Inclia no more.
Now this is at first sight a very plausible
theory ; but we take leave to doubt the accuracy of
this view of Russian policy, and hope to be able to
show that the surrender of the Straits wollld be of
no avail in bringing about permanent peace between England and Russia,, but, on the contrary,
wo~~lcl
enable the latter Power to prosecute her
designs against India with a far greater prospect
of ultimate success.
I t must be borne in mind that Russian trading
vessels can at the present moment freely pass
between the Mediterranean and Blaclr Sea ports,
and that so long as Russia abstains from war this

can go on developiilg witllout let or hindrnace.
But this is not sufficient for the Eussixiis. They
desire t o be inclependenl of the goodwill of tllc
Torte, a n d objecl Lo be hainl~eredby irlrsoine restrictions with regard to their war vessels ; :~nd
they wish to gain coinl~letecom~nnildover the
Strails so as to Le able lo close t2iem :~g:~inst
possible eneilzies, and in orcler t1i:~tLllcir Ifacli Sea
fleet may be available for use i11 Llle bledi!,crrano:~~i.
In other words, Xussia wisllcs Lo turri tlie Blnclr
Sea into a IEi~ssianlake wliicll would form :L sec~ir(?
base for further operatioils in the Meclitc'I-1'~11e:~ll
;
sizd if she were to achieve tliis ol?jccL, wlint woultl
tlierl be her positiou with resl,cct to Iildi:~? Si11ll)ly
this : Slie woulcl be estal~lished in a well-iiigll
irr~pregnablepositiori on tlle flank of' the sllortcsst
route fro111 England lo tlle Xast, and woulil seriously lrleiiace Uritisll s1zpreiuar:y in tlic M edit ~1'1'3]lean ; s l ~ would
e
linve nz:~cle a
striclc to~w,rils
01)taining a footiiig on the Lr:~dcroute by wl~icll
the conlmerce of the East lias always fourid ils
way to Xurol~eann~nrlrets; a~iilshe woultl liavc
rendered it almost iii-q~ossillclor TC~~gla~id
(in t,he
event of war) to attaclt licr in l ~ c nlof;t,
r
vulncrnLlc
points, viz. in Llle C:~ucasusnilcl on tho I3l:~ckSC:L
coasts.
Such, then, would l)c tlic sit,uulWnif I,llcStr:~its
were surrenrlcrc(1 to Bussi:~ill rctnrn for 1wr 1)rolnise to a21st:~infro111 filrtllcr tlirc:ill,r~~izlg:ulv:il~r:c?s
townrcls olir Tll(li:~11X':i~ll)ir(?,111l(lrv1i:~tgu:\r:~nt,i!(:
is there that :my s u o l ~prcmisa ~ f o u l dI)(: kr.1~1~9
I11 h11e 171-eccdinp p:lgrs it, h:ls brcn slio\vi~ hirw
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Russian pledges have been broken one after another for the past thirty years, and there is surely
no one so credulous as to believe, in spite of these
examples, that Russia would abstain from m & i q
a Gnal attempt to secure the prize she has so long
and so perseveringly sought afl;er, even if she were
to make a hundred promises to that effect.
And even if we allow that the Russian nation
would honest1~-desire to abide by the terms of
such .a covenant, it must be remelnbered that tlle
very extent and colltinuons expansion of tile Russian Empire is a factor which cannot be ignored.
From the sl~oresof the Caspian Sea to far distant
Corea tllere are scores of poiilts at which 13ussian
interests clash with those of Great Britain, to say
notlling of t l ~ eserious jealousies and complicatiolls
which would inevitably arise if the Russians gained
a footing in the Medit,erranean, and were thus in a
position to effectively interfere in the afairs of
Syria, EgjrPt, and Northern Africa. With so many
loopholes for quarrelling we surely could not be
certain that we should not, at some future period,
find ourselves drawn into a war wit11 Russia in
defence of vital interests ; and then .what would
become of the promise ? Could we expect Russia
still to adhere to her covenant, and refrain from
nlakillg an attack on India, which is the only point
where she could seriously injure us? No, certainly not; ; mid it would be well, tb erefore, if we
once ancl for all recognise the fact that we cannot
purchase permanent pence for Inclia by any sucll
surrencler.

111 Russia11 eyes India slid Coiistantinople arc,
i~~timately
conilectecl wit11 each other. Tliey want
possessioli of both ; and while they hope, by threatening India, i;o slialre tlze resolnt,ion of Englishmen, and thus pave tlie way for t11c occtzl)n.l;ion of
the shores of the Bosphorus and D~nrclaiiclles,they
also are keenly alive to t.l~ef:~cttli:~tclnce they Ilccoille masters of those Sl;rnits, t;heil. s~zl)scq~~eut
erorts for the es~al~lislimeiltof nil enipire in
Souther11 Asia wo~ilclbe greatly simp1ifir:il. 111 oiLe
versioii of tlle so-called Will of Peter the G.ren[;l
there are the following words : ' Approach :IS nc:,lr
as possible to Constautinople :111cl IiiiZi:~. IIe who
establislies lliinself iii tliose two p1:~ceswill Ile tlic
true sovereign of the wol.1~1; ' aiid ure Ilol(1 to tlle
belief that whether tl~ese.cfrol*cls.cflere wril.tcii 'l)y
tlie great Czar or lind their origiii ill tlie fertile
brain of Nal~oleon Bo~laparte,tdlicyfcmn the ]icynote of Russian policy in the East at tlic ~~rcseil~;
moment.
Believiilg tlieii, as we clo, that tlic tiillc is not
far rlistant urlien tlle Russialis ~villm:~lie a f ~ i r ~ l ~ c ? r
move towarcls tlle Inclns, eibllcl- for tlic l~nrl~osc!
of
contest,ing oul. suprc?iaxcyin tllc East, o r in o1.ilrr
that they might :~pproacl~
:ts closc as l)ossil,lu to
our fi.ontie1.s before. tlwy niakr: theil* fin:~ls11ri1,lg;
being confronteil, as we ~ulclc)ul)~;cxll~.
:Llae, 1,y tllc:
possibility-n:~y, thc? l~rc.)l):~l)ility-c,E
~ 1 1 ~ 1:L1 (1:ulgerous clcvc!lol~lnc!~it
of l;l.lc Ccntr:d A,,.;i:l,l, c~,lc?st,ioll,
we niaint,:tin tlii~tit is 1iigJ~ti~nc!t1l:lt tlw ~ ) ~ ~ , O ~of
II(:

Roo ' ItI~llnoiro~
dn C11r:vr~lic.r il'I!:on,'
Douxibmo CrdiLion. Pnrie, 1H50.
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Xngland should clecide whether they call permit;
the Cossacks to come any closer to the Indian frontiers without endallgeriilg the safety of that great
dependency, or whether they should not rather
make up their miilds to resist any f ~ ~ r t h eencroachr
ments on the part of Russia by every possible
nieans in their power. They must aslr themselves
whether i;l~eyare resolved if needs be to enter into
a bitter struggle with Russia in defence of the
ulorious empire which their forefathers have built
b
up, or if they will'decline such a contest, ancl by so
doing confess bcfore the world that they are u11worthy of the great trust which Elas been conm1itted
to their care.
The Russian frontiers at present msrch side by
on
side wit11 those of Afghanistan from the Heri-RLI~
the west to Chinese Turlrestan on the east ; and.
wlnat guarantee have we got that this frontier line
will be respected by the Power which has so syatematically attaclred and subdued all the petty
States and tribes to the north of the Amir's dominions ? I t is true that we have Russia's promise
that she will respect the integrity of Afghanistaa,
ancl will abstain from all interference in the affairs
of that State ; but horn. can we place any reliance
on such promises when we have before us so many
iixtances of pledges ~ ~ l l i chave
l l been violated by
Russia mhenever it suited her purpose to xalre a
fresh move towards India? The Czar's Government declared in 1864 that they had reached a limit
beyond which they would not advance ; and did
they lreep within tlla~limit? They promised to

restore Samarlcand to the Amir of 3olrllar:i. Did
'they do so ? They declared tllat they llail no intention of occupying JKhiva or Merv. Was not a
large slice of I<llivan territory ~~?restcil
from tlle
helpless Khall, and is not n Russian gnrrison now
located in the oasis on the Murg1:llal)? A i d did
not tlle Russians also clcspatch a11 a1lll)nssaclor with
a consiclerable escort to the Court of Slierc Ali in
spite of their repeateil promise not to interfere in
Afghan &-airs or even to send agents to the Amir's
capital? These are a few ex:nny)les out of the
lnany which could be q~zotecl,if necessary, to show
that Russinil prolnises are al~solulely~~rorLlilcss
as
a guarantee against fnrther :~ggression on their
part.
And, on the otlier llanil, mc! I C I ~ ~ I tllnt
T the
Russi:tns have, for lrlatly years pi~st,yl~c~tiolieil
1:1lc
Afghan Amir's soverciigil 1.igllts over hl'gll:~~iTurkestan, and lime llillteil tl.lat tlic true fsoilticr
between tlle I3rit;ish a~lcl1tussi:ui spliercs o' artti011
in Asia sho.ulrl be rlelineil by the Hiiiilu ICusll
range. This co~ltentio~l,
wliic11 was at, first 1)11(;
forward in a haltirlg manlier, 11:is rccc~~f.ly
assurilcii
rnore definite sl1:~11e; :ulrl tvllilc I,iussi:~1.1
wril;c:rs a t
the present tirnc take ILO pains to C O I ~ C C : I ~tllc f:icL
that 1i11ssia ~i~c:ans,if possil~lc, t(,~c;st~:~i(lIICIauthority tl~rsughout Lllr: c!-ou~ltrylying l,c!t,r~t:c!~
tllc PIirlilu Iinsh :md Rivitr Oxus, t,lll?yc!vcrl go so
Bsr :LS to i[isl)utc: T3ngl.tuitl's c!scl~isivc~
rig11,t to noll1x01 Afgllan policy, :uiil rc:Li:r LO :I,ltnrrsi:u~occ!upation of 11cr:~tas an c;vc!~~C
~vllich~rn~sl;
iakc? plac:r.
in. tluc coursc?. Wc thus see. tli:~I.~vllilt!i,11r: (li~)lt)-
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nlatists on the Neva are nominally bound by their
pronlises to England, but in reality are merely
waiting for a convenient opportunity for the next
move, public opinion in Russia is gradually being
accustolned to the idea that Afghan-Turkestan
and Herat must inevitably become 12ussian possessions, and that England will be powerless to prevent it, but will have to bow before accomplisl~ed
facts.
Have Englishmen, then, made up their minds
as to what should be done in the event of Russia
~liakingsuch a move, either on Herat or against
Ai'gl~an-Turkestan,or-as is Inore probable-on
both provinces simultaneously ? Have they formed
ally opinion as to tlie blest means of counteracting
the great; blow wliicli would thus be struck against
our vital interests in the East? The time for
forming some decision regarding this nlatter cannot be much longer delayed ; and if the safety and
welfare of tlie Indian Empire is not to be subordi.nated and sacrificed to party interests at home,
.it is not . only necessay that a definite line of
policy should be adopted with regard to Central
Asian affairs, but it is also imperative that tlie
line of collduct so debermined should be steadfastly adhered to, and should not be dependent
on the passing fancies of each successive administration.
Now, in order to more fully understand the
situation, let us, for n moment, consider what
,would be our position if we were to permit the
.Russians LO move across the northern I'rontiera of

,
,

!

:!

,;

r

Afghanistan and establish themselves in Herat or
Afghan-Turkestan. .
I n the first place, it must be remembered that
by such an invasion of the h i r ' s dominions,
Russia would not only have conclusively demonstrated-if such furl;her proof be necessary-that
her pleclges are of no avail in restrail~irig her
onward march towards India ; but if B~lglancl
were then to take no steps to expel tlle intruders,
her inaction woulcl be attributed to fear. Among
the native populations of I i ~ d i aand Afgllnnistnn
this fact alone would produce a conclition of alar111
and ~ n i s t ~ uwliicll
st
would seriously accentuate the
clifficulties of our position ; in every bazaar ai1d
hamlet in the East it W O L I ~ Cbe
~ allispered that the
clays of the great British ' Raj ' were numbered ;
and malcontents, and many waverers also, vllo
might otllerwise liave throw11 in their lot wit11 us,
would prepare to declare tllemselves in favour' of
our rivals.
Alid while our position in India, woulcl. be sorely
shaken by the acloption of such, half-hearted policy,
would our positioii wit11 regarcl to Afgl~anistsnbc
any better ? We should have to either occul~y
the eastern and south-ensteriz l~ortions of tllat
count.ry, or else try to erect a ' buffer State ' o11.t of
the remaants wllicli Russia had le.ft. And what
prospect woulcl there l ~ of
e raising up a new a i ~ t i
stable Afghan kirlgdonl out of the wreclc of tlze o1.d
one T The Britisli Govenu~~ent
113s repcatJc(lly
sl;ated that they woulcl l~ermitno foreign inicrfe~enccin Afghan aatirs, nlirl hnve cleclare~l t.,llnt
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they would resist all encroach~nentson the A i l ~ i ~ ' ~
dominions. This has been the avowed policy of
Great Britain ever since the days of Dost Mdiommed ; and although our policy towarcls the rulers .
of the kingclom of Kabul has been subject to many
variations, ancl has passed through all the changes
from studied incl~fferenceto unpro.fitab1.e interference, still it has illvariably been affirmed that
Afghanistan must be kept free froin Russia11 influence. Were we, therefore, to countellance a
Muscovite occupation of ally porl;ion of the Amir's
dominions, we should not only appear before the
Afghan people as a nation which abandoned a
time-l~onouredpolicy rather than run the risk of a
collision with Russia, but we sllould also stand
conclemnecl for having betrayed and deserted them
in their hour of need.
Wit11 the Afghans in s ~ i c ha frame of mind
would there be any reasonable prospect of our
being able to erect an efficient barrier out of the
reinnants of the kingdom of Kabul ? And even
if such a 'buffer State ' could be mailltailled for a
few years, would it be 'the strong and friendly
Power on our north-western frontiers,' which so
many statesmen have declared it to be our true
policy to establish ? IIaving by our actions confessed our inal~ilityto upliold the integrity of tlie
Anlir's doininions, how could we possibly expect
to succeed in the construction of a inore lasting
and more reliable obstacle to Russia's aclvance out
of i;he fragments of Afghanistan which the White
C z a ~iilight be plcaseil to leave to ns ? 11;
woulcl

2 86
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With a
be a, fruitless-nay, a11 impossible-task.
disquieted population i11 Indi:~,a i d with a turbuleiit
nud resentful people on our borders, no Governnlent in Ii~diacould possibly hope to construct a
new, lasting, and friendly Afghan kingdom out of.
the wreck of the old one.
And even if the existence of such a 'buffer
State' were found to be possible, we could not
expect to exercise the same degree of control over
its external relatioils as we now exert over the
foreign policy of the Amir Abdur Rahman. The
co~uil;rynow l~nomaby tlie name of Afghanistan
~ ~ o u lliarre
c l disappeared from OR the inap of Asia,
niicl 3 new State would have come into being, with,
regard to wllicli the Russians woulcl no longer be
fettered by ally proniises of non-intervention. The.
new order of things would be followed by a correspoilding change in Russia's policy. She wonld
no longer be hampered by any irksome pledges of
lion-in~erferencein the affairs of our trunipery
' buffer State,' and would be carelul to a,bstain froin
entering illto any inconvenient contracts ; and thus,
insteacl of a united Afghanistan under Britisli
control, m7e shonld have a puny principality on
our borders, not solely under the influence of the
Indian Government, but under the dual coiltrol of
England an.d Russia. I t is surely unilecessary to
com~neilton the conditions of disorder and perpetual unrest which would be inherent in such a n
asrangenlent.
Aiicl would our position be improvecl if we
were to t,ake possession of the provinces of Iiabul
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and Kandahar, and thus join with Russia in a
partition of Afghanistan ? By the adoption of
such a Line of action we should 110 cloubt make it
clear to the people of India that we had at last
determined to place a limit to Russia's advance,
and were resolved to beat back the tide of invasion
before it reached the plains of the Punjaub. They
would thus gain confidence, and in proportion as
their belief in our power increased so would the
danger of trouhles in our rear diminish ; arid such
a step mrould therefore tend to lninimise the difficulties of tlie Irldian Government so far as the
internal administration of the country is concerned.
And, as compared with the eslablishment. of a nev
'buKer State' in EasLerli and South-Eastern Afghanistan, a British occupation of Kabul and Kandahar
would possess the one other advantage that, instead
of having a weak and unstable native Stateson our
bordel-s, exposed to tlie machinations of Muscovile
agents mrho have invariably proved themselves to
be adepts in the cogcoction of cunningly devised
political plots, we should, by our presence in the
country, .be in a position to observe, and in a
measure to counteract, any Russian attempts to
intrigue with the local cl~iefsand tribesmen.
But although our position in India might be
somewllat imnl~roveil by snch a forward move,
would we not raise np for ourselves fresh trials and
hurcleils in Afghanistan ? Reference has already
been inade to tlie dangerous effect which would
be proiluced in tlie minds of the Afghan people
if wc were lo coiullenance a Rnssian occul2ation

-

-

of any portion of the Amir's doinii~ions,in spite
of our repeated declarations that we shoplil permit no foreign interference in the affairsdof that
State. But great as would be their resentineiit if
me failed to adhere to our avowed policy, and
deserted them in their time of trouble, it woulcl be
illcreased a hundredfold if are were to join with
Russia in the disinel-nbenneiit of their country. We
should be considered to be not,llin,n better thnii a
nation of tricksiters, whose prolnises were vrortliless,
a i d who mere ready a11cld williug to sacri'lce our
allies and our good ilaiile for tlie sake of territorisl
aggr.anc1iseinent. Our first ancl seconcl Afglian wars
would be brought fortvaril as evideilce against us.
It woulcld be said that \Ire had inerely eiltereil upon
those calnpaigns for the purpose of gaining possesthat having 11een twice
sion of the countl-y,
foiled by the stu'bbonl ~esistallceof the Afghan
people, we bad at last cleciclecl to joi~ihnncls t~rit~ll
the nation we llad so frec~ueiit,lydeno~ziicedill
order to achieve our object. Such, :~iirl similnr
ideas-fostered, a s ltliey proba1)ly would be, by the
,
secret teacliiiigs of llussialz crnissnries-tvoulil L;llie
deep root in tlie minds of tlle peol)le, :~ii(lwe
shoulcl sooil begin to exl3erience :111 tllc! dilIicnltiex
of OUT eit~zation. 11;inust lje rc.~a~ei~~bcrccld
tll:~t\lr(.u
slloulcld have to c1e:~l with the 1nol.e tn~I~nlc?nt
:uld
f'niiatical portion of the 11opul:~t;ionof AfK~ll:~ilis~;~,l,
auil vrllile t811e Bnssia~ls~ ~ c . sct;tli~lg
re
~IOWIL
wi(;li
their iiew ITerati su1.1jcc:ts nut1 wit11 t;lw ' I J s l ~ c ! ~ ~
A.l'gliali-'l'urkeshll, tvc sllor~lil lind it, a ~ L L * Ill, ,I.(:
: L ~ ~ L I O L I~:LsI<
S
to ~ O V ( ! Y ~ L1,110 d(?.sc~(\ll(l:~,
1s
1lL1,
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mountaineers who gave us so much trouble on
former occasions. A large and permanent increase
to our Indian army-especially
in the British
element-would be unavoidable, and our financial
burdens and political responsibilities would be
increased to an incalculable extent.
And there is one other point to be considered.
Whether we decided to establish a new 'buffer
State ' or determined to assume direct control over
Eastern and South-Eastern Afghanistan, we should
be confronted by the great problem of the settlement of the frontiers of the newly acquired Russian
possessions. And how is this problem to be
solved? We know that three years were spent
over the recent delimitation of the north-western
frontiers of Afghanistan between the Hefi-Rud and
River Oxus, and we also h o w that although two
years have been occupied in the interchange of
communication^ between the British and Russian
Governments regarding the Pamir Question, no
satisfactory understanding has yet been arrived at ;
and such being the case, what prospect would
there be of the speedy deniarcation of a boundary
extending from Beluchistan on the south to the
Pamir plateau on the north, and passing for the
most part tl~rough little-known and imperfectly
explored regions ? Why, it would take years
before even the general direction of the line was
agreed upon, to say nothing of' the disputes and
delays which would inevitably arise while the
details were being worked out on the ground.
The conduct of the Rtzssiens during the last
YOL. 11.

Boundary Commission d3ords a clear warning of
what we should have to expect if we were ever so
foolish as to attempt the joint delimitation of a
new frontier such as that to which we now refer.
Flushed with their success in ha.ving at last gained
possession of Herat, they woulcl insist on the new
.boundary being fixed in accordance wit11 their
wishes, and unless we were prepared to make goocl
our claims by force of arms, we s11.ould either have
t,o abandon the task (zltogetlier and 1e:~ve the
frontier undefined, or permit it to be laid clown in
accordance with the dictates of Russia.
It is possible that our position woulcl be
rendered somewhat less di.ficult if we were to
steer a micldle course, and were to occupy the
Randallar 'province only, a native ruler being still
maintained on the throne of Kabul. As cornpnre(1
with the policy of remaining behinil onr existing
frontiers and striving to preserve the rcrn~lntitsof
the Amir's dominions as a 'buffer St,zt,e,' or in
comparison even with a Rritisli occnpni;ion of the
whole of Eastern and South-Easten1 Afghzniskan,
such a course would no doubt possess some
advantages. By its adoption we sllo~~lcl
still show
that we intender1 to bar Russia's f~l'urtllr!rprogress,
and as tliis wonld clenote conficlel~cairl our own
strength there woulcl he less tlm~gerof tunlulcs in
Indin ; we shoulcl still bc, in a bctl:cr posildoii to
couni;cl.act E ~ ~ s s i niiitriguea
n
ilia11 if wo U'CLYC? I:O
remain hehitlcl our present frontiers ; uro ulzould
secure Hancla11:~r withoul, 1)urcloiiil~got,trscjlvc!s
with tlie government of tht? more turhnl(!llt :ulil

unprofitable portion of Eastern Afghanistan ; and
me should, moreover, be able to gradually prepare
the way for an eventual occupation of the Kabul
province in case we found the continuailce of
native rule to be detrimental to our interests.
But although this last alternative would seem
to be better than the others which have been
referred to, we believe that no half measures will
prove successful in wading off tlie blow which
Russia intends, sooner or later, to strike against
our Empire in the East. She has repeatedly proinised to respect the frontiers of Afghanistan, ancl
vi7e have as frequentlyinade it known that we shall
permit no violation of the Amir's dominions. I t
is our true policy to see that tliese promises are
lrept, ancl if we fail to do so we shall only have
ourselves to blaine if the Afghan people turn to
Bussia when they find tliat we are unable or unwilling to protect Lhem. If we permit the Cossacks
to occupy Rerat or Afghan-Turkestan, we must
not be surprised if the belief gains ground in India
that we were powerless to prevent it, and it is
aeedless to dwell on what the clii%cul~iesof our
position. would be if such opiiiiotis unfortr~nately
1)egan to tiice root in the nlinds of the people.
In former years it vas frecluently said that the
further Russia aclvailced into Central Asia th.e
wealrer she wou1.d become, owing to extencleil
communication.s and the hostility of tlie tribes she
would encounter during her progress. But virllo
can now say that Russia's power for threatening
Inilia is less than it was a.t any former pe,riocl
1r 3

292
.-.-. ---

!

CONCLUSION
--

-.

-.

The people who started this theory seemed to
imagine that Russia v a s going to send her armies
across unexplored deserts and mountai~i ranges
with. a reckless. disregard of the most ordinary
military and po1it;ical precautions; while, as a
matter of fact, she has continued her advance with a
remarkable clegree of caution and deliberation, and
has not only secured her commuiiications with her
base, but has also loolced to her lateral supports,
and has been careful not, to make any fresh move
until slie has first consolidated lier existing position.
To quote the words of the late Sir I-Ienry, Raw;
linson : ' Anyone who traces the movements of
Russia towards India on the map of Asia cannot
fail to be struck with the resemblance which these
movements bear t o the operations of an army opening parallels ajirzilist a belengueretl fortl-ess.' Slie
has advanced, and is still aclvt~ncing,tow:utls India,
not after the manner in wliich an army assaults a
position in the field, but with the care and deliberation with wliich a skilled general collducts
the siege of a strong fortress. One after another
the pl~ysical obstacles which were supp~ficcI to
form a11 allnost iinl~assablebarrier to 11er :~ilvancc
have all been passed ; tlle vast ileserts have 1)ec.n
left miles behilid by the Coss:~cks; the ' gig:nltic,
snow-clacl mountains ' o,T the firopam.isus have, C ~ T L
better acc~uaint;nllce,ilwinilleil into nil insig1ii~fic:ult;
range of' sandstone hills, and ins~eailof' our l,c?iiig
able to point to l;lle t h ~ ~ ~ a i kof( lmiles
f i of t~nc!s~~lort:t~
wastes vl.iicl~forinr!flyi~lt,ervenctll)c?t;wc?c:n
t ; l l c :I~lldi:ui
and 'nussi:~nfrontiers, we rlow Iaiolv that tllcrtl :u.cJ
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but 500 miles remaining between our advanced
posts in the Pishin Valley and those of the Russians
in Badgllis.
Are we, then, going to let Russia continue her
march until this last remaining interval between her
frontiers and India shall have entirely disappeared ?
Are we going to cast aside all our advantages
in the vain hope of securing permanent peace,
or rather in order that we might ' put off the evil
day ' ? Those 500 miles of country which still separate the Cossack from the Sepoy are of the greatest
importance in that they secure us from surprise,
and, by keeping Russian agents at a distance, prevent them from disturbing the peace of Inclia by
their secret intrigues. But, above all, it must be remembered that SO long as we prevent the Russians
from perinaneritly establishing themselves in Herat
or any other portion of Afghanistan, our India11
troops will, in the event of war, possess the inestimable advantage of being able to oppose, in selected
positions, an army which has had to undergo long
and toilsome marches, exposed throughout to the
harassing attacks of local tribesmen.
If we, however, permit Russia to absorb the
northern and western provinces of Afghanistan,
these aclvantages will disappear, and any short
respite we might gain by such fatuous policy would
be completely neutralised by the new dangers and
dificulties we should have to face. Whctl~erwe
then rlloved forward into Eastern Afghanistan or
remained behind our present frontiers, the result
would be clisastrous. Our Indian arllly mvould have
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to be greatly increased, large sums would liave to
be spent on new~fortificatiol~s
nncl other defensive
measures, and to meet this additional expenditure
on warlike prepaations, fresh burdens would have
to be inlposed on tlie people. And to what purpose ? We slioulcl be discredited in the eyes of
the Afghan nation ; the people of India would
begin to doubt our power ; and Russia would be in
a more favourable position, either to invade India,
01- to shake our power by means of intrigue. She
mould construct railwaj~sto the extreme limits of
her possessions; lmge garrisons would be established at strategical points close to her frontiers ;
2nd then, ~vllenit suitecl her to make a fresh move,
our soldiers, insteacl of encoulltering an exhausted
army, would find themselves confronted by troops
who hacl been exposed to 110 greater l~ardshipsthan
they had tl~emselvesexperienced.
There is one important factor in the case which
has not yet been considered, viz. : the attitude of
the Afghan people ; and it may be asked whether
it would still be our best policy to oppose a
Muscovite occupation of Northern and Western
Afghanistan even i f the Afghans were on Russia's
side, or if it would not be wiser to wait until we
could make sure of their co-operation or neutrality.
Now, we may be perfectly certain of one thing, and
that is that the Afghans will never be able to
maintain an attitude of neutrality in the event of a
conflict between England and Xussia in Central
Asia. They will have to choose between the contencli~lgparties, ancl will either fight on our side
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in defence of their kingdom, or join with Russia in
tlie hope of obtaining some share in tlie plunder of
India. If we then fail to observe our engagements
towards them, and if we shrink from supporting
ever likely to forget our desertion and range themselves on our side? And if they were to turn
against us when we offer to preserve their country
from foreign invasion, could we possibly rely on
their assistance after they had been exposed to
Russian propagandisln and after they had become
accustomed to Russian rule? We think not. Our
besl; chance of gaining the assistance of the Afghan
people is by displaying coiliidence in our own
strength, and in steadfastly resolviiig to preserve
their kingdom fro111 Russian occupation. If they,
prove unwilling to assist us in repelling such an
invasion of their country, they will never help us
in the defence of India, but under Russian
influence will rather prove to be an additional
danger, and it would therefore be madness for us
to allow Russia to take up a position on our
frontiers merely because the Afghans might prove
to be lzostile, and in the vain hope of obtaining
their aid at some later period.
any further approximation of the Russian and
Indian frontiers ; and such are the difficulties we
should have to face if we were to permit Russia
to violate the Amir's dominions. For the reasons
we have given above, we believe it to be England's
true policy to make any Russian invasion of
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1 Afghanistan a
d; her

casus Belli, and, in the event of
crossing the frontiers of that state, to wage

( war against her in all parts of the world until she

1 is forced to abandon her aggressive purpose.

Such
$ a war woulcl indeed be a deplorable catastrophe,
which can only be contemplated with a repugnance
al;lmost amounting to horror ; but however dreadful
and far-reaching the consequences of sucll struggle
might be, they could be no worse than those which
would be attendant on tlie similar straggle wliicll
must inevitably be forced oil us at a later period
, 1 ion we
if we abandon all the advantages of pos't'
now possess. The conflict would tlieil be far more
bitter, of longer duration, and inorc far-reaching,
for, as our dangers and dificulties increased, we
should be compelled to put forces into motion
which we might otherwise shrililr from ~ztilising.
If Russia violates Afghan territory and attempts
to establish herself in Nortliern or Western
Afghanistan, she will only do so for one of two
reasons. She will do so either for Ihc purpose of
directly contesting our supremacy ill Iridi:~,or in
order that she might obtain a more favouraljle
position for attaclring us at some later pc!riocl. If
she wishes for peace, if she lioricstly clcsires to
introduce order, civilisation, and coi~l~nercial
1)rosperity into Central Asia, she has su0ic:icnt sc:opc?
and ample opportunities in her wiclo empiro f,)r so
doing witlzout going farther alic!IcZ, anil wit lloul,
making aggressive movements ~vlii(:lican ollly pro..
voke war, and must inevitably procluco a contiition
of the wildest anarchy throughont nll tho coull-
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tries in the Heart of Asia. If she abstains from
interference in Afghan affairs we are not likely to
meddle with the tribes and people within her
sphere of action, but will rather welcome the increased prosperity and good order which are to be
expected from the introduction into Central Asia
of Western ideas and a more stable form of government ; but if she is not content with her position,
and if she steps beyond the limit which she herself
has agreed to respect, then we must be careful to
preserve our great Eaatern dependency from her
disturbing influence, and for this purpose it will
be necessary to strike her in her most vulnerable
points, and shake her power while her Asiatic
armies are marching across the space which still
intervenes between her frontiers and the positions
we intend to defend.
I t is not the intention here to say where those
positions should be, and it would be useless to
attempt to lay down any hard and fast rule as to
where our Indian armies should make their first
stand against the invaders, for the nature and
extent of our offensive and defensive measures
must necessarily be dependent on numerous and
complicated circumstances. But whether we meet
them beyond the Passes, or strike them as they
struggle through the difficult defiles on our frontiers, the defence of India will be greatly simplified if the people of England will be true to themselves, and resolutely make up their minds to
actively oppose any further Russian advance towards our great Eastern Empire.
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APPENDIX I

The Will of Pete~the Great, as given in ' Des P ~ o g ~ ddes In
Puissance Iiusso ' by bl. Lesu~;publisl~ed in Punis in
1812.

I. NEGLECTnothing which can introdl~ceEuropean
manners and customs into Rnssia, and with this object gain
the co-operation of the various Courts, and especially the
learned men of Europe, by means of interesting speculations, by philantl~ropicand philosophical principles, or by
any other suitable means.
11. Maintain the State in a condition of peiyetual war
in order that the troops may be inured to warfare and so
that the whole nation may always be kept in training and
ready to march at the first signal.
111. Extend our dominions (by every possible means
towards the north along the Baltic, as well as towards tlie
south along the shores of the Black Sea; and for this
purpose :IV. Excite the jealousy of England, Denmark and
Brandenburg against the Swedes, by means of which those
powers will disregaid any encroachments whicli we may
then make on that State, and which we will end by subjugating.
V. Interest the TIouse of Austria in the expulgion of
tlie Tnrks from Europe, and undor this pretext maintain
n perinunellt ariny and establid L ~ O C ~ C ~ on
~ L the
~ L ~shorefl
S

-

-

-

of the Black Sea, and thus by ever moving forwards we
will eventually reach Constantinople.
TI.ICeep up a state of anarchy in Poland ; influence
its national assemblies, and above all regulate the elections
of its kings; split it up on every occasion that presents
itself ; and finally sul~jugateit.
VII. Enter into a close alliance with England, and
maintain direct relations wit11 her by means of a good
commercial t,reaty ; allow her even to exercise a certain
monopoly in the inte~iorof the Sbate, so that EL good unilerstanding may by degrees be established between the
English merchants ancl sailors and ours, who on their part
are in favour of everything which tends to perfect and
increase the Russian Navy, by aid of which it is necessary
to a t once stiive for mastery over the Baltic and in the
Black Sea-the keystone on which the speedy success ol
the scheme depends.
VIII. Bear in mind that tho commerce of India is the
commerce of the World, and that 11e who can exclusively
control it is the dictator of Europe; no occasion should
therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its
decay, to advance to the Persian Gulf, and then to endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant
through Syria.
IX. Always interfere, either by force of arms or by
intrigue, i n the quarrels of the European I'owers, and
especially in those of Germany ; and with this object :X. Seek after and constnntly maintain an alliance with
Austria; encourage her in her favourite idea of national
predominance; profit by tlio slightest ascende~icygained
over her to entangle her in disastrous wars, so that she
may gradually bo wealroned; oven help ller somotimos;
but incessantly stir up agr~inst;her Ghe enmity of tho whole
of Europe and pnrticularly that, of Germany, by rousing
the jealousy and mistrust of the German princes.
XI. Always seloot wives for Russian pi~inces from
among the German Princesses ; RO that by thus rnultiply-
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ing alliances based on close relationship and mutual
interest we will increase onr influence over that Empire.
XI. Make use of the power of the Church over the
disunited and schismatical Greeks who are scattered over
Hungary, Turkey, and the southern parts of Poland ; gain
them over by every possible means; pose as their protectors ; and establish a claim to religious supremacy over
them. Under this pretext, and with their help, Turkey
will be conquered, and Poland, being unable any longer
to stand alone, either by its own strength or by means of
its political connections, will voluntarily place itself in
subjection to us.
XIII. From that time every moment will be precious.
All our batteries must be secretly prepared to strike the
great blow, and so that they can act with such order, precision, and rapidity, as to give Europe no time for preparation. The first step will be to propose very secretly,
separately, and with the greatest circumspection, first to the
Court of Vessailles and then to that of Vienna, to divide
with one of them the Empire of the World; and by mentioning that Russia is virtually ruler of the Eastern World
and has nothing to gain but the title, this proposal will
probably not rouse their suspicion. I t is undoubted that
this project cannot fail to please them ; and a war to the
knife will be kindled between them which will soon become
general, both on account of the connections and widespread
relationships between these two rival Courts and natural
enemies, and because of the interests which will compel the
other powers of Europe to take part in the struggle.
XIV. I n the midst of this general discord, Russia will
be asked for help, first by one and then by anobher of the
belligerent powers ; and after having hesitated long enough
to give them time to exhaust themselves and to enable her
to assemble her own armies, she will at last appear to
decide in favour of the Etouse of Austria, and while she
pushes her regulnr troops forward to the Rhine, she will
at once follow them up mitli the hordes of Asia ; and as
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they advance into Germany, two largo fleets filled with
a portion of these same hordes must set sail, one from the
Sea of Azoff and the other from the port of Archangel,
under convoy of war vessels from the Black Sea and
Baltic; they will suddenly appear in the Mediterranean
and Northern Ocean and iilundate Italy, Spain, and France,
with these fierce and rapacious nomads, who will plunder a
portion of the inhabitants, carry off others into slavery to
re-people the deserts of Siberia, and render the remainder
incapable of escaping from our yoke. A11 these distractions will afford such great opportunities to the regular
troops that they will be able to act with a degree of energy
and precision which will ensure the subjugation of the rest
of Europe.

APPENDIX I1

Circzilar Desyatch addressed by Prince Gortc7~a7coffto Russian,
Rejwesen,tativss abroad : dated 21st of Novernbw, 18G44.
St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1864.

The Russian newspapers have given a n account of the
last military operations execnted by a detachment of our
troops in the regions of Central Asia with remarkable success and important results. It was to be foreseen that
,these events would the more attract the attention of the
foreign public that their scene was laid in scarcely known
countries.
Our august Master has commanded m e to state to you
briefly, but with clearness and precision, the position ill
which we find ourselves in Central Asia, the interests
which inspire us in those countries, arid the end which we
have in view.
The position of Russia i n Central Asia is that of all
civilised States which ai'e brought into contact with
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half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social
organisation.
I n such cases it always happens that the more civilised
State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier
and its coinmercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendency over those whom their turbulent and unsettled
character make most undesirable neighbours.
First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put
down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier
have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to
more peaceful habits, but are in thoir turn exposed to the
attacks of the more distant tribes.
The State is bound to defend them against these
depredations, and to punish thoso who commit them.
Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically
recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social
organisation makes it impossible to seize. If, the robbers
once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is
soon forgotten ; its withdrawal is put down to weakness.
I t is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible
and palpable force ; the morn1 force of reason and of the
interests of civilisation has as yet no hold upon them.
The work has then always to be clone over again from the
beginning.
I n order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these
hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon
them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or
less forced submission. But soon beyond this second line
other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten
the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of
repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose
one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless
labour and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance,
rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilisation an
impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and
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--deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties aild
expenses increase with every fitep in advance.
Such has been the fate of every country which has
found itself i n a similar position. The 'United States in
America, France i n Algeria, Bolland i n her Colonies,
England in India-a11 have been irresistibly forced, less
by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this onward
march, where the greatest dificulty is to know when to

on one side on the Syr-Darin, on the other on tlie Lalce
Issilr-Kul, and to strengthen these two Iines by advanced
foi,ts, which, little by little, have crept on into the heart
of those distant regions, without however succeeding in
estnblishing on the other ~ i d of
e our frontiers that tranquillity which is indispensable for their security.
The explanation of tliis unsettled state of things is to
be found, first, in the fact that, betmeen tbe extreme
points of this double line, there is an immense unoccupied
space, where all attempts a t colonisation or caravan trade
are paraIysed by the inroads of the robber tribes ; and, in
the second place, in the perpetnnl fluctuations of tho
political conditioli of tliou~countries, where Turlce~tnnal~d
Rhokand, sometin~esunited, sometimes at variance, always
at war, either with one a~iotlleror rnithBolrliart~,presented
no chance of settledrelations or of any regular trrmsactiona
whatever.
'.l1he Imlsorinl Goverr~rne~it
tlms found itself, ill spitn of
all its afforLs, in the dilommn wo llavo r~bovct;nllutlrd to,
t'ht~tis to say, cornpolled c!it;hr?r to parrnit; tl~e:continuunco
of n, utntc: nf permanent disorilar, ~ r ~ r n l y s i ntog id1 ~c:?cu~ii;y
and progrew, or t o corldotr~r~
itsolf to costly nnil rlififnnt
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subjugation by armed force, one after another, of the small
independent states whose habits of pillage and turbulence
aild whose perpetnal revolts leave their neighboum neither
peace nor repose.
Neither of these alternative courses was in accordance
with the object of our august Master's policy, which consists, not in extending beyoiid all reasonable bounds the
regious nncler his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to
liis rule, in guaranteeing their secnrit,y, ancl in developing
their social organisation, their commerce, their well-being,
ancl their civilisation.
Our task was, therefore, to discover a system adaptecl
to the attainlnent of this threefold object.
The foilowing principles have, in consequence, been
laid down :1. It has been judged to be indispensable that our
two fortified frontier lines-one extending from China to
the lake Issik-Knl, the other from the Sea of Aral aloilg
the Syr-Daria, should be united by fortified points,
so that all our posts shonld be in a position of rnulual
support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes
might make with impunity tlieir inroads and deprcdations.
2. It was essential that the line of oar advanced forts
thus completed shonld be sitnatecl in a conntry fertile
enough, not only to insure their supplies, but also to
facilitate the regular colonisation, which alone can prepare
a future of stability and prosperity for tho occupied
country, Isy gaining over the neighbouring populations to
civilizcil life.
3, and lastly. It was urgent to lay down this line
definitely, so as to escape the danger of being carried
away, as is almost inevitalsle, by a series of repressive
measures ancl reprisals, into an uillimited extension of
territory.
To attain this end a system had to be established which
shonld depend not only on reason, wliich may be elasiic,
VOJ,, 11.

X

~

--

b l ~ ton geographical and political conclitions, which are
fixed and permanent.
This system was suggested to us by n very simplo fact,
tlie result of long experience, namely, that t h e nomad
tribes, which tau neither be mized nor puliished, nor efyectually kept in order, are our most inconvenient; neigl~bonrs;
while, on the other hand, ngricultural aud commorcinl
populations attached to the soil, alld possessing a lnoro
advanced social organisation, offer us every chance of
gaining neigl~bourswit11 wliom there is a possibility of
entering into re1at'ions.
Consequent;ly, our frontier line ought to s~vdlowup
tho former, and stop short a t tho limit of the latter.
T h e ~ ~three
e
principles supp1.y a cloar, iintnml, nnil
logical explanation of our last militlnry operntions in Central
Asia. I11fact, our original ft.oi~tiorline, estsncl ing along
t h e Syr-Dnrio to Fort I.'erovslii oil onc side, mid on tllo othel,
to tlie Lake Issilr-Kul, bncl tlio cll.~wb:~cliof bnir~gnllno.ut
on the verge of the desert. I t was I~wlionby n, wiile gal,
Letjweeli tlie two extrernc? poinCs ; it did not olli.;~-sufliciellt,
revonrces to our troops, and left n11sett;leil tril~csover tho
bordor with wliich any settlocl ni~ai-lgegomcnt bccn111o
itnpossible.
I n spite of our ~~nwillingness
to oxtend 0111.fro~~t;iclr,
those mot;ives h:~d beon ~ o ~ v e ~ ' fcll~~ioligli
ilI
t o it~ll~lc(!
I;~IC)
Imperial Govenl~nenl;f:o estnl~lishthis lillr) 1~i:trvc?r~11
'1',:$(!
I,suil;-Ral and the Rys-T')arin l ~ yfrrtifyii~g t11c~t;o\~.nof
Chiml:ontJ, l:~t;c!ly occnl)ir?dl)y ns. Iiy Llic! :dopt4ionol' t;his
litlo wo obtnhl n ilo-ulllo ~usulti. 'In t l ~ lirst
!
pl:~ct+,tho
count~~y
i t h l l i ~it1~i~ .fc;rI;ilo,wall ~v0011(~il,
:~lld~11t;ertvI
I)y
n i i ~ ~ ~ e ~ om:~t;c:r-coi~rfic!~
iisr
; ili is 11artly i~lll:d~il;clil
I J v:~rirl~~s
~
I<irgl~i.wtril~cs,wl~ic.:hIlavo :~lrc:~hy
:~c:copi;~lil'our
1-ult:; i(;
(:oilscquonl~dyolE:l% fi~vonr:d,lc!cosiili.tions fi,i*colo~lia:b(;iol~
and tlie s u ~ ~ p of
l yprovisions Lo our g i ~ r r i s o l ~ III
~ . t110 H L ~ C O ~ I ~ ~
pl:hce, it p ~ i 1t18~ ill
~ Iii1(9 itr~~ri(!(li:~i;(!
r ~ ~ ! i ~ l ~ l ~of'
o ~t,Il,j
~t~l~(,~o~~
r.~gricultiil*d
and r:omrr~r!rc:ialpo11111:d;io1l,li l i l o l . Nr(+
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ullsettled, and better organised social state ; fixing for us
with geogra~hicalprecision tho limit up to which me are
bound t o advance, alld at which we must h d t ; because,
while, on the one hand, any further extension of our rule,
meeting, as it wonld, no longer with nilstable comm~ulities,
such as the nomad tribes, but with more regularly coustit u t e d States, wonld entail considerable exertions, anti would
draw u s on from annexatioil to annexatiou with unfsreseen
colaplications. On the other, with such States for our
future neighbours, their backward civilisation and the
instability of their political condition do not shut us out
f140rn t h e hope &at the day lnny come when regular rolntions
may, to t h e advantago of both parties, take the place of tllo
permanent troubles whiol~have up to the present rnoineut
~ a r a l y s e dall progress in those countries.
Such, Sir, are the intereats which inspire the policy of
our august master i n Central Asia ; such is the object, by
E i s I ~ n p e r i a Mqjesty's
l
orders, of thc action of his Cabinet.
You are requesied to tako these argnments as your
guido in any explanations you may give to the Goveriiinent
t o which yon are accredited, in case questioils aye asked or
yon may see credence give11 to erroneons ideas as to our
action in these distant parts.
It, is ileedless for me to lay stress upon tlie interest,
which Russia evidently has not to increase her terl-itory,
and, above all, to avoid raising complications on her frontiers
which can but delay and pamlyse her domestic developmeni;.
The programme which I have just traced is in accordailce
w i t h theso views.
Very frecluenlly of late yen1.s the civilisation of these
countries, which are her neighbours on tlie continent of
Asia, has been assigned to Russia as her special ~nission.
N o agent has been t'ound more apt for the propess of
c i v i l i s a t i ~ lthan
~ commercial relations. Their developmcllt
everywhere o r d ~ rand stability ; but ill Asia it
iJcmancls a comy~lctetmnsforn~tttionof the habits nf t1he
x2

t
to be tauglit t o tho populnlions of
people. Tlle G r ~ thing
Asia i s that they will gain more in fjvouring nncl prot(>ctiiig
t,he caravan trade than in robbing it. These e1emcnt:~~y
idces can oidy be accepted by tlio ~mblicwhore one existh ;
that is t o say, where tl~ereis Bolnc, orgfinisocl. fbrrn of sociely
and a Governmel~tto direct and rapresent it.
W e are accomplivl~ingthe first pnrl of our tndi in
c ~ r ~ y i nour
g frontier to tho limit wllore the iudixpensi~blo
conditions we to bo founcl.
Tlle second we shall nccoinplisli in making ovory offo~bt;
henceforward t o prove t o our 11eighl)onring Htntus, by rL
system of Grmllesa in the reprousion of their rnis~lei.tlx,
co~nbineclwith mocleration mil just,ico in tlie usu of our
sbrangth, ancl respect for tlleir i~~depcncloncr,
that llussia
i a not their onotny, tllnt s l i ~orlt(*rt:~iilstowaril~them no
idens of conquast, and that pe:~ceful and cominel~ci:~lrclatious with Iler are rno1.e l~rolital~lu
t11:rn clit3or~lar,pill~~ge,
re~risals,allcl a l~orrnnnont~ t t ~ of
t oW:W.
'I'lie Imperitd Cnbilict, in nssllllliug this tnsl;, talre,s :IS
its guiclo t h e into rest,^ of Itussin. I 3 u t it holiaves t,h;~f;,: ~ t
tlie flame timo, it is promoting tlie interests of hu~n:mit,y
and civilisation. It lins a right to aspect, t l ~ r tllu
~ t line c ~ f
conduct it pursues anil l.lle principles ~vldcllgnidu it will
meut with cl just and ~unclidnppreciution.
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1)rcssed on the boundnry questio~l
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rcspcting Rllssinll concluests in
ARUL
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stand agxiufit Russia by, 290, 287
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France, her projected illvasion of
India in collcorl with Russia, i.
51-58; declnres war against
Russia (1812), 74, 75
GANDAMAI~,
Treaty of, ii. 107
Georgia, i. 44 ; alliance with Russia
(1783) of, 45 ; Persian campaign
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to, 49 ; s~wrenderod to Eussin,
52 ; Russian officer assassinated
bg the Queen of, 59; proolamation of Alexander I. to, 59
Giers, M., i.208, 210; his assnr.
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a mission to ICabd, ii. 108, 109,
165 ; 011 the Afghm bonntlnry,
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011 Afghan affairs, 227
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Julolr, Fort, capture of, i. 185
JASSY,

193, 194
I-Ierat, Persian advance on, i. 9.2,
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termination, ii. 1-18 ; his ncgotiations wit11 Ilholmm~d,27 ; his
proclametion in, 39 ; yepares for
the invasion of India, 18
Ra~llbara,Baron, i. 255, 269, 261,
262
' Iiey snd gate,' the, i. 36, ii. 238
Kl~anikoff, Nicholas, mission to
Iihorassan of, i. 181
Khiva, first mission to Ruseiafrom,
i. 10 ; Cossack invasions of, 18 ;
first diplo~naticrelations between
Rnssia and, 21 ; submission to
Russia of the Kllan of, 28 ; Petel.
the Great's expedition to, 29, 30 ;
Persian advance on, 88; envoy
sent to Russia from (1760), 40 ;
Mouraviehs iniasion to, 80 ;
despatch of Russian army for the
conquest of IIhiva, 112 ; failure
of Russian expeditioil (1839) to,
122, 123 ; liberation of Russian
captives from, 124, 126 ; Russian
lnissio~l(1841)to, 137 ; Ipktieff s
mission to, 178, 179 ; Russia's
projected attack on, 281 ; defence
works colnmenced at, 292, 293;
fiends embassies to Russia, 294 ;
march of Russian army to, 303321 ; attaclr on, 323 ; capitulation
of, 330, 331 ; treaty between
R u s ~ i aand, 332-334
lchoja Sale, ii. 192-195, 242 e t sep.
R1.lojoiit, i. 203 ; ii. 26, 40
Ill~oltand,civil war in, i. 183, 184 ;
Russia11 formnyd movemont in,
185-199 ; insurrection in, ii. 2634; Russian invasion of, 35-56;
annexation to Russia of, 55
Kholtandisn~c, the, i. 150 ; their
attacks on the Russians, 153 ;
lose Mi-Mechet, 159, 160 ; their
attempts to retake Alr-bIechet,
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to, 181
Druleff, General, his scheme for
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Kizil TepQ,ii. 226, 228
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IC0lpalt0ffs11&y, Licut.-Colonel, i. 186,
187, 255, ii. 55, 74
Komaroff, Major-General, i. 290,
ii. 184, 200; at Kizil TepB, 228
Kopill, foundiug of, i. 149 ; 161
ICrasnovodalc, i. 238, 273, 274, 277,
278, 279, 286 ; headquarters of
the new Trans-Caspian district,
ii. 21 ; Tudioman blockade of,
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Jizalch, i. 207 ; and the Steppe
Commission, 209, 299 ; march of
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attack on the Turko.
man^, ii. 20
Kulllberg, Colonel, ii. 239
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i. 237,254, 256 ; em.1y liistory of,
242-249 ; Russian evacuation
of, 272
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Dengl~ilTop&,ii. 159-161
Kushlr, River, ii. 230
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Lord, i. 191, 222
Lazarcff, Lient.-General, ii. 70; his
experlitionngninsttheTurliomans,
and death, 126-130
Leontscheff, Colonol, i. 319, 330,
321
Lessar, M., ii. 175; exploring expeditions of, 176-182, 220, 239
Livsdia, meeting nt, ii. 63
Loftus, Lord Augustus, i. 226; ii,
63, 108
Lomakin, Colonel, i. 290, 295, 311 ;
lnarch of his army to Kl~iva,313317 ; first governor of tlie new
Trans-Caspian district, ii. 21 ; his
exploring expeditions, 23-25 ; his
disastrous expedition ngnillst the
TelrlrBe, 116-126 ;tnkes command
ageinst the
of second expeditio~~
Teklrds and is defeated, 190-140
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to Persia, 69, 70, 73
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i. 92, 9G, 97, 103, 105,
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Maonaghten, Sir W., mission to
C01u.t of Lahore of, i. 109, 127 ;
nlnrclei*of, 130
PIalchram, battle of, ii. 37, 38
IJInrgslnn, occupation of, ii. 43
Marlroeoff, Colonel, al~poiuted to
the chief commanci a t Krasnovodslc, i. 286 ; his oxpodition
to the OX~IS,
237, 286 ; espedition
to t h e Atrelr ltiver, 289, 290 ;
attacks the TelilcCs, 29G ; iinporlance of his operrrtions, 297,
298 ; clisnsters and retreat of his
nruiv on the march to Khivn.
310,"311
' AInuterly inactivity,' policy of, i.
191. 222 : ii. 275
nlnnde, J&jor-~enern,l,ii. 102
Mnyo, Lord, i. 224
hfelilcoiY, Gonoral Loris, ii. 69
iIIenchiltoff, Prince, i. 8 3
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y , ; l%nssianilltrigno in,
171; annexed by Russia, 187 ;
benefits to Rnssin &om the annexation of, 190, 191
hIicllnel Peodoroviteh, proclaimed
Cenr, i. 15 ; appenls to Englnncl
for help, 19 ; attempts to trade
with Central Asia, 20
Michael, Grai~ciD ~ ~ l ri.e ,299, ii. 21
Mirsky, Prince, i. 285
Mongols, their early devasti~tious
i n Asia and Europe, i. 1-4 ; do.
cliilo of their power in Europe,
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bIoscow, gradual rise of, i. 5

Monravieff's luission to Iihive, i.
8 0 ; account of hi8 j o ~ r ~ n e 117
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Murcrllab. River, ii. 206. 226, 228.

NAMANGAN,
ii. 50, 5 1
Nepoleon, joins lZnssia i n a projected invasion of India, 51 ; his
prep;lrations for tlle invasion of
England, 63 ; his liroposnls to
Persia. 63.. 64 .: mc7 the Treatv of
Tilsit, '68
Nau. i. 203. 207
Nnvnrino, i. 90
Nezhoff, ii. 175 ; exploring expedition of, 162
Neutml zoue, proposed, i. 223, 251)
' Nem Siberian Line,' i. 29
Nicholas, Emperor, i. 83 ; his letlcr
to the Ainir of Afghanistan, 99
Nipclm, Trebty of, i. 22
Novu Alesandrovsk, fort of, i. 116
ORISIC,i. 28, 117
O r c n b ~ ~ r gb~lildillg.
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of, i. 38, 112 ;
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Orloff-Denisoff, i. G O , 57
Ouseley, Sir Goro, i. 75, 76, 77
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PAL>IER,
Colonel, i. 133
Pdmerston, Lortl, i. 159
l'ninir region, divisions of, i. 232 ;
Rusfiian eqeclitioii illto, ii. 58 60 ;
Blitiali csplor,ztion i n the, 269,
260 ; Xussinn activity i n the, 263269
Panjdeh, ii. 207, 209, 213 ; hcld by
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before, 338, 231, 286, 237
Paul, Eiliperor, his nlpl~u'e wit11
England (1799), i. 50,51; concorts
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Peysia, Potcr the GreaL's comiill~niAfgl~nilBoundnry question, i. 231,
cations with, i. 31 ; regains her
279, 302 ; on tho ~ n o v e ~ ~ l o of
nts
lost provinces, 86 ; Gritis11 trade
Russin to~vnrdsIndia, ii. 292
w i t l ~ ,39 ; ltussian dcscent (1781) Rointhnl, Coloucl, i. 265
on, 46 ; calnpnign in Georgia, of, Resht, Trcnty of, i. 3G
47 ; occnpios Erivan, 60 ; Lord Ridgewny, Colonel, ii. 230,240,
lveUesley's mission to, 64, 65 ;
24G, 247 ; 011 thc ros~iltof tho
negotintcs wit11 Prance for prosettleinent of tlio Uoulidary qucstcction against Russia, G7, 68 ;
tion, 248, 249
missions Goin England and India Roberts, Lord, ii. 102, 1 4 ; hi8
to, 69-13 ;acccpts Russinn condiiunrch to IC~II(~RI~:LP,
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